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The expression Unfair Trade Practice incorporated in the 
MRTP Act, 1969 and Consumer Protection Act, 1986, circumscribes 
many facets of commercial advertising. This advertising has come 
to be recognised as the most effective tool of modern marketing 
and essential for the sales promotion. It can convert consumer's 
"Wish" to purchase, into "Will" to purchase. So long as the 
trader fairly projects the qualities and other attributes of his 
wares, he is safe. His campaign can be proscribed only when he 
makes false or misleading claims. When an advertisement is false 
or misleading, it is declared as unfair trade practice. The 
definition of unfair trade practice provided under the two Acts 
applies to goods and services. However, it is not clear as to 
whether it applies to goods already in existence or to future 
goods also. The application of. the definition to shares and 
debentures has not yet come out of the judicial controversy. The 
scope of the expressions, unfair method, unfair or deceptive 
acts, has not been delineated. 
The varieties of commercial advertising are diverse as is 
human ingenuity. These advertisements have raised many questions 
for researchers to ponder. Should commercial advertisement be 
accorded constitutional protection? Since advertisements are 
addressed to general public which include; persons of reasonable 
intelligence, average intelligence and credulous and gullible, 
the question arises as to whose intelligence should courts con-
sider as a standard to determine whether an advertisement is 
false, misleading or not? Can advertiser plead defence of mens 
rea? Traditionally courts have been lenient to advertiser where 
his advertisement is found mere puff, for the reason a reasonable 
person will not take such claim seriously. If consumer will not 
be allured by such advertisement, then it is difficult to under-
stand why such advertisement is made? Television advertisements 
have posed new problems for researchers to answer. Sometimes it 
is not possible to demonstrate the product with its natural 
colour as it is lost in the television lights. So in order to 
show the viewers the qualities of the product, it becomes neces-
sary to use artificial product instead of real one. Then the 
question arises; should demonstration be in comport with the 
express claim made in the advertisement, or demonstration be 
treated simply as a warranty and it is only express claim which 
should be true or both, express claim and demonstration should be 
true. The line between permissible and non-permissible compara-
tive advertising is not clear. The issues attendant to the com-
parative advertising are yet to be judicially addressed. There 
are no rules framed or judicially evolved for the interpretation 
of the commercial advertisements. 
The status of the specific categories of unfair trade prac-
tice mentioned in the two Acts, is not clear. Are they unfair per 
se or rule of reason has to be applied. The scope of these unfair 
trade practices has not been outlined. The evaluation of the 
powers of the MRTP and CP Acts dealing with the unfair trade 
practice, has not been made. 
Objectives Of The Study 
The main objectives of the study are: 
1. A systematic study and evaluation of the conceptual 
development of the principles relating to unfair 
trade practices. 
2. To examine the specific legal provisions in the 
MRTP and CP Acts, aiming to curb unfair trade 
practices and to point out their jurisprudential 
justiciability to achieve the desired result. 
3. To make a comparative analysis (wherever possible) 
of our lav, with the transboder legislations on the 
subject so as to come out with the suggestions in 
order to strengthen the existing law. 
k. To evaluate the approach adopted by the quasi judi-
cial and judicial authorities to eliminate unfair 
business practices. 
5. To present a comparative account (wherever possi-
ble) of the approach of the transnational courts on 
the subject in order to provide the solution to the 
issues which have hither to remained unaddressed. 
6. To analyse the powers of the **RTP commission and 
Redressal agencies and their suitability to curb 
the menace of unfair trade practices. 
Research Methodology 
The Study relating to the legal control of unfair trade 
practice with reference to the MRTP and CP Acts, is a doctrinal 
research. The statutory material of India, America, Australia, 
Canada and England relevant to study has been analysed. The case 
law laid down by the courts and quasi judicial bodies in India 
and transboder countries on the subject has been examined. The 
Reports, Journals and Surveys both Indian and foreign have been 
consulted. The proceedings of the Seminars, Conferences and 
Symposia have been utilized. The Reports submitted by the various 
coirani ssions/commi ttees relevant to the thesis have been studied 
and referred wherever necessary. 
Design of Study 
For the culmination of the objectives set to be achieved, 
the present study has been divided in to the following chapters. 
Chapter I gives a sketch of research problem, objectives of the 
study, research Methodology and design of study. 
Chapter II details the historical development of the law 
relating to unfair trade practices and drives home the point that 
the catch words of the past, i.e. Caveat Emptor, freedom and 
sanctity of contract and privity of contract, have out lived 
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their utility due to change in market structure.That there is 
an urgent need to provide legal mechanism free from these doc-
trines as is also evinced from the developments which have taken 
place in the transnational countries. 
Chapter III covers the first part of the definition of unfair 
trade practice. The unfair trade practice may be adopted in 
respect of goods and services. However, it is not made clear as 
to whether goods involve only existing goods or also future 
goods. It has been suggested that the future goods should also be 
brought within the confines of the definition. Otherwise, there 
will be two possible difficulties. (1) where for example a compa-
ny falsely advertises that his goods are of particular quality 
and discontinues the advertisement when goods are actually thrown 
open in the market, then a consumer who purchases goods in pur 
suance of the advertisement will get no compensation for any loss 
or injury as the goods were not in existence at the time when 
advertisement was made. (2) if the view that the goods must be in 
existence at the time when representation was made Is upheld, 
then the same test should be applied to services also. Since 
service unlike goods have no permanent existence and may be 
regarded as being inchoate until they are actually supplied. 
The application of the MRTP and CP Acts to shares and deben-
tures is still unresolved. The present interpretation leaves the 
purchaser of shares and debentures out side the protection of the 
A«RTP and CP Acts. It has been therefore suggested that the inves-
tor of money for the purchase of shares and debentures be treated 
as hirer of service. Since the word "finance" is expressly men-
tioned in the definition of service, so any false or misleading 
claim made in respect of shares or debentures be treated as 
unfair trade practice relating to service. 
The term "unfair act" used in the definition has not been 
defined. The following definition has been suggested. 
An unfair act in relation to a trade practice is one 
which causes substantial injury to consumers which is 
not out weighed by an off setting consumer or competi-
tive benefits that the practice produces. 
Explanation: while determining as to whether the injury 
to the consumer is substantial, regard shall be had to 
the value of the goods or services in question . 
Similarly the word deceptive act has not been explained. 
The following definition has been suggested. 
A deceptive act in relation to a trade practice is one 
which has a potential to mislead consumers of ordinary 
intelligence with regard to material facts. 
Chapter IV titled Commercial Advertising-1egal Perspectives 
covers the issues like, constitutional protection, application of 
mens rea, standard of protection, defence of puffing, television 
commercials, comparative advertising and interpretation of adver-
t i sements. 
The judicial recognition of the fact that the commercial 
advertising enjoy constitutional freedom is considered by the re-
researcher a positive step as the profit motive alone should not 
be the determining factor for an advertisement to fall outside 
the freedom of speech. However, this doesn't mean that the adver-
tiser has a right to be wrong but there should be no censure on 
the dissemination of truthful information needed by the large 
section of the society designated as consumers merely on the 
ground that the information has commercial motives. This will 
naturally need the gleaning of information necessary for subserv-
ing public good from that which is false or deceptive. 
Although the words like falsely, knowingly, intentionally 
have been used in the definition of unfair trade practice which 
denote mens rea, it has been suggested that the compensation for 
loss caused due to false or misleading advertisement should not 
be made dependent upon the presence of mens rea on the part of 
advertiser. Since the class of practices legislated in the two 
Acts are not criminal in any real sense but are practices pro-
hibited under penalty, the efficacy of the two Acts cannot be 
attritioned by reading mens rea in the liability for compensation 
to the consumer who has suffered loss due to the false represen-
tation. The compensation Is the only tangible remedy available 
under the two Acts to deter the unscrupulous trader. 
Keeping in view the awareness level of consumer rights in 
India, it has been suggested that the quasi judicial and judicial 
bodies should take into account the intelligence of an average 
person while interpreting an advertisement. In other worlds, the 
test should be as to what would be the impression of a person 
with an average intelligence after listening or reading an adver-
tisement. However, it should not be treated as a general stan-
dard. The context in which an advertisement is addressed should 
also be taken into account. For example, where an advertisement 
for a specialised equipment is directed at an expert group, such 
as engineers, the standard will be different as against the 
advertisement addressed to general consuming public or directed 
to children. 
A considerable latituted has been given to a trader to 
extoll the qualities of his product. The underlying argument in 
its defence is that no reasonable man will believe such adver-
tisement as true. But this defence cannot reconcile with the 
average man's intelligence test as advocated above. Furthermore, 
if consumers will not take seriously the exaggerated claims of 
the trader, then it is difficult to understand why trader is 
resorting to such puffing. Thus it is suggested that the commer-
cial puffery be made actionable. 
Sometimes it is not possible to advertise a product with 
its natural colour. So some artificial substance has to be sub-
stituted to obtain a natural look. This involves the problem of 
interpretation of television commercials. One possible interpre-
tation is to treat demonstration merely a dramatization of the 
express claims made in the advertisement. So express claim should 
be true without caring for the truthfulness of demonstration. 
Second approach is to treat television demonstration as a warran-
ty without taking into account the express claim. The third 
approach is the combination of the first two, i.e. to interpret a 
television demonstration both a warranty that the result could be 
duplicated without trickery and a proof of the express claim made 
in the advertisement. A demonstration which failed in either of 
these tests would be considered deceptive and would not be per-
mitted. It is suggested that the demonstration as well as the 
express claim made should be correct. In other words an adver-
tisement should be accurate at both ends of the television cam-
era. 
Regarding comparating advertising, it is suggested that the 
insignificant comparisons should be declared as misleading. 
Otherwise an advertiser will focus more on insignificant compari-
sons and will derive benefit out of all proportions. Following 
are the suggestions which should be incorporated for regulating 
comparative advertising. 
1. The aspects of the advertisers product which are 
being compared with the competitors product should 
be made clear. 
2. The comparisons should be factual, accurate and 
capable of substantiation. 
3. There is no likelihood of the consumer being 
misled as a result of comparison, whether about 
the product advertised or that with which it is 
compared. 
I4-. The advertisement should not unfairly denigrate, 
attack or discredit other products, advertisers or 
advertisements directly or by implications. 
5. The subject matter is not chosen in such a way as 
to confer an artificial advantage upon the adver-
tiser or so as to suggest that a better bargain is 
offered than is truely the case. 
Chapter V covers specific categories of false or misleading 
advertisements. Various sub-clauses of the definition laying down 
different forms of false or misleading representations are not 
properly worded. In order to remove ambiguity, it is suggested 
that sub-clause (1) be amended on the following lines: 
The practice of making any statement, whether orally or 
in writing or by visible representations which is false 
or misleading that .... 
The word "falsely" used in clauses (i) (ii) (iii) and the 
word "false or misleading" used in clauses (vi) (ix) (xi) should 
be dropped. 
Clause (i) says that it is the practice of making any state-
ment and the word "practice" means a series of acts. It is sug-
gested that clause (i) be read with section (v) (ii) of the MRTP 
Act so that a single or isolated act of any person in relation to 
any trade is enough to stamp any trade practice as unfair provid-
ed of course other characteristics of unfair trade practice are 
found. 
A question arises; are the labels on the goods as offers? 
There are two possible interpretations. One is not to use the 
term in technical sense and not to insist on the dichotomy of the 
offer and invitation to treat. The other interpretation is to 
give offer narrow meaning in the sense as is understood in the 
contract law. It is suggested that the former view should be 
preferred over the later as it will widened the reach of the 
provi sion. 
The question as to whether the offering of gifts, prizes or 
conducting of contests, lotteries, game of a chance or skill are 
per se unfair has been debated before the MRTP Commission and the 
controversy is still alive. In order to maintain balance between 
the legitimate interest of the traders and the consumers, it is 
suggested: 
1. Offering of gifts or prizes genuinely should not 
be prohibited; 
2. Lotteries are against public policy and therefore 
should be prohibited; 
3. Lotteries which do not directly or indirectly 
demand public subscription should be permitted; 
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^•. Lotteries which run on the finance raised by the 
public subscription and which involve skill to a 
substantial degree are not in fact lotteries but 
game of skill, so it should not be proscribed. 
The provision controlling sale or supply of goods hazardous 
to life is ambiguously worded. It does not make clear as to 
whether manufacturer or seller is responsible to consumer in case 
loss or injury is caused to the consumer. It has been suggested 
that the proper course is to see who is responsible for loss or 
who is in a position to control the danger. 
This provision makes liability dependent on the negligence. 
The liability under the law of torts is strict and transborder 
laws also provide no fault liability in such cases. It is sug-
gested that the principle of no fault liability be incorporated 
in the provision dealing with the sale or supply of hazardous 
goods. 
Chapter (V) deals with the powers of the MRTP commission vis-a-
vis unfair trade practices which include (1) Power to issue 
injunction (2) Power to grant compensation (3) Power to review 
orders {U-) Power to punish for contempt (5) Power to pass cease 
and desist order and consent order (6) Power to order corrective 
advert i sement. 
At present injunction cannot be passed against those aiding, 
abetting or conspiring the actual wrong doer. So a clause be 
attached to section 12 -A so as to encompass the above persons 
also. Whether the interim injunction order is appealable or not 
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is yet to be resolved. However, examples are in galore where the 
High Courts or the Supreme Court was called in aid to stay the 
operation of the injunction order. It is, therefore, suggested 
that the injunction order be made appealable before the Supreme 
Court with a clause stating that an injunction order passed by 
the MRTP coiranission shall not be called in question in any High 
Court. 
The provision dealing with the compensation provides that in 
case(loss or injury, compensation will be given to consumer. But 
the word consumer has not been defined in the MRTP Act. So it is 
not clear as to whether the term consumer includes user of the 
goodsywho is not the actual buyer. It is suggested that the 
definition of consumer as provided under section 2(d) of the CP 
Act be incorporated in the AARTP Act also. 
There is no guidance in the MRTP Act and the Rules and 
Regulations framed there under regarding the principle for meas-
uring damages. The MRTP Commission expressed conflicting opinions 
on this point. It is suggested that the principles of law of 
torts be applied for measuring damages. 
The MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 provides provision for class 
action suits. However, the MRTP Commission held that a voluntary 
registered consumer organisation cannot file suit in the repre-
sentative capacity as it cannot be said to have the "same inter-
est" as the class has. It is therefore suggested that an Explana-
tion be provided either in the MRTP Regulations or MRTP Act that 
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"a recognised consumer association shall be deemed to have the 
same interest as other consumers on whose behalf the consumer 
association has filed the complaint. 
The power of MRTP Commission to amend or revoke its earlier 
order raises many problems of interpretation (1) Is this power 
unlimited or, is it subject to limitations? What is the extension 
of the Commission's power? Does the expression "in the manner in 
which it was made", imply that the Commission by invoking this 
provision can order fresh hearing? It is suggested that this is a 
discretionary power but it cannot be arbi trary, vague or f<i.nciful. 
It must be guided by the relevant considerations. Although there 
are no apparent limitations on this power, it cannot be construed 
so wide as to permit rehearing on the same material. It has to be 
kept in mind that basically this is a corrective or rectificatory 
power, "so it cannot be exercised to order fresh hearing. The 
expression in the manner in which it was made" cannot be con-
strued as giving power to the correnission to make fresh order in 
the same way as previous order was made, i.e. by hearing parties 
and witnesses. But it merely indicates a procedure to be fol-
lowed by the commission in amending or revoking an order. 
Section 36-D which gives power to the MRTP Commission to 
pass cease and desist order is not in consonance with section 36-
B which gives inter alia power to the Commission to file com-
plaint suo motu either upon its own knowledge or information. 
Section 36-D provides that the "Commission may inquire into any 
unfair trade practice which may come before it for inquiry". This 
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expression does not embrass within its import the suo motu in-
quiry which the Commission is competent to institute by virtue of 
section 36-B. It is suggested that the words "come before it" 
should not be interpreted to mean that it should come before the 
Commission from other sources than its own knowledge and informa-
tion. However, in order to avoid any possible controversy, it is 
suggested that the words "which may come before it for inquiry" 
be omitted from section 36-D. 
A single trader or a class of traders cannot file a com-
plaint. Naturally no cease and desist order can be passed even if 
the practice is injurious to competing trader or class of trad-
ers. Since under section 12-A injunction can be granted on the 
application of a trader or class of traders and under section 12-
B compensation can be granted to a trader or class of traders, so 
there is need for harmonious construction of sections 12-A, 12-B, 
36-B and 36-D. This can be possible only by interpreting the 
words "Public interest" under section 36-D as to cover both, 
class of traders as well as a single trader. However, it is 
suggested that like consumer, trader may be accorded locus standi 
under section 36-B and Commission be empowered to pass cease and 
desist order, where a trade practice is prejudicial to competing 
trader. Since traders as compared to consumers are more alert and 
conscious of the tricks WViicV\ their competing traders; so' 
arming them with the power to file complaint will help in con-
trolling unfair trade practices. 
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Chapter VI covers powers of the consumer fora vis-a-vis 
unfair trade practice. At present consumer fora do not possess 
power to order return of excess price charged. Section 14 be 
amended in order to incorporate a clause which will run as fol-
lows. 
To return the consumer the price charged in excess of 
the price fixed by or under the law for the time being 
in force or displayed on the goods or in package. 
The powers of the consumer fora are restricted to section 
14. It is suggested that a residuary clause be incorporated in 
section Ik which should run on the following lines: 
To grant such reliefs as the District forum deems fit 
in the interest of justice. 
The powers to enforce orders are laid down in sections 25 
and 27. Section 25 provides that the orders may be enforced in 
the same manner as if it were a decree or an order made by a 
court in a pending suit but in case of the inability of the CDRAs 
to execute their orders, it shall be lawful for them to send such 
orders for execution to the court. Section 27 provides punishment 
for defaulter. 
The question which has been debated before the Consumer fora 
is; whether it is necessary that the decree holder must satisfy 
first section 25 and only then he can invoke section 27 or it 
entirely depends upon the decree holder whether to take help of 
section 25 or 27. Basically in sections 25 and 27 two independent 
remedies have been incorporated by the legislature for executing 
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the orders of the forum. If the decree holder approaches the 
consumer forum under section 27, the forum will not be right to 
ask him to exhaust first section 25 and only then come under 
section 27. Sections 25 and 27 therefore give two optional reme-
dies to the decree holder and it lies entirely in his discretion 
what option he is going to exercise. 
Section 27 arms the consumer fora with the power to inflict 
punishment or impose fine on the judgment debtor in case of his 
default. However, rules have not been framed for the exercise of 
this power by the consumer fora. It is necessary that an express 
provision be incorporated in section 27 for the said purpose. 
Consumer fora do not possess express powers to issue interim 
injunction. However, consumer fora have \v»V>C5r«-Vktpowers to issue 
the same like that of civil courts. In order to avoid any contro-
versy, it has been suggested to amend sections 14,17 and 21 to 
provide express power to grant stay or interim relief by the 
District forum. State Commission and National Commission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century economists have invented sophisticated 
ways of mapping consumer behaviour and choice. The initiative 
lies with the skilled technostructure inside the corporation who 
can manipulate prices and demand. The technological developments 
changed the needs and tastes of the consumers. The simple kind of 
goods and services which were well suited to them in the past/ 
have been replaced by the complex and complicated products. They 
differ so widely from each other, interms of use, benefit, 
efficacy, durability, purity and potency that it becomes very 
difficult to make their comparative analysis for assessing the 
suitability of price which the consumer has to pay. The expert 
knowledge to the consumer is necessary to appreciate the features 
of these products. But the pace of modern innovations has ren-
dered obselete> the experience and knowledge of the consumers. So 
the present day consumer is placed in a precarious position. On 
the one hand, non expert knowledge will not reveal many important 
characteristics of modern products, on the other hand, it is not 
possible for the consumer to have experience and knowledge about 
the each product which he is going to purchase. 
In absence of any Governmental and non Governmental agency 
to provide the relevant information about the product, consumers 
have to rely on the information provided by the trader. This 
information is disseminated through the electronic or print media 
or through hand bills, drum beats, samples, stickers,sales talks 
or door to door salesmen etc. Advertisements and other sales 
promotion schemes have become well established modes of modern 
business. The sponsor of this information Is manufacturer or 
seller himself. His prime motive Is the more and more sale of his 
own product and not to provide consumer^ correct Information for 
right purchasing decision. The advertisement to the consumer 
should not be deceptive has always been one of the points of 
conflict between business and consumer. 
The traders in order to ensure smooth sailing of their 
producjbs, resort to unfair business practices. Their advertise-
ments often fail to inform consumers about the utility, charac-
teristic, grade, quality, durability, purity etc of the product 
and In addition raise expectations beyond that which can be 
fulfilled by a product or service. Instead of making blatantly 
false or misleading statements, the traders dexteritly make the 
half truth or ambiguous statements. They omit factors which would 
be unfavourable to them but would influence consumers attitude 
and undue emphasis Is given to the Insignificant or Irrelevant 
Information. The advertisements are composed or purposefully 
printed In such a way as to mislead. The goods or services of 
rival competitors are being disparaged in order to bring their 
own goods Into lime-light. The false comparative analysis about 
the different products is being highlighted in order to project 
own product. The false warranties and guaranties relating to the 
length of the life of product, durability, potency and like are 
being announced without any reasonable basis. Fictitious bargain 
offers are made to deceive consumers. Many devices are used to 
lure buyers into believing that they are getting something for 
nothing or at a nominal value. The advertisement of goods at 
discount rates or along with gifts or prizes are being made 
without any Intention to fulfil the promise. The contests and 
lotteries are being conducted for promoting business Interests. 
These unfair business practices are diverse In nature as Is 
human ingenuity. Since man has not stopped thinking, so he con-
tinues to contribute to the development of techniques and designs 
of salesmanship. In India false and misleading advertisements are 
rampant. The consumer complaints council CCC/ a wing of the 
advertising standard council of India ASCI, received more than 
1/200 complaints against advertisements since its inception in 
1985 and around 95 per cent of these were misleading. 
Today the marketing of goods and services is being made 
through the trained business executive. Untrained consumer is no 
match for the businessman. The balance of power is weighted in 
favour of traders who employ expert advisers for marketing, 
research to know consumer preferences and to represent their view 
point before government. In fact they work round the clock on 
their business and they put every effort to ensure smooth sailing 
of their goods and services* In contrast, consumers are not organ-
ised; they suffer in silence. They therefore,need protection 
against the unfair business practices of the traders. 
The MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 and Consumer protection Act, 
1986 have been passed to deal with the unfair business practices. 
The legal provisions curbing these practicei were originally 
borrowed from the Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia. Howev-
er, with the passage of time this law was found inadequate to 
cope up with the new unfair practices floated by the traders. So 
It was thought necessary to have flexible provisions which will 
embrace not only existing unfair trade practices but also those 
to be invented in future. To achieve this goal, the MRTP (Amend-
ment) Act, 1991 and Consumer protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 
were passed. The language of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 1914 of USA as amended by the wheeler lea Amend-
ment Act 1938 has been adopted in the definition of the unfair 
trade practice.'Since much time has not elapsed when new concepts 
have been incorporated, the Regulatory Agencies under the MRTP 
and CP Acts have not found occasion to dwell deep on the issues 
which have rocked the courts in America and Australia. Till date, 
these Regulatory Agencies have laid down mechanical judgments and 
no plausible jurisprudence has been evolved. The ambit and scope 
of the expressions, "unfair method , unfair or deceptive act" 
used in the definition of the Unfair Trade Practice is yet to be 
delinated. No thought has been given to the question as to under 
what circumstances an advertisement may be called as false or 
misleading ? What should be the standard of proof for such adver-
tisement ? The application of puff. • and Mens rea to commercial 
advertisements is still unexplained. The new dimensions of con-
sumer deception added by the television commercials have not been 
addressed. The nebulous Issues relating to Bargain offers, offer-
ing of gifts, prizes, and holding of contest, lottery or goods 
involving rislt are unresolved. 
The powers of the MRTP Commission vis-a-vis unfair trade 
practices differ from the powers of the Redressal Agencies.Neith-
er the MRTP Commission nor Redressal Agencies have made any 
plausible evaluation of the ambit and scope of their powers. 
These are some of the core issues which the researcher aims to 
address in the present thesis. 
OBJECTIVES OP THE STUDY: 
The main objectives of the study are: 
1) A systematic study and evaluation of the conceptual 
development of the principles relating to unfair 
trade practices. 
2) To examine the specific legal provisions in the HRTP 
and CP Acts, aiming to curb unfair trade practices 
and to point out their Jurisprudential Justiciabili-
ty to achieve the desired result. 
3) To make a comparative analysis (where ever possible) 
of our law, with the transborder legislations on the 
subject so as to come out with the suggestions in 
-to 
order strengthen the existing law. 
4) To evaluate the approach adopted by the quasi judi 
cial and judicial authorities to eliminate unfair 
business practices. 
5) To present a comparative account (wherever possible) 
of the approach of the trans-national courts on the 
subject in order to provide the solution to the 
issues which have hither to remained unaddressed. 
6) To analyse the powers of the MRTP Commission and 
Redressal Agencies and their suitability to curb the 
menace of unfair Trade practices. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY; 
Research Methodology is the means through which desired 
objectives are sought to achieve. It involves a systematic plan-
ning and comprehensive methods. The type of steps to be taken in 
research depends upon the purpose for which the research is 
under-taken. The study relating to the legal control of unfair 
trade practices with reference to MRTP and CP Acts, is a doctrin-
al research, so statutory material of India, America, Australia, 
Canada and England relevant to the study has been analyzed.The 
case law laid down by the courts and quasi judicial bodies in 
India and "fcransborder countries on the subject has been examined. 
The Reports,Journals and surveys both Indian and foreign have 
been consulted. The proceedings of the Seminars, Conferences and 
Symposia have been utilized. The Reports submitted by the various 
Commissions/Committee s relevant to the thesis have been studied 
and ref^ v^-ted where-ever necessary. 
DESIGN OF STUDY: 
For the culmination of the objectives set to be achieved, 
the present study has been divided into the following chapters. 
Chapter-I is introductory in nature. It highlights the need for 
the present research and projects some of the issues which have 
been addressed in the thesis. The objectives for the thesis and 
research methodology have been given along with the design of the 
thesis. 
Chapter-II gives a historical retrospect of the unfair trade 
practices. The time honoured doctrines of past have been analysed 
and their in-efficacy in changing market structure has been 
highlighted. The legislative developments in relation to unfair 
trade practices and the reasons which led to the enactment of the 
MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 and consumer protection Act, 1986 have 
been presented along with the up to date amendments in these 
Acts. 
Chapter-Ill analyses the first part of the definition of unfair 
trade practice. This definition is silent on the issue as to 
whether it applies to existing goods only or to future goods 
also. The application of the two Acts to shares and debentures 
has not been yet resolved. The parameters of the expression, 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, have not been outlined in 
the definition and the MRTP Commission or the Redressal Agencies 
have not found opportunity to deliberate upon. This expression 
has been borrowed from section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act 1914 as amended by the wheeler lea Amendment Act, 
1938 of United States. So the Judicial interpretation put by the 
American Courts and the limitations of that interpretation have 
been examined. The approach which the MRTP Commission and the 
Redressal Agencies should adopt, has been suggested. 
Chapter-IV covers commercial advertising in legal perspective. 
Since unfair trade practices under the MRTP and CP Acts involve 
Commercial advertisements of diverse nature, so separate treat-
ment has been given to commercial advertising and issues like 
opinion of the consumers in Britain, Europe (including Britain) 
and India about the advertisements, constitutional protection, 
application of mens rea, standard of protection, defence of puff-
ing, television commercials, comparative advertising and inter-
pretation have been discussed. 
The surveys conducted in Britain, Europe (including Britain) 
and in India have been presented to project the opinion of the 
consumers who believe that most of the commercial advertisements 
are false or misleading. Through statistical data it has been 
shown that the traders through out world have steadily increased 
advertising expenditure. Thus there is every reason to regulate 
these advertisements to ensure that they are not false or mis-
leading. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the importance of 
information to the operation of efficient markets is by now 
fairly well accepted , the trader should have constitutionally 
protected right to highlight the merits of his goods or servic-
es. Advertising should be treated as speech and thus falling 
under the fundamental right<9^freedom of speech. The element of 
trade, commerce or profit motive should not distinguish the 
commercial advertisements from the speech. 
The application of mens rea to commercial advertisements has 
not yet received judicial attention. The words like 
falsely,intentionally and knowingly have been used in these two 
Acts and they denote mens rea. Then should mens rea be imported 
In the definition and in its absence trader be not held liable to 
compensate for any loss ?. 
The aim of the law controlling unfair business practices is 
to protect consumers. The consumers are vast multitude of public 
including, persons of average intelligence, credulous and fatuous 
and reasonably intelligent persons. The question arises as to 
whose intelligence should MRTP Commission and redressal agencies 
treat as a standard to determine the nature of the advertisement. 
This issue has not been authoritatively resolved yet. The defence 
of puffing in the advertisements has provided an escape route for 
the traders to cheat the innocent consumers. It is said about the 
puffing that reasonable consumers cannot be misled by it, but if 
it creates no impression on consumers, it is difficult to see why 
it is used? The commercial advertisements on television have 
posed new questions for the researchers to answer. The natural 
colour of the products is lost in transmission on the television 
screen, so in order to give a natural look in the advertised 
product, artificial substances have to be substituted in order to 
give natural look. Then if the demonstration made on the TV 
screen is false but the express claim made with the demonstration 
is correct, can such advertisement be treated as false and what 
will be the position where demonstration is true but the express 
claim made is false? The use of celebrity to advertise goods or 
services has now become common. The non expert knowledge of the 
celebrity about the advertised goods or service is yet another 
thought provoking issue relating to false or misleading adver-
tisements . 
The comparative advertising is a species of commercial 
advertising and like its genus is double edged. It has been now 
judicially recognised that the truthful comparative advertising 
shall not be prohibited but to determine whether the particular 
comparative advertisement is false or misleading or not; is not 
free from difficulty for the reasons (a) there is no clear line 
between comparative and non comparative (b) a considerable amount 
of puffery has been traditionally been allowed in advertising, 
the same is true in case of comparative advertising.The limits of 
permissible puffery are far from being cltar. No guidelines have 
been framed to determine the correctness of a comparative adver-
tisement. Although it has been argued in the thesis that there Is 
no reason to extend this common law principle of puffing in the 
present day consumer protection law, there is no decision of the 
judicial or quasi judicial bodies on this point. 
Although there is a consensus that the false and misleading 
advertisements are bad, few however, agree about how best to tell 
whether an advertisement is misleading. In the light of the 
judicial decisions, various rules for the interpretation of the 
advertisements have been suggested. 
Chapter V deals with the specific categories of unfair business 
practices as Incorporated in the definition, A detailed discus-
sion on sub clauses (1) to (x) and clauses (2) , (3) and (4) 
covering bargain offers, offering of gifts, prizes, holding of 
contests and lotteries and goods involving risk of injury, has 
been made. Sub clauses (1) to (x) are not properly worded. Some 
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sub clauses use the term "falsely" and some "misleading", thus 
giving an impression that where a representation is misleading 
and not bla/*tantly false, will not be covered by the clause using 
the expression "falsely". This is not correct. However in order 
to remove any doubt an amendment has been suggested. Various ex-
pressions used in these sub clauses have been discussed in the 
light of the transborder Judicial pronouncements in order to 
outline their scope. 
The provisions dealing with the Bargain offers do not cover 
a situation where trader disparages his own goods to a consumer 
who has visited his establishment in response to the bargain 
offer made in the advertisement and then switches the consumer 
to another profitable item. It is not clear as to whether the 
labels on the goods or catalogues making offers be construed as 
offers or mere invitation to treat. The provision expressly 
states that the intention of the traders not to supply goods at 
the bargain offer must be proved. The proof of intention is not 
easy and consumer cannot get compensation where he fails to 
establish the intention of trader^not to provide goods at bargain 
offer. Whether the trader making a bargain offer should mention 
the period, during which said bargain will last, in the adver-
tisement itself or without mentioning period, the bargain offer 
should remain valid for a reasonable period is not clear. The 
Explanation attached to the provision is also ambiguous. 
The status of sales promotion devices, e.g. offering of 
gifts, prizes, holding of contests and lotteries has not been 
authoritatively resolved. The MRTP Commission has expressed 
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conflicting opinions on Lhc question as to whether these devices 
are perse unfair trade practices or capacity to cause loss or 
injury to the consumer, has to be proved. 
The traders do not hesitate in marketing the goods which 
are hazardous to life and property. The provisions which prohibit 
such trade practices do not make clear as to whether in case of 
injury to the consumer, against whom should he file complaint? 
should he file complaint against manufacturer or seller? The 
conflicting opinions have been cxprcLJsed on the question as to 
whether loss or injury" covers only physical loss or loss of any 
sort..Isl 
Chapter VI out lines the powers of the MRTP Commissions vis-a-
vis unfair trade practices. This chapter is having six sub 
chapters titled as (1) power to issue injunction (2) power to 
grant compensation (3) power to amend or revoke orders (4) power 
to punish for contempt of commission (5) power to order correc-
tive advertisement (6) power to pass cease and desist order. 
The power to grant compensation has raised the issues like, 
locus standi to voluntary organisations, application of the 
limitation Act and mens rea, the principles applicable for meas-
uring damages and the consumer's duty to mitigate. The right of 
consumers to file class action suit has many attendent legal 
queries yet to be resolved. 
The issues relating to the power to grant injunction have 
been subject to many conflicting observations of the MRTP Commis-
sion and at present injunction cannot be issued against those who 
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are aiding or abetting the trader who has resorted to unfair 
trade practices. 
The power to order corrective advertisement has been provid-
ed in the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991. It is yet to be seen as to 
how it reconciles with the commercial advertisements as these 
advertisements fall within the Freedom of Speech and Expression 
guaranteed under Art, 19 (1) of the Constitution. 
The scope and ambit of the power to amend or revoke the 
earlier order has been called in question before the apex court. 
It has also raised many questions of procedural nature. Can one 
Bench hear the review application of the case decided by another 
Bench? Can larger Bench be constituted to hear the review appli-
cation •? 
The power to issue cease and desist order involves questions 
relating to locus standi of trader, practices which have been 
discontinued before passing cease and desist order, and implica-
tions of this order. Another pertinent issue is the status of the 
consent order. 
Chapter VII deals with the powers of the consumer fora vis-a-vis 
unfair trade practices. This chapter has been divided into five 
sub chapters namely; power to remove defects and deficiencies; 
power to award compensation; power to enforce orders; power to 
issue Interim orders and who can file complaint against whom ? 
At present consumer fora have no power to order refund of 
price or charges which the trader or provider of service has 
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received from the consumer. Similarly non supply of goods or 
services does not fall either in "defect" or "deficiency" as 
defined in the CP Act. 
The power to award compensation is still subject to negli-
gence of the respondent despite the fact that all the consumer 
legislations throughout the globe provide for strict liability. 
The power to enforce orders has generated debate among the 
various fora about the true scope of sections 25 and 27. No rules 
have been framed for the exercise of the powers by the consumer 
fora under section 27 and the application of criminal procedure 
code to section 27 is also not free from doubt, it is also not 
clear as to whether order made under section 27 is appealable or 
not. 
The consumer fora do not have express power to pass interim 
order. There is a controversy as to whether power to pass final 
order includes an inherent power to pass interim order. 
The question germane to the present study is who can file 
complaint and against whom? The CP Act provides that besides 
consumer, state and central governments and voluntary consumer 
organisations can file complaint. It is also provided in the Act 
that a purchaser of goods for resale or for commercial purpose 
is not a consumer and therefore cannot file complaint under the 
CP Act. Before Amendment Act, 1993, the expression commercial 
purpose came up for deliberation before various consumer fora and 
they expressed conflicting opinions. In order to resolve this 
issue an explanation was attached to the definition of consumer 
through the Amendment Act,1993. However, this explana-
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tlon is also not in concord with the overall scheme o£ the CP 
Act. So several principles have been suggested to determine as to 
whether goods are for commercial purpose or not. 
It is not clear as to whether consumer can also file com-
plaint against the actual manufacturer when he has purchased 
goods from a vendor who is not the actual manufacturer. 
Chapter VII titled conclusions' and suggestions covers the re-
search findings and suggestions to strengthen the existing law 
and to resolve the present controversies which have come on the 
fore due to conflicting Interpretations of various provisions 
given by the MRTP Commission and consumer redressal agencies. 
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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES -
A HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
Unfair trade practices are as old as the trade itself. 
However, the legal mechanism to curb these practices took its own 
time to settle. Although, the courts from the very beginning were 
quick to condemn the unfair or misleading conduct in dicta , 
Judicially imposed limitations and practical considerations of 
time and cost confined these remedies to narrow circumstances. 
The tenderness exhibited towards trade practices of doubtful 
probity was rooted in the history of markets and fairs In the 
medieval England, In which trust was neither given nor expected*. 
In the medieval days, transactions of sale and even of 
barter between strangers were few and rare. When trading did take 
place. It was In markets and fairs where the goods were openly 
displayed. So it was presumed that the buyer relied on his own 
skill and judgment. Only a fool would rely on the word of 
stranger, he might never see again -- the idea of Caveat Emptor 
well reflected that practice-^ . 
1. American Wash Board Co v. Saginaw Mfg. Co, 103f 281 (6th 
cir,1900) . 
2. Developments in the Law : Deceptive Advertising 80 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1013 (1967). 
3. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale LJ. 1133 
(1931); See also Horwits, The Historical Foundations of 
Modern Contract Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 945-52 (1974); 
Gordon Borrie and Aubrey L.Diamond; The Consumer Society and 
the Law, (4th ed. 1980) at 19. 
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At common law unfair trade practices are subject to legal 
control through three types of remedies . 
1. Civil suit by consumer. The remedy sought to be enforced 
through a civil suit was either Tortious or Contractual. 
2. Civil Action By Competitors*. 
3. Criminal prosecution . 
Civil Suit Bv Consumer: Tortious Reroedy 
Only towards the end of the eighteenth century did common 
law Impose liability for dishonesty^, the fons'et origo of deceit 
being Pasley V. Freeman^. It assumed its modern shape after Dezzy 
V. Peek^. 
The following four^ elements hav£ to be satisfied for suc-
cessful action for deceit: 
These remedies will not be discussed as 
the scope of the present study. 
they fall outside 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
For Illuminating discussion on common law remedies and 
attendant legal obstacles, see Hester, Deceptive Sales 
Practices and Form of Contracts -- Does The Consumer Have A 
Private Remedy? (1968) Duke LJ. 831. 
R.W.M Dlas et al. Tort Law (1984) P 184. 
(1789), 3 T.R. 51; 100 ER. 450. 
(1889), 14 APP. Cas 337. 
Howard Allan Bartnick is of the view that the plaintiff in 
order to prevail in an action in deceit, has to show; 
(a)that the representations were made by the defendant; 
(b)that they were made knowingly and with design false; (c) 
that they were made for the purpose and intent to deceive 
and defraud; (d) that they did deceive and defraud; (e) that 
they related to an existing or past fact; (f) that the party 
to whom the false statements were made did not know that 
they were false (g) that he relied on their truth and suf-
fered loss; See Howard Allan Bartnick; Consumer Protection 
in Georgia: The Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, Emory 
LJ vol 25 (1976) p 445. See also a comment on Maryland's 
Consumer Protection Act: A Private Cause of Action For 
unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices. Maryland. L. Rev. vol 
38 (1979) at 733. 
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1. a false statement made, orally, in writing or by conduct 
of existing facts^°; 
2. made with the knowledge of its falsity or recklessly, not 
caring if It be true or false-*-^ ; 
3. with the intent that the plaintiff should act on it^ , & 
1 3 
4. the plaintiff does act on it to his detriment-^-'. 
A deceived buyer might bring an action for deceit against a 
seller who had falsely advertised a product but legal pitfalls 
and requirements of proof made this remedy lllusory^^. It is 
not easy to prove scienter, a basic premise to fix responsibili-
ty. Secondly, to show that a reasonable consumer would have 
relied on like representation is often difficult to establish. 
Probably the most trouble-some requirement is that the statement 
must be related to a past or existing fact and not an opinion 
stated by the seller. This requirement leaves a large grey area 
where the merchant who has made exaggerated claims about his 
9~ R.V. Barnard (1837) 173 ER 342. 
10. Promise and declaration of future purpose are not generally 
actionable. If however, the declaration of purpose can be 
constructed as a representation of a present state of mind, 
it will be treated as a statement of fact, Edgington v. 
Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 chn 459. 
11. Supra note 6. 
12. Langride V. Levy (1837); 150 ER. 863, 1458. 
13. The damage is the gist of the action. Smith V. Chedwick 
(1884) 9 APP Cas. 187. 196 per lord Black-buns; For judicial 
statement of the requirements see lord Maugham in Bradford 
Third Equitable Benefit Building Society V. Borders (1941) 2 
All. ER. 205 at 211. 
14. See generally Bohlen; Misrepresentation As Deceit, Negli-
gence or warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1929). 
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product can maintain that his statement was mere "puff" ^ and he 
should not therefore, be held liable. Although, some writers 
are of the opinion that it is reasonable to grant some latitude 
to the producer pro-claiming the merits of his own goods, there 
is a school of thought which believes that the category of fact 
and opinion in an action for deceit had an adverse effect on the 
information value of advertising . 
Contractual Remedy 
Three associated principles permeated the development of 
Law of contract. These are (a) Caveat Emptor (b) Sanctity of 
contract (c) Privity of contract. These Principles are discussed 
here under. 
a) Caveat Emptor: 
Caveat Emptor has its origin in the Middle ages and was 
dominant feature of the sale of horses in market overt Since 
all sales used to take place in the open market where seller and 
buyer were face to face, it was presumed that since buyer is the 
15. Puffing can be defined as a representation by the seller 
which are merely opinions or commendations of the quality of 
goods or affirmation of their value see Ga. Code. Ann 109 A-
2-313 (2) (1973). 
16. See Bishop, Advertising and the Law, Benn (2nd ed) at 47; 
Prosser, Hand Book of the Law of Torts (4th ed 1971) at 
723. For judicial opinion see Kirchner V. F. TC 63 FTC 1282 
(1963) . 
17. See E. Rogers; Goodwill, Trade Marks and Unfair Trading 
98(1914). 
18. Market overt means an open public place legally constituted 
market. Lee V. Bayes (1956) 18 CB 599. For detailed discus-
sion on this issue see P. S. Atiyah The Sale Of Goods (8th 
ed. 1990) at 368. 
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best judge of his own Interest, so If he makes a wrong selection 
by his own choice, he cannot complain later-on against the sell-
er. As the Judge in Fifteenth century case said: if a man sells 
me a horse and warrants that it has two eyes, and it has not, I 
shall not have an action. I can know this for myself from the 
beginning^^. This legal position remained unchanged till seven-
teenth century. Then the express warranty was given effect & 
buyer was given remedy when goods did not conform to the warran-
ty. J. Fitzherbert a seventeenth century judge observed: 
If a man sells unto another man a horse, and warrant 
him to be sound and good, if the horse be lame or 
diseased, that he cannot work, he shall have an action 
against him... But note: it behoveth that he warrant 
the horse, without such warranty, it is at the other 
peril and his eyes ought to be his judge in that 
case^''. 
In the last quarter of seventeenth century, courts did not 
insist on the express promise or warranty on the part of seller. 
In Cross V. Gardner ^^ the buyer bought two oxen, the seller 
represented that they were his own but infact belonged to another 
and were taken from the buyer. Chief Justice John Holt said that 
since no amount of examination of the oxen here would reveal 
their true owner and credit given on the affirmation makes the 
action lie. Thus there was an implied warranty that the seller at 
19. C.f. Gordon Borrie and Aubrey L Diamond; The Consumer, 
Society And The Law (4th ed. 1980) at 20. 
20. Id at 19, 
21. (1688), earth 90. 
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the time of sale had right to sell^^. Hundred years later. Jus-
tice Buller in Pasley V. Freeman ^^ interpreted the observation 
of John Holt in Cross V. Gardner^^ to mean that there is no 
distinction between warranty and affirmation and real test lies 
75 in the intention of the parties . 
The beginning of the nineteenth century marked a complete 
shift from the original insistence of the courts on words of the 
promise. Now courts began to infer the promise from mere fact of 
sale. Even though nothing was said. Thus in Gardiner V. Gray^^, 
the buyer had agreed to purchase twelve bags of waste silk which 
turned out to be unmerchantable. Lord Ellen Borough held that 
when there is no opportunity to inspect a commodity, the maxim 
Caveat Emptor cannot apply. The goods must be saleable under the 
denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The purchas-
er cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on dunghill. 
Few years later in Jones V. Bright?-'', the plaintiff bought 
from a manufacturer some copper for a stated purpose of sheathing 
a ship, it lasted only for 4 months instead of normal 4 years. CJ 
Sir William Best in his new found vigour observed: 
22. Emphasis added. 
23. (1789) Term Rep. 51. 
24. Supra note 21. 
25. Modern reflection of this type of distinction can be found 
in Oscar Chess Ltd v. Williams (1957) IWLR 370. 
26. (1815) 4 Camp 144. 
27. (1829) 5 Bing 533. 
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I wish to put the case on the broad principle/ if a man 
sells an article^ he thereby warrants that it is mer-
chantable that is, fit for some purpose. If he sells it 
for a particular purpose, he thereby warrants that it 
is fit for that purpose. If that turns out not fit, the 
buyer will have remedy . 
Last quarter of the 19th century saw in England, the enact-
ment of^  Sale of Goods Act, 1893^^. This Act represented an im-
portant step in the abandonment of the original common law rule 
of caveat Emptor. The Judicial pronouncements in Cross V. Cardn-
er^°, Pasley V. Freeman-^^, Cardiner V. Gray^^ and Jones V. 
Bziqht?^ found legislative recognition in Sections 13, 14(2) and 
14(3) along with the Caveat Emptor. Thus this was the precursor 
of the shift from Caveat Emptor to Caveat Venditor^^. However, 
there was no provision in the Act to prevent the seller from 
contracting out his liabilities. To plug this loophole. Supply of 
Goods Implied Terms Act, 1973-^ ^ was passed on the recommendations 
28. Emphasis added. 
29. Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 is a replica of English Sale 
of Goods Act, 1893. 
30. Supra note 21. 
31. Supra note 22. 
32. Supra note 25. 
33. Supra note 26. 
34. P.S. Atiyah opines that indeed it is now unrealistic to 
treat the basic principle of law as Caveat Emptor rather 
than Caveat Venditor. The sale of Goods (8th ed. 1990) at 
125. 
35. Law Commission Report, First Report on Exemption Clauses in 
contracts (1969) law Com. No. 24 (1968-69) HC 403.Paras:4.1-
6.24 at 517. 
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of Law Cominission^°, which restricted the seller from contracting 
out the implied terms. In 1979 a consolidated Sale of Goods Act 
was passed in which the amendments made by the 1973 Act, were 
Incorporated. The Sale of Goods Act, 1979 has caused hardships to 
the seller as the buyer is given right to reject the goods even 
on trivial grounds. In order to maintain the balance, English law 
commission after issuing a working paper in 1983 published 
final report. Sale and Supply of Goods in 1987-^ ,^ which recom-
mended certain changes in the Sale of Goods Act, 1979. These 
changes have been accepted by the Government .in principle. Howev-
er, these changes will not affect the consumer transactions"''^ . 
Freedom and Sanctity of Contract: 
Early development of law of contract was greatly influenced 
by the then prevailing moral values and business norms. Although, 
English Law of Contract has taken Its roots In the Middle Ages, 
most of the general principles were developed and elaborated in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the days of natural law. 
To the Judges of eighteenth century, theories of natural law 
36. No such Act has been passed in India. 
37. Working paper No. 85, Sale and Supply of Goods. 
38. Law Com. No. 160 Cm 137 (1987). 
39. Broadly, the proposals Inter alia are that no change Is to 
be made in consumer sales, but in non consumer sales the 
buyer will no longer have the right to reject the goods in 
case there is a breach of the statutory requirements as to 
quality where the breach is so slight that it would be 
unreasonable to reject the goods (section 15 A). 
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meant that men had an inalienable right to make their own con-
tracts for themselves and to the Judges of the nineteenth century 
similarly meant that the law should interfere with the people as 
little as possible^^. The theme of this dogma is well reflected 
in often quoted passage of Sir George Jessel that if there is 
anything more than another which public policy requires, it is 
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the 
utmost liberty of contracting and their contracts, when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by courts of Justice. Thus the main thrust was given to 
promise^^ which once made was held sacred and was enforced. The 
notion was that the oxen are tied by their horns^^ and men by 
their promises. Judges task was relegated to that of an umpire 
who was called on only when some thing went wrong. Thus the 
shibboleths freedom of contract and sanctity of contract became 
the foundation on which the whole Law of contract was built. This 
40. P.S.Atiyah; An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 2nd ed. 
1977 at 5. 
41. Printing and Numerical Registering Co V. Sampson (1875) L R 
19 Eq P.465; Similar views were expressed by Henrey Sidgwick 
in his Elements of politics; suppose contracts freely made 
and effectively sanctioned and the most elaborate social 
organisation becomes possible at least in a society of such 
human beings as the individualistic theory contemplates 
gifted with mature reason and governed by enlightened self 
interest, cited in Kessler and Gilmore contracts. Cases and 
Materials 2nd ed. 1970 at 4. 
42. For detailed account of promise as the basis of contract see 
Randy E Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, Col. L. Rev 
vol 86 Jan 1986. 
43. Walter Stren, "Consideration and Gift," 14 Int & Com. L. 
Quart. 677. 
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unlimited freedom of contract and its sanctity proved divorced 
from the reality in nineteenth century hence. The emergence of 
standard form contracts'*'*, giving the consumer an option either 
to take it or leave it'*^  with no scope to negotiate, exposed the 
limitations of freedom of contract theory. 
As the nineteenth century waned, the very freedom of con-
tract with its corollary, the freedom to compete, was merging 
into the freedom to combine; and in the last resort competition 
and combination were incompitable. Individualism was yielding to 
monopoly, where strange things might well be done in the name of 
liberty. The background of Law, social, political and economic 
has changed. Laissez fair as an ideal has been supplanted by 
social security and social security suggests status rather than 
contract^^. 
Horizons of change in socio-legal outlook came to witness. 
Law is no longer treated as a police but a positive instrument 
for the achievement of well being of the people through Justice. 
The moral principle that one should abide by one's agreements and 
44. In France standard form contracts are known as contracts of 
adhesion, see Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law 
(2nd ed 1963) at 152. Linhoff calls them compulsory con-
tracts, see scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper, (1943) 43 
Col L. R. 586. 
45. Per lord Diplock, Schroder Music publishing co ltd v.Macanly 
(1974) 3 All. ER 616 at 624. 
46. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmstons, Law of contract (12th ed) 
at 19. 
47. Holland. T E, The Elements of Jurisprudence (13th ed 1924). 
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fulfil one's promises is being increasingly met by another moral 
principle namely, that one should not take advantages of an 
unfair contract which one has persuaded another party to make 
under economic and social pressures^". 
Without overtly replacing the shibboleth of freedom of con-
tract, the twentieth century witnessed increased intervention of 
both, judiciary ^^  and legislature ^^ on behalf of the consumer. 
Privity of contract: 
The doctrine of privity of contract means that a contract 
» 
cannot as a general rule, confer rights or impose obligations 
arising under it on any person except the parties to 
en 52 
it^ -^ .The origin of the doctrine is shrouded with uncertainties"". 
48. Supra note 39 at 11. 
49. Courts in order to mitigate the rigour of exemption clauses 
have evolved various rules eg. Contra proferentem rule, 
theory of fundamental" breach, reasonablness of the exemption 
clauses. For an academic treatment on these rules see 
A.G.Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract (1961) 77 LQR 98 
at 99; Gower Exemption Clauses; Contractual and Tortious 
liability (1954) 17 MLR 155; Linhoff, The Scope of Compul-
sory Contracts Proper, (1943) 43 col LR 586. 
50. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 was passed in England. Now 
no party can by reference to any terms of the contract 
exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury 
resulting from negligence. However no such Law has been 
passed in India. The Trade Description Act, 1968, makes it 
an offence to offer goods for sale in false or misleading 
language. 
Sl.G.H.Treital, Law of Contract, 4th Ed p 419. 
52. For a detailed discussion see Contracts for the Benefit of 
Third partier.. 12 Int. Comp. L. Quar-3.18; Promise Without 
Consideration and Third party Beneficiary in American & 
English Law 15 Int. Comp. L. Quar 835. 
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It is often linked with consideration^-^. But its dichoto-
my^^ suggests that the rule will stand even in absence of the 
consideration^^. There may be several reasons for the receiption 
of this common Law rule. One possible reason may be that it is 
unjust to allow a person to sue on a contract on which he could 
not be sued^^. Second possible reason is that if third parties 
could enforce contracts made for their benefit, the right of 
contracting parties to vary such contract would be unduly ham-
pered-^' . 
The concept of privity bears some significance where the 
transactions are of commercial nature, i.e. When the buyers and 
sellers are merchants and they enter into the transaction with 
approximately equal strength . But it does not suit to 
consumer sales. It often, happens in such sales that one member 
of the family purchases goods and whole family consumes it. The 
doctrine of privity will preclude the family members from 
53. S.S.H. Azmi, Sale of Goods And Consumer protection (1992) at 
164. 
54. However, there are writers who consider privity of contract 
and privity of consideration as the two different ways of 
saying samething. See Smith & Thomas; A Case Book on Con-
tract (8th ed) P 213; see also Salmond and Williams; The law 
of Contracts PP. 99-100. 
55. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston in Law of contract (12 ed) at 
78, opineithat it is true if the doctrine of consideration 
were abolished, the problem of privity would remain, as it 
still remains in other legal systems. 
56. Tweddle V. Atkinson (1861) IB & S at 398. 
57. Supra note 51 at 420. 
58. Jolowic J.A. The Protection of the Consumer and Purchase of 
Goods under English Law 32 M L R. 170. 
27 
enforcing any claim in the court of Law, as the rationale is that 
they have only availed or consumed but have not purchased them. 
From the consumer's point of view, the requirement of privity of 
contract appears to be very unfortunate. This doctrine came under 
scathing attack in Lockett V. AM Charles^^ Ltd., when it was 
observed that it is really very strange that the plaintiff's 
right to sue a hotel keeper for having supplied poisonous food, 
should depend, in absence of negligence, on the fact whether she 
herself is paying for it or her host. In two celebrated cases, 
Donoghue V. Stevenson^^ and Grant V. Australian Knitting Mills^^ 
no remedy was available to the consumers for their injuries. In 
former case, plaintiff who was injured by the contaminated ginger 
beer was not himself a buyer but only consumer. But in latter 
case, although plaintiff was himself a buyer of underpants which 
caused dermitites, the seller had delivered the goods in the 
original form as received by him from the manufacturer,because 
the effectual remedy available was against the manufacturer in 
tort on the grounds of negligence and no remedy was available to 
the consumer/buyer because of the privity rule. Absence of negli-
gence in addition to lack of privity may mean that no remedy at 
all is available to the injured consumer. This is what actually 
happened in Bucklay V. Reserve.^^, when the plaintiff suffered 
59. (1938) 3 all. ER. 170 
60. (1932) AC 562. 
61. (1936) A C 85, 104. 
62. (1959) C L Y 1330. 
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Illness caused by eating snail in the restaurant. The plaintiff's 
claim was dismissed because of the privity rule as he was the 
guest of the actual buyer who had paid for the dinner. As negli-
gence was not alleged on the part of restaurant, the third party 
had no claim in tort either . 
These traditional doctrines of common law namely, caveat 
Emptor, freedom and sanctity of contract and privity rule were 
reflections of the then existing state of values and norms. Even 
today the spirit of these doctrines holds good. There are no two 
opinions about the fact that the promise once made must be ful-
filled or where person has himself inspected the goods he should 
blame none but himself in case of any defect or Justice demands 
that only the parties to the contract must be entitled to or 
liable under the contract. However, the developments of twentieth 
century has proved that these catch phrases of past have outlived 
their utility. The market structure of the past has undergone a 
sea change which the propounders of these doctrines might not 
have envisaged. The modern paradigms of marketing have proved 
that these doctrines if implemented in letter and spirit, will 
prove harsh to consumers. The complex nature of the goods hardly 
provides any scope for an ordinary consumer to detect the defect 
while inspecting the goods. The aggressive advertising campaign 
has also added to the confusion of the consumers in making 
choice. Thus need to provide a new legal mechanism free from the 
63. See for detailed analysis of undesirability of the doctrine 
of privity rule. Supra note 53. 
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doctrines which have outlived their utility to cope-up with the 
arsenal of unscrupulous traders bent to bilk the consumers was 
felt. As the Australian Attorney General puts it: 
The marketing of goods and services is conducted on an 
organised basis and by trained executives. The un-
trained consumer is no match for the businessman who 
attempts to persuade the consumer to buy goods or 
services on terms and conditions suitable to the ven-
dor. Thus consumer needs protection by Lavi . 
US Reflections: 
The common law doctrines were venerated and received with 
full enthusiasm by American courts during their early stages of 
development of Law. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
the American courts strictly followed the doctrine of caveat 
Emptor which regulated the relationship between the buyer and 
seller in the market place. In an era of unbridled individualism, 
denial of freedom of contract either to the buyer or the seller, 
irrespective of the circumstances in which it was concluded would 
have been in-conceivable .The rule of privity of contract laid 
down in Winter-bottom V. Wright^^ by the British Courts in which 
the driver of a defective coach could not recover damages from 
the manufacturers on the ground of privity of contract, was 
meticulously followed by the American courts. 
64. Senator Murphy, the then Attorney General while introducing 
the Trade practices Bill of the common wealth of Australia 
in the Senate — Quoted from John Goldring Consumer Protec-
tion and Trade practices Act,1974-6'6 Federal L Rev. at 288. 
65. D.N. Saraf, Consumer Protection Law in India (1990) at 4. 
66. (1842) 10 M & M 109, 152 ER 402. 
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Present consumer movement of America is largely accredited 
to the farming community and honest businesses. The impetus 
behind the movement for the earliest legislation gathered 
strength during the 1870's and 1880's. The farmers could not fail 
to mark the contrast between the rapidly falling prices which 
they received for their produce and the relatively sticky prices 
of the goods which they needed to buy. The farmer lost both as 
buyer as well as seller. The price which the farmer received for 
the commodities he sold, seemed to him to have been fixed by 
those to whom he sold, so also he felt that the price of his 
supplies was fixed by those from whom he bought . The explana-
tion was found in the trust or monopolies. Since the farmers were 
better endowed with the political influence so they influenced 
the congress and the result was the Sherman Act, 1889 which 
declared such trusts unlawful"''. Although the Sherman Act, 1889 
to a great extent curbed the formation of trusts which distorted 
or hampered competition, nevertheless, experience showed that 
there were several monopolistic and restrictive trade practices 
to which the Act did not reach. In order to remove these infirmi-
ties, Clayton Act, 1914 was passed. This Act declared, price 
67. Solon J Buch, The Granger Movement, Harvard University 
press, 1913 C F A.D Neale, The Anti Trust Laws of the U.S.A. 
(2nd ed) at 13. 
68. Section 1 of the Act declares: Every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states or 
with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal.... 
Section 2 says Every person who shall monopolize or attempt 
to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons to monopolize any part of the trade orcommerce 
among the several states or with the foreign nations,shal1 
be deemed guilty ot a misdemeanour 
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discrimination,^^, exclu-sive dealing^° and tying agreements'•'• 
7 2 
acquisition of competing companies and interlocking direc-
tors, illegal. However there was no provision to deal with the 
unfair trade practices. For instance in American wash Board co. 
V. Saginaw Mfg cty , the manufacturers of Aluminum Wash board 
sought to enjoin the false representation that a competing Zinc 
board was made of aluminum, the Federal Court held that absent 
any evidence of "passing off", such a misrepresentation could not 
be restrained. Thus the defendant could not be restrained from 
deceiving the public by selling a board not made of aluminum, 
although falsely branded as such, being infact a board made of 
zinc material. In Standard Oil Co v. United States^ ^, the US 
Supreme Court confined the role of the Sherman Act by holding 
that only unreasonable contract in restraint of trade would be 
held unlawful under the Sherman Act. Within hours after this 
pronouncement. Senator, Frances G. Newlands proposed that con-
gress should constitute an administrative tribunal similar to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, over interstate transporta-
tion'^. Thus the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 was passed. 
sT^ Section 2 
70. Section 3 
71. Section 7 
72. Section 8 
73. 103 F 281,50 LRA 609 (C.C.A.6th.1900) 
74. 221 USI (1911) . 
75. Cong REC 1225 (1911). 
76. 51 Cong REC. 11084 (1914) (Senator Newlands) 
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The original bill gave the commission a purely advisory role, 
but a specific provision to control unfair competition was subse-
quently inserted in section 5 of the Act and the agency was 
given the power to issue cease and desist orders, against viola-
tors. Since unfair competition at common Law had been limited to 
the substitution of goods of one producer for those of another, 
section 5 was amended to declare unlawful" unfair methods of 
competition". Thus the framers apparently anticipated that the 
commission would move against abuses not yet contrived as well as 
those that occasioned the statute. One supporter of the 
77 legislation noted with prescience the merits of elasticity 
Unfair competition. Like fraud is a creature of protean 
shapes. It assumes one attitude to day and another 
tomorrow. As with fraud, so it will be with unfair 
competition. In fraud there is a constant race between 
rouge and the chancellor. In unfair competition there 
is going to be a constant race between the corporation 
and the commission. 
The spirit of congress was not taken into account by the US 
7 ft 
Supreme Court while interpreting section 5 of the Act'°. 
In its 1935 Annual Report, the commission recommended that 
section 5 be amended so as to specifically prohibit not only 
unfair methods of competition in commerce but also unfair and 
TT. 51 Cong. REC 11598 (1914) (Senator Thomes) 
78. For instance, in FTC V Gratz 253 US 421 (1920) The US Su-
preme Court held that the words Unfair methods of competi-
tion are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning 
is in dispute. It is for the courts and not for the commis-
sion, ultimately Lo determine as a matter of Law what they 
include. They are clearly in-applicable to practices never 
heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because 
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression . 
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7 9 deceptive acts and practices in commerce . Thus wheeler-lea 
o n 
Amendments to FTC Act were made in 1938 ". These amendments 
extended jurisdiction of the commission to cover unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce regardless of whether such 
conduct injured competitors or consumers. Secondly, these amend-
ments gave the commission power to have an effective control over 
false advertisements of goodS/ drugs, cosmetics and therapeutic 
devices. These amendments laid the foundation of modern consumer 
movement in America^^. In 1973 FTC Act was amended by the Trans-
Alaska oil pipeline Act. Three important changes were made in the 
original Act. First, commission was empowered to seek injunctive 
relief in Federal Court for violation of any Law within its 
Jurisdiction •^ .^ Second, commission was authorized to represent 
itself in Federal Court by its own attorneys if after ten days 
notice the court action desired by the commission was not taken 
by the justice Department . Third, increased maximum 
79. 1935 FTC ANN. REP. 14 see also 1936 FTC ANN REP 16-17. 
80. The Immediate provocation of passing of wheeler-Lea amend 
ments was the ruling of US Supreme Court in the landmark 
case of FTC V. Raladam Co, 283 Us 643 (1931). It was held 
that the commission lacked jurisdiction to proceed against 
false advertising without the proof that the advertisement 
adversely affected competitors even though it admittedly 
deceived the public. 
81. According to Loyett these amendments marked the first real 
departure from the tradition of caveat Emptor in consumer 
contract administration. See Loyett; State Deceptive Trade 
practices Legislation 46 Tul. L. Rev. 724, 728 (1972). 
81a. Section 408 (f). 
82. Section 408 (d) 
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civil penalty for violation of commission's cease and desist 
orders from $ 5,000 to $ 10,000^^. 
The Federal Trade commission was armed with more powers by 
the enactment of the Magnusm-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act. This amendment popularly known as FTC 
Improvement Act has expanded jurisdictional reach of the commis-
sion to matters in or affecting commerce, confirms the commis-
sion's authority to promulgate trade regulation, rule defining 
Unfair or deceptive acts or practices, gives the commission an 
authority to represent itself in court proceedings and makes 
clear that the commission's investigating authority extends to 
persons, partnerships and corporations, instead of only corpora-
tion as in the past . 
Commenting on the Federal Trade Commission's powers to pro-
tect consumers J Collier says, the consumer redressal provisions 
clearly mean money out of the pockets of corporate offenders and 
in many cases money into the pockets of consumers . 
Indian Perspective: 
As British were the past colonial masters of this whole 
subcontinent, the whole body of the commercial legislation was 
replica of English Enactments, so there was every reason to 
sT! Section 408 (c) 
84. For detailed analysis of these amendments see Earl. W. 
Kintner & Christopher Smith," The Emergence of The Federal 
Trade Commission As A Formidable Consumer Protection 
Agency." Mercer. L. Rev. Vol 26, 1975 at 69. 
85. Wall Street Journal, Jan 20. 1975 at 12 col. 2. 
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follow the cannons of interpretation evolved and developed by 
the English courts. It is only after independence, that our 
legislators while thinking independently began to feel the inade-
quacy of Laws protecting consumer's Interest^^®. 
With the adoption of Constitution in Nov. 1949, the aspira-
tions of the people of India found an explicit expression in the 
preamble, fundamental rights and directive principles of state 
policy. The Constitution establishes a welfare state. We the 
people of India gave the Constitution unto ourselves to secure 
socio economic and political justice® . This objective of econom-
ic justice is the generic philosophy of which the consumer pro-
tection is a constituent element. It is in this generic sense of 
"We the people" that the term consumer is visualised by the 
Constitution. A 20th century Constitution of an exploited and 
under developed country could not afford to espouse a laissez-
faire policy^^ . 
Art. 14 of the Constitution of India guarantees equality 
before law to all persons. Therefore, producers, sellers and 
consumers are all equal before law either for receiving reward or 
punishment. Further, Article 14 guarantees equal protection of 
85a. The major legislations controlling anti consumer practices 
prior to independence were; The Indian Penal Code 1968, The 
Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
1940. 
86. Preamble to the India Constitution. 
87. V. P Bharatiya, Consumer Protection : So Much Done Much More 
To Be Done, Paper presented in a seminar on Consumer Protec-
tion through law conducted by the University of Jodhpur in 
1989. 
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laws to all persons. Constitutionally, state is enjoined to pass 
laws, in order to give protection to consumers against the un-
scrupulous traders. 
Art. 19(1) (g) guarantees a right to all citizens to carry on 
any occupation, trade or business and Art 301 guarantees freedom 
of Trade and Commerce. This right however, is subject to the 
restrictions contained in Art. 19(6) and Art. 304. It has been 
made clear that the freedom of trade or business does not include 
trade or business in immoral or criminal activities^ . So unfair 
trade practices are outside the constitutional protection. 
The Economic Justice, equality of status and equal protec-
tion of laws. Freedom of trade, business and the reasonable re-
strictions on such freedoms are all directly or indirectly aimed 
at what we term in modern context, as consumer protection. To 
achieve this, state is directed to promote the welfare of the 
people by securing to them justice, social, economic and politi-
cal to minimise the inequalities in income, status, facilities 
and opportunities^^, to secure to the citizens their right to an 
adequate means of livelihood to see that the ownership and con-
trol of the material resources of the community are so distribut-
ed as to subserve the common good, to ensure that the operation 
of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of protection to the common detriment, to make 
88. State of Bombay v. RM.D Chamar Bauswalla (1957) SCR 874. 
89. Art. 38. 
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available to both men and women equal pay for equal work, to 
protect human beings from exploitation on account of sex or 
tender age, to ensure that they are not forced by economic ne-
cessity to enter in a vocation unsuited to their age or 
strength^^. The state has to make effective provisions for secur-
ing right to work, public assistance in cases of unemployment, 
old age, sickness and disablement-^-^. 
The state has also to endeavour to secure to the workers a 
living wage, a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of 
leisure, to provide free education for children^^. Promote with 
special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker 
sections and protect them from all forms of exploitation^ . 
The state shall take into consideration the raising of the 
level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and 
the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and 
to introduce prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating 
drinks and of drugs injurious to health^^. For the raising of the 
nutritional standard and public health, the organisation of 
agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines 
is also recommended to the state^, as also the protection and 
?0"^  Art. 39. — — — 
91. Art. 41. 
92. Art. 45. 
93. Art. 46. 
94. Art. 47. 
95. Art. 48. 
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Improvement of the environment^^. Thus a constitutional duty is 
imposed on the state to protect consumers from the manipulative 
economics, indulged in by the business tycoons and state is en-
joined to formulate its policies in such a way as to ensure 
maximum possible benefits to the consumers. 
After independence, many laws preventing unfair trade prac-
tices have been enacted by the Indian Parliament", their scope 
is however, limited. They deal separately with the various dimen-
sions of the unfair trade practices. Since the present study is 
concerned With the unfair trade practices as covered under the 
Monopolies And Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969"°, and 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986^^ so the raison de'-etra of the two 
enactments is outlined here. 
Immediately after independence, big houses surreptiously 
began to accumulate more and more wealth as there was no legal 
mechanism to control this. They tried to control market by 
96. Art. 48 A. 
97. These are : The Drugs Control Act,1950; Indian Standards 
Institution (Certification Marks) Act, 1952 (since 
repealed); Drugs And Magic Remedies (objectionable adver-
tisement) Act,1954; Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 
1954; Essential Commodities Act,1955; Trade And Merchandise 
Marks Act,1958; Monopolies And Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act,1969; Cigarettes (Regulation of Production, Supply and 
Distribution Act, 1975; Standard of Weights and Measures 
(Enforcement) Act, 1985. The Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 
1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
98. Hereinafter referred to as MRTP Act. 
99. Hereinafter referred to as CP Act. 
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employing monopolistic and restrictive trade practices. In order 
to ensure that the economic power does not remain in the hands of 
few individuals or groups of business houses, it was thought 
advisable to make a thorough enquiry to see the actual function-
ing of the market forces. Jawahar Lai Nehru, the then Prime 
Minister while moving draft of third plan in parliament 
remarked^°°: 
An advance in our nations income and in our 
per capita income has taken place and I think it is 
desirable that we should enquire more deeply as to 
where this has gone. 
Accordingly on October 13, 1960 an expert committee under 
the chairmanship of Prof. Mahalonabis was set up which submitted 
its report in 1964. This committee found that despite all coun-
tervailing measures taken, concentration of economic power in the 
private sector, is more than what could be justified on function-
al grounds^ . In pursuance of the recommendations of this com-
nittee. Government of India appointed in April, 1964, the Monopo-
lies Inquiry Commission (MIC) which submitted its report on 
31.12.1965. Monopolies Inquiry Commission suggested inter alia 
that an independent statutory body known as MRTP commission be 
10 2 
established-^"^. In order to give effect to the recommendations 
of the MIC, MRTP Act, 1969 was passed and it came into force from 
100. On 22. 08. 1960. 
101. Report of,the Committee on the distribution of income and 
levels of in^TVnc Part I (1964), P. 1. 
102. Monopolies and Inquiry Commission Report (1965) 139. 
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1st. June, 1970. This Act thus was primarily aimed at preventing 
concentration of economic power, monopolistic practices and 
restrictive trade practices. However, Unfair Trade Practices were 
not covered by the Act. With the passage of time, in the imple-
mentation of the MRTP Act, certain problems were encountered and 
several obscurities and Lacunae where also noticed in the provi-
sions of the Act. So Government appointed a high powered expert 
committee (popularly known as Sachar Committee) for reviewing 
the provisions of the Act. With reference to unfair trade prac-
tices, the Sachar Committee made following observation: 
Our MRTP Act at present contains no provision for protection 
of the consumers against false or misleading advertisement 
or other similar unfair trade practices. The Act at present 
is directed against restrictive or. monopolistic trade prac-
tices. These provisions proceed on the assumption that if 
dealers, manufacturers or producers can be prevented from 
distorting competition, the consumers will get fair deal. 
But this is partly true. There is now greater recognition 
that consumers need to be protected,not only from the effect 
of restrictive practices but also from the practices which 
are resorted to by the trade and industry to mislead or dupe 
the customers^^**. 
The Sachar Committee pointed out that unfortunately our Act 
is totally silent on this aspect. The result is that the consumer 
has no protection against false or deceptive advertisements. Any 
misrepresentation about the quality of a commodity or the potency 
of a drug or medicine can be projected without much risk. This 
has created a situation of a very safe heaven for the suppliers 
103. Vide notification no 50 1981 dated 30-5-1981. 
104. Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and 
MRTP Act5(August 1978) at 262. 
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and a position of frustration and uncertainty for the consumers. 
Therefore, it should be the function of any consumer legislation 
10 5 to meet this challenge specifically-^"-^. 
Keeping in view the recommendations of the Sachar Committee, 
Parliament amended the MRTP Act in 1984 and a new chapter on 
unfair trade practices was incorporated in the Act. The Committee 
proposed various unfair trade practices to be enumerated in the 
definition ^nd with some exceptions, be punishable as an offence. 
Any person or undertaking indulging in any of them be liable to 
be prosecuted before the commission . However, this suggestion 
has not been accepted by the Parliament for the reason that these 
provisions are comparatively recent in origin and proper adminis-
trative machinery has to be geared up to track drown the viola-
tions throughout the length and breadth of the vast country, they 
are regulated by issue of prohibitory orders and orders for 
payment of compensation for loss or damage suffered by the con-
sumer and punishment by way of imprisonment enjoined upon only if 
those prohibitory orders are violated"^^^. A modified definition 
of Unfair Trade practice was incorporated in the MRTP (Amendment) 
Act, 1984 . The definition had six parts. First part governed 
the rest five parts which covered, false and misleading adver-
tisements ,bargain offers,offering of Gifts,prizes and conducting 
105. Id at 263 
106. Id at 272 
107. Lok Sabha Debates. MRTP (Amendment) Bill 1984 vol (48) May 
7 at 412. 
108. See Supra note 104 at 270. 
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of lotteries and contests, supply of goods hazardous to life and 
property and hoarding and destruction of goods. 
The main part of the definition which governed the rest, was 
as under: 
In this part, unless context otherwise requires, Unfair 
Trade practice means a trade practice which for the 
purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any 
goods or for the provision of any services, adoptes one 
or more of the following practices and there by causes 
loss or injury to the consumers of such goods or servic-
es, whether by eliminating or restricting competition or 
otherwise 
This original definition was rigid and applicable to only 
those practices which were enumerated in the definition itself. 
In order to provided flexible definition! will cover not only 
unfair trade practices which have been expressly mentioned but 
also those to be contrived, this definition was amended in the 
year 1991 and flexible definition was provided which is almost 
similar to the one provided in section 5 of the American Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 1914 as amended by the Wheeler lea Amend-
ment Act, 1938. 
For the better protection of the interests of consumers, the 
parliament passed the CP Act. The definition of the Unfair trade 
practice provided under the MRTP Act was bodily lifted and incor-
porated in the CP Act. However, the remedies available under the 
two Acts are different. Under the CP Act, remedies available are 
cheap. The procedure applicable is simple and free from technical 
Juggernauts and time is provided within which decisions should 
come. The remedies available under the two Acts are different. 
However, some common remedies are also provided. The CP Act 
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provides establishment of three tier quasi judicial bodies at 
District, State and National level. Where it is found necessary, 
more than one district forum can also be instituted. In the 
district forum a complaint of the value of 5 lakhs can be filed, 
more than five lakhs but less than 20 lakhs is the jurisdiction 
of the State Commission and more than that falls in the jurisdic-
tion of the National Commission. 
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DEFINITION 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE 
Like advancement in Science and Technology, a palpable 
advancement in the Paradigms, techniques, designs and methods of 
fraud and dishonesty with a view to bilk consumers came to no-
tice. Consumers who are generally ill informed, ignorant and 
inexperienced, most often than not fall in the trap of unscru-
pulous traders who by their garrulity and glib coax successfully 
consumers to purchase unwanted goods. In order to protect consum-
ers, a rapid increase in the recent past came to witness in the 
volume of legislation against not only fraud and dishonesty in 
commercial transactions but also against false or misleading 
advertisements, oppressive bargains and dangerous products. This 
regulation of unfair business practices is based on twin princi-
ples of curbing directly injurious practices which are caused by 
the imbalance in bargaining power between the parties or indi-
rectly by restraining unfair competition and Lfiereby ensuring 
high quality goods at lower prices^. 
2 
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 
until 1984 had power to prevent monopolistic and restrictive 
trade practices only and there was no provision to tackle the 
unfair business practices. The rationale was that if dealer, 
manufacturer or producer can be prevented from distorting compe-
tition, the consumers will get fair deal . However, this proved 
1. Cayne and Trebilcock, Market Consideration In The Formation Of 
Consumer Protection Policy, 23 U.Toronto LJ. 396, 1973. 
2. Hereinafter referred to as the MRTP Act, 1969. 
3. Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and 
MRTP Acts popularly known as Sachar Committee's Report, 1978 
at 262. 
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partly true. Thus in order to curb unfair business practices, 
parliament on the recommendations of the Sachar Committee insert-
ed a chapter on unfair trddt.' practices in the MRTP Act to bol-
ster and supplement the law relating to restrictive Trade Prac-
tices . 
Section 36-A of the MRTP Act defines unfair trade practices 
and similar definition of unfair trade practices has been provid-
ed in the Consumer Protection Act^'^. 
Definition of Unfair Trade Practice: 
The first part of this definition runs as under: 
In this part, unless context otherwise requires, unfair 
trade practice means a trade practice which for the 
purpose of promoting sale, use or supply of goods or 
for the provision of services, adopts any unfair method 
or unfair or deceptive trade practice*.,. 
Further, clauses (1) to (5) of section 36-A of the MRTP Act 
and section 2(r) of the CP Act cover various forms of unfair 
trade practices such as false representation; bargain sale; 
offering gifts and conducting of promotional contests; supply of 
products which do not comply with the safety standards; and 
hoarding and destruction of goods. 
4. Gazette of India Text 22 Dec, 1984 part ] Ind Sec 2 (No.54) at 
37. 
5. However, preamble to the MRTP Act was not amended to reflect 
this change. See T.N panday; In-adequacies in the Bill. The 
Economic Times (New Delhi) P 11,1984. 
5a.Herein-after referred to as the CP Act. 
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The first part of the definition makes it clear that the 
existence of trade practice is necessary for sustaining charges 
under section 36-A of the MRTP Act or under section 2{r) of the 
CP Act°. This Trade Practice means a practice relating to carry-
ing on of a trade and trade means any business; industry, pro-
fession or occupation relating to the production, supply, distri-
bution o^r control of goods and includes the provisions of any 
o 
service . Hpwever , there o^ a: no def ini t ions of "Trade practice"and 
"Trade " provided under the CP Act. It is suggested that the 
definitions of these two expressions be also provided in the CP 
Act to avoid any ambiguity. 
The second ingredient of the definition is that the objec-
tive of the trade practice must be the promotion of sale, use or 
supply of goods or services. It is immaterial whether due to such 
promotion sale did go up or not . 
The words "sale", "use" or "supply" used in the definition 
are of wide connotation. The word "use" is concomitant result of 
sale or supply. If trader promots use of the goods or services, 
he in fact promotes sale or supply of those goods or services. 
Thus there is an obvious reason to include "use" within the 
confines of the definition. 
6. Surya Scooters P V. Greaves Cotton & Co (1993)3 Comp CJ 283. 
7. See Section 2 (v) of the MRTP Act. 
8. Section 2 (s) . 
9. Oswal Agro Mills ltd. In the matter of UTPE No.2 5 of 1985, 
decided on 27th March, 1987. 
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The word "supply" is much wider than the "sale" and Includes 
transaction by which goods are leased or supplied under the hire 
purchase arrangements. 
The definition prohibits promotion of goods or services by 
employing unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice. However, 
it is not clear whether this prohibition applies to only existing 
goods or also to future goods^^. 
MRTP Conunission in Surya Scooters (p) v. Greaves Cotton £ 
observed: 
That before there can be any trade, there must be some 
goods with respect to which any trade or business or 
industry can be carried on or run. There can be no 
trade practice if there are no goods. 
The above opinion of the MRTP commission is based on the 
ground that the goods mean as defined in the Sale of Goods Act 
and includes among other things products manufactured, processed 
or mined in India. The words used here are "manufactured, pro-
cessed or mined " which in the present context imply, goods which 
have been already manufactured, processed or mined and not which 
will be manufactured, processed or mined. 
It is a submitted that the observation of the MRTP Commis-
sion is not based on correct interpretation of the term "goods" 
10. Future Goods have been defined as those goods which are not 
both existing and identified. A purported present sale of 
such goods operates as a contract to sell UCC 2-105 (2). 
Section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 defines future goods 
as those goods which have been agreed to be produced or 
manufactured or procured by the seller. 
11. Supra note 6. 
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and has overlooked the history behind the amendment made to goods 
which resulted in the incorporation of the words "products Manu-
factured, processed or mind in India". 
The original definition of the goods in the MRTP Act^^ was 
defined with reference to the sale of Goods Act, 1930. This 
definition was amended in the year, 1984 on the recommendations 
of the Sach^r Committee. The Committee made following pertinent 
remarks: 
The existing definition of goods does not cover the case 
of investment companies dealing in Stocks and shares and 
other activities like mining or processing eg. fish and 
animal products which are not covered under the definition 
of goods in the Sale of Goods Act. Many Investment compa-
nies maintain that they are not undertakings within the 
meaning of the Act as the existing definition of Goods 
would not include dealings in stocks and shares. In order 
to put matter beyond doubt. We would therefore, recommend 
that the definition of the goods should be revised... The 
proposed definition would run as follows:-
"Goods" means goods as defined in the Sale of 
Goods Act (ACT III of 1930) and Includes products 
manufactured, mined or processed in India . 
Thus it is amply clear that the object of incorporating an 
additional clause in the definition o£ the "goods" was not to 
restrict it to only those goods which have been already manufac-
tured, processed or mined but the purpose of this amendment was 
as mentioned by the Sachar Committee. 
The definition of the "goods" taken as a whole reads: 
Goods means as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 
(3 of 1930) and includes: 
i) Products manufactured, processed or mined in India, 
i i) .... 
12. Section 2(1) of the CP Act defines goods still with refer-
ence tothe Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
13. Supra note 3 at 240. 
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The manner of construing an inclusive clause and its widening 
effect has been explained in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps^ 
and has been followed in a series of cases-*-^  in India, it has 
been laid down: 
"include" is very generally used in order to enlarge 
meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body 
of the Statute, and when it is so used, these words or 
phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only 
such things as they signify according to their natural 
Import, but also those things which the definition 
clause declares that they shall include". 
Thus clause (1) cannot limit the operation of the main definition 
but has definitely widened the scope of the main definition by 
virtue of the word "includes". 
If the interpretation of the commission given in Surya 
Scooters is taken as the correct proposition of law, then two 
practical difficulties will crop up. 
Firstly, where for example a company whose goods are still 
in the manufacturing stage falsely advertises that the goods are 
of particular quality and discontinues the advertisement when 
goods are actually thrown open in the market. Then a consumer who 
purchases goods in pursuance of the advertisement, will get no 
compensation for any loss or injury as the goods were not in 
existence at the time when advertisement was made. 
14. 1899 AC 99 
15. Regional Director Employees State Insurance Co. v. High 
land Coffee Works of PFX, Saldentia and Sons and another, 
1991 (3) sec 617; CIT AP v. M/S Taj Mahal Hotel Secundera-
bad, 971 (3) SCC 550; and the State of Bombay and others v. 
The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC510; 
Lucknow Development authority v. MK Gupta, 1994 SCJ. 103. 
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Secondly , if the view that the goods must be in existence 
at the time when representation was made is upheld then the same 
test must be applied to "services" also. Since services unlike 
goods have no permanent existence and may be regarded as being 
inchoate until they are actually supplied^^^ It will be difficult 
to apply the Act to a representation, for example, the qulity of 
services which have not at the time the representation is made, 
1 n 
actually been supplied"^ '. The stand of the Australian courts is 
that where a person makes a statement in an advertisement about 
the quality of service that he is offering, it will be read in 
the advertisement as containing not only a promise that service 
of that quality will be provided to those responding to the 
advertisement, but also statement of fact that the service 
which the advertiser is currently offering or providing (or has 
in the past provided) to his customers »_, of the statedL 
1 8 quality-^", and where it is not possible on facts, says 
19 Hartnell-^^, it may well be possible to imply a representation of 
the fact concerning the advertiser's intention as to the future 
or ability to provide services of the quality promised . It is 
therefore submitted that where a representation is made regarding 
the goods not in -existence, the approach adopted should be to 
16. Hartnell, "Consumer Protection Provisions Of The Trade 
Practices Act", (1979) 53 ALJ 544. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Henderson V. Poineer Homes Pvt (1980) 29 ALR 597. 
19. Supra note 16. 
20. Id at 550. 
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read an intention on the part of the advertiser that when goods 
will come into existence, they will be of stated quality etc and 
of course a person will get remedy only when goods come into 
existence but devoid of the represented quality. 
The application of the MRTP and CP Acts to shares and deben-
tures was time and again debated before the MRTP commission and 
redressal agencies. The term goods has been defined under these 
Acts with reference to Sale of Goods Act, 1930^^ and shares and 
2 2 stocks are expressly mentioned in that definition'^. However, 
that definition is silent on the shares before allotment. The 
2 3 
supreme court in Gopal Jalan and co v. S E Association^^ laid 
down that till allotment., shares do not exist and it is only 
after allotment that they come in to existence. This opinion was 
* 
also followed by the MRTP commission in subsequent cases''^  and in 
Consumer Education Centre v. T T K Pharma^^^the Full Bench of the 
21. See section 2 (e) of the MRTP Act and section 2 (1) (i) of 
the CP Act. 
22. Section 2 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act defines goods as 
every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and 
money; and includes stocks and shares, growing crops grass and 
things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed 
to be severed before or under the contract of sale. 
23. AIR 1964 SC 250. 
24. D G (l&R) v. M/S spring steel ltd. UTPE No 457/87;DG (l&R) 
V. M/s Universal luggage Mfg. UTPE No 7/87; DG (l&R) v. M/s 
Moser Beer India ltd UTPE 393/87; DG v. M/s Rock land leas-
ing ltd UTPE 44/88; DG (l&R) v. M/s Nagarar June Fertilizers 
and chemicals ltd UTPE 73/87; DG (l&R) v. Kumanwalia Housing 
Development finance co ltd (1991) 2 comp. LJ 452, DG (l&R) 
V. M/s Federal loyal corporation ltd, UTPE 125/86; DG (l&R) 
V. lohia Machines ltd kanpur (1985)2 Comp LJ 247; J.P Sharma 
V. Reliance petro chemicals (1988) 3 Comp LJ 289, 
24CL- (1990) 68 Comp Cas 89. 
MRTP commission went a head by holding that issuing of shares or 
debentures is a mode of raising capital. Raising capital is 
making of arrangements for carrying on of any trade. It is just 
like purchasing furniture or appointing employees which are 
necessary arrangements for trade but has no connection with the 
mode or method of carrying on a trade. The definition of trade 
practice under the MRTP Act makes it clear that it is a trade 
practice relating to carrying on of any trade and cannot be said 
that a company is trading in shares when it issues shares to 
public^^. 
In order to obviate the effect of the above rulings, the 
MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 amended section 2 (c) to the effect 
that the shares and stocks including issue of shares before 
allotment would be treated as goods for the purposes of the MRTP 
Act, However, this amendment has not removed all those flaws 
which were pointed out by the Full Bench in T T K Pharma i e. 
the definitions of trade and trade practice have not been 
amended nor any explanation to this effect has been appended so 
as to clear the present ambiguity. After this amendment to 
the definition of goods, the M R T P Commission had an 
occasion in Dinesh Gupta v. Reliance polythylene Itdr and 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — - , _ — — _ — ^ — _ „ „ _ » _ — _ — ^ — *. — _jft 
25. Similar observation was made by the MRTP commission in re 
oswal Agro fortune limited UTPE No 159 of 1988 comp L Digest 
vol. X VII No.11. Kamanwala Housing Development Corporation 
limited UTPE No 218 of 1987 decided on 24.4.1991; Continen-
tal Construction limited RTPE No.211/86 decided on 18.11. 
1987, Comp L Digest Vol xvii No 11, Ankur Electronics limit-
ed, Comp L Digest Vol. xi No,1; UP Electronics corp. v. 
Union of India C A No. 2690 of 1992 decided on 26.8. 1992. 
26. (1993) 1 CTJ MRTPC 
K G V, Skypak Couriers^'' to deliberate upon a complaint alleging 
unfair trade practice in relation to issue of shares and convert-
able debentures. But in neither of the cases the issue of main-
tainability of the complaint on the ground that the issue of 
shares does not amount to "trade" and "trade practice" was 
raised. So the commission decided these cases on merits. In Sohan 
lal M Baldva v N E P C Agro Goods ItcP-^ however, the MRTP commis-
sion without making any reference to the controversial issues 
like the definition of trade and trade practice held that delay 
in refunding share application money is a case of unfair trade 
practice as the services were not of the quality as claimed. 
On the other hand the definition of goods has not been 
amended under the CP Act like the MRTP Act. Keeping in view the 
opinion of the supreme court in Gopal Jalan, a complaint in re-
spect of the shares before allotment cannot lie before the re-
dressal agencies. However, without touching to the root of the 
problem, the Rajasthan state commission in LC Chandgotya v North-
ern leasing and Industries^ upheld the opinion of the District 
forum that the stocks and shares are included in the definition 
of the goods and in N Maduram Financial services pvt Itdv. Modern 
woolen Itd^^, the Tamil Nadu state commission in order to protect 
27. (1993) 1 C T J 20 MRTPC. 
28. (1993) 2 Comp LJ 268. 
29. (1991) 2 CPJ 19. 
30. (1992) 2 CPJ 756. 
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the interest of consumer and to escape from the controversy of 
the definition of Trade and Trade practice held that those who 
purchase the shares and debentures from the existing share hold-
ers and seek the transfer from the company in their name, are 
persons who have hired services of the company for consideration, 
the consideration being the value of the shares or debentures and 
they are therefore, consumers within the meaning of section 2 (1) 
(d) (ii) of the Act. In between these two opinions, the complain-
ant's counsel In DR. B S Gob.i v. Steel Author i ty of India ^, 
stated that although allotment of shares is not a service, the 
delay in such allotment will amount to deficiency of service. 
This plea was not accepted by the commission and held that in a 
contract of sale of goods simplicltor, mere delay in delivery 
therefore, , beyond the agreed date would not convert it into 
deficiency of service within the meaning of the Act. 
The National commission found opportunity to deliberated on 
this issue in Gurdial sing and ozs v. united land and Housing ltd 
and sons''^ and Ram Naryana Paramesh Warayar v. Larsen and Toubro 
33 qf 
ltd-'-'. In Gurdial Singh, issue was relating to sale shares to 
complainant with a stipulation for repurchase. The apex commis-
sion held that this was purely a transaction of sale of goods and 
not an agreement of hiring of any service '*. This proposition 
31. (1991) CPJ 631. 
32. 11(1993) CPJ NC 216. 
33. (1993)1 CTJ 116 
34. Id at 217. 
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was carried further by the Haryana state commission in M/B P 
Flzer ltd V. Hanssaf singl?^ by holding that stocks and shares, 
being goods, their purchase by investor prima facie is not for 
consumption or use, but for commercial purpose . In Ram Natyan 
Paramesh the complaint was regarding delay in the delivery of 
allotment letters to the allottee of the debentures. The National 
commission without delving on the basic issue held that if the 
debenture holder had purchased the debentures for resale which he 
could not effect in the absence of allotment letters, the trans-
action would become a transaction for commercial purpose and 
therefore he would not be a consumer. Thus held the debenture 
holder as the consumer of goods. The commission also held that 
the consumer forum can consider his claim for compensation under 
section 14 (1) (d) for any liquidated damages only in case it is 
established that he has suffered loss due to deficiency in serv-
ice and negligence on the part of the respondent. 
The issue of shares came up before the supreme court also in 
Morgan stanly Mutual Fund v. Kartikdas^^. The apex court first 
made it clear that although there is no definition of Trade 
Practice under the CP Act, yet as per rules, the expression Trade 
practice shall have the same meaning as provided under the MRTP 
Act. Then the apex court made the same observation as was made by 
the MRTP commission in T T K Pharma. It was held that the share 
35. 111(1993) CPJ 1721. 
36. Id at 1728 See also Braham Dutta Agarwal v. San Tubes ltd and 
ors (1994) 3 CPR 78. 
37. 11 (1994) CPJ 7 Sc at 16. 
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means share in capital. The object of issuing the same is for 
building of capital. To raise capital means making arrangements 
for carrying on the trade. It is not a practice relating to 
carrying on of any trade. Creation of share capital without 
allotment of shares does not bring shares into existence. There-
fore, a prospective investor is not a consumer, nor do have con-
sumer courts jurisdiction in the matters of this kind . 
The decision in Sohan lal M Baldawa laid down by the MRTP 
commission was overruled by it In 0 G V. Deepak Fertilizer co 
Itdr^ in the light of the supreme court's ruling in Morgan Stan-
ley. The commission held (1) that the debentures before allotment 
are not goods under MRTP Act, 1969 and it makes no difference 
whether the debentures are convertible or ordinary. (2) Even 
assuming that the debentures are goods even prior to their allot-
ment, no Trade or Trade practice is involved where the company 
merely offers the issue for subscription to the public by way of 
raising capital for its trade or business; (3) it can also not 
amount to hiring of service. 
From the afore discussed case law, it is still not clear as 
to whether MRTP Act or CP Act applies to shares and debentures. 
One view is that the shares and debentures before allotment are 
not goods and even after allotment, company issuing shares cannot 
be said as trading in them but it is simply a mode of raising 
capital. This means that the MRTP (Amendment Act) 1991 which 
38. Id at 17 see also Godrej soaps ltd v sham Sunder Gupta and 
ors (1994) 2 C T J 753 (supreme court) 
39. (1994) 3 Comp L J 614. 
Included shares before allotment in the definition of goods, has 
not changed any position as the corresponding changes in the 
definition of "Trade" and- "Trade practice" have to "be made so 
that shares and debentures before and after allotment are cov-
ered and even if these amendments are made, a complaint cannot 
lie before the consumer redressal agencies as the consumer who 
purchases the goods for commercial purpose or for resale is 
excluded fron the purview of the CP Act, Another views is to hold 
it as a service to the consumer and to provide relief in case 
service is found deficient . It is submitted that the latter 
approach is more beneficial & in accord with the objectives of 
the two Acts. If it is hold otherwise, then the investors will be 
left without any protection as his complaint will neither be 
covered under the MRTP*Act nor CP Act. Such beneficial construc-
tion to the CP Act was advocated by the supreme court in Lucknow 
Development Authority v. M K Gupta^^ which will apply mutatis 
mutandis to the MRTP Act also. It was said: 
The provisions of the Act have to be construed in 
favour of the consumer to achieve the purpose of enact-
ment as it ii: a social benefit oriented legislation. 
The primary duty of the court while construing the 
provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive 
approach subject to that it should not do violence to 
the language of the provisions and is not contrary to 
attempted objectives of the enactment^^ 
If the above approach is adopted, then there is no need of 
making any amendment in the two Acts as the word "Financial" is 
40. (1994) SCJ Vol. 1 at 103, 
41. Id at 111. 
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expressly mentioned in the definition of service^^ and services 
even if of commercial nature, are included in the CP Act. It will 
not be out of place to mention here that in order to protect 
investors from the unfair trade practices of the business commun-
ity. Truth in Lending Act and Financial Services Act, 1986 have 
been passed in America and England respectively but in India 
quasi judicial bodies are still groping in the dark to understand 
as to what constitutes financial service. 
The MRTP and CP Acts enjoy the distinction of giving protec-
tion not only to consumers of goods but also consumers of servic-
es. For this purpose definition of the word "Service" has been 
provided under the both Acts^^. It is in three parts. The main 
part is followed by inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary 
clause. The main clause itself is very wide. It applies to "any 
service made available to potential users". The word "any" and 
"potential" are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word 
"any" dictionarily means "one or some or all" and has a diversity 
of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as 
well as "same" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute de-
pends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. The 
42. See S.S.H Azmi; Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartic Das : A 
Critique XI Alig LJ 1996 at 50. 
43. Section 2(o) of the CP Act and 2(r) of the MRTP Act defines 
the term service as : Service means service of any descrip-
tion which is made available to potential users and includes 
the provisions of facilities in connection with banking, 
financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of elec-
trical or other energy, board or lodging or both (housing 
construction) entertainment, amusement or the purveying of 
news or other information, but does not include the rendering 
of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal 
service. 
other word "potential" is again very wide. It means capable of 
coming into being^ possibility. In other words service which is 
not only extended to actual users but those who are capable of 
using it are covered in the definition. The clause is thus very 
wide and extends to any or all, actual or potential users. But 
the legislature did not stop here. It expanded the meaning of 
service further in modern sense by extending it to even such 
facilities as are available to a consumer in connection with 
banking, financing etc^^. In absence of any indication, express 
or implied, the definition covers services provided by the au-
thorities created by the statute^^. This definition is wide 
enough to cover not only services enumerated but also other 
AC 
services which can be read as implied in the definition^". 
The services free of charge or "under a contract of personal 
service" are excluded from the purview of the two Acts. The term, 
"contract of personal service" has not been defined under the act 
44. Supra note 40 at 113. 
45. See Indian Medical Association v. V P Shantha & Ors (1995) 11 
CPR 412 in which medical services were held to be included in 
the definition. Similarly education has been field a:; covered 
in the definition of service see Oza Nirav Kanubhai v. Cen-
tral Head apply Industries Ltd. and Ors (1992) 1 CPR 735; 
Abel Pacheio Graciov v. Principal Bharathi Vidye Peeth 
1(1992) CPJ 105; M. Subesh v. Official in charge 11(1992) CPJ 
933 and Tilak Raj v. Haryana School Education Board (1991) 
2CPR 309. 
46. (1992) 2 Comp. LJ 242 See also Cosmopolitan Hospital Authori 
ties 4 Anr v. V P Nair (1992) 3 Comp. LJ 80. 
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the Act. However/ the National Commission in Modgi v. Crosswell 
Tailors^^ held that there is a well established difference 
between "contract of personal service" and contract for personal 
service". The contract of personal service involves a master 
servant relationship where servant has no discretion but has to 
follow the directions of the master. In other words, contract of 
personal service covers a situation where master not only dic-
tates the servant what he has to do but also how he has to do. 
But in contract for personal service, the master only informs his 
servant what he has to do and how he will do it is the job of the 
servant. This distinction was also confirmed by the Supreme Court 
in Indian Medical Council Authorities v. V. P. Shantha^^. 
The present definition of unfair trade practice provided in 
the MRTP and CP Act, was incorporated through MRTP (Amendment) 
Act, 1991 and CP (Amendment) Act, 1993 respectively. The unamend-
ed definition was restrictive in its scope and was confined to 
only those unfair business practices which were mentioned in 
the definition itself. Thus those practices which were not men-
tioned in the definition, could not be questioned before the MRTP 
Commission or Redressal Agencies. 
47. Supra note 46. 
48. The definition before amendment was as follows : In this 
part, unless the context otherwise requires, unfair trade 
practice means a trade practice which for the purpose of 
promoting sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provi-
sion of any services, adopts one or more of the following 
practices and thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers 
of such goods or services, whether by eliminating or re-
stricting competition or otherwise. 
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The tirst para ot the amended detinition of the unfair trade 
practice is almost similar to Section 5(a)(1) of the definition 
provided under the federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 as amended 
by Wheeler-lea Amendment Act, 1938 of United States. This defini-
tion runs as follows: 
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawlui. 
ijince une worda unrair method and unfair or deceptive prac-
tices are or uiMiiiiiai iinpor Lance and m tact have to a consider-
aPie extent wiaenea the scope and ambit of the detinition, neith-
er these words have been derined in any of the two Acts nor have 
either MKTP Commission or Consumer Redressal Aqencies found 
chance to expound these concepts. So for proper understanding of 
these, terms, exposition of the American courts can be of great 
help. The words inserted in the amended definition of the Unfair 
Trade Practice have wide connotation and have potential to em-
brace the situations not yet conceived^^. So instead of enumerat-
ing the few practices and leaving many, the best possible ap-
proach was adopted by inserting the words which can cover any 
trade practice wnich can rairlv be said as unfair or deceptive, 
united states Lonqress stated tne redsons tor not enumerating the 
4^. Commenting on the dynamic naLure ot original section b of FTC 
Act, Senator Cummins Jaid, "The words unfair competition can 
grow ana broaden and mould themselves to meet circumstances 
as they arise,just as the words restraint of trade have grown 
and been moulded in order to meet the necessities of the 
American people. 51 Cong. REC 1400 3(1914). 
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specific practices with unusual candour in the Conference 
Report'^ in the following words: 
It Is Impossible to frame definitions which embrace all 
unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventive-
ness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices 
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would at 
once be necessary to begin over again. If congress were 
to adopt the method of definitions, it would undertake 
endless task. It is also practically impossible to 
define unfair practices so that the definition will fit 
business of ever sort in every part of the country-* . 
The concepts incorporated in the definition are discussed 
hereunder: 
Unfairness Doctrine 
In United States after the wheeler-lea Amendment Act, 1938 
till, 1972, there was no authoritative opinion as to what consti-
tutes unfair trade practice. In 1964, Federal Trade Commission 
Issued a policy statement popularly known as Cigarette Rule^^. 
50. HR. Rep. No. 1142, 63 Cong. 2nd Sess. 19(1914) Cf. EarlW. 
Kintner Christopher Slmith, The Emergence of the Federal 
Trade Commission As a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 
Mercer Law Review 1975 Vol,26, P.656. 
51.The senate Committee on Interstate commerce Report Endorsing 
the trade Commission bill voiced same sentiments: The Commit-
tee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether 
it would attempt to define the many variable unfair practices 
which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance or 
whether it would by a general declaration condemning unfair 
practices , leave it to commission to determine what practices 
were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be 
better, for the reason, as stated by one of the representa-
tives of the Illinois Manufacturer Association, that there 
were too many practices to define, and after writing 20 of 
them in to the law, it would be quite possible to Invent 
others. Ibid. 
52.Statement of Basis and purpose of Trade Regulation, Unfair or 
Deceptive Advertising and labeling of cigarettes in relation 
to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed Reg 8325, 8355 
(1964). 
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The Criteria set out in this rule were apparently approved by the 
US Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co.^ which are as follows: 
1. Whether the practice, without necessarily having 
been previously considered unlawful, offend public 
policy as it has been established by statutes, the 
common law or otherwise whether in otherwords, it 
is within at least the penumbra of some common law 
statutory, or other established concepts of unfair-
ness; 
2. Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; 
3. Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers 
(or competitors or other businessmen). 
This judgment has cast bread on wide waters. The public 
policy, morality and ethics which are devoid of precise meaning 
have been declared as a touchstone to label the trade practice as 
unfair. Although nineteenth century judges tried to crystalize 
the heads of public policy '*, yet judicial views inevitably 
differ upon whether a particular contract is immoral or subver-
sive of the common good, there is no necessary continuity in the 
general policy of law^-^, for what is anathema to one genera-
53. 405 US 233, 244-45 n. 5(1972). 
54. For instance, a contract of marriage brokerage, unfair or 
unreasonable dealings, the creation of perpetuity, a contract 
in restraint of trade, wagering contract are declared as void 
for being opposed to public policy. For illuminating discus-
sion on public policy see, winfield, public policy in the 
English Common Law, 42 Mar LR 76-102 (1928). 
55. Cheshir, Fifoot and Furmitlaw of contract. (12th ed) 1991 at 
357. 
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tion seems harmless to another^^. So Lord Atkin's words of cau-
tion merits highlighting that the doctrine of public policy 
should only be invoked in clear case in which harm to the public 
is substantially incontestable and does not depend upon the 
Idiosyn-cratic inference of a few judicial minds^ . Otherwise 
public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term^ and when once 
eg 
you get astride it, you never know where it will carry you*^ "^ . 
Like public policy, ethics and morality are also dependent on the 
vagaries of Individual and social outlook. If ethics be termed as 
ideal pictures of life, individually formed and followed by men 
and morality as rules or principles governing human behaviour 
which apply universally within a community or class®'^ . Then the 
question is whose ethics and whose morality should determine the 
character of a trade practice. Since the law relating to trade 
practices cannot be framed for each individual, community or 
class separately, should then only those moral principles be 
C 1 
gleaned which in the eyes of Hart°-^, are so originally connected 
56. For instance, a contract to hire a hall for a meeting to 
promote atheism was held contrary to public policy in cowan 
V. Milbourn (1867) LR 2 Exch-230 but fifty years later this 
view was rejected in Bowman v. Secular Society (1917) A C 
406. 
57. Fender V.St. John Mildmay (1938) ACl See also Gherulal V. 
Mohadeodes AIR 1959 SC 781. 
58. Parke B In Egerton V.Brown Low (1853) 4 HLC 1, 123. 
59. Atkin J In Richardson V. Mullish, (1924) 2 Bing. 229, 252. 
60. A.M. Matta, Moral Values; Religion and the Law: Some observa-
tions, 11: 2 RLR (1993) 178. 
61. Hart. H.L.A. Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) at 11. 
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with the central coze^^ that its preservation is required as a 
vital bastion. Again the test is subjective one and will be 
coloured by the idiosyncrasies of the judges which Lord Atkin so 
vehemently tried to abjure while deliberating on the public 
policy issue°^. There is also no consensus on the extent to which 
the law should enforce moral values^. 
Commenting on the Spezry & Hutchinson doctrine an Australian 
writer observes°^: 
The breadth of the American provision seems, on the 
casual observation of an outsider, to be its greatest 
asset and (potentially) its greatest failing. On the onfi, 
hand, it is extremely flexible and therefore can be 
employed in furtherance of almost any regulatory poli-
cy. On the other hand, it is startlingly vague. It is 
clear from the decision in Sperry & Hutchinson that the 
prohibition is not Limited to deceptive practices nor 
confined to activities with antitrust or other economic 
implications. What then are its limits. In its lack of 
definition, it runs the danger of becoming a rallying 
point for an almost infinite variety of causes. Unrea-
soned application of the standard might ultimately 
62. For Hart in every society there is to be found ... a central 
core of rules or principles which constitutes it Ibid. 
63. Supra note 59. 
64. John Stuart Mills opined that coercion can only be justified 
for the purpose of preventing harm to others. For a discus-
sion on Mill's stand see Smark,49 Can,Bar» Rev. 188, 197-200. 
On the other hand Hart extends the role of the law by his 
acceptance of "Paternalism" in addition to Mills reliance on 
harmful consequences to others, law Liberty and Morality 
(1963), at 30-34. Lord Derlin has advocated another extreme 
by holding that he was not seeking to say that law must 
automatically punish in the case of offences against morali-
ty, but rather there are no circumstances in which you can 
say that law may not punish in such cases. The listener June 
18,1964 Cf. Lord Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (1972) 
(3 ed) at 53. 
65. A.J.Duggan, Fairness in Advertising; In pursuit of the Hidden 
persuaders, Melb. Ul. Rev. Vol.11 June 1977 at 63, 
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either erode the effectiveness of regula-tory activity 
or threaten the survival of the activity regulated°°. 
The unfairness doctrine propounded by the US Supreme 
Court in Sperzy & Hutchinson's case, was later on applied to a 
number of trade practices which can be classified as; claims 
published without reasonable prior substantiation" ; 
claims, which tend to reach or exploit particular vulnerable 
66. Similar views were expressed by Robert Pitofsky in his arti-
cle, "Beyond Nader: Consumer protection And the Regulation of 
Advertising; He observes: The Supreme Court's broad grant of 
authority to the FTC to develop new rules in the consumer 
protection field is too vague to provide any meaningful 
enforcement guidelines, Har L.Rev.Vol.90, No. 4 Feb 1977 at 
681. At another occasion the learned author observes: many 
people are legitimately concerned that the term (Unfairness) 
is so vague as to be useless in predicting what is legal and 
so general as to confer on the commission excessive legisla-
tive authority... sperry & Hutchinson makes even commission-
ers wonder about the limits of their authority see Pitofsky 
in Kirkpatrick; Elman, pitofsky and Baxter, Debate: The 
Federal Trade Commission under Attack: Should Commissions 
Role Be Changed? 49 Antitrust L J. 1481,1492 (1980). 
67. Previous to Ptizer Inc, 81 FTC 23 (1972), substantiation of 
claims relating to health & safety was necessary but in pti-
zer's case this requirement of substantiation was extended 
even to the claims not relating to health & safety. The ra-
tionale of this requirement was held to be that it is imprac-
tical to expect individual consumers to run test on the thou-
sands of products they purchase and that it is more efficient 
for a seller to run test once for each product claim. The 
consumers are entitled to the substantiation information and 
should not be compelled to enter into an economic gamble to 
.determine whether a product will or will not perform as 
represented. Thus unsubstantiated claims that Firestone 
safety stops 25% quicker (Fire stone Tire & Rubber Co. (1970-
73 Transfer binder) Trade Reg. Rep. 320, 112, at 22, 069 (FTC 
1973), Vaga is the best handling passengers car ever built. 
(General Motors Corp et al (1970-73 Transfer binder) 3 Trade 
Reg.Rep 20747 at 20,600 (FTC 1974), reserve cooling power-
only Fedders has this important features Fedders Corp; 3 
Trade Reg. Rp, S 20,825 at 20691 (PTC 1975) were declared 
unfair Trade practices. For criticism of this claim substan-
tiation doctrine see Supra note 68 at 683. 
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c a 
groups"" and instances in which sellers fail to provide consumers 
with information necessary to make choice among competing pro-
ducts'^. 
Unfairness Doctrine : New Approach: 
In the process of expanding horizon of the Unfairness doc-
trine, the Federal Trade Commission of USA proposed in 1978 to 
regulate advertising on TV programme aimed primarily at children. 
While these ads were rarely 'deceptive' in the conventional 
sen$-e, the commission argued that they 'unfairly' took the advan-
tage of susceptibilities of the young viewing audience. By con-
gressional dictate, however this rule making power was aborted in 
1980*^ °. In the wake of criticism of the children's Advertising 
68.In ITT Continental Baking Co.83 FTC 1105 (1973), claim that 
wonder bread helps in dramatic growth of children was held to 
have exploited the aspirations of children and parental con-
cern for rapid and healthy growth and development id at 872. 
69.At one stage commission in Alberty v. FTC had opined that an 
advertisement cannot be said to be misleading if it is not 
more informative, 182 F 2d 36 (DC Cir) 340 US 818 (1950). But 
later on commission came with a different opinion. See for 
instance, non disclosure by the vocational schools of the 
percentage of enrollers who do not complete the course, the 
percentage of graduates who do not obtained employment and the 
salaries and employment of graduates who do obtain job was 
declared unfair, Lafayette United Corp. (1973-76) Transfer 
Binder) Trade Reg Rep (CCH) 20,499 (FTC 1974). Similarly 
failure to declare future land development programms and 
failure to state that the purchase price off lots is not all 
inclusive, by promoters was said to be unfair. AMREP. 
Corp,(1973-76 Transfer Binder) Trade Reg. Rep. CCH 20, 846 
(FTC 1975) see also Horizon Corporation (1973-1976 Transfer 
Binder) Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) 20,845 (FTC 1975) Similarly In re 
International Harvester co. 104 FTC 949 (1984), ejection of 
hot'fuel in the Harvester's tractors which could result in the 
serious fires and which was in the knowledge of the Harvester 
company but did not notify it was held as unfair practice. 
70.FTC Act Section 18 (i), USCA Section 57 (a) (i) "The Commis-
sion shall not have authority to promulgate any rule in the 
children's advertising proceeding... On the basis... that such 
advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice". 
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Rule proposed in 1978, the Commission issued a policy statement 
on unfairness in 1980^-^ which delineated the implications of the 
three test criteria laid down in Spezry & Hutchinsons (Supra). A 
resume of this policy statement is here under. 
Consumer injury; 
The commission in its policy statement laid down that the 
independent nature of the consumer injury does not mean that 
every consumer injury is legally 'unfair'. To justify a finding 
of unfairness the injury must satisfy two tests. It must be 
substantial. It must not be outweighed by any counter-vailing 
benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; 
and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not 
reasonably have avoided^. As examples of substantial injury, the 
statement referred to monetary harm as when sellers coerce con-
sumers into purchasing unwanted goods and services or when con-
sumers buy defective goods or services on credit but are unable 
to assert against the creditor claims or defenses arising from 
the Transaction or unwarranted health and safety risks. On the 
other hand, emotional impact and other more subjective type of 
harm were ordinarily excluded. 
71.The policy statement had a political purpose-to keep congress 
off from stripping the FTC all or part its power to regulate 
unfair practices. Infra note 72. This policy statement has no 
binding effect and could be disregarded or rejected by courts 
or future commissions. 
72.These are excerpts of the letter called FTC's policy state-
ment. For full text of the letter see 4 CCH Trade 
Reg.Rep.50,421. 
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Violation of Public Policy: 
The Second S i H Standard asks in the opinion of the commis-
sion whether the conduct violates public policy as it has been 
established by statute, common law, industry practice or other-
wise. This creterion may be applied in two different ways. It may 
be used to test the validity and strength of the evidence of 
consumer injury or loss often, it may be cited for a disposition 
of legislative or judicial that such injury is present. Although 
public policy was made by Sperry and Hutchinson's case q.n inde-
pendent criterion for determining the character of a trade prac-
tice, it is used in the opinion of the commission as an addition-
al evidence on the degree of consumer injury caused by specific 
practices. 
To the extent that Commission relies heavily on public 
policy to support a finding of unfairness, the policy should be 
clear and well established. In other words, the policy should be 
declared or embodied in formal sources such as statutes, judicial 
decisions, or the constitution as interpreted by the Courts; 
rather than being ascertained from a general sense of national 
values. The policy should likewise be one that is widely shared 
and not the isolated decision of a single state or a single 
court. 
Unethicalf immoral or unscrupulous conduct: 
Finally, the third Sperry and Hutchinson's standard asks 
whether the conduct was immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscru-
pulous. The test in the opinion o£ the Commission was included in 
70 
order to be sure of reaching all the purposes of the underlying 
statute, which forbids 'unfair acts or practices. Only general 
principles of recognised standards of the business ethics are 
declared as the yard stick. This test has proven largely duplica-
tive. Conduct that is truely unethical and unscrupulous will 
almost always injure consumers or violate public policy as well. 
The Commission has never relied on the third criteria of sperry & 
Hutchinson as an independent basis for a finding of unfairness 
and has decided to act in future only on the basis of the first 
two. 
Thus 1980 policy statement of Federal Trade Commission 
places primary emphasis on Consumer injury which must be substan-
tial, and must be an injury that consumer could not reasonably 
avoid. Public policy has become a second confirming factor and 
public morality has been dropped completely . Thus, the unfair-
ness doctrine has lost its original intuitive meaning based on 
moral considerations, and has become more of a cost benefit 
analysis'^. The policy statement of Federal Trade Commission 
while refining the unfairness doctrine gave more weight to the 
consumer injury and consumer was burdened with an onus of proof 
that he was not in a position to avoid this injury a hint at the 
emergence or Caveat emptor approach under which a practice might 
73.John A Spangle et al. Consumer law, cases and materials, 
American Book Series, 1991 at 65. 
74.See generally Averitt the Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practic-
es", in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Geo 
LJ 225 (1981) See Also Phillip 1. Blumberg; Consumer protec-
tion in the United States. Control of Unfair or Unconscionable 
practices, American Jol of Comp. Law Vol 34 1986.99. 
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not be considered unfair, despite a significant injury, if con-
75 
sumer could, or should have been more vigilant in avoiding it 
Deceptive Practices; 
The term "deceptive or misleading practice" has found place 
In various legislations of the world'" but has proved difficult 
to ascribe any exact meaning' . The term deceptive has been 
75.See for contrary opinion, Jean Braucher, Defining unfairness: 
Empathy and Economic Analysis At the Federal Trade Practices, 
Boston. Univ. L. Rev 1988 Vol 68 at 413,wherein the learned 
author opined that the two major concerns raised by the policy 
statement; uncertainty about the nature of the cost benefit 
analysis contemplated and the possibility of the advent of a 
consumer beware approach, were allayed by the credit practice 
Rule Analysis,, published in March 1, 1984 and which came into 
force in 1987. 
76.For instance see section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 1914 as amended by the Wheeler Lea Act, 1938, section 52 
of the Trade Practice Act, 1977 of Australia, section 33(c) of 
Combines Investigation Act, 1923 of Canada; Section 3 of the 
Trade Descriptions Act, 1968 of England. 
77.The reason for this difficulty is laid down as under: 
The fertility of man's invention in devising new schemes of 
fraud is so great that courts have always declined to define 
it, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it in 
whatever form it may present itself. It is better not to 
define the term, lest the craft of men should find ways of 
committing fraud which might evade such definition. A. M. 
Jur 2d Fraud & deceit, 1 at 18 Cf. James D. Jeffries, Pro-
tection for consumers Against Unfair And Deceptive Business 
Mar. Law Review, Vol. 57 No.4 1974 at 595. Following defini-
tion of deception has been given by the members of the 
Federal Trade Commission of USA: 
1. An advertisement is deceptive; if it makes a false claim 
about any material fact; 
2. If it produces an inaccurate belief about any material 
fact in (some) consumers; 
3. If it leaves (some) consumers with inaccurate beliefs 
about any material fact; 
4. If it falls to disclose the information that would be 
optional under the circumstances. See Howard Beales, 
Richard Craswell and Steven & Salop; The Efficient Regu-
lation of Consumer Information, the Journal of Law and 
•Economics Vol. XXIV (Dec, 1981) at 496. 
72 
Interpreted to cover misleading statements. In other words, these 
7 8 two terms were considered synonymous^. But in Australia a 
conduct will be proscribed if it is either misleading or decep-
tive^. Thus suggesting the independent requirements for a prac-
tice to be declared misleading or deceptive. Nevertheless it is 
difficult to see any distinction between misleading conduct and 
deceptive conduct and it will rarely if ever, be necessary to 
draw any such distinction"^. 
To deceive implies to cause to believe what is false, to 
lead into error^^. It means to believe that a thing is true 
which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows 
or believes to be false°^. In United States, courts have not 
shown unanimity in laying down principles to measure deceptive-
ness in advertisements. One view is that the likelihood or pro-
pensity of deception is the criteria by which advertisement is 
Q "J 
measured"-* and in the statement of Basis and purpose for the 
78.In Chrysler Crop v. FTC 561 F 2d 357 363 (DC Cir 1977) it was 
held that an advertisement may be deceptive if it has a tend-
ency and capacity to convey misleading interpretation; In FTC 
V. Sterling Drug, Inc, 317 F 2d 669, 674(2d Cir 1963) capacity 
to deceive was defined in terms of a lilmelihood or fair prob-
ability that the reader will be misled. 
79.Section 52 runs as follows: 
A Corporation shall not in trade or commerce engage in 
conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely ie 
mislead or deceive. 
SO.Taperrell, vermusch and Harland, Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection, 608 Par 1412 (3rd ed. 1983). 
81.Oxford English Dictionary. 
82.R.C.London & Globe Financial Corp. Ltd (1903) 1 Ch 728 at 732; 
See also weitmann & Katies Ltd (1977) 29 F LR 336; 2 TPC 329. 
83.Beneficial Corp. v. FTC 542 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
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mine the nature of an advertisement^^^ and in the statement of 
Basis and purpose for the Funeral Industry Practices Rule"^ de-
fined deception as a practice with the tendency or capacity to 
djceive a substantial segment of the purchasing public in some 
.' aterial respect . The cigarette Rule was issued in 1964 and 
/•uneral Practice Rule was issued in 1982 but even then there has 
not been a general trend towards the adoption of the likelihood 
standard. In some cases the pharases "tendency or capacity" and 
"likelihood" have been used interchangeable, thus suggesting that 
these words are synonymous"". The word "likelihood" connotes a 
higher standard of Proof than either "tendency or capacity". 
There is a difference of degree of probability of deception. 
84. 29 Fed. Reg 8324 (1964). The rule itself was subsequently 
pre-empted by the cigarette labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965, codified at 15 USC (1982. 
84a.American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F 2d 681, 687 (3rd 
Cir 1982) (misrepresentations are condemned if they possess a 
tendency to deceive); Chrysler corp. v. FTC, 561 f. 2d 357, 
363 (D.C Cir. 1977) (the advertisement had a tendency and 
capacity to mislead consumers); Mackenzie v. United States, 
423 US 827 (1975) (the commission has the expertise to deter-
mine whether advertisements have the capacity to deceive or 
mislead the public); FTC v. Colgate - Palmolive Co. 380 US 
374, 391 - 92 (1965) (nor was it necessary for the commission 
to conduct a survey of the viewing public before it could 
determine that the commercial had a tendency to mislead). 
85. 47 Fed. Reg at 42, 274 (1984). 
86. Montgomery ward & Co v. FTC 542 F. 2d 611 (3d. Cir 1976). 
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Similarly courts failed to come in agreement on the question 
as to whose intelligence should determine the nature of adver-
tisement. One view is that the FTC possessed a mandate to protect 
the unwary and foolish members of the buying public as well as 
the diligent^"^, other view is that the commission may not inject 
novel meanings into advertisements and then strike them down as 
unsupported. Advertisements must be judged by the impression they 
o p 
make on reasonable members of the public . 
Due to the lack of consistency in the deception elements 
propounded from time to time, the FTC Chairman Miller mooted a 
proposal that Congress should amend section 5 to include statu-
tory definition of deception. Congress, however, requested that 
the FTC should compile a written report outlining the current 
status of deception enforcement. The commission's response to 
this request was the 1983 policy statement, which was received 
with considerable controversy. The commissioners differed on the 
elements of deception and they used different terminology while 
attempting to describe it. The majority commissioners defined 
deceptive advertisement as an act or practice by which consumers 
if acting reasonably would likely to be misled to their detriment 
by a material representation. According to the minority commis-
sioners the following elements must be present to justify a 
87. Holmes FTC Regulation of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising : 
Current Status of the Law 30 DE Paul L Rev 555 (1981). 
88.In re Bristol - Myers v. FTC 102 FTC 21, 320 (1983); American 
Home Products Corp. v. FTC 98 FTC 136 (1981); In re Heinz W 
Kirchner 63 FTC 1282 (1963) 
75 
finding of deception : 1) a practice capable of misleading; (2) 
the practice must have impact upon a substantial number of con-
sumers; and (3) the practice must be misleading with regard to 
o q 
material facts""^  
While analysing the two opposite views on elements of decep-
tion/ one finds common agreement on certain issues. Princip«--lly/ 
both sides agreed that showing of actual loss to the consumer is 
not necessary. The split between the majority and minority 
was not one of actual versus potential deception but rather one 
of the degree of probability of deception employed as a standard. 
The most controversial element of the majority's definition 
is to interpret an advertisement the way a pn-'ikok;i.rCt, and reason-
able man would. Although the minority opinion did not expressly 
endorse the foolish consumer standard which would have been the 
other extreme of the reasonable man's standard, it adopted 
"Substantial number" as a criterion which o£ course is not the 
same as a reasonable man's standard, nevertheless, is on the 
midway between the two extreme standards. 
There was also difference of opinion on the proper interpre-
tation of the materiality requirement. The minority objected to 
the majority's statement that a finding of materiality was synon-
ymous with a finding of injury to the consumer. The minority 
89.The test of the policy statement and accompanying dissents may 
be found at 45 Anti-trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BRA) 689 (Oct. 
27, 1983), 
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Interpretation by contrast, simply stated that the misrepresenta-
tion must have been material to the consumer. Even so, the under-
lying analysis of the material requirement in the two statements 
on 
appear quite similar^ . 
The policy statement issued by the commission has no force 
of law. it can be ignored by the future commissioners and courts. 
Nevertheless, the FTC Commission in Cliffdale Associates, IncP^ 
and Thompson Medical Co, Inc^^ applied the standard set in the 
policy statement in order to reach a particular conclusion. In 
Cliffdale Associates, the Administrative Law Judge applied the 
principle which had strong similarities with the minority opinion 
of policy statement. The commission rejected these observations 
by saying that "it is circular and inadequate to provide guidance 
on how a deception claim should be analysed and then proceeded to 
articulate its own standard for determining whether a practice is 
deceptive. This standard precisely echoed the definition that had 
been set forth in the 1983 policy statement. In International 
9 3 Harvester the respondent who was manufacturer of tractors 
failed to warn the consumers about the defect with the result the 
consumers were injured. The commission did not find the respond-
ent guilty, not by invoking principles set in the policy state-
90. For detailed discussion on this policy statement see candace 
lance oxendale. The FTC And Deceptive Trade Practices : A 
Reasonable Standard? Emory Law Journal, Vol. 35 (1986) at 
91. 103 FTC 110 (1984) 
92. 104 FTC 648 (1984) 
93. 104 FTC 949 (1984) 
Ace Wo. -^  \ 
lr<fo^^ ^^ 
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ment but by relying on cost - benefit analysis. It was held that 
the failure to warn about a latent safety hazard is a pure omis-
sion. The seller is not responsible for disseminating all infor-
mation about its product which might be helpful to any given 
consumer, the implied warranty of fitness which arose upon the 
sale of a product was not violated by the failure to disclose 
each and every potential safety problem. The determinative factor 
was the degree of risk. The stringent requirement of disclosure 
would cause advertisements to be overrun with every conceivable 
disclosure about every aspect of a product. 
The dissenting opinion stated that the undisclosed facts 
must be both material and necessary to correct a false expecta-
tion held by a substantial body of consumers. Thus the dissenting 
opinion retained traditional deception analysis, the majority 
went outside deception law altogether to create a separate doc-
trine for pure omission which is based on cost-benefit analysis. 
In India^  both the MRTPC and CBRA$ did not find occasion 
to expound the phrases; "unfair method and unfair or deceptive 
trade practice". So Independent grounds to attack a Trade prac-
tice as being unfair or deceptive have not been formulated. In 
fact these expressions have been used interchangeable. The prin-
ciples relating to "unfairness" and "deceptiveness" evolved by 
the American courts can be a good guide for the MRTP Commission 
and redressel agencies. But it cannot be lost sight of that 
Initially the American courts did not demand higher standard of 
proof as they due demanding at. present for the reason, the con-
sumer protection laws in American are now a century old. The 
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awareness level of consumer rights has markedly increased there 
and consumers are not only conscious of their rights but are 
comparatively organised. On the other hand, consumer protection 
laws in India are recent in origin. The consumers are not only 
illiterate, unorganised, ignorant but they suffer in silence. In 
fact consumer movement has not yet blossomed and what ever con-
sciousness is there, it has not percolated to grass root level. 
So it will not serve any purpoco if American standards are blind-
ly followed without taking into account the society for whose 
benefib laws are enacted. The following definitions are there-
fore, suggested for unfair and deceptive practices: 
An unfair trade practice is a trade practice which 
causes substantial injury to consumers which is not 
outweighed by an offsetting consumer or competitive 
benefits that the practice produces. 
Explanation: While determining as to whether injury to 
the consumers is substantial, regard shall be had to 
the value of the goods or services in question. 
A deceptive trade practice is a trade practice which 
has a potential to mislead consumers of ordinary intel-
ligence with regard to material facts. 
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COMMERCIAL 
ADVERTISINQ - LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
In ancient times, advertising was not known because market-
ing was almost entirely unknown. Whatever was produced was con-
sumed easily. There was no surplus. With the advancement in civi-
lization and social needs extra production was achieved which was 
sold to other persons. This marked the begining o£ marketing . 
Since market place was relatively small, and because most buyers 
were illiterate, the original advertisers sought to attract their 
attention by voice, drum, horn and samples o£ the merchandise 
offered. Advancement in civilization brought through mechanical 
progress, education , the development of communication, transpo-
ration and postal system have changed the form but not the nature 
of advertisements. The crier has turned his attention to more 
degnified radios and television commercials . Print media has 
also played an important role for advertising the products. This 
in fact has become world wide phenomenon. In America the adver-
tising expenditure swelled from twelve and half billion dollars 
in 1962 to eighteen billion dollars in 1969^. In Canada, 
although advertising expenditure is smaller, it has increased 
1. For general discussion on the evolution of advertising See 
M.N. Mishra, Sales promotion and Advertising Management, 
1994. 
2. Rudoff Callmann; The Law of Unfair Competition, Trade Marks 
and Monopolies 3rd Ed. 1971 vol.1 at 631. 
3. News-week August 18, 1969, P.62. 
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by 120% between 1954 and 1965 and grew relatively as a percentage 
of the gross national product from 1.60% in 1954 to 1.75% in 
1965^. In India TV revenue through ads in 1993 was 430 crores and 
in 1994 it came to 530 crores. The print media's ads revenue in 
1993 was 200 crores and in 1994 it was 2500 crores^ 
TABLE 1 
Showing TOD Five Spenders On Advertising And Publicity 
In India In The Year. 1992^. 
X Company Net sales in Rs Advt.S Publicity 
Hindustan lever 1,50,658 4,468 
I T C 98,157 2,561 
Brooke Bond 63,877 2,109 
Godfrey Philips 48,085 1,705 
I C I 69,278 1,628 
(Figs in Rs Lakhs) 
Divergent views have been expressed relating to the role of 
advertisements vis-a-vis consumers. Thus two schools of thought 
have developed. One view is that the advertising creates noxious 
values to impel the (citizen) into becoming a'virtuous 
consumer•.Advertising has single handedly transformed the average 
citizen into a passive, lazy, greedy, sensual, wooly-minded 
4. D.B.S Advertising Expenditure in Cannada, 1965, P.6 See also 
Firestone, The Economic implications of Advertising (Toron-
to, 1967), PP. 34-38. 
5. The Times of India, New Delhi, Monday August 8, 1994 at 14. 
6. The Economic Times, New Delhi, June,25; 1992. 
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materlialistic, culturally depraved, whose head has become a TV 
tube and whose motto is "consume" . 
Another view is expressed by a Russian writer Kuruin in the 
following words: 
Thanks to well organised advertising, the consumer can 
more rapidly find the goods needed by him, purchase them 
with small expenditure of time, and select the goods 
according to his taste The presumption that a 
good product needs no advertising is dying . 
Leaving aside the Juristic views, a survey conducted in Britain 
in 1975 by WOP Market research^ shows that consumers were 
Jones,The Cultural And Social Impact Of Advertising On Ameri-
can Society, S.Osgoode Hall L. J. 65 at (1970). Similarly as 
early as 1800, Williams Cobbett referred to advertising as 
this species of falsehood, filth and obscenity. Richar Higgart 
wrote of advertising as out to achieve its ends by emotionally 
abusing its audiences. Pat Gierth of a well known advertising 
agency says that advertising "has its own quotas of visual, 
verbal and mental pollutants. Quoted in D. S. Nicholl: Adver-
tising 1973 at 159. Duggan opines: Advertising, which Superfi-
cially plays an informative role, is seen in fact as a manipu-
lative device which creates a scheme of wants in the consumer 
by rearranging his motives. Purchasers are induced not by the 
presentation of products which will satisfy existing needs in 
the consumer,but by appealing to his suceptibillities and 
subconscious drives. See A. J. Duggan, Fairness in Advertis-
ing: In pursuits of the Hidden Persuaders, 11. Melb U. L Rev. 
50 at 86 (1977) . 
Qouted from Marshall Goldman, Product Differentiation and 
Advertising : Some Lessons from Soviet Experience in Speaking 
of Advertising 352-53 (Toronto 1963), See also the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Consumer problem and inflation (the 
Prarice Report) 1968, PP.252-253 wherein Prarice Royal Commis-
sion says that advertisements provide five services to consum-
ers : information, acquiantance with the variety of existing 
products : acquaintance with the new products and charges. 
Pre-shopping accumulation of knowledge to save time and to 
better arm the consumer with fact necessary to the pruchase, 
and acquaintance with claims of producers. 
Consumerism, Political, Social, Economic Review, 2 July, 1975 
at P.8. 
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just as satisfied purchasing unadvertised iproducts, and a clear 
majority thought most advertisements were misleading or dishon-
est. 
TABLE 2 
CONSUMER VIEWS OF ADVERTISING 
Agree Agree Disagree Dis- Nel-
Stronqly Strongly agree ther DK 
Rather buy an adver-
tised product 2% 
Advertisements 
tell the truth 1% 
32% 
23% 
39% 
52% 
2% 
9% 
21% 
13% 
4% 
2% 
A survey based on interviews with nearly 9,500 consumers 
throughout the EEC, including Britian confirms that consumers 
although believe that advertising provides useful information, 
they are still highly sceptical of lt^°. 
TABLE 3 
OPINIONS ON ADVERTISING IN EUROPE 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Do not 
entirely on the on the entirely know/no 
whole whole reply 
Advertising 
provides consumers 
with useful 
information 10% 
Advertising often 
makes consumers buy 
goods which they do 
not really need 38% 
Advertising often 
misleads consumers 
as to the quality 
of the products 38% 
40% 29% 17% 4% 
39% 14% 6% 3% 
38% 15% 3% 6% 
10. European consumers (Brussels : Commission of European commu-
nities 1976 at 57 - 58 c.f. Ross cranston. Consumers and The 
Law 1978 at 41. 
83 
In India the consumers complaints council CCC, a wing o£ the 
advertising standard ^uncil of India ASCI recieved more than 
1,200 complaints against misleading advertisements since its 
inception in 1985 and around 95 per cent of these were mislead-
ingll. 
Keeping in view the various points, the truth of the matter 
is that while there is no need to quarrel with the premise that 
information with respect to most product characteristics is 
available as a result of sellers responding to incentives gener-
ated in the market place, there nevertheless remain many areas 
where key information necessary for consumers to make sensible 
choice between rival brands or to decide whether to buy the 
product at all, is absent-''-'-^ . 
Traders in order to convince the consumers that their pro-
duct is having added advantages, unscrupulously resort to adver-
tising campaign which quite often is either false or misleading. 
The guises under which false or misleading advertisements appear 
are as varied as they are ingenious .The term false or mislead-
ing advertisement has not been defined either under the Monopo-
lies and Restricitve Trade Practices Act"^ -*, 1969 or under 
11. The Times of India, New Delhi 21.05.1993. 
lla.Robbert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader : Consumer Protection And the 
Regulation of Advertising. Harv. L R Vol. 90, No. 4, 1977 at 
664. 
12. Lapointe Machine Tool Co. v. J. N. Lapointe Co., 115 Me 472 A 
348 (1916). 
13. Hereinafter referred to as the MRTP Act, 1969. 
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the Consumer Protection Act^^, 1986. The term "false" means "not 
true"-^^, "designed to deceive"-^^, "Contrary to fact" and the term 
"misleading" which is wider than "false" means capable of leading 
into ezror^°. These false and misleading advertisements are 
covered in the commercial advertising. The courts throughout the 
globe have remaincdbusy in resolving the nebulous issues surround-
ing them, but in India no plausible jurisprudence has been devel-
oped. The various issues germane to the commercial advertising 
are discussed hereunder: 
Conatitutional Protection; 
The Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India^^ is the first case 
which came up before the Supreme Court in which the constitution-
al Protection to commercial advertisements has been decided. The 
14. Hereinafter reffered to as CP Act, 1986. The term false 
advertisement has been defined under section 16(a) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 of USA in the following 
words: The term false advertisement means an advertisement 
other than labelling which is misleading in material respect; 
and in determining whether an advertisement is misleading 
there shall be taken into account (among other things) not 
only representations made or suggested by statement, word, 
design, device, sound or which the advertisement fails to 
reveal, facts material in the light of such representations 
or material with respect to consequences which may result 
from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement 
relate under the conditions described in said advertisement, 
or under such conditions as are customary or usual. 
15. State V. Arnett, 338 MO 907, 92 S.W.Ad 897, 900. 
16. Sential Life Insurance Co. v. Blackmei, C C A Colo, 77 F."d 
347, 352. 
17. In re Davis, 349 Pa 651, 37 A. 2d 498, 499. 
18. Donald and Heydon, Trade Practices Law, (Vol.2) 1978 at 553. 
19. AIR 1960 Sc 551. 
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case impugned the contitutionality of Drug and Magic Remedies 
(Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 on the ground that 
unreasonable restrictions have been imposed on freedom of speech. 
It was laid down: 
An advertisement is no doubt a form of speech but its 
true character is reflected by the object for the 
promotion of which it is employed. It assumes the 
attributes and elements of the activity under Art 19(a) 
which it seeks to aid by bringing it to the notice of 
public. When it takes the form of commercial advertise-
ment which has element of trade or commerce it no 
longer falls within the concept of freedom of speech, 
for the object is not the propagation of ideas, social, 
political or economic or furtherance of literature or 
human thought, but the commendation of the efficacy, 
and importance of certain goods 
The advertisements prohibited by section 3 of Act 
of 21 of 1954 relate to commerce or trade and not to 
propagation of ideas; and advertising of prohibited 
drugs or commodities of which the sale is not in the 
interest of the general public cannot be speech 
within the meaning of freedom of speech and would not 
fall within Art. 19 (1) (a) "^-^  . 
It is submitted that the judgment of the Supreme court is 
erroneous. To say that an information not in the interest of 
general public cannot reap the benefits of guarantee enshrined In 
Art.19(1)(a) is one thing, but to say that an information with a 
motive to promote commercial interest cannot qualify for the 
"speech" so as to enjoy the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
is entirely different. 
The importance of information to the operation of efficient 
markets is by now fairly well accepted. For the proper utiliza-
zation of money and right purchasing ducitiiuri, Lhu coiiijuiiier must 
20. Id. at 563. ~~~~~ 
21. Ibid. 
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have information. Advertising is a medium of information and 
persuasion, providing much of the day to day education and facil-
itating the flexible allocation of resources necessary to free 
enterprise economy. Neither profit motivation nor desire to 
influence private economic decision necessarily distinguishes the 
2 3 peddler from the preacher, the publisher or the politician 
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that the adver-
tiser has a right to be wrong but there should be no censure on 
the dissemination of truthful information needed by the large 
section of the society designated as consumers merely on the 
ground that the information has commercial motives. This will 
naturally need the gleaning of information necessary for sub-
serving public good from that which is false, deceptive or 
misleading. 
The above cited opinion of the Supreme Court was fortified 
by the views of the US Sopreme Court expressed in Valentine v. 
Chzestensen^ , wherein it was laid down that the constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising. It is amuzing to note that this judgment had 
already been disapproved when our apex court quoted^^ it with 
approval. 
22. For detailed discussion on the need of consumer information. 
See Howard Beales, et.al.. The Efficient Regulation of Con-
sumer Information, Jol. of Law and Eco., vol.XXIV 1981. 
23. Developments in the Law -- Deceptive Advertising, (1967) 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1027. 
24. 316 US 52, 62 S. ct. 86 L Ed. 1262 (1942). 
25. Quoted at 563 Supra note 13. 
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In Cawmatano v. United States^^, It was stated: 
Valentine v. Chzestensen ruling was casual, almost 
offhand. And it has not survived reflection. That 
freedom of speech of the press directly guaranteed 
against encroachment by the federal Government and 
safe-guarded against state action by the Due process 
clause of the fourteenth Amendment, is not in terms or 
by implication confined to discourse of a particular 
kind and nature ... Those who make their living through 
exercise of first Amendment rights are no less entitled 
to its protection than those whose advocacy or promo-
tion is not hitched to a profit motive. 
2 7 Later on the US Supreme court in a number of cases^' held 
that the commercial advertisements do enjoy protection of the 
first amendment. But nonetheless this protection is by no means 
absolute. This was made cleat in a landmark decision in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc^ . In Central Hudson Gas S Electric corporation v. Public 
Service Commission of New YottP"^, four pronged test was propound-
ed . 
26. 358 US 498, 513 - 14 (1959). 
27. For instance In Pittsburgh Press Co v. Pittsburgh Common on 
Human Relations, 37 L. EcJ. 2nd 669 (1973), an ordinance that 
forbade newspapers from running help wanted ads in sex desig-
nated columns was upheld. Nevertheless, it was conceded that 
these ads though are classic examples of commerical speech, 
are not entirely without first amendment protection. Similar-
ly in Bigelow v. Virginia, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1975), the court 
invalidated a state statute which prohibited the advertising 
of abortion services and made such advertising a misdemeaner. 
28. 425 US 748 96 S.ct 1817, 48 L. Ed 2d 346 (1976). The court 
said, "We of course do not hold that (Commercial Speech) can 
never be regulated in any way. Some forms of commercial 
speech regulations are surely permissible. 
29. 447 US 557, 100 S.ct 2343, 65 L. Ed.2d 341 (1980)., For the 
application of these tests see 463 U.S 60, 103 S.ct 2875, 
77L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983) Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products corp. 
See also Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company 
of Puerto Rico 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.ct 2968, 92 L.Ed. 2d 266 
(1986). 
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(a) The Commercial advertisement must be truthful and not mis-
leading (b) It has to be established that asserted governmental 
interest because of which commercial advertisement is attempted 
to regulate is substantial, (c) If both inquires yield positive 
answers, then it has to proved that the said regulations directly 
advances the governmental interest and (d) the governmental 
regulations are not excessive than are necessary to serve 
that interest. 
The Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspaper Bombay Ltd. v. 
Union of Inida^^ over-ruled the Hamdard Dawakhana case and 
held that the observations made in that case are broadly 
stated. The commercial advertisement cannot be denied the protec-
tion of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution merely because they 
are issued by businessmen . In a recent case of TATA Press Ltd 
V. Hahanaqar Telephone Hi gam Ltd^^^. the Supreme Court went ahead 
by extending the protection of Art. 19(1) (a) not only to adver-
tisers but also consumers. It was laid down that this Article 
guarantees not only the freedom of speech and expression, it also 
protects the rights of the individual to listen, read and receive 
the said speech. So far as the economic needs of citizens are 
concerned, their fulfilment has to be guided by their information 
disseminated through the advertisements. The protection of Arti-
cle is available to the speaker as well as to the recipient of 
the speech^. 
30. AIR 1986 Sc 515. 
31. Id at 547. 
31a.AIR H^S Sc 2.^35 
32. Id at2.448. 
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Application of Mensrea; 
Since the famous case of Pasley v. Freemair^^, the liability 
under conunon law for false representation requires scienter or 
knowledge of false-hood essential. This common law principle 
however, has not been extended by the courts in the statutes 
aiming at protecting consumers which are silent on the require-
ment of scienter. 
In United States as a general rule courts do not inquire 
into good or bad faith of the advertiser or the purpose of the 
advertisement in passing upon its truth or falsity. The point for 
consideration in such cases is whether under the facts and cir-
cumstances in connection with the publication of the advertise-
ment, the language in and of itself, without regard to good or 
bad faith is calculated to deceive the buying public^^^. "Calcu-
33 lated" however, does not mean "intended" but "apt" to deceive"'"'. 
The rationale of this principle is that even innocent misrepre-
sentation involves some element of fraud, they (representors) 
must therefore extricate themselves from it by purging their 
business methods of a capacity to deceive*^^. 
In Australia in order to make it clear that the intention is 
not necessary for the proscription of a trade practice as decep-
tive or false, the words "or is likely to mislead or deceive" 
32a.(1789) 3. T. T. 51. 
32b.Ford Motor Co. v. F. T. C 120 F 2d 175 See also F. T. C. v. 
Real Product Corp., 90 F 2d 617; L & C Mayers Co. v. F. T. C. 
97 F 2d 365; Bear Mill Mfg., FTC, 98 F 2d 67. 
33. Common Wealth v. Slone, 321 Mass 713, 75 NE 2d 517 (1947). 
34. F. T. C. V. Algome lumber Co., 291 US 67, 81, 78 L. Ed. 655, 
54 S.ct 315 (1934) . 
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were inserted in section 52"^^ of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 
through an amendment in the year, 1977. It is now made clear 
through the judicial gloss that intention to deceive is not 
necessary'^^ and this is so, both, where it is alleged that the 
conduct in question was in fact misleading or deceptive as well 
as where it is alleged that it was likely to mislead or 
•in 
deceive"*'. 
In Canada section 33(c)^ of the Combines Investigation Act, 
1923 prohibits a representation relating to price if that repre-
sentation is materially misleading. The Ontario Supreme Court in 
R V, Allied Towers Merchants limitetP^, held that there is noth-
ing in the express language of section 33 C(l) disclosing any 
intention that mens rea, in the sense that the materially mis-
leading representation made must be known to be such by the 
accused, is not an essential ingredient of the offence. 
35. Section 52 now reads as : A corporation shall not in trade or 
commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive 
or likely to mislead or deceive... 
36. Puxu Pty Ltd. v. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Ltd. (1979) 
31 ALR 73, 5 TPC at 945; Firona Pty Ltd. v. Hersfield Hold-
ings (1981) 6 TPC 414; Brown v. Jam Factory Pty Ltd. (1981) 
35 ALR 79; Diary Vale Metro Co-operative Ltd v. Brownes Dairy 
Ltd (1981) 6 TPC 793 at 799. 
37. Taperell, Vermeesch and Harland, Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection, 610 Para 1414 (1983). 
38. Section 33 C(l) runs as : Every one who, for the purpose of 
promoting the sale or use of an article, makes any materially 
misleading representation to the public by any means whatever 
concerning the price at which such or like articles have 
been, are, or will be, ordinarily sold, is guilty of an 
offence punishable on summary conviction 
39. (1965) 20. R. 628, (1966) 1 C.C.C 220. 
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In England it is an offence to make knowingly or recklessly 
a false statement about the service, accomodation or 
facilities''^. As to recklessly, a statement is deemed to be made 
so if it is made regardless of whether it is true or false, 
whether or not the person making it had reasons for believing 
that it might be false'-^. It was made clear in BFI Warehouse Ltd 
V. Nattrass^^, that recklessly does not imply dishonesty. The 
prosecution need to show only that the defendant did regard to 
the truth or falsity of his statement even though it cannot be 
proved that he deliberately closed his eyes to the truth. This 
43 
rather diminishes the force of mens rea requirement "'. In view of 
the difficulties surrounding this provision it is perhaps not 
without significance that it has been omitted from the otherwise 
very similar Hong Kong Trade Descriptions ordinance, 1980". 
In India section 36-A of the MRTP Act, 1969 and section 2-
(r) of the CP Act defines unfair trade practice. Throughout this 
definition words like, falsely'^, inte.itionally ° and knowingly 
40. Section 14 of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. 
41. Section 12(2) (b). 
42. (1973) 1 All ER 762. 
43. Brian Harvey & Deborah L Parry : The Law of Consumer Protec-
tion and Fair Trading, (1992 4th ed.) at 358. 
44. Id 341 
45. For instance Sub-clause (i) states : falsely represents that 
the goods are of particular standard, quality, grade, compo-
sition, style or model; see also Sub-clause (ii), {iii),(vi). 
46. Clauses 2,3 & 5. 
47. Clause 4. 
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have been used. These words denote nothing but mens rea . Then 
should mens rea be imported in the definition o£ unfair trade 
practice and in its (pygsence trader be not held liable to compen-
sate for any loss or injury to consumer, etc under sections 12(e) 
and 14 of the MRTP and CP Acts respectively? The answer to this 
question is flat-ly no, for the following reasons. 
The class of practices legislated in the Act are not crimi-
nal in any real sense but are practices prohibited under penalty. 
The efficacy of the two Acts cannot be attritioned by reading 
mens rea in the liability for compensation to the consumer who 
has suffered loss due to the false representation. The compensa-
tion is the only tangible remedy available under the two Acts to 
deter the unscrupulous trader. The other remedy available i.e. 
'cease and desist order' in MRTP Act applies only to the future 
conduct. 
The Supreme court while interpreting the provisions of 
another consumer protection legislation, i.e. Prevention of Food 
Adulteration Act, 1955 which involves criminal prosecution, 
excluded the application of mens rea in the offences under the 
4 9 Act . If mens rea can be excluded in the criminal offences, why 
cannot be the same dispensed with in the misrepresentations 
involving only penalty. 
48. G. Scidasivan Nair, Mens Rea In Consumer Offences, Leela 
Krishnan (ed) Legal Control of Consumer Protection, at 293. 
49. See Sarjood Prassad v. State of UP, AIR 1961 Sc.6 31; Pyarali 
K. Tejani v. M R Dange, AIR 1974 Sc.288; A P Grain and Seed 
Merchants Association v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Sc.2346; 
State V. Udipi Co-operative Milk Society, AIR 1960 Mys 80; 
Public Prosecutor v. Dhanapal, (1962) 2MLJ 217. 
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In Australia under Section 53 of the Trade Practices Act, 
1977 and in Canada, section 33 C(i) of the Combines Investigation 
Act, 1923, criminal prosection can be launched against the ac-
cused and the liability is strict. These enactments deal with the 
same subject matter as our MRTP Act and CP Act and similar phras-
es as falsely, intentionally and knowingly have been used but 
these phrases were interpreted as not including mens rea. 
50 The Sachar Committee had recommended some defences under 
section 36 A, but these defences did not find favour with the 
legislature when the chapter on unfair Trade Practice was incor-
porated in the MRTP Act. This shows that the parliament also in 
its wisdom thought it in-advisable to make this compensatory 
remedy available only in presence of mens rea. 
Standard of Protection: 
One of the objectives behind the law aiming to curb unfair 
trade practices is to protect the general public from false and 
misleading advertisements. The question is whose intellegence in 
50. For clause (1) of section 36-A defences recommended were: 
Dthat the act or ommission giving rise to the offence was 
result of a bonafide error; or (b) that he took reason-
able precaution and exercised due diligence to prevent 
the occurrence of such error and that he took reasonable 
measures forthwith, after the representation was made, 
to bring the error to the attention of the class of 
persons likely to have been reached by the representa-
tion. 
2)the person whose business it is to publish or arrange 
for publication of advertisement and did not know or had 
reason to suspect that its publication would amount to 
contravention of any such provision shall not be liable 
under the Act. See for further details. The Report of 
the High-Powered Expert Committee on Companies and MRTP 
Acts, 1978 at 271. 
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the general public should be treated as a standard in order to 
determine the character of an advertisement. The choices include 
: "the reasonably intelligent consumer", the "average consumer", 
and the "most naive hypothetical consumer". 
In America it is fool hardy to claim that advertising liter-
ature will only be read by a certain part of the public. Thus it 
is worthless argument that "one putative audience will not read 
CI 
and the other will not heed to an advertisement"' ". The adver-
tisement must not mislead general public and general public has 
been defined as that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, 
the unthinking and the credulous who in making purchases do not 
stop to analyse but too often are governed by appearances and 
general impressions^^. The average purchaser has been variously 
characterised as not straight thinking , subject to 
impressions^^, uneducated^^, and grossly uninformed^°; he is 
51. Belmont Laboratories v. Federal Trade Commission, 103 F 2d 
538 (CCA 3rd, 1939) . 
52. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co, 178 F 73 (CCA 2nd 1910) 
A.P.W Paper Co. v. F.T.C., 149 F 2d 1945); Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
F.T.C. 150 F 2d 106 (CCA 5ht, 1945); Plorillard Cp. v. F.T.C. 
186 F 2D 52(CCA 4th, 1950; American Life & Accident Ins. Co. 
V. F.T.C. F 2d 289 (CA 8th, 1958); Colgate Palmolive Co. v. 
F.T.C, 310 F ed 89 (CA 1st 1962). 
53. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp v. F.T.C. 143 F 2d 676 
(CCA 2nd, 1944). 
54. Stanley Laboratories v. F.T.C, 138 F 2d 388 (CCA 9th 1943). 
55. Aronberg v. F.T.C. 132 F 2d 65 (CCA 7th, 1942). 
56. Berkey and Gay furniture Co v. F.T.C, 42 F 2d 427 (CCA 6th, 
1930) 
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Influenced by prejudice^' and superstition; and he wishfully 
believes in miracles, allegedly the result of progress in sci-
.58 
ence-
The purchaser is not duty bound to suspect or discredit the 
advertisers claims^', and the vendor knowing this must act ac-
cordingly^^. The ordinary purchaser is not conversant with the 
technical cant of the sciences, and he is untrained in the Law 
The language of the ordinary purchaser is casual and unaffected. 
He is not an expert in grammatical construction"^ or an educated 
analytical reader ^^ and therefore, he does not normally subject 
every word in the advertisement to careful study . 
57. Benton Announcement v. F.T.C., 130 F 2d 254 (CCA 2nd, 1942). 
58. In the matter of Great Britain Spiritualist Church, 29 F.T.C. 
782 (1939). 
59. Supra note 46 at 680. 
60. F.T.C. V. Standard Education society, 302 US 112, 822 Ed. 
141, 58 S at 113 (1937). 
61. F.T.C. V. Algoma Lumber Co., 219 US 67 L Ed 655, 54 S at 315 
(1934). 
62. D.D.D Crop v. F.T.C, 125 F 2d 679 (CCA 7th, 1942); Sebvone 
Co V. F.T.C, 135 F 2d 676 (CCA 7th, 1943). 
63. Supra note 55. 
64. Chairman Miller of the Federal Trade commission suggested 
that section 5 be amended to (1) require that a deception be 
material (2) preclude a challenge to a statement of opinion 
on deceptiveness grounds; and (3) require that deceptiveness 
be tested on the basis of perceptions of a reasonable consum-
er standard rather the most gullible consumer standard sug-
gested by many of the cases construing section 5. However, 
other members showed disagreement with the Chairman's desire 
to see the commissions power to attack deception further 
limited. See 1056 BWA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep 589 
(1982) . 
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In India the Sacheu: Committee had also endorsed the "average 
purchasevstandard"^^ as a test to determine the character of a 
trade practice. But the Supreme court in relakhanpal National Ltd 
V. MRTP commission^^, failed to lay down any clear cut principle. 
The apex court started with a "common man's test" and concluded 
with a "reasonable man's intelligence" as a standard, the court 
observed; 
When a problem arises as to whether a particular act 
can be condemned as an unfair trade practice or not, 
the key to the solution would be to examine whether 
it contains a false statement and is misleading and 
further what is the effect of such representation 
made by the manufacturer on the common man? Does it 
lead a reasonable person in the position of a buyer 
to a wrong conclusion? . 
The judgment was influenced by the law as stated in Hals-
bury's law of England" relating to representation. Therein it is 
stated that the test by which representation is to be judged is 
to see whether the discrepancy between the fact as represented 
and the actual fact is such as would be considered material by a 
reasonable representee . 
It is submitted that the law enunciated in the Halsbury's 
law of England reflects the hey days of Caveat Emptor. This time 
65. Supra note 50 at 263. 
66. AIR 1989 Sc 1692. This is the first case decided by the 
Supreme Court relating to UTP under section 36 A of the 
MRTP Act. 
67. Id at 1695. 
68. Quoted with approval at 1695. 
69. Halsbury's laws of England (4th ed) Para 1044 and 1045. 
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honoured doctrine has now been metamorphosised in to Caveat 
Venditor. Both, MRTP Act and CP Act reflect this change^°. Thus 
this "reasonable representee" standard cannot hold water any 
more. 
There is no denying the fact that the Indian consumers are 
not only unorganised, ignorant, ill informed and ill advised, 
they are also ignorant of their rights. Consumers are not con-
scious of the surreptious methods of the traders. Traders are 
fully in know of the plight of the consumers.They therefore, 
harvest it to the maximum. So it will not serve any worthwhile 
purpose if "reasonable man's" standard is upheld, leaving vast 
majority of credulous, gullible and unthingking, unprotected. 
However, this "common man's" test cannot be regarded as a 
general standard applicable in all situations. The context in 
which an advertisement is addressed should also be taken into 
account. For example, where an advertisement for a specialised 
equipment is directed at an expert group, such as engineers, the 
standard will be different as against the advertisement addressed 
to general consuming public or directed to children. 
70. MRTP Commission in Director General V. Iyer and Sons p Ltd. 
(1991) 3 Comp L J 190, held that when a problem arises as to 
whether a particular act can be condemned as an unfair trade 
practice or not, the key to the solution would be to examine 
whether it contains a false statement and is misleading and 
further what is the effect of such representation on the 
commmon man. Id at 192. 
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Pittnci flC Putttng; 
The defence of puffing has roots in common law and is avail-
able both/ under law of Torts and Sale of Goods Act. It was be-
queathed by Caveat Emptor doctrine . By virtue of defence of 
puffing a wide latitude is allowed to traders in extolling the 
qualities of the things they have to sell. Purchasers are expect-
ed to be capable of exercising reasonable judgment and discrimi-
nation and they cannot complain merely because their own opinion 
of the goods may fall far below that of the seller. So long 
therefore, an advertiser confines himself to general praise of 
his goods, he is fairly safe, no matter how exaggerated his 
praise may be ^ . The rationale of puffing defence has been ex-
plained in Kirchner V. FTC'^, in the following words: 
True, as has been reiterated many times, the commissions 
responsibility is to prevent deception of the gullible 
and credulous, as well as the cautions and knowledgeable 
This principle loses its validity, however, if it 
is applied uncritically or pushed to an absured extreme. 
An advertiser cannot be charged with liability with 
respect of every conceivable misconception, however 
outlandish, to which his representation might be subject 
71.An American commentator opines: The term which grew up in an 
era of Caveat Emptor, reflects the view that the buyer should 
expect a considerable amount of actual lying by sellers eager 
to dispose of their goods. See Developments in the Law -
Deceptive Advertising, (1967) 80. Harv.L Rev. 1054. 
72.Bishop, Advertising and the Law, Benn, 2nd Ed. at 47. it is 
also said about puffing that "it is a privilege to lie his 
head off, so long as he says nothing specific, on the theory 
that no reasonable man would be influenced by such talk".See 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 732 (4th Ed. 1971). 
73. 63 FTC 1282 (1963) 
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among the foolish or feeble - minded .... A representa-
tion does not become "false and deceptive" merely be-
cause it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an 
insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class 
of persons to whom the representation is addressed 
The defence of puffing which was the concomitant result of 
caveat Emptor was surprisingly received by the courts in various 
countries'^, while deliberating on the issues involving consumer. 
In India the MRTP Commission also considered ouffing as defence. 
In re Weston Electronics ltd. and anothers'°. The Commission 
Observed: 
The phrase 'Zero failure' is capable of many interpre-
tations and dominant impression that it leaves is that 
the TV set manufactured by the respondent is technical-
ly close to perfection. It should be remembered that 
the use of hyperbole is an indispensable ingredient of 
good advertisement, unless it becomes indistinguishable 
from falsehood. 
The underlying argument in the defence of puffing is that no 
reasonable man shall believe such advertisement as true. But this 
74. Id. at 1290. 
75. In Germany, a claim of the florist that he has the most beau-
tiful flowers in the world was considered as mere puff. 3 
Reimer 385. In England, a land partly useless but described 
as very fertile and improvable was held as puff in Dimmock V. 
Hallet, (1886) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 21. In America it has been 
held as merely puff to describe a tooth paste as being one 
which will beautify the smile or to claim that a particular 
motor oil was the perfect lubricant which would enable a 
motor car to travel an amazing distance See Bristol Meyer V. 
PTC 1950-51 Trade Cases 62, 722 (1950); Kidder oil Co. V. 
FTC, 117 F 2d 892 (1941) 
76. UTP Enquiry No.20/1985, order dated.24.6.1983. See also DG V. 
Cement Corporation of Gujarat (1992) 2 Coinp LJ 331; DG V. 
Milkfood Ltd. Patiala (1994) 2 comp. LJ 373. 
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defence cannot reconcile with the "common man's" test as enun-
ciated in determining the character of an advertisement. When we 
77 
say law is meant to protect those who believe in miracles , 
inexperienced and credulous^®, puffing defence cannot find the 
niche in the citadel of consumer protection laws. After all an 
advertiser will not resort to puffing unless he has a faith that 
7 9 gullible consumers will be allured by his campaign'''. It is 
obvious that the fatuous may be deceived by claims that the more 
intelligent or experienced purchaser will readily recognise as 
mere puffing . The remarks of Handler on this point deserves 
mention; the maxim that a reasonable latitude must be conceded to 
the salesman and advertiser in boasting his own product, presup-
poses a defeatist attitude and an analytically fallacious ap-
O 1 
proach •^. Thus it is believed that modern courts will be less 
willing that some of the older cases suggest to encourage eulo 
8 2 gistic statements where there is a real risk of deception •'. It 
77. Supra note 58. 
78. Supra note 52. 
79. An American author, Preston, argues that advertisers would 
not puff unless they thought that some consumers would be-
lieve their claims. As a result Preston would prefer to make 
the puffing advertiser fully liable for his claim see Pres-
ton, The Great American Blowups; puffery in Advertising And 
Selling (1975); See also Kinter, A Primer on the law of 
Deceptive Practices 97, 192-93 (2d. ed. 1978). 
80. Supra note 2 at 671. 
81. Handler, False Advertising under the wheelerlea Act (1939) 6 
Law and contemp. Prob. 91, 99. 
82. S pra note 37 at 616. 
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is pertinent to mention here that British Columbia Trade Practic-
es Act, 1974 under-section 2(3) makes commercial puffery action-
able^^. Therefore, one is reminded of the opinion expressed by an 
Australian court while interpreting the Consumer Protection Act, 
1969 (N.S.W): 
The Act under consideration is a Consumer Protection 
Act. Its general objective is to provide safeguards for 
the weaker party in numerous commercial transac-
tions .... one of the major evils to be controlled is 
false and misleading advertising. It is an Act there-
fore, which is setting standards for advertiser 
It is for the Act to control advertisers and not for 
what are claimed to be present advertising standards to 
mould the law*^  . 
Television Commercials: 
Television commercials have given new dimension to the false 
and misleading advertisements. Sometimes it is not possible to 
advertise a product with its natural colour or with the composed 
substances, for example true colours of coffee, orange juice and 
iced tea are lost in transmission on a television screen and 
artificial substance must be substituted to obtain a natural 
look. The hot television lights require the use for example, of 
mashed potatoes for ice cream, and shaving cream to get the kind 
of head that is normal on a glass of beer . This involves the 
problem of interpretation of television commercials. One possible 
interpretation is to treat demonstration merely a dramatization 
83. Section 2(3) reads as: The use, in any oral or written repre-
sentation, of exaggeration, innuendo, or ambiguity as to a 
material fact, or failure to state a material fact..." 
84. CRW Pty Ltd. V. Sweden, 1972 AR (N.S.W) 17 at 36-37. 
85. Jonathan M Purver, et.al.. Business Law, Text and Cases, 
(1983) at 1011. 
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of the express claim made in the advertisement. Thus demonstra-
tion is unconnected with the express claim and so long express 
claim is true, the advertisement will not be treated as deceptive 
even though demonstration was accomp lished by trickery. 
Second approach is to interpret television demonstration as a 
warranty without taking into account the express claim. Thus the 
demonstration obtained by employing trickery will be considered 
as deceptive but it is not necessary that the demonstration 
should prove the express claim made in the ad. The third approach 
is the» amalgam of the first two, i.e. to interpret a television 
demonstration both a warranty that the result could be duplicated 
without trickery and as proof of the express claim made in the 
advertisement. A demonstration which failed either of these tests 
Q C 
would be considered deceptive and would not be permitted . 
It appears that the American Supreme Court in FTC V. Colgate 
ft 7 
- Palmolive Co has leaned in favour of the third approach. In 
this case advertiser sought to demonstrate that its shaving cream 
had super-moisturizing properties which permitted the shaving of 
sand paper, and thus it would be effective in shaving the tough-
est beards. Since on television screen sand paper appears as a 
plain coloured paper, the cream was applied instead of plexiglass 
covered with sand, which was then swept clean by a razor. The 
record showed that the sand paper could not be shaved unless it 
86. Stewart E; The Law o£ Comparative Advertising : How Much 
Worse is "Better" Than "Great", Col. L R (Vol.76:80) 1976, 
at 107. 
87. 380 US 374 (1965). 
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Is soaked for some eighty minutes. The following principles were 
laid down: 
1) If it becomes impossible or impracticable to show simu-
lated demonstration on television in a truthful manner, 
this indicates that television is not a medium that 
lends itself to this type of commercial, not that the 
commercial must survive at all costs; 
2) if the inherent limitation of a method do not permit 
its use in the way a seller desires, the seller cannot 
by material representation compensate for those limita-
tions; 
3) where in order to substantiate an asserted claim, test, 
experiment or demonstration is made which is false, in 
other words test, experiment or demonstration is not 
what is claimed in a commercial, the commercial will be 
misleading; 
4) where the prop is not being used for additional proof 
of the product claim eg mashed potato in place of ice 
cream, it will not be misleading but where the purpose 
is to give the viewers objective proof of the claims 
made eg in Rapid Shaving Cream, the commercial will be 
misleading ; 
Justice Harlan in his dissent while arguing that the FTC 
should use that standard which evaluates only the accuracy of the 
representation as seen by the viewer on the screen, and that what 
goes on in the studio should not matter to the commission, he 
posed the following interesting questions: 
would it be proper for respondent Colgate, in advertising 
a laundry detergent to "demonstrate" the effectiveness of 
a major competitor's detergent in washing white sheets, 
and then "before the viewer's eyes", to wash a white (not 
a blue) sheet with the competitors detergent? The Studio 
test should accurately show the quality of the product, 
but the image on the screen would look as though the 
sheet had been washed with an ineffective detergent. All 
88. For a comment on this judgment see Robert Pitsofsky, Beyond 
Nader : Consumer Protection And the Regulation of Advertis-
ing, Harv. L.R. Vol.90(1977) at 687 
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that has happened here is the converse : a demonstration 
has been altered in the studio to compensate for the 
distortions of the television medium, but in this in-
stance in. order to present an accurate picture to the 
television viewer^ . 
However, it seems that Justice Harlan's poser received 
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answer from the commission in Mattel of Union Carbide Corp that 
through the use of the demonstration and the statements used in 
conjunction therewith, respondent represents, directly or by 
implication that such demonstration is evidence which actually 
proves how the product demonstrated is superior than the compet-
ing brands. 
Thus in America, both, courts and commission have thus 
decided to treat televised demonstrations as representing proof 
of the claims which means that the advertisement would have to be 
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accurate at both ends of the television camera"^ -^ . 
Comparative Advertising; 
Comparative advertising concept is as old as the art of 
selling itself^. The species of comparative advertising like its 
genus is double edged. It can act as an effective tool for con-
sumer information and right purchasing decision. But it may also 
be used to mislead consumers by projecting false, incomplete, 
89. 380 US at 398. 
90. 79 F.T.C. 124 (1971) . 
91. Supra note 86 at 109. 
92. James D Jeffries, Protection For Consumers Against Unfair and 
Deceptive Business, Marq. L. R Vol.57, No. 4 (1974) 566. 
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distorted or insignificant comparisons^-^. Inspite of its advan-
tages, the European legal systems have traditionally prohibited 
or severely restricted the practice of comparative advertising as 
it has been seen from the view point of rival competitors as a 
form of unfair competition^'*. In Germany if such ads are under-
stood ^s making comparisons with competitor's products, they fall 
95 within the general prohibition against comparative advertising 
Under common law, the courts without any reservation took a 
consistent stand that the comparative advertising is not dispar-
agement of one man's goods to project their inferiority over the 
goods of another. In White v. Mellion^^, it was held that when 
all that is done is making comparison between the plaintiff's 
goods and the goods of the person issuing the advertisement, this 
cannot be regarded as a disparagement of which the law will take 
cognizance and the raisin de'etre of this policy was enunciated 
in De Beers Abrasive Product Limited V. International General 
Electric Company of New York Limited^^ that a trader may puff his 
93. There is every possibility that consumer may rely more on 
comparative advertisements. As callman states : Grammatically 
the superlative is of stronger import than the comparative. 
In comparative advertising, however, the contrary is often 
true because puffing by superlatives is either discounted or 
ignored. See Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trade 
Marks, And Monopolies (ed. 1968) 
94. See Taperell, Vermeesch and Harland; Trade Practices and 
consumer Protection, 610 Para 1444 (1983). 
95. Warren S Grimes; Control of An Advertising in the United 
States And Germany : Volks Wagen Has a Better Idea: Harv. L. 
R Vol.84 (June, 1971) at 1794. 
96. (1895) Ac 154. 
97. (1975) All ER 599. 
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own goods even though this may, logically speaking, involve the 
denigration of a rival's goods. Since puff was considered a good 
defence in case of false or misleading advertisement and can be 
said as an extension of Caveat Emptor doctrine, nevertheless, 
objectionable point is to give latitude to a trader to disparage 
goods of another by making a comparative statement which is 
false. This licence to a trader to denigrate the goods of another 
was given by Lindley M. R. in Hubbock and Sons V. Wilkinson, 
Heywood and Clask Limited^^ when he said "to say that one's own 
goods are better than other people's even if each particu-
lar charge of falsehood is established, it will only come to this 
that it is untrue that the defendants paint is better than or 
equal to that of the plaintiff's for saying of which, no action 
lies. However, realising the anticonsumer effect of this blanket 
rule. Walton J in De Beers Abrasive Products Limited V. Interna-
tional General Electric Co of New York Limited^^ held that cer-
tain fprms of comparative advertising may give rise to an action 
for slander of goods and to draw a line between the permissible 
and the impermissible, the test to be applied is whether a 
"reasonable man would take the claim being made as being a seri-
ous claim or not-^ '^ .^ He rejects the alternative test as to wheth-
er there had been a specific allegation of defects or demerits, 
because such allegations can be made which would not be taken 
98. (1899) IQB 86 (CA). 
99. Supra note 97. 
100.Id at 605. 
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seriously : a claim for example, that a Rolls-Royce car sinks in 
water when claimants car does not^°^. The precise solution to 
this problem is given by Holdson L.J. in Cellacite and British 
Uzalite Ltd V. Robertson Co Inc?-^^, he said the general position 
in law is "ComparslQn - yes, but dispargement - no" where a 
trader makes detailed and untrue disparagements, he lays himself 
open to an action for slander of goods. 
At present, the consumer protection legislations namely, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 of America, Combines Investi-
gation Act of Canada, The Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia, 
Monopolies And Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 and Consumer 
protection Act, 1986 of India do allow comparative advertis-
ing^^^, provided of course that is not false or misleading. 
However, to determine whether a particular comparative advertise-
ment is false, misleading or not, is not free from difficulty. 
For the reason (a) there is no clear line between "Comparative 
and Non-Comparative", (b) a considerable amount of puffery has 
traditionally been allowed in advertising, the same is true in 
case of comparative advertising. The limits of permissible puf-
fery are far from being clear.In India there is also no clear cut 
101. Criticising this approach of Walton J, R G Lawson opines : 
This test Is misconceived. Such claims as he Instanced be 
cause of their nature do not infact point to defect or demer 
Its. Rolls Royce cars are not meant to float in water. See R 
G Lawson, Advertising Law (1st Ed. 1978) at 259. 
102. Times, 23rd. July, 1957. 
103. These Acts regulate only false or misleading advertisements. 
Therefore, there Is no harm In making truthful advertise-
ments Including comparative advertisements. 
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legislative policy regarding the cases in which a trader through 
comparative advertising projects true but insignificant compari-
sons or when he described accurately competitors goods but ex-
aggerated the merits of his own goods. Besides the quality com-
parisons, there is no legislative or judicial policy regarding 
the price comparisons. 
In Australia it has been said that the comparative advertis-
ing is permissible unless it fails to compare "like with like 
. This can be further elaborated by holding that the quality 
has to be compared with the quality of competitor's goods and 
price with the price, and it is also permissible to the trader to 
project his goods as more superior and less expensive as compared 
to his competitor. 
The puffing is considered a defence in false and misleading 
advertisements, both in America^^^ as well in India . However, 
in America, in order to check the possible misuse of this 
defence, it has been emphasised that there is a difference bet-
ween the mere claim of superiority and assertion of fact that 
implies an ability on the part of the defendant to substantiate 
the assertion. 
104. Stuart Alexander and Co (Interstate) Pty Ltd v. Blenders Pty 
Ltd (1981), 37 ALR 161 at 163. 
105. Smith - Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Electric Products Inc. 242 
F. Supp 302 (N.D. Ill, 1965). 
106. Re-Weston Electronics Ltd and others UTP Enquiry No. 20/1985 
order Dated. 24. 06. 1985. See also DG V. Cement Corp. of 
Gujarat (1992) 2 Comp LJ 331 : DG V. Milk Food Ltd, Patiala 
(1994) 2 Comp LJ. 373. 
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On the question of insignificant comparisons, neither the 
MRTP Commission nor Consumer Redressal Agencies found any occa-
sion to deliberate. The American courts have failed to take any 
consistent stand. In P Lozillard Co V. FTC^^'^, the Reader's 
Digest had published an article indicating that its laboratory 
tests had shown that all cigarette brands were more or less equal 
in tar and nicotine content, and the difference that did exist 
were so slight that they would not make any difference in the 
physiological effect on the smoker. However, a table attached 
with the article did show that the old Gold cigarettes tested, 
contained less nicotine tars and resins than the other brands, of 
course the difference was utterly without meaning so far as 
efficacy upon the smoker is concerned. Nevertheless, lorrillard 
ran an advertising campaign stressing the fact that old Gold was 
found lowest in tars, nicotines and resins, while making no 
mention of the basic thrust of the article. The commission passed 
cease and desist order and court of Appeals also did not change 
that. The concern however, of the commission and court was not 
that Lorrillard highlighted insignificant difference but the 
advertisement was edited in such a way as to create an entirely 
false and misleading impression, not only as to what was said in 
the article, but also as to quality of the company's cigarettes. 
Since court emphasized only the misrepresentation of the Read-
er's Digest article and not the deceptiveness of the claim 
itself, so it is not clear whether the result would have been 
107. 186 P. 2d 52 (4th Cir, 1950) 
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been the same if, rather than relying on the Reader's Digest 
article, the Lorrillard Co had conducted its own tests showing 
that old Gold contained less tars and nicotine than other brands 
and then advertised this fact. The International Parts Corpora-
tion^^^ did exactly the same. It advertised its electric welded 
muffler as safer than conventional mufflers. Expert evidence 
showed that the continuous weld was more leak proof but there was 
no danger of carbon monoxide gas leaking from any well made 
muffler. So the court of appeals found that the expert testimony 
sufficiently supported the advertising claim and vacated the 
FTC's cease and desist order. However, this opinion was not 
carried in Hatter of Ever Sharp, Inc.^^^. "Ever sharp" ran an 
advertisement of his own Schick Krona Chrome blade with that of 
competitor's stain-less steel blade. The magnified pictures of 
these two types of blades showed after using these blades five 
times, the stainless steel blade gets more corroded and advertis-
ers then asked the viewer to decide which blade he would prefer 
to use. The commission found that the corrosion that occurred 
after five shaves did not materially affect shaving performance 
and that the advertisement was therefore misleading. 
Commenting on this judicial wavering, Stewart E. rightly ob-
serves : 
there is no mechanical formula for deciding when a 
comparative advertisement is deceptive. The goal of FTC 
actions and policy should be to allow advertisers to 
108. International Part Corporation v. F.T.C., 133. 2nd 883 
(7th cir 1943) 
109. 77 F.T.C. 686 (1970) 
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present as much potentially useful information as 
possible without encouraging the dissemination of false 
and misleading advertising. Even if the FTC policy is 
not always apparent, the mere fact of commission regu-
lation may dissuade comparative advertisers from issu-
ing less than truthful advertisements. Due to the 
relatively few comparative claims, which have been 
fully evaluated, however, the precise path which the 
commission's regulation will take, remains largely in 
the realm of conjecture-'-"'- . 
However, it is suggested that the insignificant comparisons 
should be declared as misleading otherwise an advertiser will 
focus more on insignificant comparisons and will derive benefit 
out of all proportions. This approach is more demanding in goods 
involving health and safety of the consumers. 
Where an advertiser after truthfully stating the merits of 
the competing product, falsely embellishes his own, there is an 
unfair trade practice. This was laid down by the American Court 
in Electronic Corp. of America V. Honey Well Inc. ^^. However, in 
B. H. Bunnco V. A. A. Replacement Parts Co. ^^ it was emphasized 
that so long as the origin of the substandard parts is clear to 
the buyer, it will not be an unfair method of competition. The 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1964 which has been adopt-
ed by several American states-'--''-^  grants a cause of action both in 
110. Stewart E; The Law of Comparative Advertising: How much 
Worse is Better than Great, Col. L. Rev. Vol. 76:80 (1976) 
at 99. 
111. 428 F. 2d 191 (1st Cir. 1970). 
112. 451 F. 2d. 1254 (5th Cir. 1971). 
113. The 1964 Act or its 1966 revision which made only minor 
changes, has been adopted in its entirety or in substantial 
part in Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Ilinois, Maise, 
Minnesotta, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahome. Con-
necticut and Florida adopted the Act for a period but have 
since repealed it in favour of individual state statutes. 
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case of disparagment and in cases where an advertiser misrepre-
sents the quality of his own goods •^. In India on the other hand 
although this issue has not been yet resolved either by the 
commission or by courts, nevertheless, such bussiness practices 
shall be treated as unfair ones. Since an advertiser misrepre-
sents his own goods, such misrepresentation will be no less 
unfair by mere fact that the advertiser fairly states the quality 
of his competitor's goods. 
Price comparison has also posed many problems as there is no 
legal provision either in the MRTP Act, 1969 or in the CP Act, 
1986 relating to the permissible and impermissible price compari-
sons. In America Price Comparison Advertising Code regulates 
three types of direct price comparisons. 
1) Comparisons between the seller's price and the 
price at which the seller offered or sold merchandise 
in the past; 
2) Comparisons between the seller's price and the price 
at which the merchandise will be offered in the future; 
and 
3) Comparisons between the seller's price and that of a 
competitor. Where the comparison relates to a former 
price of the seller (e.g. formally priced at $10.00 
now $8.00). The items compared must either have been 
sold or offered for sale at the price within the 
last 90 days immediately preceding the date of the 
advertisements. If the comparison does not relate to 
an item sold or offered for sale during the 90 days 
period, 'the date, time or seasonal period of such 
sale or offer must be disclosed in the advertise-
ment. In any case, the code provides that no price 
comparison be made based upon a price which 
exceeds (the seller) ... cost plus normal mark 
up regularly used by him in the sale of such proper-
ty or services. 
114. UDTPA section 3(a) 
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Where the comparison relates to a seller's future price 
(e.g. Now $5,00 next month $7.00), the future price must take 
effect on the date disclosed in the advertisement or within 90 
days after the price comparison is stated in the ad. The stated 
future price must then be maintained by the seller "for a period 
of at least 4 weeks after its effective date, except where its 
compliance becomes impossible because of the circumstances beyond 
his control. 
Where the comparison relates to competitor's price (valued 
at $20.00 our price $15.00), the code requires that the competi-
tor's price must relate to goods or services that were advertised 
or sold in the preceding 90 day's period. In addition, the price 
must be representative of prices at which such consumer property 
is sold or advertised in the trade area in which the price com-
parison is made. The code also requires the seller to disclose 
that the price used as a basis for the comparison was not the 
seller's own price. Finally the code requires the seller to 
disclose conspicuously the general nature of the material dif-
ference in the property or services . In England also the 
Consumer Protection Act, 1987 through section 21^^^ provides 
guidance to determine permissibility of price comparison. 
115. See for detailed account of this code. Supra note 103, 
116. See infra commentary on subclause (ix). 
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In India the Advertising Standards Council (ASCI) chapter 
IV, provides that the advertisements containing comparisons are 
permissible in the interest of vigorous competition and public 
enlightment provided: 
1) It is clear what aspects of the advertisers product are 
being compared with what aspects of the competitors pro-
duct; 
2) The Comparisons are factual, accurate and capable of 
substantiation; 
3) There is no likelihood of the consumer being misled as a 
result of comparison, whether about the product adver-
tised or that with which it is compared; 
4) The advertisement should not unfairly denigrate attack or 
discredit other products, advertisers or advertisements 
directly or by implication; 
5) The subject matter is not chosen in such a way as to 
confer an artificial advantage upon the advertiser or so 
as to suggest that a better bargain is offered than is 
truely the case. 
The above guidelines do not have force of law. It is sug-
gested that these guidelines be incorporated in the both Acts so 
as to enable the redressal agencies to assess objectively the 
trade practice in question. 
Instead of making any precise claim, an advertiser may use 
such vague terms for instance, less than regular price, list or 
recommended price, competitive price, area price or he may claim 
that his price is special price or consumer can save money by 
buying his product. The question is how to determine the truth-
fulness of such claims? 
In Canada many of the above terms were put to judicial gloss 
nevertheless, it is not easy to ascribe any standard meaning 
115 
applicable to all these situations''-^ '^ . The pragmatic approach is 
adopted in America in the FTC's statement of policy regarding 
comparative advertising wherein it has been laid down that the 
commission evaluates comparative advertising in the same manner 
as it evaluates all other advertising techniques. The ultimate 
question in such situations is whether or not the advertisement 
has a tendency or capacity to be false or deceptive. This is a 
118 factual issue to be decided on a case by case basis"^ -^  . 
Interpretation of Advertisements 
Traditionally, the legal control over the claims made in 
representation revolve around the narrow goal of prohibiting 
false and misleading statements by asking whether a particular 
117.In Eddie Black (1962), 38 CPR 140 and Allied Towers Cases 
(1365) 15 Mc Gill LJ 654 " Regular price has been defined as 
the price at which it (an article) is ordinarily sold gener-
ally in the area in which the representation (as to regular 
price) is made. Similarly without assigning any meaning to 
the expression "list price" judge Sweet in Allied Towers case 
(1965) 15MC Gill LJ 654 held that the list price is not an 
unfamiliar term to retail buyers and that these people re-
alise that retailer some times sell below their price. In R. 
V. Becker, (1963), 15 Mc Gill LJ 654. The Term "Save over" 
was held to be capable of more than one interpretation and 
held that the words "save over" $100 coupled with the inclu-
sion of the advertiser's price did not necessarily disclose 
an offence under section 33c notwithstanding the fact that 
the highest price at which such items had previously been 
sold was $269, some what less than $269 which was suggested 
by the ad. However, R. V. Pattons place limited (1968), 57 
CPR 12 an opposite interpretation was given to the term "save 
over" . 
1 1 8 . 1 6 C P R 1 4 . 1 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 
119.The words, representation, statement and advertisement have 
been used interchangeably here, although there is a well 
established difference between these terms see Given v. C. 
Holland (Holdings) Pty (1977) 15 ALR 439. 
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claim is false or true . This hardly serves now the purpose. As 
Boorstin puts it : 
The broadest of the distinction which no longer serve 
us as they did, is the distinction between' true or 
false; Well-meaning critics (including many in the 
advertising profession) Who say the essential problem 
is false advertising are firing volleys at an obsolete 
target Advertising fogs our daily lives less 
from its peculiar lies than from its peculiar truths. 
The whole apparatus of Graphic Revolution has put a new 
elusiveness/ iridescence and ambiguity into every-day 
truth in 20th century America ^ . 
It has now been recognised that the aim of advertising is to 
provide consumers with product information which can operate on 
two levels; informative and persuasive. The informative context 
brings to the attention of a potential buyer the type of the 
commodity or service put to sale, its quality, serviceability, 
usefulness and price. The persuasive context of an advertising 
message refers to that part of the advertisement which attempts 
to translate latent wants on the part of an individual into an 
effective demand for goods, and service, encouraging the prospec-
tive customer to purchase a specific product or service adver-
tised^21_ 
The MRTP Act, 1969 and CP Act, 1986, before amendments in 
1991 and 1993 respectively like other legislations^^^, confined 
legal control to "informative" level. The incorporation of 
120.Boorstin, the image (1962) 216-7 quoted by Trebilock in 
Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society (1970) 16 Mc Gill 
263-282. 
121.Cohen; Misleading Advertising and Combines investigation Act, 
(1969) 15 Mc Gill Law Journal 622, 626. 
122.For instance Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia; Trade 
Descriptions Act, 1968 of England. 
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compendious words like "unfair method" and unfair or "decep-
tive acts" through the above amendments have widened the scope 
of the two Acts. There is now no reason not to censure a repre-
sentation which falsely persuades the consumers to purchase for 
example the tooth paste which will make them more popular or 
sexually more appealing. This claim cannot be treated differently 
f,rom a claim that it makes teeth 25 per cent whiter than any 
other brand or that it will prevent cavities-^ *-*. 
The consumers can be persuaded to purchase by a number of 
ways, one of them being testimonial advertising. This technique 
involves the use of a third party to vouch for the quality or 
efficacy of the advertised item. The endorsement can come from 
celebrity - usually in the sports or entertainment field (e.g. 
Sunil Gawasker advertising Dinesh & Vimal suiting, Kapil Dev 
sports shoes, Ms. Universe lirill soap and Ms World Hair 
shampoo). This endorsement can also come from an expert or group 
of experts who in the opinion of consumers occupy better position 
to evaluate the merits of the product. 
These deceptive advertisements can raise numerous questions. 
For example is it misleading to use a celebrity endorsement if 
the celebrity does not really use the product? Is it misleading 
to disclose that celebrity is being paid? It is deceptive not to 
disclose that while some experts think that the product is desir-
able, others disagree. 
123.Howard and Hulbert, Advertising and the public interest; 
Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (1973) at 5. See 
for contrary opinion A J Dugan; Fairness in Advertising in 
pursuit of the Hidden Persuader; Melb. Unv. L. Rev. Vol.11, 
June 1977 at 66. 
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In India neither MRTP commission nor Redressal Agencies under 
CP Act had occasion to deliberate on these issues. In America, 
the Federal Trade Commission promulgated in 1975, the first of 
its final Guides on Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertis-
ing^^*. These guides can prove helpful to both, the MRTP commis-
sion and consumer fora for resolving issues relating to testimon-
ial advertising. 
Under these guides an endorsement must always reflect the 
honest opinions, findings, beliefs or experience of the 
endorser . Advertisers are forbidden to present endorsements 
out of context or continue using them if they no longer have 
faith or belief that the endorser continues to subscribe to the 
I O C 
views presented to the public ". Where the advertisement repre-
sents that the endorser uses the endorsed product, then the 
endorsement must have been a bonafide user of it at the time 
197 
endorsement was given . The payment or promise of payment to an 
17 8 
endorser, however, need not be disclosed . 
Apart from guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission in F T C 
17 9 V. Cooga Mooga Inc. ^ held that endorser will be personally 
responsible for false claim. The implications of the order are 
124. 16 C.F.R. 255 et seq (1980), 4 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 39,038 
Additional guides were issued in 1980 See 45 Fed. Reg. 3870 
(1980). 
125. Id. 255.1 (a). 
126. Id. 255.1 (b). 
127. Id. 255.1 (c). 
128. Id. 255.5. 
129. 92 F.T.C. 310 CCH Trade Reg.Rep. 21,417 (1978). 
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significant because they provide a strong incentive for a celeb-
rity endorser to independently verify the claims made in advere-
tisements before being associated with a product. This principle 
can be applied in India also if any claim of endorser is found 
false. The informative content of advertisement has raised many 
problems for interpretation. Although there is consensus that the 
false and misleading ads are bad, few however, agree about how 
best to tell whether an advertisement is misleading. In the 
course of interpretation of ads, rules were formulated by various 
courts. An overview of these rules is as follows. 
l.To determine whether a representation is misleading, it 
cannot be resolved by merely examining whether it is 
correct or not in the literal sense. A representation 
containing a sLdteiuiinL apparently correct in the technical 
sense may have the effect of misleading the buyer by using 
tricky language-'-^ .^ Similarly a statement which may be 
inaccurate in the technical literal sense can convey the 
truth and sometimes more effectively than a literally 
correct statement. It is therefore, necessary to examine 
that does a consumer on reading the advertisement fcj^ m a 
belief different from what the truth is?^^^ 
2.This consumer belief can be determined by two methods: (i) 
"to ascertain the effects of the advertisement which the 
advertiser's handiwork will have on the eye and mind of 
the reader^ . For example an advertisement might be 
deemed to be deceptive if it deceives some consumers by 
130.For instance the statement that tea rusk was made in Holland, 
Michigan may be true but the impression it conveys is that 
the product is of Dutch origin. U.S. v. Schucman (111 DCWD 
Mich 1910); The statement that an imported perfume was 
"bottled in U.S.A" necessarily implies that the blended 
mixture was imported. Floret sales C. v. F.T.C, 100 F 2nd 358 
(CCA 2nd, 1938); Statement that a radio has two tubes without 
disclosing the fact that one did not function and was merely 
a rectifying tube is misleading. In the Matter of Radio wire 
Television, Inc 34 FTC 1278 (1942). 
131.Supra note 67 at 1965. See also F.T.C. v. National Health 
Aid, 128 F. Supp. 340 342 (1952); More-trench Corp.v. F.T.C. 
127 F 2d 792 at 795. 
132.F. T. C. V. Sterling Drug Inc, 317 F. 2d 669 (2d cir 1963). 
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causing them to hold a false belief about the product, (ii) 
to ascertain the character of the advertisement, without 
explicit reference to the ad's effect on consumers. For 
example an ad is deceptive if it makes a factual claim and 
that claim is false. The Federal Trade Commission in United 
States and MRTP Commission in India have adopted this ap-
proach. Thus once a claim is identified to have been made in 
the advertisement it is then easy to decide whether that 
claim is true or false. However, it is a difficult task to 
determine which claims an advertisement can fairly be read 
as making. For this net impression test has been suggested 
which will involve inquiry in the advertisement in its 
entirety. In other words entire mosaic should be viewed 
rather than each tile separately^"*^. 
3.Once it is determined that a representation is misleading, 
it will be declared so only when it is material and capable 
133.Ibid, See also Puxu Pty Ltd. v. Parkdale Custom Built Furni-
ture Plight Ltd. (1980) 31 ALR 73; Henderson v. Pioneer Homes 
Ply Ltd. (1980) 29 ALR 597 at 604; Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. 
DIA (Engineering Ltd. (1981) 6TPC at 700-1; Colgate-Palmolive 
Pty Ltd. V. Rexona Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 391 Stuart Alexander 
Pty Ltd. V. Blenders Pty Ltd. (1981) 37 ALR 161. For contrary 
opinion See Richard Crqsswell; Interpreting Deceptive Adver-
tising, Bost Univ. L. Rev. Vol. 65 July 1985. at 676. The 
learned author opines that if the advertisement is viewed as 
making false claims, it will be banned as deceptive and 
consumers may lose the truthful information as well. But if 
the advertisement is viewed as making only truthful claims, 
it will be permitted to continue unchanged, and at least some 
consumers will continue to draw mistaken inference. This 
dilemma in his opinion could be resolved in several different 
ways. For example one approach would be to hold the advertis-
er responsible only for those inferences that were the fault 
of the advertisement itself, but not for those that were the 
fault of the consumer. This was adopted in fact by the author 
from the opinion expressed by Nelson and Hoyer, In corrective 
Advertising And Affirmative Disclosure Statement; The poten-
tial For Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, 46 J. Market-
ing 61, 70 1982; Another approach is to make greater use of 
consumer surveys to identify the beliefs which consumers 
actually form when exposed to the challenged ads. This view 
was expressed by Gardner in Deception in Advertising: A 
Conceptual Approach, 39 J. Marketing 40, 41-45 (Jan 1945) 
see also for the similar opinion, Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer 
Deception Before the Federal Trade Commission 17 kans. L.Rev. 
559, 561 (1969); However, Crass-well has himself suggested 
that Law should select the meaning that will minimize the 
overall injury to consumers. Id at 677. 
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of affecting purchasing decisions^"^^^ In-accuracies in 
unimportant details will not be fatal"*-^ .^ The expression 
"material" is not to be interpreted in terms of Y^Jue but 
rather degree to which the purchaser is affected "* . 
4.Where a statement is capable of bearing two meanings, one 
of which is true and the other false, the mere fact that 
one possible meaning is true will not necessarily prevent 
finding of deceptiveness-'-'^  . However, where a statement can 
convey a secondary meaning, it may be allowed, even though 
the primary, original meaning could not be truthfully 
asserted, if it is shown that the word in fact has a sec-
ondary meaning to the general public 
5.Since it is an overall impression of a representation which 
has to be taken into account, a representation standing 
alone may be treated as deceptive but due to the presence 
of qualification or, limitation such prejudicial effect may 
be erased, ",. However, qualification should be equally 
effective and it must not directly contradict the 
134. See FTC v.Royal Milling Co, 288 US 212, 216-7 (1973) (de-
ceived into purchasing an article which they do not wish to 
buy); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc v. F.T.C. 122 F. 2d 
158, 161 (3rd cir 1941) (makes the average purchaser unwill-
ingly purchase that which he did not intend to buy); 
F.T.C V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 US 374, 386 (1965) 
('fact which would constitute a material factor in a pur-
chaser's decision to buy"). 
135. Halsburys Laws of England (Ed. 4th para 1044& 1045). 
136. R V. Kellys on Seymour ltd (1969), 60 CPR 2 4 at 26. 
137. Murray Space Shoe Corp v. FTC 304 F 2d 270,272; US v. 95 
Barrels of Vinger, 265 Us 438 443 (1924). In Australia it 
was held in CRW Pty Ltd. v. Sneddan 1972 AR (NSW) 17 
that offering of used cars for sale on payment of low depos-
its was held misleading as to type of credit transaction 
involved and misleading as to the range of potential custom-
ers to whom such credit was available. 
138. F. T. C. V. Algoma Lumser Co, 219 US 67, 80 (1934); Howard 
Hunt Pen Co. v. F.T.C, 197 F.2d 273 (3d cir,1952). 
139. F. T. C. Sterling Drug Inc, F. 2d 669, 675 92d Cir, 1963). 
140. J B Williams Co; 3 Trade Reg. Rep 17, 339 at 22, 449 F.T.C. 
DKE. No 8547, 1965. It was made clear that the main wording 
must not imply that the limitation on the original claim is 
of little significance; similarly in Fell v. F.T.C 285 F. 2d 
879 (9th Cir,1960) it was held that a claim made in layman's 
language is not effectively limited by technically phrased 
qualification. 
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as to create 
must be atune 
other words 
original assertions or be so vaguely worded 
further uncertainty-'-^ . The qualification  
with the pitch of the main statement . In 
if an advertisement is in writing, qualification must be 
in the same bold letters as the main statement^^-^. 
6. The advertisement may be misleading because things are 
composed or purposefully printed in such a way as to 
mislead^^. In case of advertisements, common law prin-
ciple will apply to the extent that seller is not gener-
ally bound to disclose information which may be relevant 
to a prospective purchaser's decision but if he does 
speak on any given matter he is bound not to distort the 
information he gives by revealing only part of the 
truth^^^. 
7. Consumer is considered to have been wronged when he does 
not get goods or service of the stated quality made in 
the advertisement. It is no defence that although the 
product was of lower quality than claimed it' was still 
worth the price charged . 
8. Where an advertiser is making a claim which is not 
susceptible of objective proof for example a claim that 
the product will produce a subjective sensation which is 
a matter of taste or emotion and will greatly vary from 
person to person. In such cases physical factors which 
produce the sensation can be examined objectively. For 
example a claim that a cigarette was not irritating 
willbe determined by a measurable fact i.e. whether 
irritating constituents are present in the smoke*^^ . 
141. Giant Food, Inc v. FTC, 222, F.2d 977, 986 (D.C Cir, 1963), 
Cert, dismissed, 376 US 967 1964. 
142. American life and Ace. Ins. Co v. FTC 255 F.2d 289 (8th 
Cir), Cert, denied 368 U.S 875 (1958). 
143. University Publication, In the matter of UTPE No.23 of 
1987, decided on 10th October, 1988. 
144. See Sachar Committee's Report, at 263. See also Boots Compa-
ny (India) Ltd. Bombay, UTPE NO. 401 of 1987 decided on 
17.11.1988. 
145. See generally Spencer Bower & Turner, Actionable Misrepre 
sentation, (3rd ed) (1974), at 94. 
146. Supra note 138. 
147. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co, 55 F.T.C. 354 (1958). 
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9. Since the findings of the MRTP Commission in Society 
for Civic Rights v. Colgate Palmolive Ltd.^^° that a 
representation is misleading if it has capacity or 
tendency to mislead, is even after the amendment to MRTP 
Act and CP Act, a valid exposition of law, so law will 
be violated even if no person was infact induced to 
enter into contract as a result of that 
representation^^^.. Moreover, it will also be irrelevant 
that any false or misleading statement was igfact cor-
rected prior to any sale which has been made . Howev-
er, such correction will affect the cease and desist 
order or injection which the Commission may otherwise 
grant^^^. There may also be palliation in the compensa-
tion which may be granted to the injured consumer. 
10.When an advertiser is making a false or misleading 
claim. It has to be scanned in order to ascertain 
whether that claim is a promise, prediction"^ or opin-
ion-'-^ '^ . If it falls in the category of promise it should 
be declared false or misleading and not otherwise irres-
pective of the fact whether the promise made W«-S-
148. (1991) 3 Comp LJ. 378. 
149. DG V. Body Wrap Company (India) P.Ltd. UTPE No. 83/1986 UA 
No. 146 of 1986) decided on 27.11.1986. 
150. The rationale of this principal which in American literature 
is called "first contact deception" has been explained in an 
American case of CRW Pyt Ltd v. Snedden, 1972 AR (N.SW) 17 
in the following words; The evil in such cases is the bring-
ing of people to the appellants premises by misleading 
statements. Once there, it may be true enough that they will 
be told precisely what transaction is available and the 
circumstances under which it is available. But then they are 
the captives of the advertiser and available to be persuaded 
to enter into some other transaction 
151. In the matter of Super Computronics (p) Ltd (1992) 3 Camp 
LJ. 303. 
152. In Thompson v. Master touch TV series (1977) 15 ALR; it was 
held that the prediction that " Should earn $ 400 Per week 
minimum" did not constitute false statement. 
153. In DG V. Guinea Mansion (1988) 2 Comp LJ at 144. MRTP Com-
mission held that the expression "most artistic Jewellery" 
is not synonymous with the "best jewellery of the land". The 
term art is for human skill. Art finds expression in objects 
in which skill may be expressed. Art is something personal 
and every artist has its own style and design. It depends 
upon one's perception. 
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relating to present, past or future fact"^ -^ ^ 
11. The advertiser cannot assert the defence that the pur-
chaser was contributorily negligent. Since consumer law 
is aimed at protecting unthinking, credulous, ignorant 
and gullible consumers, so they are generally assumed to 
be negligent^^^. Indeed, the commercial advertiser seeks 
to capitalize upon this careless approach of the consum-
ers and thus induces them to purchase. 
154.However, in England the position is that a promise as to what 
a speaker will do at sometime in the future cannot be a false 
trade description under the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. 
See Beckett v. Cohen (1973) 1 All ER 120. For a criticism of 
English cases see Milner," The Rape of the Trade Description 
Act". (1975) 38 MLR 694. However, in Australia it has been 
made clear that this distinction cannot be applied while 
interpreting section 52 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974. See 
Goldring,"The Trade Practices Act"1974 - 75 and the Law of 
Innocent Misrepresenting 1976 50 ALR 126 at 135-6. 
155.Belmont Laboratories v. FTC, 103 F 2d 538 (CCA 3rd 1939). 
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SPECIFIC CATE60RIES 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 
F A L S E O R M I S L E I A D I N G A D V E R T I S E M E I N T S 
Various forms of the false and misleading representations 
mentioned in the definition are not now exhaustive enumeration of 
the Unfair Trade Practices^ in view of the amendments made in the 
MRTP and CP Acts. The language is couched in the words of widest 
amplitude. The scope of the definition is not only confined to 
the advertisements made through mass media but will equally apply 
to a single false or misleading statement made in the course of 
promotional activity of a trade . The statement made whether 
orally or In writing or by visible representation will be cov-
ered. This includes assertions whether made by words written or 
spoken or by conduct . Thus a situation like in Given v. C.Hol-
land (Holdings) Pty Ita,- will be well covered In which the 
1. The Supreme Court's opinion expressed in Lakhanpal National 
Ltd. v. MRTP Commission AIR 1989 Sc 1698 that the definition 
of unfair trade practice Is not Inclusive or flexible but 
specific and limited In Its contents. Is now no more valid 
after the amendments made In the Act. 
2. In given v.C Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd. It was held that the 
representation Involves an assertion whether made by words or 
conduct whereas statement Is confined to only words spoken or 
written (1977) 15 ALR 439. See also Pryon v. Given (1980) 30 
ALR 189. 
3. (1977) 15 ALR 439. 
4. I. I. Iiyak, it appeals, is of the sau opioioo. le kas givea two separate headiogs ii his look, one for 
false lepiesestatioi uoder vhich clauses Ii) to (iv| have beea discussed aod aoothet for •isleadlag 
zepiesentatioBs udez vhich clauses (vi), to (vii), (ix) aod (x) have been discussed, see I. I. layak, 
Coosuiez Piotectioi in lodia: ia geological Treatise Oa Cousoier Justice (1S)1) P.31]-333. lovcver, It 
seeis froi the cases decided by the NBTP Couissioo that it has read the word 'false* as inclndiag the 
•isleadiog represeitatioo. See for iostaoce DG (I i i ) r. U t i i a l B i i i Centre (1)11)2 Coap LJ 17(; 
Godfzer Phillips ladia Ltd. aad l a o t b e i , UTPB Ho.2(0 of 1)11 aad It lo.740 of 1)11; la the utter of; 
Ivs Suzuki Ltd, Baoglore fl))2) 2 Coip U 251; ID the latter of liodustao CIBl Geigy Ltd. Boibay, 
(1))3) 2 Coap LJ 3(1. The Hord 'lisleadiog' is expressly incorporated in section 3(a) of the Trade 
OescriptiooiAct, 1)(( of Boglaod in addition to word 'false' in section 3(1). 
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dealer was held liable for false representation when it was found 
that mileage shown on the meter of a used car was false. Simi-
larly undisclosed mockups in television commercial to repre-
sent product which are distorted in normal transmission will 
also be covered. The pictures or cartoons promoting sale, supply 
or use of goods or services will also fall in the ambit of defi-
nition. 
However, various sub-clauses of section 36 A and 2(r) of the 
MRTP and CP Acts respectively in which different forms of false 
and misleading representations have been incorporated are not 
properly worded. Sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii) talk of representa-
tions which are false. Does it mean that if a representation is 
of the nature mentioned in these clauses which is not false but 
misleading, will be outside the purview of these clauses. For 
example, a statement which is literally accurate but because of 
its ambiguity is likely to mislead will not be a false represen-
tation. Although it may well be argued that (1)false representa-
tion encompasses misleading representations as well (2)the words 
"unfair or deceptive acts" used in the main body of the defini-
tion are wide enough to include misleading statements also, then 
what was the need of retaining the word "misleading" in sub-
clauses (vi), (ix) and (x)? It is therefore, suggested that in 
order to remove any doubt, sub-clause(i) be amended on the fol-
lowing lines; 
"The practice of making any statement, whether 
orally or in writing or by visible representation 
which is false or misleading that" 
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The word "falsely" used in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and the 
words "falsely or misleading" used in clauses (vi), (ix), (xi) be 
omitted. 
Clause (i) says that it is "the practice of making any 
statement", the word practice means repeated action; habitual 
performance or succession of acts of similar kind . In short it 
must be more than one act. If this interpretation is given to the 
word "practice" then single act of representation will not con-
stitute unfair trade practice. It is suggested that clause (i) be 
read with section (v)(ii) of the MRTP Act so that a single or 
isolated act of any person in relation to any trade is enough to 
stamp any trade practice as unfair^provided of course other char-
acteristics are also found . 
The various forms of false or misleading representations 
enumerated in sub-clause (i) to (x) are discussed hereunder: 
Sub Clause (i) 
False representation regarding the particular standard, 
quality, grade, composition, style or model of goods. 
This sub-clause (i) is based on section 53 of the Trade 
Practices Act, 1974 of Australia . The word "particular" caused 
5.Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed). 
6.MRTP Cpimnission also expressed similar views in re Godfrey 
and Boyce Mfg, Corp Ltd. (1990) Comp. Cas at 229; see also CERC 
V. T.T.K Pharma Ltd (1990) 68 comp. cas 89; In the matter of 
TVS Suzuki Ltd and Anr (1994) 3 comp LJ 595. 
7.Section 53 (a) runs as follows; falsely represents that the 
goods are of a particular standard, quality, grade, composition, 
style or model or has a particular history or particular previ-
ous use. Section 13-301(7) of the Maryland Consumer Protection 
is also similarly worded which says represents that goods or 
services are of a particular standard quality or grade or that 
goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of anoth-
er . 
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some doubt to Australian Courts about its scope. So suggestions 
were made to Swanson Committee for its deletion. 
However,the Committee rejected the suggestions on the ground that 
such deletion might widen the scope of the clause so as to encom-
pass general standard etc., which may create uncertainty as to 
its real import. 
Suggestively speaking the word "particular" should be read 
as opposed to general. "Particular" connotes here a special 
attribute or feature of the represented goods. However, it cannot 
be interpreted independently but with reference to the context in 
which it will come into question. For instance a statement about 
the number of miles traveled by an used car describes a particu-
lar attribute of the vehicle and therefore, describes its partic-
ular quality^ or where a car is labelled as Maruti car it will be 
false representation if the car is not of the particular quality 
maintained by the Maruti udyog or if a car dealer represents the 
superceded model as the latest it will be a false representation 
as to a particular model"'-'^ . 
8. Swanson Committee Report, para 968. 
9. Supra note 3. 
10. In Dr.B.W. Roshan Kumar v. M/s Sipani Automobiles Ltd. 1992 
1 CPR 326; Dr. Madan Roa v. M/s Sipani Automobiles Ltd. 
(1992) 1 CPR 357; Dr.S.C.Bembalgi v. M/s Sipani Automobiles 
Ltd. (1992) CPR 479; Dr.P.Soundars Paridan v. M/s Sipani 
Automobiles Ltd. and Anr. 111(1992) CPJ 393 cars were repre-
sented as having quality engine built with Japanese technol-
ogy when in fact they were fitted with locally made defec-
tive engine. It was held in all the four cases that it is 
false representation as to standard, quality and perfor-
mance. Similarly in CERC v. Karnavati Auto Ltd., UTPE 23/85 
order dated 19.2.1987, the claim that consumption of moped 
is 90 Km per litre was found possible only in ideal condi-
tions which are almost impossible to obtain. Hence a false 
representation as to particular quality of moped. 
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The components of sub-clause (i) are not mutually exclusive 
but overlap in many situations'^^. The MRTP Commission in a number Of 
cases quite rightly held a representation false on more than one 
grounds^^. For example if the composition of a product is not as 
represented it will naturally affect its particular quality and 
also standard. The word grade also denotes quality or value. Thus 
describing ice-lolly as 100% ice cream when it is manufactured 
from a material which is neither milk nor cream / it is a false 
representation as to composition and to a particular quality 
which an ice cream is possessing. Similarly Dentobac Creamy Snuff 
when instead of refreshing as claimed, causes giddiness and other 
harmful effects because of its 35% to 45% tobacco contents which 
fact was suppressed, is an unfair trade practice both of composi-
tion and quality^ . 
The word "quality" is a subjective connotation. Therefore, 
those facts which may be taken into reckoning to determine the 
quality should not be false^^ for example to call old stocks as 
11. Doolan v. (Nations Ltd. (1981) ATPR 40-257 at 43-294. 
12. For instance see DG v. P. Pazasmel & Co and ors UTPE No. 50 
of 1988 decided on 7.9.89; In re Hind watch WD (1993) 1 Comp 
LJ 323; Atual Dua v. Helvette Watch House, Comp cas, 1990 
Vol.69 357. 
13. DG V. Milk-foods Ltd. UTPE No.292 of 1987 (lA No.79 of 1987) 
decided on 18.12,1987. 
14. In re Parag Perfumes, UTPE No.283/1988 order dated 
21.3.1990. 
15. In re Jindal Aluminium Ltd, (1990) 1 Comp LJ 425. 
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seasons best sale"^^. The word quality is linked with the standard 
in the sense that the latter means general recognition or a type, 
model or combination of elements accepted as correct or 
perfect-^^. So it is the quality which sets the standard. To sell 
spurious watch as HMT quartz is a false representation as to 
quality as welli^Jstandard because HMT watches are known for their 
1 8 
standard which has been set by its quality^ . Not only this 
alone, using falsely ISI mark"'-^ . or "R Brand" which has not been 
20 
registered under Indian Trade Marks and Merchandise Act* or 
using brand name of a company which has earned fame for its 
quality and standard^^or using brand name similar to the one of a 
reputed company e.g. Vamal instead of Vimal, Relinage instead of 
Reliance, are all false representations as to quality and stan-
dard^^. 
Model is almost synonymous with style and denotes also 
design. The plain illustration based on model or style will be 
iTi In the matter of Singhal & Bros New Delhi UTPE No. 211 of 
1987 decided on 15.1.1988. 
17. Black's Law Dictionary, (5ht. Ed.). 
18. In the matter of Sagar Electronics (1993) 1 Comp LJ 325. 
19. Usha International Ltd. UTPE No. 62 187 decided on 18.11.87. 
20. Vinod Vithaldas v. India Shaving Products Ltd. and ors; UTPE 
No.85 of 1985 CIA No.148/85 decided on 29.9.1987. 
21. Godfrey India Ltd. and anr UTPE No.260 of 1988 and lA No. 40 
of 1988. 
22. DG V. Paresmal Co and ors. UTPE No. 50 of 1988 decided on 
7.7.1989. However in an earlier case of re Manohar Cut 
Pieces Fancy Cloth Merchants UTPE No.30/1985 order dated 
10.7.85 held that any infringement of Trade mark cannot be 
looked into by the commission as it falls under Trade & 
Merchandise Marks Act 1958. 
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a representation that a car is of a particular years model when 
in fact it is a model of an earlier year^^ or to describe a 
watch HMT Kartik model when infact it is not or is HMT but not of 
Kartik model. It will also cover representation based on subjec-
tive test e.g. ready made garments of English or Japanese 
style23. 
•Phe word "quality" was incorporated in clause (i) through 
(Amendment) Act, 1991. Before this amendment the MRTP Commission 
had held in DG (ISRJ v. Food Specialists Lttp-^ and in re Food 
Specialities that sale of a package containing contents of 
quality less than what is mentioned on the container may amount 
to a contravention of the Standard of Weights and Measures (Pack-
aged commodities) Act or the rules framed thereunder, but the 
implementation of the said Act or the rules is not within the 
Jurisdiction of the Commission unless there is an unfair Trade 
Practice within the meaning of section 36-A of the MRTP Act. Now 
both MRTP and CP Acts have been armed with the power to stamp a 
representation as unfair trade practice if it falsely states 
particular quantity of the product. The word quantity will in-
ll^Ransley v Spare Parts S re condition Co Pty Ltd. (1975) ITPC 
219. 
23. Hind Watch Co. New Delhi UTPE No.87 of 1990 decided on 
18.9.90 See also re Export India UTPE No.34/1984 order dated 
19.5.86. 
24. (1987) 62 Comp Cas. 122 (MRTPC). 
25. (1991) 70 Comp Cas. 569. 
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26 
elude length, width, height, area, volume, capacity and number 
Since both, MRTP Act and CP Act are in addition to and not in 
derogation of any other law^', so there will be no conflict bet-
ween these two Acts and the Standard of Weights and Measures 
(Packaged Commodities) Act. 
In all cases mentioned under section 36-A(i) of the MRTP Act 
and section 2-r(i) of CP Act, the burden of proof is on the 
representator and not on representee in view of section 106 of 
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which makes it clear that if a fact 
is specially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of 
proving that fact is upon him. Thus where a person is claiming 
that his treatment is world famous, he has to prove it^^. 
Sub-Clause (ii) 
False representation regarding the particular standard, 
quality or grade of services: 
For sub-clause (ii) there must be a false representation 
regarding the particular standard, quality or grade and such 
representation must be relating to services^^. So what is relev-
ant for the interpretation of clause (i) holds true for clause 
^ ' See Section 2(3) of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968 of 
England. 
27. See section 4 of the MRTP Act and 3 of the CP Act. 
28. DG. V. Manne Quins, (1989) 3 Comp LJ 155. 
29. This clause is similar to section 53(9a) of "the Trade 
Practices Act, 1974 which is as follows: falsely represents 
that services are of a particular standard, quality of 
grade. 
30. Section 2(r) . 
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(ii) also. The word service has been defined under the MRTP 
Act^° as well as under the CP Act"^ ^ as follows: 
Service means service of any description which is made 
available to potential users and includes the provision 
of facilities in connection with the banking, financ-
ing, insurance, transport processing, supply of elec-
trical or other energy, boarding, lodging or both, 
housing construction, entertainment, but does not 
include the rendering of any service free of charge or 
under a contract of personal service. 
There was a controversy whether the term service should 
•JO 
apply to goods only or immovable property also*"-. The Indian Ex-
press quoted the then Law Minister as saying that the housing is 
not covered but if housing activities amounted to rendering 
service, then it is covered*^ .^ The MRTP Commission also made it 
clear in DG (I&R) v. Mano Builders^^, that the word service 
defined in the MRTP Act is confined to not only business relating 
to goods but also includes the provisions of any service relating 
to immovable property. 
31. Section 2(o). 
32. I C Sexena is of the opinion that services relating to 
immovable properties are outside the purview of CP Act. See 
The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, A view Point, 30 JILI 
321. 324 for contrary opinion see S.H.Azmi, sale of Goods 
and Consumer Protection in India 1992 at 240. 
33. The Indian Express; July, 1987 New Delhi. 
34. (1988) MRTP Report 4. See also DG(I & R) v. Nahid Co Housing 
Pvt. Ltd. UTPE 331/88 order dated 6.4.1989; A P Singh v. 
Capital Promoters Pvt. Ltd. Comp. cas. Vol.73(1992) at 149. 
National Commission also came in agreement with MRTP Commis-
sion in UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Housing Development) v. 
Garima Shukla IC?J 7; Luckhnow Development Authority v. M M 
Sood F.A. No.10 of 1990); Banglore Development Authority v. 
C L Jagannath (F.A.No.42 of 1990); Suman Chandra Jain v. UP 
Avas Evam Vikas Parshid (1991) 1 CPJ 258. Mrs Sneh Chadda v. 
Delhi Development Authority (1991) 1 CPJ 13; Lucknow Devel-
opment Authority v. M K Gupta SCJ 1994 Vol.1 at 103. 
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Although, in order to remove any doubt, service relating to 
housing construction was inserted in the definition through MRTP 
(Amendment) Act, 1991, and real estate in the definition of serv-
ice through CP (Amendment) Act, 1993, their are still innumerable 
services which may fall within the ambit of the definition but 
have not been expressly mentioned. In this connection the opinion 
of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M K 
Gupta deserves mention: 
The provisions of the Act thus have to be construed in 
favour of the consumer to achieve the purpose of enact-
ment as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. 
The primary duty of the court while construing the 
provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive 
approach subject to that it should not do violence to 
the language of the provisions and is not contrary to 
attempted objectives of the amendment. 
The MRTP commission passed cease and desist orders not only 
against those whose services found express mention in the defini-
tion but also against the provider of those services which can be 
read as implied in the definition by virtue of the word "any de-
scription" mentioned in the definition of service. Thus the cease 
and desist orders were passed against the teaching shops for 
35. SCJ 1994 Vol.1, 103 at 110. 
36. See in re India Education Centre UTPE No.368/88 decided on 
6.12.88; In re Career College Bombay UTPE No.108/1983 order 
date 8.1.88; In re National Institute of Information Tech-
nology New Delhi UTPE N.226/88 order dated 23.3.88; In re 
Advance Degree College Jaipur No.333/1988 order dated 
10.3.89; In re Shree Narayan Open University Qulon UTPE 
No.387/88 order dated 27.10.89; Indian Management Institute 
DG V. Indian Institute of Management Stu-.^ dtes UTPE No 287/88 
order dated 16.5,88; and In re Bhartiya Veterinary College 
Banglore, (1988) 63 Comp Cas. 3. 
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37 
making false claims. False claims of increase of height , 
_ _ -J q 
preventing baldness-'" or determining sex of an unborn child , 
for removing white patches^° and sex problems^-^, travel agency 
and carrier of courier service^^ were also prohibited by the MRTP 
Commission. 
Sub Clause (ill); 
False representation regarding any rebuilt, second hand, 
renovated, reconditioned or old goods as new goods; 
The object of this sub-clause is to prohibit any representa-
tion that the goods are new when in fact they are rebuilt, second 
hand, renovated reconditioned or old^^. The word "new" does not 
have any fixed and rigid meaning^-'. The Molony Committee recom-
mended that the "Trade description" formerly contained in the 
37. In re M/s New Height UTPE No.14/1985 order dated 1.4.1986. 
38. In re Manne Qunis UTPE No.167/1986 order dated 20.7.89. 
39. In re Mrs Kamalesh r^aper(1988) 64 Com. Cas. 109. See also 
In re Ravi Foundation UTPE Enquiry No.93/1986, order dated 
4.7.1986. 
40. re Vaidya Sri Jawala Prasad, UTPE No.245/87 order 
dated5.9.1989; re Shyam Ayurved Bhawn UTPE No.470/1987, order 
dated 14.12.1990. 
41. In re Dr.N.D.Singh, UTPE No.256/87 order dated 21.12.1990; 
DG(I & R) V. Prakash Clinic (1988) 63 Comp. Cas. 171. 
42. In re Pratap Travel UTPE No.135/87 order dated 26.5.88. 
43. In re Overnite Express UTPE No.120/88 order dated 6.10.88. 
44. Sec.53(b) of Trade PracticesAct, 1974 Correspond to 
clause (iii) of MRTP and CP Act, Sec.13-301(6) of Maryland 
Consumer Protection Act, 1973 provides; represents that the 
goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, 
reconditioned, reclaimed, used or second-hand. 
45. In re ABC Copiers Pty Ltd. ATPC Annual Report, 1978-79. 
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Merchandise Marks Act (Now replaced by Trade Descriptions Act, 
1968) should include descriptions as to any goods being new in 
the sense of being "Unused" . However, sub-clause (iii) is wide 
enough to include representation to claim unused but old goods as 
new ones, similarly representation like the one in R v. Ford 
Motor Co, Ltd. where a car was described as new but infact had 
been damaged in the process o£ delivery and thereafter repaired 
and was as good as new, will be false . 
Since the word "new" has many meanings, it is not possible 
to determine its meaning unless read in the context in which it 
was used. To say goods are "as good as new" possibly suggests 
that goods are not new or to say goods have been "sparingly 
used" means that goods are second hand '^. 
46. Report of the Molony Committee on Consumer Protection (1962) 
Para 636. 
47. (1974) 3 All ER 489. 
48. In this case it was held that it is not a false indication 
as defined under section 3 of the Trade Descriptions Act, 
1968. However, this decision has been criticised on the 
ground that there are obvious difficulties if this decision 
is taken too far. Buyers can surely assume in the normal way 
that "new" goods travel from production line to retail 
outlet in ^^ Tristine condition. Any repair, however, skillful 
can affect the durability of goods. Brain W.Harvey et.al. 
The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading (1992) at 
365. 
49. This was the observation of Trial Judge in R v. ford Motor 
company Ltd. Supra note 203, but was rejected by Court of 
appeal. However, in India it seems that trial judge's ob-
servation holdjgood. 
50. However, Karnataka State Commission in Dr.Vasan v. 
S.L.Goswamy (1992) 11 CPJ 954 held that the advertisement in 
news paper that the washing machine had been sparingly used 
sQggests that brand is new. 
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similarly to advertise sale of "Fashion Foot Wear" suggests that 
the goods conform to the fashion currently in vogue in that 
area^^ and will not be old. The word "new" some times even con-
notes the meaning of "recent in design or model". Thus goods 
cannot be called as "new" where they have remained in the stock 
for such a period of time that their quality deteriorated or 
depreciated in value. Thus reduction sale of unused but old goods 
cannot be represented as reduction sale of new goods. However, 
what should be the maximum period after the expiry of which 
unused goods cannot be called as new, will vary from case to 
case. In Australia, the Trade Practices Commission was of the 
opinion that the maximum time limit may differ from case to case 
but as a general rule, provisions of the Trade Practices Act will 
not be infringed if claim of "newness" is made within six 
CO 
months '. However, later on it seems that the Commission did not 
consider it rational to adhere strictly to this limit^^. There is 
a decision also in Anand and Jhonson Pty Ltd. v. Trade Practice 
Conuaission which has indirectly disapproved the six months 
rule. In this case vehicle was assembled in Jan., 1975 and 
then sold in 1977 as "new". The use of word "new" was not consid-
ered as false representation. It is submitted that in such 
51. In the matter of M/S Heels, New Delhi UTPE No. 24 of 1984 
decision on 4.2.1985. 
52. Advertising Guidelines (Information Circular No.10) para 74. 
53. Advertising and Selling (1981) para 342, 4. 
54. (1979) 25 ALR 91. 
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Situations, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. It will depend 
upon the facts whether the article is slow moving or fast moving 
and on the customs or usage of trade. 
Since the phrase "false representation" has been used in Sub 
clause (iii), it is doubtful whether the failure to disclose that 
the goods are reconditioned, renovated or second hand would 
itself contravene the said Sub clause. Since the primary aim is 
to protect gullible and ignorant consumer, the MRTP Commission 
and redressal agencies in such cases may read an implied repre-
sentation that they are new unless anything said contrary. This 
also can be inferred from the ruling of the MRTP Commission in re 
Bennett Coleman £ Co Ltd. where the respondent in its publica-
tion series "Indrajal comics" brought out two comics, which were 
virtually copies of the one published earlier. Th s fact was not 
disclosed by the respondent and Commission held that it is an 
unfair Trade Practice of giving false impression that two comics 
are new which in fact they are not. 
Sub Clause : IV. 
False representation of Sponsorship, approval, 
performance, characteristics, accessories, uses or 
benefits of goods or services: 
Like most acts false advertising, misrepresentations relat-
ing to sponsorship, approval, testimonials, endorsements, awards 
and prizes as such were not actionable at Common Law56 . The 
55.UTP Enquiry No. 29/1986 order dated. 25.8.1986. 
56.Hendler, False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 Yale LJ 
22, 35. 
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maxim consensus facit legem, communis error facit jus (consent 
makes the law, common error r.epeated many times makes law) held 
the field and courts were reluctant in granting relief except 
when they were convinced that what the defendant is doing, is 
such an imitation of complainant's trademarks as is reasonably 
tin 
calculated to deceive the consumers"' . 
Consumer legislations ignored the common law principles 
which could not keep pace with the changing patterns of sales 
promotions. Relief is now granted to the consumers not only in 
those situations which have been expressly mentioned but also 
which can he legitimately called as falling within the four 
corners of misleading practices. 
In India false repriesentation about the sponsorship appro-
val, performance, characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits 
c o 
of goods or service is an unfair trade practice^". The word 
sponsorship means and presumes certain degree of responsibility 
as is imposed on the person sponsoring the goods or services for 
57. Centaur Co v. Marshall 92 F 605, 612 (CCWD Mo 1899) affd 97 F 
785 CCA 8th 1899); Hoover CO v. Sesquicentennial Exhibition 
Ass'n, 26 F 2d 821 (DCED Pa 1928). 
58. This provision is similar to section 53 (c) of the Trade 
Practices Act, 1974 of Australia which is as follows: repre-
sents that goods or services have sponsorship approval, 
performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits 
which they do not have. Maryland's Consumer Protection Act 
section 13-301(5) provides: represents that goods or servic-
es have sponsorship, approval, characteristic, ingredients, 
uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or that a 
person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or 
connection that he does not have. Section 14 of the Trade 
Descriptions Act, 1968 of England also deals with the same 
issue. 
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the quality and characteristics of the goods or services of other 
person. Thus a person who sponsors the goods or services of other 
person in fact makes a certain promise, guarantee, pledge with 
regard to the standards and characters of the goods or 
services^®^. The word approval provides an implied or express 
sanction, confirmation or commendation of the goods or services 
by the person who is claimed to have given his approval in re-
spect of the goods or services^^. However, here it has been used 
in the sense that a person is making representation that he has 
sponsorship or approval of the other which in fact he does not 
have. Thus where the management committee is not making any 
representation about the recognition of the school, it will not 
be a misrepresentation and unfair trade practice under this sub-
clause, even though the school is not recognised . It will be 
otherwise where a school is not recognised but is claimed to have 
been recognised . 
The word "approval" is wide enough to include testimonials 
endorsements, awards and prizes. It may be claimed that leading 
58a. R.K.Nayak; Consumer Protection Law in India, An Ecological 
Treatise on Consumer Justice; (1992) at 319. 
59. U.K.Chaudhary "Unfair Practices and MRTP Act -- 111", Finan-
cial Express (New Delhi) Col. P.6, 16.2.1985. 
60. DG(I&R) V. Greenfield Public School and Anr. (1991) 1 Comp 
LJ 163. 
61. In re Modern New Delhi Public School UTPE No. 69/1988 order 
dated 23.2.1988. Also see in re Indian Management Develop-
ment Institute Noide UTPE No.386/1987 order dated 
28.10.1987. 
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62 
academicians are in the Board of management of an Institution 
or well known institution e.g. ISI has approved the product 
Similarly the so called third party technique, i.e. where a 
party-in-interest circulates propaganda allegedly attributed to 
independent groups, will be an unfair trade practice under this 
sub clause. 
Place of origin if represented falsely will also be pro-
scribed under this sub-clause. In India because of the substan-
dard products in the market/there is a definite consumer prefer-
ence for the imported goods over the domestic one's. Not only 
this alonefforeign goods have become status symbol. So there is a 
strong temptation for the trader to give these items a foreign 
flavour and to capitalize the weaknesses of the unwary consumers* 
so, the MRTP commission has come down heavily on such practices. 
Thus it has refused to accept technical guidance equivalent to 
"technical collaboration" and declared a representation false in 
which the word foreign technology"was used when in fact goods 
were assembled in India^^. The commission held that the technol-
ogy would include the components and the technique of assemblage 
62. DG V. Indian Management Development Institute, (1988) 63 
Comp. Cas at 133. See also DG v. Management Professionals 
Association, Comp Cas (1988) Vol.63 at 673. 
63. Usha International Ltd; UTPE No. 62/87 decided on 
18.11.1987; In re Godfrey Philips India Ltd, Comp Cas. 
(1988) Vol. 64 at 120. 
64. In re Kelvinator of India Ltd., UTPE No.58/1984 order dated 
3. 6. 1985. 
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also**^ . However, in re British physical Laboratories India 
the advertisement was as follows;'' Sanyo of Japan joins with BPL 
India in an exclusive financial and technical arrangement to 
create BPL-Sanyo companies in India". The MRTP Commission held 
that the advertisement did not convey that already collaboration 
had come into existence or that respondent was going to manufac-
ture electronic products under the brand name of BPL Sanyo. The 
wordj to create BPL Sanyo companies in India clearly indicated 
that there was a mere manifestation of an intention. It is sub-
mitted that the consumer laws are aimed at protecting gullible, 
fatuous, and unwary consumers who are not experts in grammer. 
Therefore, to say that the words''to create'' implies future 
Intention will be beyond the comprehension of those to whom it is 
addressed. This fact is well know to the traders also. Otherwise 
there was no need to invest a handsome amount for advertising a 
product whose collaboration was simply a conceived idea which may 
or may not materialize. Even if the collaboration does not click, 
the lingering effects of the advertisement will coax the unwary 
consumers to purchase the product of the respondent on the as-
sumption that it has the foreign collaboration. The better course 
was to order respondent to cease and desist from such advertise-
ment and when collaboration becomes possible at that time he 
would be free to advertise.Where a trader is having collaboration 
65. (1992) 2 Comp LJ 172. 
66. (1988) 111 Comp LJ Rev. 144. 
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with a foreign company which is known by its products, it will 
not be an unfair trade practice to use the company's brand name 
instead of the name of the company itself. This rule was laid 
down y the Supreme Court in re Lakhanpal National Ltd. v. HRTP 
Cowmission^ in the following words: 
The Mitsushita limited is not a popular name in this 
country while its products National and Panasonic are. 
An advertisement mentioning merely Matsushita limited 
may therefore, fail to convey anything to an ordinary 
buyer unless he is told that it is the same company 
which manufactures products "National" and "Panasonic" 
and there is no scope for any confusion on that score. 
However, court added that it would be proper for the appell-
ant company to give the full facts by referring to Mitsushita 
ltd. by its correct name and further stating that its Products 
CO 
are known by the names "National" and "Panasonic""". 
The supreme court although was of the view that the adver-
tisement in question would not harm the conumer's interest' yet 
better course in the opinion of the court was that true facts 
must have been revealed to the general public. Thus the observa-
tion of the supreme court comes close to the opinion long back 
expressed by judge Learned Hand that "in such matters we under-
stand that we are to insist on the most literal truthfulness. It 
is certainly true that puffing of this type is not necessarily 
trivial; businessman and advertising agencies spend a handsome 
67. .AIR 1989 Sc. 1698. 
68. Ibid. 
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amount In connection with these misrepresentations and it can be 
presumed that they do so with the intention of misleading consum-
er^^. Keeping in view the observations of the Supreme Court and 
the opinion of the judge Learned Hand, advertisements propogating 
sponsorship or approval must be clearly worded and there should 
not be even an iota of doubt about such sponsorship or approval. 
There will be a misrepresentation where a person claims that 
the goods are from a particular place when they infact are not. 
However, consumer must know the importance of the place of ori-
gin, e.g. to represent fruits of Himachal Pradesh as Kashmiri 
fruits, shawl of any other state as a Kashmiri shawl or a sari of 
any other place as a banarasi sari. 
A representation as to performance or characteristics may be 
false in a wide variety of circumstances. Thus a false represen-
tation as to the durability of goods or as to the efficacy of the 
repair service will be caught ". False representation regarding 
the benefit or usefulness of goods or services will also infringe 
this sub clause'^. 
69. Movetoench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F 2d, 79(CCA 2nd, 1942). 
70. Taperell, Vermeesh and Harland, Trade Practices and Consumer 
protection, (3rd ed. 1983) 1459. 
71. DG V. National Egg Co-ordination Committee Pune (1989) 2 
comp LJ 161. The advertisement that "Just two eggs contain 
more protien than 6.6 Kgs apples" is a false advertisement 
as to usefulness of the product»Damaged hair come back to 
life again with the use of the given formula was held also 
false representation as to usefulness of the product in DG 
(I&R) V. Manne Quins Bombay (1989) 3 Comp LJ 153. 
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The Australian Trade Practice Commission has issued Adver-
tising Guidelines in which it has been made clear that no repre-
sentation regarding the performance, characteristics, uses or 
benefits of goods or services should be made unless they could be 
demonstrated by tests based on recognised testing methods or by a 
72 survey of usage under normal conditions in a reasonable period 
It is suggested that the MRTP Commission and National Com-
mission should be empowered to issue similar guidelines. Such 
guidelines will reduce the work load and will in practice act as 
a preventive measure so that the advertisers product claim do not 
violate sub clause (iv). 
Regarding accessories, a claim for example that all models 
7 •? 
are accompanied with accessories when infact they are not'"' or to 
represent in the advertisement that the goods are accompanied 
with accessories which are infact available only at an additional 
cost, will be a false representation unless that fact is clearly 
indicated'^. 
72. Advertising Guidelines (Information Circle) Para 85. 
73. Bvn V. Mazda Motors Sales Pty Ltd. (1977) 2 TPC 37. 
74. See TPC representation that goods have accessories which 
they infact do not have (Information Circular No.4); Adver-
tising and selling (1981) para 223, 309. 
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?^\^ gigq^g (v) 
Represents falsely that the seller or supplier has a 
sponsorship or approval or affiliation; 
This sub clause overlaps to a certain extent with sub 
clause (iv). Unlike sub clause (iv), here, sponsorship or appro-
val must be with reference to seller or supplier himself . The 
word 'affiliation' used in this clause is akin to sponsorship or 
approval and seems to require a positive link^^. It appears that 
affiliation can be distinguished from the approval in the sense 
that the former implies a continuous link whereas the latter is a 
one time affair^^. 
Most cases in which the advertisement falsely identifies the 
enterprise from which the product allegedly originates involves 
passing off, mis-appropriation of a reputable trade name or 
misrepresentation of bussiness status^®. The origin of the pro-
duct is normally regarded as one of the indicis of quality and it 
75. This clause is similar to clause (d) of the Trade Practices 
Act of Australia which runs as follows: represents that the 
corporation has a sponsorship, approval or affiliation which 
it does not have. See also Marylands Consumer protection Act 
1973 clause (5)of section 13-301, Supra note 3. 
76 
77 
Mc Donald's System of Austral! Pty Ltd.V. Mc William's Wine 
Pty Ltd.nSll) 28 ALR 236. 
In India TV Manufactures Association V. pieco SLectronics 
and Electrical Limited UTPE No: 63/85 ( lA No: 15/87; 
p.No:10/86 in lA No:47/85) decided on 4.10. 1987, MRTP 
Commission held that the respondents representation that he 
is an affiliate of the foreign company N V phillips Hollad 
is not false as about 39.70 per cent efshares were held by 
the latter. ' 
78. Rudolf Callmann; The LaW of Unfair Competition Trade Marks 
and Monopolies 3rd. Edition 1971, Vol. 1 at 736. 
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Is the association between the two that often stimulates 
demand^^. Of course that entity with whom association is attrib-
uted must enjoy that kind of goodwill which will lure the consum-
er. In India this practice of showing false association particu-
larly with the foreign enterprises is rampant. Not only traders 
falsely represent their association in one way or other with 
some foreign and well known enterprises®^ but the most disturbing 
is that the fake educational institutions very rightly called as 
"teaching shops" resort to such practices^^ and thus play with 
the career of the unemployed youth. The MRTP Commission has "^ 'i<* 
79. American Automobile Association, Inc v. Spiegel, 101 F Supp. 
185 (DCEDNY 1951). 
80. For Instance see re Enfield Electronics Ltd. and Raghvendrs 
Enterprise Trichy UTPE No. 312/1987.order dated 23.10.1989 
representing falsely that his TV sets were made by the world 
famous Enfield company in collaboration with the Japanft.se 
Toshiba Company;In re Electrex India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. UTPE 
No.357/1987 order dated 17.7.1989 respondent claimed falsely 
that it had foreign collaboration with Hitachi Company; In 
re National Radios and Electronics Co. Ltd. (1992) 2 Comp LJ 
172 respondent made a false claim about the collaboration 
with Japan's Mitsubishi Company. 
81. DG (I&R)v.National Institute of Technology, (1988) part III 
Comp LJ Rev. 1361 faslely claimed that it had entry level 
courses of American Universities under College credit pro-
gramme and rated by University of Michigan, USA as' being at 
par with those offered by American Universities;Z)i/ (I£R v. 
Instt. of Managerial Science & Tec/joiogy UTPE264 of 1988 (lA 
No. 43 of 1988) decided on 26.4.1988, respondant claimed 
that it was conducting MBA programme, of Clayton University 
(USA) which was recognised by USA, Department of Education; 
DG (I&R) V, M P Association Comp. Cos (1988) Vol.63 at 673 
falsely promised awarding of post graduate and ph.D degrees 
through Correspondance from New York and Staton Universities 
of USA. 
148 
"tkat'fcj.inparting education is a service to the students by charging fees 
and cannot be described as a contract of personal service and the 
practice of imparting education is a trade practice within the 
meaning of section 2(u)®^. Thus any false representation relating 
to recognition, affiliation etc will be declared as an unfair 
trade practice. 
Sub Clause (VI) 
Makes a false or misleading representation concerning the 
need for, or the usefulness of any goods or services: 
Sub Clause (VI) is based on clause (f) of section 53 of the 
Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia which runs as follows: 
makes a false or misleading statement concerning 
the need for any goods or service. 
Commenting on the scope of this provision, Australian Trade 
Practice Commission °^ observed that the distinction must be 
drawn between a representation and a mere opinion. Where a state-
ment though expressed in terms of need is infact the advertisers 
opinion and consumers are normally able to Judge the matter for 
themselves, this clause will not be violated. Although this is a 
correct approach and is applied in other cases of representations 
also, yet at times it will be difficult to draw a distinction. 
There are situations were a statement can be interpreted as a 
82. UTPE No 23 of 1987 decided on 10 October, 1988; DG (I&R) v. 
Medical College of Alternatve Medicines UTPE No 279 1988 
decided on /3.4.1988; In re National Centre for Computing 
Techniques Hyderabad (1993)3 comp. LJ 237 
83. TPC Advertising^'and selling (1981) para 3 of 5-6. 
149 
statement of an objectively ascertainable need but where a 
person is possessing or is expected to possess, expertise in a 
matter in question, his advice as to whether goods or services 
are needed may be largely a matter of judgement or opinion 
However, by simply saying that the representor made opinion will 
not absolve him from the responsibilities unless he gives con-
vincing reasons as to why he formed such an opinion and if he 
fails to do so, he has made a misleading statement "concerning 
the need for the service" recommended. 
The word "need" has to be broadly interpreted and will be 
established if goods or services are desirable or preferable and 
the word"need" does not imply any notion of an imperative ques-
o c 
tion or necessity"-". A representation that in order to have child 
of one's choice (boy or girl), a pregnant women need the diet 
treatment offered by the respondent is a false representation as 
to need of the goods®^. 
The usefulness of the goods or services can be claimed in a 
number of ways and different techniques can be employed for 
claiming this usefulness. For example, inviting deposits by 
84. Supra note 70 para 1467 at 662. 
85. Keehn v. Medical Benefits fund of Australia Ltd. (1977) 14 
ALR 77. 
86. DG V. Ravi foundation, Bombay, UTPE 93 of 1986 order dated 
4.7.1986. 
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an 
offering interest at an astronomical rates , guaranteeing job 
placement after completing a particular course**", or treatment 
89 for some diseases by administering the medicine offered 
Sub Clause fVIII): 
Warranty or guarantee not based on adequate or 
proper test: 
Guarantees perform promotional function for manufacturers, 
and are acting as a system of quality control where-by informa-
90 tion can be obtained about the performance of the product"'". This 
Sub Clause does not prohibit the practice of giving warrantly or 
guarantee but requires that whenever such warranty or guarantee 
is given relating to the performance, efficacy or length of the 
life of the product, it must be based on adequate or proper test. 
However, no inkling has been given about the authority which 
87. DG(I&R) V. Oriental Finance and Exchange Co. and Ors. UTPE 
No. 54/87 decided on 15.7.1987. 30% to 38% interest was 
offered ranging between six months to 5 years; DG(I&R) v. 
Punjab Farms & Forests Pvt. Ltd, UTPE No, 240/86 (IA No. 
51/87 decided on 8.8.1987, investment of Rs.31,000 would 
yield Rs.1,05,000 in cash or 65,000 in cash plus 1 acre of 
land after six years. 
88.In the matter of National Centre for Computer Techniques, 
.Hyderabad (1993)3 Comp LJ 236. 
89. DG (I&R) V. Dr. Singh (ND), Delhi No.360/87 and lA No.91/87 
decided on 6.7.1989; DG (I&R) v. Bhargav Clinic UTPE No.l of 
1987 decided on 2.4.1987; DG (I&R) v. Sri Nagarjuna Mulika 
Kutecram, UTPE NO. 154 of 1987 decided on 31.8.1987; DG 
(I&R) V. Prakash Clinic (R) UTPE No. 250/87 (lA No. 69 of 
1987) decided on 20.10.1987. 
90. Ross Cranston, Consumers and the Law, (1978) at 143. 
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will determine whether the test is adequate or proper. What is 
adequate or proper test will vary according to the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Thus a statement that the moped has 
90 kms per litre fuel consumption ^^ is true but under ideal 
road conditions. So keeping in view the road conditions on which 
moped has to run, it can be held that the supporting test of 
warranty is not based on proper test. 
The word warranty or guarantee it seems has not been used in 
the sense as defined under section 126 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872 but has been used here in a colloquial sen^e and per-
haps in the sen^ as used by Lord Denning MR in Oscar Chess Ltd, 
an 
V. Williams *". Which runs as follows: 
In saying that he must prove a warranty, I use the 
word in its ordinary english meaning to denote a 
binding promise.Every one knows what a man means, 
when he says 'I guarantee it' or *I warrant it' or 
*I give you my word on it'. He means that he binds 
himself to it. 
This clause will apply only when a warranty or guarantee 
given by a trader is not based on adequate or proper test. So 
where it is supported by an adequate or proper test but trader 
declined to fulfil the warranty or guarantee or had no intention 
at all to perform it, the subsequent clause will apply. 
91. CERC V. Kamavati Auto Ltd. and Anr. UTPE No.95 (1957) 1 All 
Ek 325 at 328. 
92. (1957) 1 All ER 325. 
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It has been provided specifically that the onus of proof is 
on the person raising the defence that warranty or guarantee is 
based on adequate or proper test. This however, holds good for 
other representations also where a trader claims something which 
is specifically in his knowledge^-*. 
Sub Clause (VIII); 
Materially misleading the public about the war 
ranty, guarantee or promise 
This sub- clause speaks of a warranty or guarantee about a 
product or of any goods or services or a promise to replace, 
maintain or repair an article or any part there of or to repeat 
or continue a service until it has achieved a specified result 
when it is either materially misleading, or there is no reason-
able prospects that such warranty or guarantee will be carried 
out9^ 
Unlike previous sub clauses, the words "materially mislead-
ing" have been incorporated in this clause. Commenting on the 
import of the word "materially" a Canadian court in R v. Patton's 
place limited^^ observed: 
93. See also DO v. Manne Quins (1989) 3 Comp LJ 155. 
94. Clause(g) of section 53 of Trade Practices Act, 1974 of 
Australia deals with the similar representations. However, 
Amendment Act, 1977 brought many changes in these provisions 
which now read as follows. Make a false or misleading state-
ment concerning the existence, exclusion or effect of any 
condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy. 
95. (1968), 57 CPR 12. 
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It is a representation which is calculated to, and in 
effect does lead a person to act upon it because he be-
lieves that this would be advantageous to him^ . 
Thus the word "material" does not connote the value to the 
purchaser, but rather the degree to which the purchaser is af-
fected by these words in coming to a conclusion as to whether or 
not he should make a purchase^^. Thus sub clause therefore will 
not be attracted where a representation is not material. 
Since the doctrine of privity of contract rule which has 
roots in Common Law and also found place in the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872, was not incorporated in the CP Act, "H^ ese warranties 
or guarantees under the Sale of Goods Act by virtue of the privi-
ty rule, remained ineffective and restricted, to ornamental 
lettering * GUARANTEE'^^, against the manufacturer vis-a-vis the 
consumer''. Under the CP Act complaint can be filed against the 
trader who has been defined in section 2(1)(q) as follows: 
trader in relation to any goods, means a person who 
sells or distributes any goods for sale and includes 
the manufacturer thereof and where such goods are sold 
or distributed in package form, includes the packer 
thereof. 
96. Id. at 16. 
97. R V. Kellys on Seymour Ltd., (1969) 60 CPR 24 at 26. 
98. Adams v. Richardson £ Starling Ltd. (1969) 2 All ER 1221 at 
1224. 
99. This traditional rule in case of consumer sales was criti-
cised. As one consumer body remarked: If the manufacturer 
relies on the consumer to be the final link in his quality 
control system, he must take the responsibility for ensuring 
that the customer does not suffer as a result : Editorial, 
*Car Buyers warrant a New Deal', Focus, Vol.2, Sept. 1967, 
at 1. 
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The phrase "distributes any goods for sale" will include a 
manufacturer or wholesale dealer who although does not sell 
himself, employs somebody else, e.g. retailer or agent to get the 
goods sold. Therefore, he will be liable for any unfair trade 
practice including warranty or guarantee. And, under CP Act the 
plea of privity rule will not be available to him. 
The word "Promise" used in the second part of this Sub 
Clause suggests more than a mere representation or statement. 
However, it seems that quasi judicial bodies under the MRTP and 
CP Acts will not demand any more standard of proof than is other-
wise required case of representation. 
It is not clear as to whether this clause applies to a 
statement made after the time when a contract for the supply of 
goods or services has been entered into. One view is that since a 
guarantee or warranty, being a contractual assumption of obliga-
tions in respect of the subject matter of a transaction, it 
cannot strictly be said to exist before that transaction has been 
entered into-'-^ '^ . However, keeping in view the general principles 
of law of contract i.e., the terms, in order to have a contractu-
al binding shall be contempraneous to the contract, a post con-
tractual warranty or guarantee or promise may not have the bind-
ing effect. Also a trader is said to be liable for false 
warranty, guarantee or promise because his falsity had induced 
100. Supra note 70 para 1472 at 66. 
155 
the consumer to enter in to the transaction but when no such 
warranty, guarantee or promise was made at the time of bargain, 
how can it be said that consumer was induced ? 
The warranty or guarantee may be given in a variety of ways 
in relation to goods and services and they are so broad as to be 
virtually meaningless unless qualified^°^. For instance if a 
person makes a representation that he fully guarantees a refre-
girator. It is not clear as to whether in case of defect, will he 
replace it or only repair it. Whether only accessories replaced 
will be charged or charge for services will have to be paid? The 
period of the length of the guarantee is also not known and does 
he himself reserve the right to decide whether or not a claim is 
justified. In order to circumvent the possible misuse of these 
warranties, the Maqnuson - Moss Warranty Act, 1975(U.S.A) re-
quires that a businessman issuing a guarantee or warranty must 
clearly disclose certain basic information; i.e. name and 
101. See Surendrapal Pathak and Another, In re UTPE No. 78 of 
1985 decided on 5.9.1987. Tractor guaranteed found defec-
tive, respondent did not honour his own guarantee; Fedders 
loyds Corporation (P) Ltd. In re UTPE No. 125 of 1986, 
decided on 2.11.1987. Air conditioner supplied with a war-
ranty of due performance but respondent failed to fulfil the 
warranty of performance; Malviya Brothers and ors, UTPE No. 
248/86 decided on 11.11.1987 respondent did not render 
satisfactory free after sale service; DC (I&R) v. Bombay 
Wrap Company (India) Ltd, UTPE No. 83/1986 (lA No. 146 of 
1986) decided on 27.11.1986 guarantee about 2.5 Kg to 5 Kg 
weight loss by adopting respondents treatment. See also 
DG(I&R) V. Waist Away UTPE No.148/87 decided on 23.7.1987. 
CERC V. Sherry Lohise Slimming Centre (P) Ltd. and Ors. UTPE 
No. 23 of 1986, decided on 19.2.1987; Sunder Singh Khosala 
V. Hindustan Protiens Ltd. UTPE No.236 of 1987 (lA No.60 of 
1987) decided on 19.6.1987. 
102. Supra note 70. 
156 
address; the identity of those to whom it extends; the parts 
covered; What the guarantor will do, at whose expense must do and 
what expenses he must bear and exception if any^ ""^ . The guarantee 
must be available to consumers prior to a transaction and it 
becomes legally binding on a businessman and cannot be disclaimed 
and modified^°^. In addition to the disclosure problems, the Act 
requires that the guarantees be clearly labelled as either " full" 
or "limited-^ ^^ . It is suggested that clause(VIII) be amended so 
as to make necessary for the advertiser of goods or service who 
gives guarantee or warranty to disclose the nature, scope*dura-
tion and the circumstances under which warranty or guarantee will 
be available to the consumer of his goods or services. 
Sub Clause (IX) 
False or misleading representations as to price 
This sub clause aims at preventing false or mislead-
ing representation as to price and covers the practice of making 
any statement which materially misleads the public concerning the 
price at which a product or like products or goods or services 
have been or, are ordinarily sold or provided . The representa-
tion which is false or misleading must be relating to price. 
103. Section 102 
104. Section 102(b)(1)(A) and Rule 702. 
105. Section 103, 104 and 105 and Rule 700. 
106. Section 53 (e) of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia 
is similar to sub clause (ix) which runs as follows: Make a 
false or misleading statement with respect to the price of 
goods or services; see also Maryland, ConsumerProtection 
Act, 1973 Section 13 - 301(1) ; makes false or misleading 
statement of fact concerning the reasons for existence of, 
or amount of price reductions. 
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However the word " price" has not been defined either in the MRTP 
Act or in CP Act. Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 has 
defined it in terms of money consideration. The English Consumer 
protection Act, 1987 defines it as follows: 
a. the aggregate of the sums required to be paid by a 
consumer for or otherwise in respect of the supply 
of the goods or the provisions of the services, 
accommodation or facilities-'-'^ ', and ; 
b 
The above two definitions are similar in so far as they 
defirfe price in terms of money. 
Sub section 4 (1) of the Trade Practices Act , 1974 (Austra-
lia) defines "price" as including a charge of any description. 
This definition is wider than the above two definitions and will 
cover the situations like the one in Guthrie v. Hetaro Food ply 
Itdr were a false representation was made concerning the reduc-
tion in sales tax and not in price. Since in Australia, price 
includes a charge of any description, so there was no difficulty 
for the court to declare it as a prohibited practice. In India, 
it may be said that it is a representation concerning the sales 
tax and not the price. However, it may be argued here also that 
since sales tax is covered in the retail price of goods, a 
prospective consumer will consider it a reduction in the price 
which he has to pay and therefore, falls within the domain of sub 
clause (ix). 
107. Section 20(6). 
108. (1977) 2 TPC 192. 
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This sub clause is silent on the means and methods which may 
be employed for making false or misleading representation to the 
consumers as to price. 
Section 21 of the English Consumer Protection Act, 1987 
which has replaced section 11 of the Trade DescriptionjAct, 1968 
provides that an indication as to price is misleading when; 
l.the price is less than in fact it is. This covers 
all the common situations where prices purported-
ly reduced are charged at full price. 
2.in effect, the price purports to be unconditional 
whereas in fact it is conditional. 
3.the price covers matters in respect of which an 
extra charge is in fact made 
4.the price is to be increased or reduced or 
maintained when the person giving the indication 
has no such expectation. 
5.the price is linked to factual information by 
reference to which consumers might reasonably be 
expected to judge the validity of relevant com-
parison with the price indication, and these 
facts or circumstances are not in fact what they 
are. 
An indication is misleading as to method of determing prices 
when; 
a.the method is not what in fact it is 
b.the applicability of the method does not depend on the 
fact or circumstances on which its applicability does 
in fact depend. 
ff 
c.the method takes into account matters in respect of 
which an additional charge will in fact be made. 
d.the person who in fact has no such expectation. 
i) expects the method to be altered (whether or not 
at a particular time or in a particular respect); 
or 
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11) expects the method, or that method, as al-
tered to remain unaltered (whether or not for a 
particular period); or 
e.the facts or circumstances by which the consumers may 
judge the validity of any relevant comparison are not 
what in fact they are. 
Since sub clause (ix) is broadly worded with out being clear 
as to its precise import, the above provision will prove a useful 
guide In interpreting this sub clause. As said/sub clause (ix) is 
wide in scope and will cover representations of different types. 
Thus it will cover not only comparative statements about one's 
own products e.g. previously for rupees 100 but now for rupees 75 
but it will also cover a comparative statement about the price of 
10 9 
his competitor e.g. our price 100 elsewhere-^ >:%«). Similarly a 
situation where price comparison is correct but quality of the 
two products is different, will also be caught by this sub 
clause. The statement about the price reduction may not be false 
but nevertheless, misleading when the price reduced is so insig-
nificant that had it been disclosed to customer he ought not to 
have purchased the product. Similarly a statement made by a 
trader with out any plausible reason for example prices now 
reduced by 10%, buy before the prices return to normal will be a 
misleading representation under this sub clause . Making a plain 
109. Achal Kumar Galhotra v. Byford Motors Ltd. and Anr. (1991) 
72 Comp. Cas at 702, representation was Padmini car at 
Rs.28,000 less than Maruti, although two cars were of dif-
ferent descriptions, the price of Maruti car stated was also 
false. 
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representation that the transaction will be advantageous when 
in fact it is not or an ambiguous representation will although, 
be not false, nevertheless misleading under this sub clause. 
Giving impression that the price advertised is the net price but 
in practice charging extra for installation or for extra accesso-
ries will be covered by this sub clause. 
A special offer impliedly promises more favourable terms 
than the offerers' usual terms. It will be misleading if the 
seller's usual price is falsely represented as a specially 
reduced price. The making of false claim of special terms, 
equipments or other privileges or advantages-^ will 
also be covered under this sub clause. Pre-tieketing 
which involves a representation usually on the package 
or the article itself about the retail price substantially 
higher than the actual price to the consumer will be caught 
by the sub clause^^^. Other practices which are in vogue in 
India are festival discounts . Off season discounts^ , 
110. In re Communications net work Ltd. (1986) 1 Comp LJ 185, 
goods falsely offered at irresistible price inclusive of 
duties and taxes was held to be covered under this sub 
clause. 
111. No.16 in the list of unfair methods of competition; Annual 
Report of the Federal Trade Commission (1938) at 70. 
112. Helhros Watch Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 310 F 2d 
(CADC 1962) . 
113. Sarvodaya Khadi Bhawan UTPE No.289 of 1987, decided on 
17.10.1988 falsely announced special rebate of 35% during 
Kali Pooja and Deepawali. 
114. Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Khaitan India Ltd. (1994) 2 
Comp LJ 157. 
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clearance sales , manufacturer or wholesale prices and reduc-
tion sales^ -'-^  etc. These practices for the purposes of the MRTP 
Act and CP Act can be classified into two types. One, where no 
discount at all in fact is offered or offered but for a limited 
duration e.g.for two days or on an unimportant or insignificant 
items. Such practices will fall under section 36A (2) or section 
2 (v) of the MRTP and CP Acts respectively. Another practice is 
to offer discount but on outdated or worn out products or impli-
edly promising that prices will be favourable when in fact they 
are not. Such practices are with in the ambit of sub clause (Ix). 
In order to remove any possible misleading impression which may 
be caused by such statements, the MRTP commission has laid down 
the following rule: 
Where the discount is offered on such goods of 
standard quality just for the sake of publicity 
towards establishing one's goodwill, the mention of 
the quality, etc. may not be necessary; but,in 
other cases, where discount sale is neces>tated by 
reason of off season, deterioration in quality, so 
on and so forth, non mentioning of that reason for 
the discount sale would be misleading in nature, 
and would have the effect of occasioning loss or 
injury to the consumer-*-^' . 
Not only the mention of reasons for given discount are 
necessary but omission of other information may also attract this 
115,In re petal Boutique UTPE No.129 of 1986 decided on 1st.Feb., 
1988, without mentioning so, it was found that respondents 
offer of discount was to clear off the old and out of fashion 
garments. 
116.V.K. Indra Hosiery Industries, Delhi UTPE No. 204 of 1986, 
decided on 27.2.1988. 
117.Supra note 115. 
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clause e.g. the value and quantity of discount offered; the 
original price, discount offered on the net price and duration of 
118 discount offer etc"^ -^ ". 
Thus a representation will not fall under this sub clause if 
it projects purely comparative price statement about his own 
goods or services or about the goods or services of his competi-
tor in objectively measurable attributes or price-'-^ ^ (provided 
quality is same) in the relevant market^^^. The relevant market 
for the purposes of this clause will be the market in which goods 
121 of same description and quality are sold* 
When a person is raising the price for some period in order 
to advertise later on the price reduction, should such price 
reduction be called genuine or misleading? 
118. In fact this kind of information was sought by the MRTP Com 
mission from the respondent for reaching to conclusion in DG 
V. Intereraft South (Exports) (P) Ltd. UTPE No.119 of 1987 
decided on 26.2.1988. 
119.F.T.C statement of Policy Regarding Comparative Advertising 
has approved comparative advertising which compares alterna-
tive brands on objectively measurable attributes or price 
and identifies the other alternative brand by name, illus-
tration or other distinctive information. 16 CPR 
14.15(1980) CF Chester Field oppinheim et.al. Unfair Trade 
Practice and Consumer Protection cases and comments American 
Case Book Series at 602. 
120. Sub clause (ix) says that a representation as to price shall 
be deemed to refer to the price at which the product or 
goods or services has or have been sold by sellers or pro-
,vided by suppliers generally in the relevant market... 
121. MRTP Commission in one case held that it is to be ascer-
tained whether sales are regularly conducted by it at pre-
discount prices at other time. However, it is submitted that 
this proposition in no way takes into account the phrase 
"relevant market". Supra note 118. 
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In order to ascertain the genuiness of such representations, 
the American Federal Trade Commission issued guidelines wherein 
it was stated that such practices are deceptive unless it is 
shown that the further price was the actual bonafide price at 
which the advertiser had offered the article to the public on a 
122 
regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of time 
However, later on the phrase "reasonable period of time" was 
replaced by the phrase "in recent past"^^"^. The Trade Practice 
Commission of Australia has adopted the former view"'-^ ,^ and in 
order to determine whether the period in question is a "reason-
able period of time" various factors are taken into account 
including the frequency of price charged, the method of distribu-
tion and rate of turn over of goods and frequency at which the 
person acquired the services. 
More objective test has been laid down in England. There the 
previous price should be the last price at which the product was 
available to consumers in the previous six months and goods must 
be available for at least 28 consecutive days in the previous six 
months^^^. 
122. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing 16 CPR 233 (1964), reprint-
ed in Kintner, Primer on the law of Deceptive Practices 
(1971) Mac Million PP.676-78. 
123. Proposed Guides Against Deceptive Pricing 16 CPR (1974), 
Reprinted in Kintner, Primer on the Law of Deceptive Prac-
tices (2nd ed. 1978) Mac Millan, PP.76-78. 
124. TPC Advertising and selling (1981) Paras 318 to 319. 
125. 1.2.2 The Consumer Protection (code of Practice for Trade on 
price Indications) Approval order 1988 (S.I. 1988/2078). 
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Neither the MRTP Conunission nor National commission or its 
subordinate commissions have found opportunity to dwell on this 
issue. There seems no reason not to adopted the English rule 
which is more objective and will ensure certainity in predicting 
about the representation in question. 
Sut) gl.^use(x) 
Disparaging Goods oz Services of Another 
Sub Clause(x) provides that it is an unfair trade practice 
to disparage the goods or services of another person by false or 
misleading facts . The aim of advertising is to bring goods or 
services in the lime-light. This can be achieved either by extol-
ling the attributes of the product or by manipulating the weak-
nesses of the product of the competitor. Both types of advertise-
ments can be adopted so long as they are not false or misleading 
. If they are false or misleading then they will be proscribed 
126.This provision is identical with section 13-301 (8) of Mary 
land's Consumer Protection Act, 1973 which runs as follows: 
Disparing the goods, services or business of another by false 
or misleading representation of fact; 
127.In re Ace Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (1987) Tax LR 1792(30) MRTPC. 
However, there are two views about the comparative advertis-
ing; one view is that it is unethical and unfair because of 
its tendency to degenerate into name calling and unprovable 
assertatlons which demage the entire industries' reputation 
or because an underdog may use it unfairly to capitalize on 
the goodwill of a well established brand product to which it 
is not truely comparable, see N Y Times, Jan.21, 1973 at 15, 
col.1-5. The other view is that the comparative advertising 
is a desirable practice that enables the business concerns to 
challenge and deflate excessive advertising claims of their 
competitors. See Wall St. Jour, nov.l7, 1965, P.16, Col.1-2, 
Federal Trade Commission of USA is also of the view that 
comparative advertising is beneficial. (BNA, Anti-trust and 
trad Reg. Rep. No.555, A-20 (1970). 
165 
and in such situation sub clause(X) will cover the advertisements 
of the latter category. 
This sub clause censurs disparaging of goods or services of 
another person. Does it mean that the false statements Like "only 
air conditioner in India with Japanese compressor", will not be 
covered as the statement has been used without refering the name 
of any other company? It Is suggested that the word "person" used 
in the sub clause should be dropped to avoid any doubt. However, 
it will not be incongruous to mention that the MRTP commission 
has not found himself fettered by the word " person"and has 
issued cease and desist orders even in such situations where 
12 8 
advertisement does not refer to any person . 
.Sub clause (X) is wider in scope than sub clause (IX) in one 
respect i.e., under sub clause!IX) comparative advertising relat-
ing to only price is covered. Thus a false statement that only TV 
with foreign picture tube" will be covered under sub clause (x) 
but not under sub clause (IX). but on the other hand statement 
showing previous and present position of the price of the tra-
der's own brand will be covered under sub clause(IX) but not 
under sub clause (X). 
128 .See In re Pieco Electronic & Electricals Ltd. UTPE 
No.71/1987 order dated 8.11.1988, statement claiming only 
Philips gives the full bulbs whereas other bulbs were half; 
In re Novapan India Ltd. UTPE No.9/86 order dated 24.6.1988 
claimed that Novapan was the only pre-liminated particle 
board in the country; In re Competent Motors UTPE 
No.168/1988 order dated 11.12.1986 statement was that the 
facilities provided by the respondent, dealer of Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. were provided only and only by him. In all these 
cases it was held that the respondents have violated sub 
clause(x). 
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The MRTP commission has taken almost a consistent stand that 
the advertisements of self praise e.g. calling the product as 
only real product"^^^, or alsi ^^^ or only best^ -^ ^ cannot itself 
lead to the conclusion that the impugned advertisement is dispar-
aging the products of other unless it is shown that the facts are 
false or misleading which disparage the goods of other. 
The MRTP commission in D G(I&R) v. DCM Toyota Ltd^^^ held 
that it is essential to prove that the false or misleading facts 
are intended to disparage, denigrate or condemn the goods of any 
other person. 
It is submitted that the liability under both the MRTP Act 
and CP Act, is irrespective of good or bad faith of the advertis-
er. The requirement of mens rea has been dispensed with even in 
the legislations imposing punishment in terms of imprisonment. 
The liability under the MRTP and CP Acts is strict. Furthermore, 
throughout the definition of unfair 'trade Practice, the test is 
129. In Satinder Singh v. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. UTPE 
No.491/1987 order dated 7.12.1987, the commission held that 
a statement that my product is real does not amount to 
stating that the products of other companies are not real, 
so long there is no specific effort to run down other pro-
ducts. 
130 In M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. UTPE No.491/87 claim 
was that the respondent's product Zandu Chyawan Prash is 
"alsi" and it was held that the statement does not fall 
within the purview of sub-clause(x) 
131. pG (I&R) V. Milk food Ltd., Patiala, (1994) 2 Comp LJ 375 
The use of superlative terms such as "best", "perfect", 
"purest", "sturdiest" cannot disparage the goods of the 
competitor. 
132. DG (I&R) V. DCM Toyota Ltd., New Delhi (1992) 2 Comp LJ 297. 
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not only to ascertain whether the actual loss or injury has been 
caused to the consumer but has the trade practice in question 
potential to cause loss or injury or is there any likelihood of 
loss or injury. So there is no question of reading mens rea in 
clause (X). 
In DG(I&R) V. Milk food ltd., Patiala^^^ the impugned 
advertisement claimed that the respondent's Ice cream was dispar-
aging the ice cream of the competitor's who do not claim that 
their ice is 100% pure. The commission recorded the following 
reasons: 
1.100% is now being used to project or symbolise the 
quantity, standard or excellence of the product 
sought to be marketed. The term should not, there-
fore, be construed literally or commercially. Indeed 
it is similar to such terms as "best", "perfect" 
"purest", sturdiest, etc. Fortunately,however, such 
superlatives even though high sounding have ceased to 
impress the average customers who are now all too 
familiar with such hyperbols. At any rate these 
superlatives do not necessarily mean any disparage-
ment to the product of the competitors. 
2.It is not article of one time purchase, in matters of 
food and eatables, the average customer does not go 
so much by the labels, logo or slogans but the taste 
and the price of the item. He is guided mainly by the 
quality or standard, and of course, the cost of the 
eatables rather than any other things. As the adage 
goes, the test of the pudding lies in the eating. 
It is submitted that the ruling of the MRTP Commission 
cannot be said as laying down any general rule which will form 
binding precedent for future. 
133. Supra note 133 at 374. 
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It cannot be said that the traders representing falsely 
their product as 100% in any respect, can go scot free. For 
example in ice cream cases. Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 pre-
scribe following standard of its contents: 
Milk fat 10.00% 
Protein 3.05% 
Total solids 36.00% 
(Except that when any of the aforesaid preparations 
contain fruit or nuts or both then the content of 
milk fat shall be less than 8.00%). 
Starch 5.00% 
It is only after conforming to the aforesaid standard, the 
manufacturer of ice cream can legitimately call his ice cream as 
100% and not otherwise. Now if suppose without complying with the 
said standard, the manufacturer is calling his ice cream as 100%, 
is it not an unfair trade practice? Is in such situation also, 
commission right in saying that the word 100% is merely a "super-
lative hyperbol which cannot impress an average consumer"? There-
fore, it is submitted that without dwelling on the issue of 
hyperbols and superlatives commission ought to have addressed on 
a precise question, i.e., whether the ice cream conforms to the 
prescribed standard or not. 
It will be quite apposite to mention here that the commis-
sion in re Eld parry Co. Ltd., Madrasr^^^^ did take the serious 
133a.UTPE No. 137 of 1987 decided on 15.2.1988 
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note of the words "excellent quality" when the goods were 
found sub-standard. 
The argument of the commission it is submitted is fraught 
with the tendency of taking back to the era of Caveat Emptor. 
It shifts burden from the advertiser to the consumer. Accord-
ing to the commission's opinion it is now the job of the 
consumer to see whether the product is upto the standard 
which he expected from the advertiser's advertisement and not 
the job of the advertiser to advertise the goods. 
Like other advertisements, the advertisement alleged to have 
disparaged the goods or services of the other, should be read 
as a whole, the mosaic has to be read in enterity and not 
each tile separately^ such statement cannot be read out of 
contexts^^^. 
Where an opinion is expressed by some one not directly or 
indirectly involved with the product, the mere fact that his 
opinion has a tendency to disparage the goods of one 
competitor, will not be sufficient to attract sub 
clause (ix) and it will make no difference if that opinion is 
false as the requirement under sub clause (x) is that the 
disparinging statement must be adopted for the purpose 
134. Supra note 132. 
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of promoting sale, supply or use of goods or provisions of 
135 services-^ -^ -^ . 
Explanation to Clause (1): 
The Explanation appended to clause (1) runs as follows: 
For the purposes of clause (1), a statement that is 
a) expressed on an article offered or displayed for 
sale, or on its wrapper, or container; or 
b) expressed on anything attached to, inserted in, 
or accompanying, an article offered or displayed 
for sale, or on anything on which the article is 
mounted for display or sale, or; 
c) contained in or on anything that is sold, sent, 
delivered, transmitted or in any other manner 
whatsoever made available to a member of the 
public, shall be deemed to be a statement made 
to the public by, and only by, the person who 
had caused the statement to be so expressed, 
made or contained. 
The explanation cannot be construed as laying down the 
exhaustive list of the various forms in which the representation 
can be made. But this explanation has to be read with clause (1) 
itself which includes statement of all types whether made orally 
135. In re invest well publishers (P) Ltd. UTPE No.146/1987 order 
dated 5.10.88. Regarding the third "party opinion which has 
no link with the product directly or indirectly, it was laid 
down by justice Holmes in Scientific Manufacturer Co v. FTC 
3rd Cir, 1941 124 F 2d 640 that "cirtitude" is not the test 
of certainity. We have been cock sure of many things that 
were not so... But while one's experience thus makes certain 
preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they 
came to be so leaves one able to see that other, poor souls 
may be equally dogmatic about someting else." 
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or in writing or by visible representation. So advertisement by 
means of banner, cards, cinema slides, handouts, hoardings, 
broadcast on radio, etc., would very much amount to statement 
• I O C 
although not mentioned in the explanation'^ "' . 
This explanation it seems has cleared the doubt about the 
possible application of principle of invitation to treat in such 
representations. Mere mention of price on the article may not be 
an offer under the Indian Contract Act but by virtue of this 
explanation it will be a representation and representator will be 
amenable under the MRTP Act and CP Act for any false or mislead-
ing representation. 
Exceptions: 
At present, there is no exception provided under the MRTP 
Act or CP Act. The Sachar Committee had recommended following 
exceptions: 
1. The afore said provision shall not apply if a person 
establishes --
a) that the act or omission giving rise to the 
offence was a result of a bonafide error; or 
b) that he took reasonable precaution and exer-
cised due deligence to prevent the occurrence 
of such error and that he took reasonable 
measures forthwith, after the representation 
was made, to bring the error to the attention 
of the class of persons likely to have been 
reached by the representation. 
136. See S M Duger, Law relating to Restrictive & unfair trade 
practice with consumer protection. (2nd. ed. 1992) at 373. 
137.See for the difference between offer and invitation to 
treat, Grainger & Sonse v. Gough, (1986) Ac 325, 334; Pharma-
ceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots cash chemists Ltd. 
(1953) All ER 482 (CA); State Aided Bank of Travancore v. 
Dhirt Ram, AIR 1942 PC 6. 
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c) in a proceeding for contravention of any of the 
aforesaid provisions committed by the publica-
tion of an advertisement, it would be a defence 
for a person who establishes that he is a 
person whose business it is to publish or 
arrange for the publication of advertisement 
and that he received it in ordinary course of 
business and did not know and had no reason to 
suspect that its publication would amount %o 
contravention of any such provision. 
These exception are analysed hereunder; 
1. The first exception brings from backdoor the element of 
mens rea. As said already the liability under the MRTP 
Act and CP Act does not depend on the good or bad inten-
tion. Intention is totally irrelevant under the provi-
sions of these Acts. He cannot be allowed to reap the 
benefits of the bonafide error. The Commission under the 
MRTP Act be w£ll within the right to ask such represen-
tator to issue corrective advertisement so that any 
false impression created through such error will be 
erased. Again it will be appropriate to pass desist 
order against such persons so that similar error is not 
repeated and if injury is caused to consumer, he is com-
pensated . 
2. Where impugned advertisement was ceased prior to the 
launching of proceedings or where an advertiser gave an 
undertaking that he will not only discontinue it but 
will in future desist from causing it to publish, the 
MRTP Commission dropped proceedings against such re-
spondents and thus recognized this exception without 
expressly saying so. 
3. So |ay as third exception goes, till date MRTP Commis-
sion has not in a single case held an advertising agent 
liable even though this point has been raised in a 
number of cases^^°. There seems every reason for it. The 
definition of unfair trade practice provides that it is 
trade practice which for the purpose of promoting sale, 
supply or use of goods or provisions of any services". 
So advertising agent cannot be held answerable under the 
present scheme of things^-^^. He cannot be said to have 
138. D. N. Saraf, Law of Consumer Protection in India (1990) at 
113. 
139. However, D. N. Saraf is of the opinion that there is no need 
of providing any statutory provision for holding advertiser 
liable. The advertising agent will be liable even under the 
present Acts. Ibid. 
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promoted the sale, use or supply of goods. He is 
definitly doing that but for someone else and that 
person who has caused the publication of the repre-
sentation, is liable under these Acts. However, it 
is suggested that an express provision be made for 
holding the advertiser also liable but at present 
since the advertiser is not liable under these Acts, 
the question of providing an exception does not 
arise. 
In the not too distant past it was said that the two cer-
tainties in this life were death and Taxes. Today the old saw 
could be broadened to include advertising, taxes and 
death . In order to servive in a competitive market, trad-
ers have to take help of the advertising. There is nothing 
wrong in it so long it is not false or misleading. When going 
becomes tough for the trader, he resorts to false or mislead-
ing advertisements. The varieties of such advertisements are 
in-numerable as there is no end to ingenious techniques which 
businesses can invent. Without gain-say, figures are often 
more eloquent than words and an attractive price is sometimes 
more effective in inducing a sale than the quality of the 
article^*^. Thus the chances of duping a consumer by giving 
false or misleading figures, are more than by any other forms 
of false or misleading advertisement. This is the reason that 
one of the most intractable trading abuses of recent times 
has been the use of bait advertising. Such advertisements 
140. William G. Halinmet, et. al. Consumer Law, Text, Cases 
and Materials (1975) at 69. 
141. Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Trade Competition, 
Trademarks Monopolies, 3rd. ed., (1971) Vol.1 at 745. 
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offer goods at attractive bargain prices, being goods which 
the advertiser does not in fact intend to sell in more than 
minimal quantities, if at all . 
The bargain offers are elsewhere in the world more popularly 
called as bait and switch sales. In America unlike other 
countries there is no specific provision dealing with the 
bargain offers, such practices are covered by the flexible 
section 5(1)(Qj of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 as 
amended by the wheeler - lea Amendment Act, 1938 which runs 
as follows: 
Unfair method of competition in Commerce, and 
Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in Commerce, 
are hereby declared unlawful. 
In America, bargain offer or bait advertisement is not 
taken in isolation but clubbed with switch sale as is evi-
denced by the decision in House-hold Sewing Machine Co. 
Inc,^^. The court said that our decisions relating to bait 
and switch are grounded on a factual determination that tjie 
142.Supra note 70 at 690-99. 
143.76 F.T.C 207, 239 (1969). The Guides Against Bait Adver-
tising defines "Bait and Switch" as an offer which is 
made not in order to sell the advertised product at the 
advertised price, but rather to draw a customer to 
the store to sell him another similar product which 
is more profitable to the advertiser. 16. C. F. R, See 
238 (1970). 
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advertised product is not an offer which the seller seriously 
intends the buyer to accept, but a "Come on" which will lead 
to the sale of a higher priced product.The seller in order to 
woo the consumer to their establishment, offer the products 
at an extremely low price which does not intend to sell. When 
the consumer responds to the advertisement, the seller dis-
courages him from purchasing the bait and instead tries to 
switch him to a higher price and more profitable item. To 
attract the consumers, advertiser creates false impression 
about the quality, quantity, model, style, durability etc of 
the goods and when the consumer turns up, the seller either 
refuses to demonstrate the advertised product or disparages 
it through words or acts, or by discrediting its guarantee, 
its credit terms, and the availability of service, repairs 
etc. It is a common experience that the consumer believes in 
what sales man says more than what his own eyes see. The 
sales man by virtue of his professional skill convinces the 
consumer that the product shown is far better than the adver-
tised one. Since customers are psychologically prepared to 
spend their money once they are inside the store, they easily 
come in the grips of the sales man^^ . 
144. R. C. Mussehl, The Neighbourhood Consumer Centre, 
(1972) 47 Notre Dame L 1093, 1099. 
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The show of actual switching is not necessary but can be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances^^^. This will natu-
rally include bait advertising as without that switching is not 
possible. Hence, the commonly used phrase "bait and switch". Un-
like, America, in India the MRTP and CP Acts contain a 
provision on bargain offers. The provision is similar to the one 
145. See Tashof v. F T C 437 2d 707. The F T C Gudies in 16 C. P. 
R. See 238.3 (1988) do not demand show of actual switching. 
Nevertheless, che bait advertisement is a condition prece-
dent for prescribing an advertisement as a bait and switch. 
Section 238.3 of the Guides reads as follows: 
No act or practice should be engaged in by an advertis-
er to discourage the purchase of the advertised merchandise 
as part of a bait scheme to sell other merchandise. Among 
acts or practices which will be considered in determing if 
an advertisement is a bonafide offer are: 
a) The refusal to show, demonstrate, or sell the product 
offered in accordance with the terms of the offer, 
b) The disparagement by acts or words of the advertised 
product or the disparagement of the guarantee credit 
terms, availability of service, repairs or parts, or in 
any other respect, in connection with it, 
c) The failure to have available at all outlets listed in 
the advertisement a sufficient quantity of the adver-
tised product to meet reasonably anticipated demands, 
unless the advertisement clearly and adequately disclos-
es that supply is limited and/or the merchandise is 
available only at designated outlet, 
d) The refusal to take orders for the advertised merchan-
dise to be delivered within a reasonable period of time, 
e) The sowing or demonstrating of a product which is defec 
tive, unusable or impractical for the purpose represent-
ed or implied in the advertisement, 
f) 
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incorporated in section 56(1) of the Australian Trade Practices 
Act^^^, 1974 and in substance similar to section 37(2) of the 
Combines Investigation Act, 1923 of Canada"^^^. The provision is 
as under: 
Permits the publication of any advertisement whether in 
any news-paper or otherwise, for the sale or supply at 
a bargain price, of goods or services that are not in-
tended to be offered for sale or supply at the bargain, 
or for a period that is and in quantities that are, 
reasonable, having regard to the nature of the market 
in which the business is carried on, the nature and 
size of business, and the nature of the advertise-
mentl48. 
A bare reading of the above provision makes it clear that it 
has a limited scope as compared to the American law on the sub-
ject. In India even if the trader disparages his own goods and 
thereby induces the buyer to switch over other item available at 
higher price and more profitable to the trader, he will not be 
covered under the above mentioned provision which will be violat-
ed only when the bargain offer is not so or is not available for 
a reasonable period or in reasonable quantities. 
146. This section provides : A corporation shall not, in trade 
or commerce, advertise for supply at a special price goods 
or services that the corporation does not intend to offer 
for supply at the price for a period that is and in quanti-
ties that are, reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
market in which the corporation carries on business and the 
nature of the advertisement. 
147. This section reads as : No person shall advertise on a bar-
gain price a product that he does not supply in reasonable 
quantities having regard to the nature of the market in 
which he carries on business, the nature and size of the 
business carried on by him and the nature of the advertise-
ment. 
148. Section 36 A(2) of the MRTP Act and Section 2(r)(2) of the 
CP Act. 
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In order to bring a trade practice within the proscription, 
it is necessary to show that the trader permitted the publication 
of the advertisement of such trade practice. The term advertise-
ment has not be defined in the Act. It may be defined as a notice 
14 9 given in a manner designed to attract public attention as by 
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news papers, hand bills, television, bill boards and radio-*-"^ ". 
Thus the word advertisement is one of wide amplitude. Neverthe-
less, it will exclude representations made in sales talk at the 
point of sale. Thus for example, a door to door salesman who 
gains entry to a home by offering for sale a bargain priced 
appliance which in fact proves to be unsatisfactory in operation, 
but who just happens to have a better model in his car, would not 
151 be covered under the above mentioned provision . 
Since the word "advertisement" is wide enough to include 
labels on the goods or cateU-ogues, then the question arises; are 
these labele on the goods or catejogues as "offers"? under the 
Indian Contract Act, such offers are merely an invitation to 
treat. Thus there are two possible interpretations. One is not to 
use the term offer here in a technical sense and not to insist on 
the dichotomy of the offer and invitation to treat. This will 
bring all that in the ambit of the term advertisement which might 
otherwise be excluded if the offer is given a restricted meaning. 
The other interpretation is to give offer narrow meaning in the 
sense as understood in the contract law. In an Australian case of 
149. Edwards v. Lubbock County, Tex.Civ. App; 33 S.W 2nd 482; 484. 
150. First Nat.Corp. v. Perrine, 99 Mont. 454, 43 P 2d 1073, 1077. 
151.Supra note 142 at 693 para 14105. 
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Reazdon v. Morley Food Pty Ltd.^^^ smithers J held that the 
advertiser must take some positive action which constitutes the 
making of an offer on the terms specified in the advertisement 
and that he should at least during the advertised period of the 
offer publicise it to all and sundry at his chief place of busi-
ness . However, in England the price mentioned in the cata;-
logues or in mail orders is considered as a price indication. If 
such price indication is false or misleading, the trader will be 
liable for penal consequences under the Consumer ProtectionAct, 
198715^. 
Once it is proved that the trader permitted the publication 
of an advertisement through news paper or otherwise, the next 
enquiry relates to his intention* it must be proved that the 
trader had no intention to sell the advertised goods. Although 
intention is an essential ingredient, yet it is not easy to 
ascertain. Furthermore, trader may escape responsibility by 
merely showing that the non-availability of goods for sale was 
due to reasons beyond his control. Since Indian Law is replica of 
section 56(1) of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 of Australia, 
dealing with the bargain offers, the difficulty of proving the 
requisite intention was encountered there also. In order to 
152. (1980) 33 ALR 417. 
153. For criticism to this judgment see Supra note 151. 
154. See para 1.2.5 of the Consumer Protection (code of practice 
for Traders on Price Indications) Approval order 1988 
(S.I.1988/2078) read with Section 20(l)-(3) of the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1987. 
180 
155 
overcome this loophole, Swanson Conunittee in its report recom-
mended that section 56 should apply to cases where advertiser in 
fact did not supply goods or services in accordance with his 
offer, irrespective of what his intention may have been at the 
time of advertising. 
Keeping in view the recommendations, in addition to what was 
laid down in section 56, Sub-clause(2) was inserted in section 56 
by the Trade Practices (Amendment) Act, 1977 which reads: 
A corporation that has, in trade or commerce, adver-
tised goods or services for supply at a special price 
shall offer such goods or services for supply at that 
price for a period that is, and in quantities that are 
reasonable having regard to the nature of the market in 
which the corporation carries on business and the 
nature of the advertisement. 
Thus in Australia a trader cannot escape from the liability 
by mere show of absence of required intention. Failure of supply 
of advertised goods is itself sufficient for penal consequences. 
Since in India the chapter on unfair trade practice was intro-
duced in the MRTP Act in the year, 1984 and CP Act was passed in 
the year, 1986, there is no plausible explanation for not incor-
porating section 56(2) of the Federal Trade Practices Act, 1974 
of Australia in place of present section 36(A)(2) of the MRTP Act 
and section 2(r)(2) of the CP Act in order to dispense with the 
requirement of intention. 
For the applicability of provisions dealing with the bargain 
offers, it is necessary to prove that the advertiser offered 
155. Swanson Committee Report paras 9.84 - 9.87. 
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goods at the bargain price. The term bargain price has been 
defined through the Explanation appended to respective sections. 
The Explanation has two clauses. Clause(a) says that the bargain 
price means a price that is stated in any advertisement to be a 
bargain price, by reference to an ordinary price or otherwise. 
This clause is ambiguous. It does not make clear as to whether 
the ordinary price is the price of the trader who has made a 
bargain offer, or any other trader. This explanation will not 
help also where a retailer who owns two or more outlets may, 
indicate in a shop A that an article was previously sold at a 
higher price when it was so sold only at shop B. This problem 
will be more acute if shop B is at a considerable distance away 
and possibly in an area where retail margins are normally higher 
than those in the area of shop A^^^. Clause (a) of the Explana-
tion is also silent about the time during which the ordinary 
price should be in vogue. Thus runs the danger of unscrupulous 
traders raising prices today, lowering them tomorrow and then 
claiming price reduction. In England it has been made mandatory 
that the previous price should be the last price at which the 
product was available to consumers in the previous 6 months. The 
product should have been available to consumers at that price for 
at least 28 consective days in the previous months, and the 
previous price should have been in force for that period at the 
same shop where the reduced price is being offered^^^. 
156. See R. G. Lawson, Advertising Law (1978) at 165. 
157. Part 1, para 1.2.2, Supra note 154. 
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clause (2) of the Explanation provides that the bargain 
price means a price that a person who reads, hears or sees the 
advertisement, would reasonably understand to be a bargain price 
having regard to the prices at which the product advertised or 
like products are ordinarily sold. 
This clause is widely worded and unlike clause (1), even 
where there is no mention of actual reduced price, a trade prac-
tice will attract the provision when the advertisement is couched 
in such a way as to create an impression to consumers that the 
advertiser offers goods at bargain price. Thus the phrases like 
special prices, clearance sales, lower than other prices, whole 
sale prices will be covered under this sub-clause. However neith-
er clause (1) nor (2) covers the advertisements like buy today 
for Rs.lOO and not tomorrow for Rs.200 or buy now before price 
rise. These advertisements relate to future . 
The bargain offer will not invite proscription if it is true 
and lasts for a reasonable period and is available in reasonable 
quantities. In order to determine the reasonableness of the 
period and quantities, regard must be had to nature of the market 
in which the business is carried on, the nature and size of 
business, and the nature of the advertisement. 
158. However a conflicting opinion was expressed by the MRTP 
Commission in re polar Industries Ltd and Ors UTPE No.120/86 
decided on 22.1.1987. In this case off season discount of 
Rs.45/- offered on the sale of polar ceiling fans in 1986 
was measured not on the basis of current price but with 
reference to the prices which were expected to rule in 
April, 1987. The Commission held the advertisement as un-
fair . 
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Till date the cases decided by the MRTP Commission involving 
bargain offers show that the Commission has invariably determined 
the validity of the bargain offers on the touch-stone of reason-
ableness of the period and the nature of the quality and in this 
process several rules have been evolved. 
About the mention of the period during which the bargain 
offer shall last, the MRTP Commission came with the divergent 
opinions. In re citylook New Delhi^^^ and in re Heels^^^, it was 
observed that the period during which the sale should be con-
tinued and hours fixed for sale should be reasonable. It cannot, 
however, be said to mean that the period during which the sale is 
to last should also be mentioned. There are no words in the 
aforesaid provision which lead to the conclusion that it is 
obligatory to mention reasonable period in the advertisement. As 
it appears, the only thing required is that the sale should be 
for a reasonable period and the hours of the sale should be 
reasonable having regard to the nature and size of the business, 
the nature of the market in which the business is carried on and 
the nature of the advertisement. However, on the other hand in re 
Kailash Stozes^^^; re Dayal Novelties and others^^^; re Smt 
Bharti Devi and Anr^^^; re Unique Department Stores^^^} re Roop 
Milan^°^ and Deepak Agencies^^^} the Commission 
159. UTPE No. 128/86 decided on 16.3.1989. 
160. UTPE No. 24/84 decided on 20.1.1987. 
161. UTPE No. 36/84 decided on 19.8.1986. 
162. UTPE No. 33/85 decided on 24.2.1986. 
163. UTPE No. 80/85 decided on 18.11.1986 
164. UTPE No. 96/86 decided on 9.2.1987. 
165. UTPE No. 134/86 decided on 6.3.1987. 
166. UTPE No. 412/87 decided on 24.11.1988. 
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declared bargain offer as unfair and one of the grounds was non 
mentioning of the period during which the offer would remain 
valid. 
Although the provision dealing with the bargain offer talk 
about the reasonableness of the period which can be determined 
keeping in view the nature of the market in which the business is 
carried on and the size and nature of business, yet the Commis-
sion attempted to prescribe the period with exactituted and in 
this process conflicting opinions were expressed. In re vasud 
Bros^^^ the bargain offer was relating to the sale of textile 
goods, reasonable period was held not to be less than 15 days. 
But in re Panama Tzadezs^^^ where again bargain offer was for 
textile goods, not less than 7 days were considered as a reason-
able period. About the bargain offer involving readymade gar-
16 9 
ments, the Commission in re Unique Department Stoze^^^ and re 
Snow white clothiezs^^^ held that the offer should not be less 
than 10 days. It is submitted that the above opinions regarding 
the period during which the bargain offer should run, are not in 
conformity with the provision controlling the unfair bargain 
offer, for the following reasons: 
1. The period may vary from case to case depending 
upon the nature and size of the business, 
quantity at sale and nature of the market in 
which business is carried on; 
167. UTPE No. 3/84 decided on 28.4.1986. 
168. UTPE No. 35/86 decided on 17.9.1986. 
169. UTPE No. 96/86 decided on 9.3.19879. See also re Boutque 
UTPE No. 129/86 decided on 1.12.1988. 
170. UTPE No. 13/84 decided on 2.5.1986. 
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2. No hard and fast rule can be laid down re-
garding the reasonableness of the period, what 
may be reasonable period for a particular .item 
may not be reasonable for another; 
3. If the rigid rule about the reasonableness of 
the period is upheld, then even the bonafide 
bargain offers will fall within the proscrip-
tion. For example, where there was a bargain 
offer for a limited sale which did not last for 
a prescribed period, the trader will be hauled 
up for not providing the goods in accordance 
with the offer. 
4. Where for example bargain offer relates to the 
. sale of 10 radio sets or 20 refrigerators, the 
question of prescribing a period does not arise 
and the offer shall remain valid till the last 
set is disposed of. 
The MRTP Commission realising the impracticability and the 
resultant consequences of imposing any rigid "reasonable period", 
171 
held in re Roop Milan^ ^ that a reasonable period pf discount 
sale, having regard to the availability cf the stocks and the 
daily turnover, shall be mentioned so that there is no necessity 
of extending the total discount sale period in driblets. Even 
where the period is prescribed, it cannot be expected that a 
trader would undertake that the stock would last for that period 
because they may be cleared in a fraction of that period^ '^ .^ 
Naturally it would be a good defence for the trader that the 
stock did not List for the period mentioned in the advertisement 
as the demand generated by the advertisement was more than the 
goods in stock which was not in the contemplation of the 
trader^'^^. 
171. Supra note 165. 
172. Supra note 160. 
173. Emphasis supplied. 
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Akin to the question of mentioning of the reasonable period, 
the MRTP Cominission confronted with the question whether the 
reasonable period should be mentioned in the bargain offer itself 
or it will suffice that the bargain offer remained standing for a 
reasonable period although the same was not mentioned in the 
advertisement? The MRTP Commission, it appears, had no clear idea 
about the answer with the result opposite views were expressed at 
17 4 two different occasions. In DG v. Nalli Silk Press and Ors^' the 
Commission opined that where the bargain sale announced was for a 
period from 3rd April to 6th April; but the same had been carried 
on till 20th April, 1987, the taint of unfair trade practice had 
been removed. But in re Petals Boutique where bargain offer 
was made only for 3 days at the fag end of the July, 1986 but 
continued for subsequent month, the commission declared the 
bargain offer as unfair. It is submitted that it is the latter 
opinioh which is in comport with the legal provisions. As the 
requirement of law is that the bargain offer should remain cur-
rent for a reasonable period. What is reasonable period, depend 
upon the circumstances of the each case, the bargain offer and 
such period shall have to be mentioned in the advertisement 
itself. 
Along with reasonableness uf the period, Lhe legal require-
ment is that the quantities put to bargain sale must also be 
reasonable. However, this does not mean that the seller must 
174. UTPE No. 107/87 decided on 5.6.19879. 
175. UTPE No. 129/86 decided on 1.2.1988. 
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undertake to sell goods in a stated quantity but it simply im-
plies that the seller must sell the goods at the bargain price in 
the quantities as reflected through the advertisement. It has 
been suggested by an Australian writer that the reasonableness 
176 
must be determined from the point of view of the advertiser 
However, it is submitted that before reaching any conclusion, the 
advertisement itslef should be scanned, obviously consumer and 
the seller will be holding two extreme views. The test therefore, 
should be to ascertain whether the supply was equal to one re-
flected by the advertisement. 
The MRTP Commission however, has not decided cases on the 
test of reasonableness of the quantities, instead the Commission 
has given much weight to the insertion of the nature of qualities 
in the advertisement relating to bargain offer. It has in a 
177 
number of cases laid down that if the bargain offer is for old 
goods, used goods, out of fashion goods or new goods, the same 
must be mentioned in the advertisement, otherwise it will be 
misleading. Thus the Commission insisted on mentioning the rea-
sons for the bargain sale in the advertisement itself. It did not 
endorse the point that where ever the discount offered is upto 
176. Donald and Heydon, Trade Practices Law, (Vol.2) 1979 at 
632-33. 
177. In re inter Shoppe (1988) 63 Comp Cas 286; re Smit. Bharti 
Devi UTPE No. 80/85 decided on 18.11.1986; re Kailah Stores 
UTPE No. 36/86 decided on 19.8.1986; re Heera Silk House 
UTPE No. 32/85 decided on 26.2.1986; re Dayal Novelties and 
Ors UTPE No. 33/85 decided on 24.2.1986; re Jasrabhai Shah 
UTPE No. 46/85 decided on 20.10.1986; and re Apachehjeans 
Pvt. Ltd. UTPE No. 104/86 decided on 20.1.1987. 
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50%, it shall be presumed that the goods on which the discount is 
offered shall not be fresh goods. The Commission observed: 
The claim of the respondent that the customer was to be 
believed to be well-aware that the maximum discount of 
50% could not be expected on fresh and quality goods, 
was not correct. This sort of awareness on the part of 
the customer as the respondent wanted to impute to him 
could not be treated as true. This rate discount might 
vary not only by reason of age of the unsold goods, it 
might also depend upon demand, off season, defects or 
otherwise owing to the necessity to clear the accumu-
lated stock^'®. 
G I F T S , E > R I Z E S , L O T T E R I E S , C O I > J T E S T S E T C . 
Market strategies know no end as there is no end to the 
human ingenuity. Since man has not stopped thinking, so he con-
tinues to contribute to the development of designs and devices 
which promote the objective of manufacturer, producer, wholesale 
dealer, retailer and supplier i,e sale. The strategy makers are 
always in a hunt for new techniques and methods which are not 
only in tune with the tastes and needs of the consuming public 
but which have a potential to harbinger "wish" to purchase of the 
consumer to "will" to purchase. Since it is not so easy, so field 
studies have been undertaken to know the susceptibilities and 
behavior of the consumer. His urge resulting in his fickling has 
been studied at micro level. Nevertheless, since vagaries of 
consumer idio-syncrasy cannot be put into a strait jacket so it 
is not easy to predict consumer behavior at a particular point of 
time. 
178. re Skipper UTPE No. 80/86 decided on 3.3.1989. 
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Whether it is the case of introducing new product in the 
market or ensuring steady egress of the goods from the market, 
advertising has played an important and effective role. The most 
difficult task of placing a consumer in a mood to buy has been 
accomplished by advertising price cuttings, as the statistical 
figures have more potential to woo the consumer than the "words". 
Relatively recent in origin is the advertising of free gifts or 
prizes or conducting of contest, lottery', game of a chance or 
skill'Which are connected with the goods or services in such a 
way as to compel the consumer, in order to try his luck and be 
successful on the wheel of fortune, to purchase such goods or 
services. The hope of getting something for nothing is the most 
powerful bait. This attracts the customers, children, and adults 
alike. This is the lure that draws the credulous and unsuspecting 
17 9 in to the deceptive scheme . 
In order to eliminate possible misuse through these sales 
promotion schemes, consumer protection laws are in force through 
out the globe including India. 
In India, both MRTP-'-^ ^ and CP Acts"^ -^^  contain provisions to 
deal with the practice of offering of gifts, prizes or conducting 
of contest, lottery, game of chance or skill etc. This provision 
runs as follows: 
179. State V. Lipkin 169 NC 2^5 1936. 
180. Section 36 (A) (3) 
181. Section 2 (r) (3) 
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Permits: 
a) the offering of the gifts, prizes or other 
items with the intention of not pro-
viding them as offered or creating an 
impression that some-thing is being given 
or offered free of charge when it is fully 
or partly covered by the amount charged in 
the transaction as a whole. 
b) the conduct of any contest, lottery game of 
chance or skill for the purposes of promot-
ing, directly or indirectly, the sale, use 
or supply of any product or any business 
interest. 
A gift may be defined in a general way as an offer, or 
.giving of something for nothing, contingent upon the pur-
chase of the goods or services at a price . The provision 
proscribes offering of gifts and prizes or other items when 
there is either no intention to provide them as offered or 
when they are either partly or wholly covered in the price 
charged but impression is created that something is being 
given free of charge.. 
In classical law of contract a distinction has 
been maintained between offer and invitation to 
treat. Latter is simply a request to other party 
to float offer which can ripen into contract 
only when accepted by the other. This distinction was 
182. Lyon, The Economic of Free Deals (1933) at 2. 
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•1 Q T 
approved in England in a number of cases'*-*'-' and was followed in 
India^®^ also. Criticizing this approach Treitel observes: 
customer may be induced by a window display to believe 
that they will be able to buy goods at exceptionally 
low prices and to wait out side the shop for many hours 
in such statement and the shopkeeper may turn him out 
at the very moment when the customer demands the 
goods^^^. 
There is no clear cut inkling whether the word "offered" includes 
invitation to treat also. In Australia^^^, the stand taken by the 
courts is that offer for sale be read in an ordinary sense unless 
context otherwise requires and made clear that offer when used in 
a particular legislation does not necessarily have the meaning it 
does Under general law of contract. Commenting on the import of 
183. See for instance: Timothy V. Simpson (1834) 6c and P 499 P 
5Q0,"If a man advertises goods at a certain prices, I have a 
right to go into his shop and demand the article at the 
price marked" Parke J said "No if you do, he has a right to 
turn you out. Similarly In Fisher v. Bell (1961) 1 Q B 394 
it was laid down that the offence of offering a flick knife 
sale was not committed merely by displaying it in a shop 
window at a state price; In partridge v. Crittenden (1968)2 
All E R 421 it was stated that the offence of unlawfully 
offering for sale a live wild bird was not committed by 
inserting an advertisement in a news paper; similar views 
were expressed in pharmaceutical society of Great Britain v. 
Boots cash chemists itd( 19 53) I Q B 401; British car 
Auctions ltd v. (bright (1972) 3 All E R. 462. 
184. State Aided bank of Travancore v. Dhirt Ram, AIR 1942 pc 66 
wherein bankers catalogue was not held to be offer see also 
state of UP v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, (1982) 2 Sec 365. 
185. G. H. Treital, The law of contract, (4th ed 1975) at 9-10. 
186. Goodwins of newtown pty ltd v. Gurry (1959) S.A S R 295, 
Attorney General for New South wales v. Australian Fixed 
ltd. (1974) 1 N.S.W.L.R 110; W.A pines pty ltd v. Registrar 
of companies (1976) W.A.R 149. 
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section 54 of the Trade practices Act 1974 (Australia) "^ ^^  which 
is similar to section 36 (A) (3) and 2 (r) (3) of the MRTP and CP 
188 Acts respectively the learned authors Taprell et al observe-^'"': 
The courts in Australia have been prepared ... to read 
such phrases as "offer for sale" in their ordinary 
sense unless technical sense is clearly required. It is 
therefore, unlikely that the English cases ... would be 
followed in the context of section 54,even though the 
conunon drafting practice of avoiding the problem by 
enacting an extended definition of offer has not been 
adopted in Trade practices Act. Morever, regard must be 
paid to the context in which the word "offer" appears 
in section 54. An offer of gifts etc. may be made when 
no immediate offer for sale is in contemplation. An 
offer within section 54 may be made not only in connec-
tion with the supply or possible supply of goods or 
servic-is, but also in connection with the promotion by 
any means of such supply. 
It is suggested that there is no reason to deviate from the 
approach adopted by the Australian courts. Moreover, in India the 
liability of the trader for false or misleading advertisement 
goes only to the extent of discontinuing the advertisement. It is 
only when he repeats th^ ti. ,the penal consequences ensue. So it is 
not possible to imagine a different interpretation than the one 
propounded by the Australian courts in the similar context. 
The provision incorporates the words "prizes, gifts and 
other items". These words have attracted the attention of the 
187. Section 54 b provides : A corporation shall not, in trade or 
commerce in connection with supply or possible supply of 
goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any 
means of supply or use of goods or services, offer gifts or 
other free item with the intention of not providing them or 
of not providing them as offered. 
188. Supra note 153, 
193 
authors in Australia^^^ and it has been argued that since the 
word "Items" when read ejusdem generis with prizes and gifts, 
means some tangible items and will naturally exclude the offers 
like sale of a car with the free after sale service. So to avoid 
it, "items" may be construed as a thing or an object in the list. 
Other-wise the scope of the section will be restricted which will 
not be supported by any plausible consideration. In India this 
will hardly cause any difficulty in view of the amendments car-
ried in the MRTP & CP Acts in 1991 & 1993 respectively as the 
main definition of unfair trade practice contains the broad words 
"unfair method or unfair and deceptive practice". So in India 
even if the word "item" is read ejusdem generis with the words 
"prizes and gifts", the words in the main definition of unfair 
trade practice are wide enough to cover non tangible items also. 
The intention of the trader to provide free gifts or prizes 
is necessary to determine the infringement of provision. However, 
it is not easy to ascertain the intention as it is said that even 
devil does not know human mind. So suggestively speaking, the 
Regulatory Agencies should overlook the intention of the trader, 
instead he may be allowed to raise the defences like there was an 
unexpected demand or supplier failed to supply goods etc. 
A ticklish question arises when a trader makes an adver-
tisement which seems an offer of free gifts or prizes but con-
tains some onerous terms in fine print which are not easily 
189. See Donald & Heydon Trade Practices Law vol.2 (1976) at 
621. 
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descernible as compared to the main advertisement. In Australia 
the Trade practice commission first held that by such advertise-
ment section 54 is infringed"'-^ ^ but later on deviated from this 
approach ^ . Authors have expressed conflicting opinions on it. 
One v'iew is that in such situation it cannot be said that trader 
has not supplied goods "as offered". In otherwords there is 
literal compliance with the terms of the section-^^ . Other view 
i3l93 
It may be straining section 54 to read "offer" as 
meaning "offer" so far as the offer understands it. 
"offer" in the general law must be determined objec-
tively; the last is whether a reasonable person in the 
offeror's position would think an offer has been made . 
The offeror, in not drawing attention to the fine 
print, excludes it from the offer .... Hence in our 
view failure to make full disclosure of the terms, in 
close proximity to the words suggesting "freeness' will 
lead to infringement of section 54. 
Lottery, Contest. Game of chance, or skill.; 
The provision dealing with the holding of lottery, contest 
game of chance or skill has not defined the term lottery. The 
Bombay lotteries (control and tax) and prize competition (Tax) 
Act, 1958 states that the term lottery does not include a prize 
competition. This definition also does not give an idea as to 
what should be considered as lottery.. In England Lotteries And 
Amusements Act, 197S simply without providing any definition of 
lottery, provides all lotteries are unlawful. The term has been 
190. Advertising Guidelines, information circular No 10 (1975), 
TPRS 403,42 para 12.1 (c). 
191. Advertising and selling (1981) para 403. 
192. Supra note at 688. 
193. Supra note 11 at 624. 
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put to judicial gloss. Hawkins J in Taylor v. Smetten ^ observed 
that in Webester's Dictionary, a lottery is defined;distribution 
195 
of prizes by lot or chance and Atkin J in Scot v. D.P.P^ 
held that any kind of skill or dexterity, whether bodily or 
mental, in which persons can compete, would prevent a scheme from 
being a lottery if the result depends partly upon such skill or 
dexterity. However, a qualification was added by parker C. J.' in 
D. P. P V. Bradfute and Associates Itd^^^ that the skill other 
than a mere colourable skill will prevent a scheme from being a 
lottery. 
The essential requirements of the practice to be called as 
'lottery' has been outlined by Madras H C in Sesha Ayyar v. 
Krishna Ayyar-^', which are (1) A prize or some advantage in the 
nature of a prize; (2) distribution by chance (3) consideration 
paid or promised; and (4) risk of loss. 
The elements of consideration and the risk of loss consid-
ered by the courts as essential requirements, provided an escape 
_ _ _ _ _ _ y ^ _ _ ^ « ^ ^ _ 
194. (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 207 see also The News of the world Ltd 
V. Friend (1973) All ER 422 at 424; Hall V. Cox (1899) 1 
Q.B.148 at 200. A lottery for the distribution of prizes by 
lot or chance. Emperor v. Gurbaksh AIR 1934 Lah 840. A lot-
tery is a scheme for the distribution of the prizes by lot 
or chance. It usually, if not always, takes the form of 
creation of a fund by the participation in the lottery. Who 
buy tickets or pay consideration of an offer by the promot-
ers to award them a prize on some contingency, the happening 
where of depends on chance. In the matter of K. Karnakatee 
gala Enterprises UPTE No 7/86 decided on 5th March,1988. 
195. (1914) All E. R. Rep. 825 
196. (1967) 1 All E. R. 112. 
197. AIR 1936 Mad 225 (FB). 
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route for the trader who did not demand separate consideration 
for holding lottery, instead participation in the lottery was 
made contingent upon the purchase of some goods or services. When 
such practice was called in question, the trader pleaded that the 
consumer got his money's worth and he participated in the lottery 
free of any consideration, similarly the risk of loss was evaded 
when lottery offered prizes of different denominations and 
whosoever participated in the lottery, got something of value and 
without any risk of loss. 
In order to clog the loophole of consideration requirement 
the Gujarat Higher court in state of Gujarat V. Mohandas Manumal 
held^^^: 
cases have arisen in England where purchaser paying the 
real worth of goods also gets a chance of a prize while 
purchasing the goods, in that case, the contention that 
the purchaser got the real worth of ^oods and therefore 
lost nothing and the change of prize was wholly gra-
tuitous stood negatived^ In Taylor v. Smethen (1883) 
11 QBD 207. 
In the above case the appellant sold tea packets each con-
taining a pound of tea at 2s. 6d. a packet. In each packet was a 
coupon entitling the purchaser to a prize and this was publically 
stated by the appellant before the sale, but the purchaser did 
not know until after the sale what prizes they where entitled to: 
and the prizes varied in character and value. It was found that 
the tea was good and worth the money paid for it. Still it was 
198. (1979) 20 Guj LR 226. 
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held that what the appellant did, constituted a lottery within 
the meaning o£ the statute. 
* 
The element of the "risk of loss" considered essential by 
the Madras HC in Sesha Ayyar v. Krishna lyez^^^ and followed in a 
State V. Jayantilal Bhimjihhp-^^ was disputed in State of Gujarat 
V. Mohandas Manumal^^^, and was made clear that the risk o£ loss 
is not necessary and its absence cannot tilt scales in favour of 
the defendent. This was reiterated in f/im Co ltd v. Liberty Match 
Co and others^^^. 
Common issues 
A common question relating to offering of gifts, prizes or 
other items, and conducting of lottery, contest, game of chance 
or skill agitated before the various benches of the MRTP Commis-
sion iS| what should be the criterion to determine the nature of 
such practices. Before amendments to the MRTP and CP Acts, the 
main definition of unfair trade practices in the concluding words 
provided ' adopts one or more of the following practices 
and thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers of such goods 
or services, whether by eliminating or restricting competition 
or otherwise". Furthermore, section 36D of the MRTP Act^°^ 
199. Supra note 197. 
200. (1968) 9 GLR 603. 
201. Supra note 198. 
202. Comp. L. Digest, June 1991 Vol xx at 59. 
203. There is no provision similar to section 36-D under CP Act. 
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provides that the commission shall pass any order under that 
section only when such practice is prejudicial to the public 
interest or to the interest of any consumer or consumers general-
ly. This brought a vertical cleavage in the opinions expressed by 
various benches of the commission as they gave different reason-
ing in order to reach a particular decision. 
In DG(I&R) V. M/S Indian Sewing Machine^^^ M/S MB Co Tronics 
Pvt ItiP-^^.', Gujarat State Consumer Protection Centre v. M/3 Food 
Specialities of India Ltd^^^., it was held that the gifts or 
prizes offered were in fact covered wholly or partly in the price 
charged, which is prohibited under the MRTP Act. and in the 
latter case business practice was assailed also on the ground 
that the respondent had failed to provide the free cold coffee 
shaker as offered by it?*'. In parle products pvt.ltd^. it was 
stated that the contest requiring purchase of parle poppin pack-
ets to the contestants is prejudicial to the public interest and 
to tjie interest of consumers generally as the contest promotes 
excessive use of sweets which create dental problems for consum-
ers who are generally children and the most vulnerable section of 
204. U T P E No 122 of 1987. 
205. Comp. L Digest (1986) Sept. Vol (xvi) at 34. 
206. Comp L Digest (1993) June Vol (xxii) at 65. 
207. Id at 68. 
208. Comp. L Digest (1989) Sept. Vol (xix) at 51; kochar oil 
Mills in the matter of (UPTE No 53 Of 1985 decided in 15th 
Dec. 1987). 
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the society. Similarly in M/S Ethnor limited , it was laid that 
the gift scheme devised by the respondent company for alluring 
the doctors to prescribe its child patients is apart from being 
highly unethical, an unfair trade practice, as it causes loss to 
the consumers as well as injury to the health of consuming public 
as the doctors while prescribing this product will take into 
consideration extraneous factors and not merely the quality and 
efficiency of the product. 
An extreme view was propounded by a two member bench of M/S 
D.C. Aggarwal and M. Satyapal in M/S Avon cycle pvt. 
It was laid down: 
1. The question of loss or injury to the consumers by 
reason of impairment of competition or otherwise to be 
determined not from a narrow or limited point of view 
but from broader considerations governing our economic 
policy. 
2. It is not merely a matter as to how the prize scheme 
was actually financed by cutting into the profits of 
the company or through an increase in the prices of 
bicycles. While this question is undoubtedly relevant, 
a more fundamental issue is, whether the trade practice 
of resorting to the contests, lA^ tteries and similar 
methods which are increasingly being adopted by indus-
try and trade, is in the right direction from the 
point of view of the healthy marketing techniques in 
this country, particularly in relation to promoting 
consumer and public interest. 
3. India being a poor country, the endeavour of the 
manufacturers should constantly be to make available 
products of consistently high quality at low prices. 
Any practice which detracts from this basic considera-
tion should be regarded as prejudicial to consumer 
interest. 
209. U P T E No.4 of 1986 Decided on 5.3 1987. 
210. UPTE No 43 of 1984 Comp L Digest 1986 Sept. (Vol xvi) at 2p. 
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4. The practice of offering prizes by lottery tends 
to encourage the gambling instinct leading to unne-
cessary, avoidable and excessive purchases by con-
sumers for the purposes of gaining entry in to the 
lottery. Such avoidable and excessive purchases are 
real loss to the consumer. As only a few ultimately 
win prizes. The bulk of the consumers end up, as 
in every gamble, suffering losses. The gain of the 
few is therefore at the expense of many. Instead of 
protecting consumer interest, lotteries and con-
tests, therefore, clearly act in a prejudicial 
manner in regard to consumer and public interest; 
5. The resources deployed for the prizes (which only 
a few can get) can be more optimally utilized for 
maximising consumer satisfaction through general 
reduction of prizes or better services. 
6. Assuming loss or injury is an ingredient of unfair 
trade practice under section 36 A (3) (b}in the 
matter of giving away prizes by contests, lottery or 
game of chance or skill, it is to be noted that 
consumer interest is integral to any socio economic 
order especially under the MRTP Act and therefore, 
what deprives the consumer as a body or fairly large 
number of them, of the benefits from market af-
fluence and competition, must be regarded injurious 
to the consumer. 
The effect of the judgment is that all contests^ lotteries 
and games of chance or skill, conducted for the purpose of pro-
moting of the 9ale of any product as enumerated in clause 3 (b) 
of section 36A of the MRTP Act, 1969 are unfair trade 
practices . The ingredient of loss or injury to the consumers 
(whether by eliminating competition or otherwise) as envisaged in 
the definition of unfair trade practice in the opening paragraph 
211. S.S Kumar; Contest lotteries and Games of Chance; Banned 
By one stroke; Not By law But By MRTP Commissions pronounce-
ment. Comp.L. Digest (1986) sept. Vol xvi at 19. 
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of the said section 36-A are, according to the findings of the 
commission inherent in such lotteries, contests ' etc. 
However, it appears that one of the members of the Bench 
which handed down the judgment in Avon cycle case supra changed 
» 
his opinion later on. In M/s British Airways^ , M Satyapal ob-
served that as a result of the contest there does not appear to 
have been any injury or loss to the consumers Director 
General (R) has therefore concluded that the advertisement did 
not amount to an unfair trade practice and recommended that the 
matter may be dropped. We agree with this recommendation. Simi-
larly S D Manchand in M/s MECO Tronics pvt. Itd^^^ laid down: 
The contests and prizes are sale promotion gimmicks 
luring consumers to purchase a particular brand by 
promises of illusory free gifts. These gimmicks are 
unrelated to any improvement in quality or in lowering 
of prices, the two considerations which alone could be 
of benefit to the consumers. A Country where a large 
majority of the consumers are poor, hapless or disorga-
nised and where the market is generally a sellers 
market, the gift scheme covered under sub clause (a) 
and or (b) of sub section 3 of section 36 A, is a 
positive diserviceto the consumers who may sacrifice 
the considerations of price and quality for illusory 
gains. 
212. The Same Bench of Colgate case in M/s Oswal Mills ltd. held 
that the conduct of any contest for the purpose of promoting 
directly or indirectly the sale, use or supply of any pro-
duct or any business interest amounts to an unfair trade 
practice under section 36 A (3) (6) of the MRTP Act. UTPE No 
25 of 1985. Decided on 27-3-1987.; In M/s Kids Kemp, UTPE No 
419 of 1987, decided on 24-4-1989 it was held that the 
picking up of the red ball amongst white or yellow balls 
from inside the bag was a matter of chance. It was there-
fore, just a lottery or a game of chance. This is the trade 
practice which is injurious to the customers. See also D G 
(liR) V. H M M limited UTPE No 94 of 1986 decided by D C 
Aggarwal and H C Gupta on 11th May,1989. 
213. UPTE No 124/86. Decided on 7-1-1987. 
214. UTPE No 6 of 1985. Decided on 9.10.1986. 
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This Member also changed his opinion In The Blitz publica-
tion and private Itd^^^ and Miss San tosh Kalra V. Indian Book 
House pvt. Itd^^^. and tried to find actual loss^if any,is caused 
to consumers by offering such gifts or prizes . Since they did 
not, so the Member declared that the practices in question are 
not hit by the section. 
D C Aggarwal, the member of the MRTP commission who with out 
any wavering maintained from Avon cycle case (supra) to Society 
for civic Rights v. Palmolive India Itdi^^^ that contest lottery 
game of chance or skill are per se unfair, outlined the reason 
for this approach in DG V. New life General Finance and invest-
ment Co lt<f^^. it was observed: 
1. A remediel statute like the MRTP Act is not to be 
equated with a penal statute in the matter of constru-
ing its provisions relating to "the conduct of any 
215. UTPE No/86/87 decided on 14.4.1988. 
216. UTPE No 35 of 1988, decided on 22nd Nov. 1989. In mid day 
publications private ltd. U E No 50 of 1985 decided on 
12.3.1986 and Competition Sucess Review pvt. ltd UTPE No 7 
of 1985, there was no loss or injury to the consumers. So 
the practices were held not hit by the section In Society 
for Civic Rights v. General Electric Company of India ltd. 
UTPE No 389 of 1988, 19th Annual Report of MRTP commission 
at 83 it was stated that neither there is any loss of injury 
to the consumers or public at large nor there is any loss or 
restriction of competition. The holding of the contest has 
not at all increased the sale of the respondent and as such 
the contest had no effect upon the sales of the respondent 
and though the contest was organised to promote sale, it 
appears that it squarely failed in its purpose. 
217. (1991) 2 Comp L. J. 372. 
218. Comp. L. Digest (1987-88) Vol 17 at 71. 
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contest lottery, game of chance or skill. Herein, what 
is sought to be prohibited in the conduct of any con-
test, lottery, game of chance or skill for the purpose 
of promoting directly or indirectly the sale, use or 
supply of any product or any business interest. It is 
an object which has no relation or approximation to the 
underlying object of section 294 A of IPC. 
2. The various ingredients provided in the preamble of 
section 36A are subject to dominant essential "unless 
the context otherwise requires". It is to be noticed 
that clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 36 A has 
been introduced in contradiction to clause (a) of this 
sub section. 
3. It is, idle to invoke or lay emphasis on the language of 
clause (a) of 36 A and contend that it has never been 
the intention of the respondent company not to distrib-
ute prizes or gifts as advertised. 
4. Clause (b) of sub section (3) which deals with the 
conduct of contest, lottery or game of chance or skill, 
takes its sweep any business interest besides the sale, 
use or supply of any product. The phrase, business 
interest is of wider amplitude and may include services 
and other activities of a commercial nature which don't 
relate to the sale, use or supply of any product. 
5. Clause (b) of sub section (3) is an independent 
provision in section 36 A enacted for different context, 
the inkling of which is given by the caution "unless the 
context otherwise requires". 
6. If there is anything as the rule of reason in applying 
the provisions of the statute to a particular situation, 
it will be travesty of fairness in business or commer-
cial enterprise to dazzle the customer or consumer by 
promoting many fold costlier items than the value of 
item of sale and purchase itself so that the small cost 
of the item pales into insignificance and gets obscured 
by the glamour of chancing upon wining a fortune. 
The opinion of D C Aggarwal Member MRTP commission expressed 
in various decisions was affirmed by the Gujarat High Court in 
f/im CO ltd V.Liberty Match co & ors^^^. Although Gujarat High did 
not negate "the loss or injury" as an essential element to call a 
219. Supra note 2 
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trade practice unfair one, yet the court not only approved the 
opinion expressed in Ayon cycle case (supra) but also held that 
the elimination or restriction on competition cause loss to the 
consumer and contest, lottery, game of chance or skill have a 
potential to eliminate or restrict the competition. Thus it can 
reasonably be inferred that Gujarat HC also viewed section 36 (3) 
(b) as per se unfair. After these decisions, came landmark judg-
ment of the MRTP commission in Society for Civic Rights V. Col-
ga te Palmoli ve Indi a This case was first heard by a two 
Member Bench. D C Aggarwal being one among them. He did not 
change his view point already expressed by him in a good number 
of cases. However, another Member H C Gupta came with an opposite 
observation. He stated: 
A plain reading of the provisions clearly brings 
out the intention of the law makers to the effect 
that loss or injury is neither inherent nor inci-
dental to such contests and such iQgf or injury has 
got to be proved by legal evidence . 
In order to resolve the conflict. Full Bench was constituted 
which made the following observations-
1. In some cases, it has been mentioned that the amount 
spent on advertising should be utilized in reducing the 
price of the product so that the consumer may benefit. 
This is a wrong approach to the problem of advertising. 
When to advertise, whereto advertise and how much to 
advertise These are questions properly within the 
management of every company. It cannot be the subject 
matter of a judgment by the commission as to where and 
as to how much a particular company should advertise^^^. 
220. Supra note 217. 
221. Comp L. Digest 1988 Dec. Vol (xviii) at 10. 
222. Supra note 220.at 386. 
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2. Sub section (3) (a) (4) and (5) show that the practices 
mentioned in the said paragraphs are capable of or have 
got the innate quality of causing loss or injury to the 
consumer. These practice^do not need to cause actually 
loss or injury in order to become an unfair trade 
practice. If this is the meaning in respect of the 
provisions which have been examined, why the same 
meaning cannot be attributed to clause (b) of paragraph 
3 of section 36 A. The key phase must mean the same 
thing for different paragraphs. It cannot mean one 
thing for one paragraph and different thing for 
another paragraph . 
3. In trade practices enumerated in section 36-A, loss or 
injury is implicit. 
On the question why the key phrase "and thereby causes loss 
or injury "is in the preamble of the definition, the commission 
held,"our answer to this argument is that the insertion of the 
key phrase is the legislative style or device of making it know 
why it regards a trade practice which adopts any of the practices 
as an unfair trade practice. The legislature intended to convey 
that a trade practice which adopts one or more of the following 
practices has got the innate capacity or inherent quality of 
causing loss or injury to the consumers of goods and 
services ^ . On the point that even the innocent contests may be 
hit by this opinion, the commission argued: 
The contest ceases to be innocent, if it is held for 
the purposes of promoting the sale for the business 
interest of the organiser of that contest^^^. 
223. Id at 388 
224. Ibid. 
225. Id at 389. 
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After this judgment in Colgate case, the MRTP commis-
O 9 r 
sion took a consistent stand in line with the Full Bench 
decision, that all enumerated practices are per se unfair. 
The short comings of this ruling were exposed by the find-
227 ings of the commission in-re Dalmia Diary Industries ltd 
when it was held: 
The D G has not produced any positive oral evidence to 
prove the loss and injury to the consumers, but there 
is no denial by the respondent of the impugned contest. 
It has already been held by the Full Branch of the 
commission vide order dated 19th June,1991 in society 
for civic Rights v. Colgate India ltd, that the words 
"and thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers" 
are words of description which indicate that the trade 
practice described in section 36 A of the Act are 
vehicles of loss or injury. Therefore, the contest for 
the purpose of promoting the sale is an unfair trade 
practice within the meaning of section 36 A (3) (b) of 
the MRTP Act 1969. 
Authors , while commenting on the judgment of the 
MRTP commission in Colgate case came with divergent opinions. 
226. For instance see in the matter of Dinners club India (p) 
ltd. Anr anv. (1992) 3 Comp. L J 54; Z> (7 v . Indian photo-
graphic company ltd (1992) 3 comp. L.J 181; In the matter 
of Dalmia Dairy Industries ltd (1992) 3. comp L J 304; In 
the matter of G T C Industries ltd Bombay (1993) 2 comp. LJ 
109. 
227. Ibid. 
228. Rosy Kumar opines : All In all, the judgment of the full 
Bench has come as a rude shock which has the effect of 
perpetuating the wrong and the effect of putting a blanket 
ban on the promotional scheme while the legislature has 
never so contemplated. See Rosy Kumar Promotional Schemes 
Banned By The MRTP Commission; Law Permits But The Commis-
sion Does Not, Comp. L Digest, (1991) sept (xxi) at 17. On 
the other hand S. S H Azmi concludes: The decision of MRTP 
Commission in society for civic Rights is fair so far as it 
affirms that such practices are unfair per se. These prac-
tices have been declared void or illegal by industrialised 
and Civilised countries of the world because they are neith-
er fair to business community nor are in public interest See 
S. S H Azmi, A Critique On Society For Civic Rights v. 
Colgate Palmolive (India) ltd 34 JILI (1992) 137. 
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It Is submitted that the opinion of the commission needs rethink-
ing for the following reasons. 
The Sach^r Committee on whose recommendations, the chapt-
er on unfair trade practices was incorporated did not suggest the 
key phrase "and thereby causes loss or injury in the pream-ble of 
the tiefinition. Instead, following exceptions were suggested 
which were borrowed from section 37. 2 of the Combines Investiga-
tion Act of Canada. 
(a) there is adequate and fair disclosure of the number and 
approximate value of the prizes, of the area or areas 
to which they relate and of any fact within the knowl-
edge of the advertiser that effects materially the 
chance of winning. 
(b) distribution of prizes is not unduly delayed; and 
(c) selection of participants or distribution of prizes is 
made on the basis of skill or on random basis in any 
area to which prices have been allocated. 
These exceptions did not find favour with parliament when 
MRTP Act was amended in order to incorporate a chapter on unfair 
trade practices in the Act. Instead, key phrase "and thereby 
cause loss or injury to the consumer" was inserted so as to make 
it a criterion to determine the nature of all trade practices. 
Not only this alone, even if the key phrase is dismissed simply 
by saying that it is a legislative style or device of making it 
known why it regards a trade practice unfair, section 36 D of the 
MRTP Act enjoins the commission to pass any of the orders under 
229. The Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on,Companies 
And MRTP Acts (popularly known as sachar committees Report) 
at 272. 
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that section only when it is of the opinion that the practice in 
question is "prejudicial to the public interest or to the inter-
est of any consumer or consumers generally" This phrase is wider 
than "thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers" Thus sec-
tion 36 D also requires the rule of reason and not perse ap-
proach. 
With respect to restrictive trade practices enumerated in 
section 33 of the MRTP Act, the MRTP commission adopted per se 
approach which was over ruled by the supreme court in TAA Engi-
neering Ji locomotive Co ltd. v. R R T A^^^ anfll reaffirmed in 
Mahindra £ Mahindra ltd v. Union of India^^^. In order to obviate 
the effect of the supreme courts rulings and to restore per se 
restrictive character of the trade practices, parliament amended 
MRTP Act in the same year in which a chapter on unfair trade 
practices was incorporated in the Act. Had legislature intended 
to adopt per se approach in case of the unfair trade practices 
also "the phrase there by causes loss or injury to the consumer" 
would not have found place^-^^. 
The then Minister of Law, justice And Company Affairs Shri 
Jagan Nath Kaushal, while introducing MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 
in the parliament made clear that the High powered expert 
230. A I R 1977 Sc 973. 
231. A I R 1979 Sc 798. 
232. Farooq Ahmad, Unfair trade Practices: An Appriasal Of The 
Legal Control 2 KULR (1995) at 96. 
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committee had even suggested that these practices should be 
straightaway declared as illegal and any person taking recourse 
to these practices should be prosecuted. Considering the fact 
that these are comparatively new provisions and proper adminis-
trative machinery has to be geared up to track down the viola-
tions throughout the length and breadth o£ this vast country, it 
is felt it would be enough if, at least for the time being, they 
are regulated by issuinj^of prohibitory orders and orders for pay-
ment of compensation for loss or damage suffered by the consumer 
and punishment by way of imprisonment enjoined upon only if those 
prohibitory orders are violated •^•'. 
It is submitted that the correct proposition of law is in 
the dissenting opinion of H C Gupta (Member) when he says that it 
is well nigh impossible to contemplate and conceive all type of 
situations which may fall under any of the enumerated categories. 
It is for this purpose that the legislature seems to have taken 
care to include the ingredient of the actual inherent harm to the 
consumers as an essential element of an unfair trade practice. It 
is indisputable that the consideration which would apply to a 
contest in the nature of lottery are necessarily different from 
those which will apply to a pure game of skill. Even though the 
latter is also organised for promoting directly or indirectly the 
sale, use or supply of any product without much element of chance 
233. Lok Sabh Debates, Vol. 48 (7.5.84) : 412. 
210 
or gambling instinct. Normally no business house or manufactureV^ 
seller of a product would coriduct even a game of skill with out 
the intention of promoting 3t least indirectly, the sale or 
supply of his product. While the inherent loss or injury by 
eliminating or restricting dompetition to the consumer of the 
product is present in a cas^ of lottery or game of chance, it 
cannot be said to be so in a pure game of skill. Therefore game 
of pure skill organised by the manufacturer of a product will not 
be per se "OTiiaix txade pxactit:^ iv. t^xms oi s«.ctiGi:\ 1% '^h.^ MP.L«.as 
on the facts of the case it is held that the loss or injury to 
23 4 the consumers is inherent in it 
To say that the contest ceases to be innocent if it is held 
for the purpose of promoting the sale or the business interest of 
the organizer of that contest is not, it is submitted, the cor-
rect proposition of the law. The objective of section 36 A is not 
to prevent promotion of sale, use or supply of goods by organiz-
ing contest but to prevent such contests which cause or have 
potential to cause loss or injury to the consumers or where loss 
out weighes the gain. Thus for example if tooth paste dealer 
through advertisement invites essays from the consumers of close-
up and it is mentioned in the advertisement that the author of 
an ej^y rated number one will be given one lakh. Is such contest 
prohibited under section 36-A? Is loss or injury inherent in such 
234. Supra note 220 at 391 
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practice? It is submitted that the enumerated practices in sec-
tion 36 A may be classified in to two general categories. The 
representations where plaintiff consumer has to establish only 
falsity. Such practices can conveniently be called as per se 
unfair. They do not require separate proof of loss or injury. 
Unthruth is inherently deceptive. But in addition to these, there 
are representations which require proof of actual or potential 
loss or injury to the consumer and mere fact that they resemble 
with the one enumerated in section 36 A will not be sufficient. 
Despite the Full Bench decision of the MRTP Commission In Colgate 
case and then a good number of the decisions toeing the same 
line, this controversy did not die down. In M/s Aroza contractors 
and Builders private the respondent an agent of the Ansal 
properties and Industries pvt. ltd. had announced prizes such as 
Maruti car, Vijay scooter and Refrigerator to be given to those 
persons who booked the plots through the respondent. Every person 
whosoever booked the plot was given a coupon enabling him to 
participate in the prizes which were drawn through random basis 
technique. Since the present case was heard by a Division Bench 
so it was not possible for them to overrule the decision of the 
Colgate case, handed down by the Full Bench. So without over-
ruling Colgate case, the commission In the present judgment tried 
to distinguish It from the former case. It was observed: 
We have carefully examined the above decision (of the 
Full Bench In Colgate case) and Its implications. It 
must,however, be remembered that before a cease and 
desist order may be passed under 
235. (1994) C T J 64 (MRTP). 
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section 36 D (i), it has to be affirmatively proved 
that the impugned trade practice is prejudicial to the 
public interest of any consumer or consumers generally. 
This, in our opinion, is an independent requirement of 
Law. It is note worthy that while in regard to restric-
tive trade practices there is a presumption under 
section 38 of the MRTP Act that such a trade practice 
is prejudicial to public interest, there is no such 
corresponding presumption available in respect to the 
unfair trade practice. Further in Colgate Palmolive 
the Full Bech was concerned solely with the interpreta-
tion of section 36 A (1), more particularly the conno-
tation of the words "and thereby, causeSloss or 
injury". The implication of section 36 D (1) was neith-
er considered nor even argued. That being so, condi-
tions necessary for. the application of section 36 D (1) 
must be present and satisfied before a cease and desist 
order be passed. 
It needs mention here that the amendments were made in the 
MRTP and CP Acts in the year 1991 and 1993 respectively. The 
preamble of the unfair trade practice definition reads now: 
In this part, unless context otherwise requires, unfair 
trade practice is a trade practice which for the pur-
pose of the sale, use or supply of goods adopted any 
unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including 
any of the following practices. 
In the opinion of the MRTP commission expressed through DG 
V. Cement corporation of Gujarat^-^^ the only change brought by 
the amendments is that the Colgate case got statutory recognition 
that is, show of loss or injury to the consumer is now no more 
required. It is submitted that this is not correct. New defini-
tion is based on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
1914 of America as amended by Wheeler Lea Amendment Act. The 
courts in United States while interpreting section 5 made it 
clear that to determine whether a trade practice is or is not 
236. (1992) 2 comp L J 323 at 327. 
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unfair one, loss or injury to consumer is a real test. However, 
courts made it clear that it is not necessary that consumer must 
have suffered actual loss but potential of a trade practice to 
cause loss to consumer is sufficient to declare such trade prac-
tice as unfair^^^^. 
In America the accepted policy with respect to the gifts as 
a methods of pricing, merchandising and advertising is dictated 
by the following propositions. (1) There should not be any gener-
al prohibition of gifts. (2) The offeror should, however, be re-
quired to make full disclosure of the details of his offer, by 
fulfilling all terms and conditions of sale including premiums or 
9 3 7 free deals . A New York court while commenting on a statute 
design to prevent price cutting in the sale of food stuff by 
prohibiting the giving of premiums or gifts in connection with 
the sale, said, " a person engaged as a retailer of coffee might 
very well think that he could greatly enlarge the amount of his 
trade by doing precisely what was done by the defendant in this 
case, and that, while his profits on the same amount of the 
coffee sold would be smaller than if he gave no present yet, by 
the growth of his trade his income at the end of the year would 
be more than by the old method^^^. 
236a.See for instance FTC V. Hires Turner Glass co, 81 F 2d 362 
.(1935) Cf. FTC V. Blame, 23 F.2d 615 n (1928) ; FTC V.RF 
Keppel & Bro. 29 Us 304 (1934); FTC V. Algoma lumber co, 
291 US 67 (1934). 
237. Radolf Callmann, The law of Unfair competition. Trade Marks 
and Monopolies (3rd ed 1971) vol at 1045. 
238. People v. Gilson, 109 NY 389 (1988). 
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Conunenting on the approach of the Federal Trade Commission 
of America on the gift scheme as a sales promotion device, Rudolf 
Callmann observes: 
In fact a genuine gift can be a legitimate method of 
advertising. It differs from other advertisements in 
the sense that the consumer is the beneficiary who 
really gets some thing for nothing. We concluded that a 
gift is lawful if it is a real gift, not given with an 
illegal intent to "injury a competitor out of business. 
Indeed/ this would rarely be one purpose of a gift; one 
who offers a gift or premium is more interested in 
increasing his own business than injuring his competi-
tor . 
On the other hand in case of lotteries United States supreme 
239 
court has in Federal Trade Coauaission v. K. F. Keppel S Bros. 
through justice Holmes, held that the public policy requires the 
condemnation of devices which appeal to the gambling instinct, 
and induce people to buy what they do not want by a promise of 
gift or price, the nature of which is not known at the moment of 
9 40 
making purchase . However, courts have carefully distinguished 
between cases in which the customer has and those in which he has 
239. 291 US 304, 1934. for critical assessment see 32. Mich D 
Rev. 1142, in post Pub Co v. Murray, 230 F773 CCA 1st, 1916 
a news paper advertised that its photographers would take 
pictures of 50 women shoppers. The faces would be blacked 
out in the publication, and any woman who could identify 
here picture would receive a $5 gold pieces. This was not 
held an illegal advertisement but one that sought to catch 
the eye and increase the circulation of news paper. 
240. Rttdolf callmann opines that a lottery which induces prospec 
tive customers to view the display of its sponsor and which 
attracts attention to his product does immediate injury to 
his competitors. From a competitor point of view, therefore, 
consideration in a lottery is not only an insignificant 
element, but its absence even renders the game device much 
more effective in attracting attention. 
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not paid a consideration. The gratuitous distribution of property 
by lot or chance if no consideration is derived directly or 
indirectly from the party receiving the chance, does not consti-
tute a lottery^^^. 
In England as already pointed out that the Lotteries and 
Amusements Act, 1976 declares all lotteries as unlawful. Since 
there is no definition of the term "lottery", in the Act, the 
courts have made it clear that where a person is asked to "hit 
blind shots on the hidden target"^ ^^  or to guess what would be the 
guess of others, such practices are lotteries. But any kind of 
skill or dexterity whether bodily or mental in which persons can 
compete would prevent a scheme from being a lottery if the result 
depended party upon such skill or dexterity . Section 14(b) of 
the lotteries and Amusement Act prohibits any competition in 
which success does not depend to a substantial degree on the 
exercise of skill. On the other hand where no payment or contri-
bution is made by the participants, although the result depends 
upon the chance, yet such lottery is not prohibited^^^. 
2il.Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F 2d 958 (CCA 1st, 1936) 
quoting from 17 RCL 1222. 
242.Coles v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1935) All ER Rep 598 per lord 
Hewart CJ. 
243.Supra note 195 and 196. 
244. Wjite Bread and Co Ltd. v. Bell, (1970)2 All ER 64. 
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In Canada there is general censure to offering of 
prizes or gifts or holding of the contest, lottery, game of a 
chance or skill but this is subject to some exceptions ap-
pended to section 3.7 of the Combines Investigation Act. 
These exception are the same as suggested by the Sachar 
Comroittee^^^ but were not incorporated in MRTP Act. 
Thus from the above discussion on transboder laws 
following points emerge. 
1. Offering of gifts or prizes genuinely, are 
not prohibited. 
2. Lotteries are against public policy and, 
' therefore proscribed. 
3. Lotteries which do not directly or indirectly 
demand public subscription are permitted. 
4. Lotteries which run on the finance raised by 
the public subscription and which involve 
skill to a substantial degree are not in fact 
lotteries but game of skill, hence permitted. 
It is suggested that the above tests should be applied 
by the MRTP Commission and consumer Redressal Agencies to 
determine the real nature of the advertisement. These tests 
naturally do not admit the per se approach but rule of rea-
son. 
245. Supra note 292 
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C300DS I N V O L V I N G R I S K O F I N J U R Y 
The practice of marketing shoddy goods is rampant in India. 
The censure in such practice lies in the fact that the consumer 
is duped sometimes to the tune of his payment and he does not get 
even money's worth. The present day consumer is also exposed to 
risks by purchasing goods which endanger his life and property. 
Increasing affluence and range of complex consumer products 
combine to produce the all too prevalent situation in which 
unsafe products can produce death or serious injury. Sometimes 
the danger arises from defective design, at others, from the use 
of defective materials or poor workmanship. At other times haz-
ards are created simply because inadequate instructions (or none 
at all) are given for the operation of complex appliances^ °. So 
the fleecing of consumer by taking his money in lieu of the sub-
standard product is a lesser evil. The greater evil which needs 
immediate attention is to prevent the market from being flooded 
by the goods which involve risk of injury as these goods are 
double edged. They claim not only money but life or property as 
well. The MRTp247 ^^^ ^p ^cts^^^ have a provision to deal with 
such goods. This provision runs as under: 
Permits the sale or supply of goods intended to be 
used, or are of kind likely to be used by consum-
ers, knowing, or having reasons to believe that the 
goods do not comply with the standards prescribed 
246.' Supra note at 718. 
247. Section 36 A(4). 
248. Section 2 (r)(4) . 
218 
by competent authority relating to performance, 
compositions, contents, design, construction fin-
ishing or packaging as are necessary to prevent or 
reduce the risk of injury to the persons using the 
goods. 
This provision is ambiguously worded, it is not made clear 
as to who is answerable to the consumer in case he is Injured by 
using those goods. The words "permits the sale or supply of 
goods", if construed narrowly make the seller responsible to the 
consumer but the words "knowing or having reason to believe" 
absolves him from any responsibility in cases where goods have 
been supplied by the manufacturer which do not call for any 
examination or which are sold in the same package in which manu-
facturer had suppiied^^^. As elaborated by Clerk J in a Scottish 
case of Gordon v. M Hatrdjp- wherein the plaintiff's son died due 
to eating tinned salmon : the grocer could not be held liable for 
the defects in the goods because he was not expected to examine 
the contents of the tin without destroying the very condition 
which the manufacturer had imposed, in order to preserve the 
contents "the tin not being intended to be opened until imme-
diately before use". 
249. S. S. H. Azmi opines : The modern mode of packaging of the 
goods is so complicated that the manufacturer intends and 
insists that the goods be opened only at the time of con-
sumption and the packaging should not be disturbed unless 
the goods are required for actual use. This is done partly 
to avoid adulteration of the standard products and partly 
due to the reasons that certain packages are airtight. In 
otherwords, the possibility of intermediate examination is 
excluded. Sale of Goods And Consumer Protection in India 
(1st ed. 1992) at 77. 
250. 1903 6f (Cf. of cess), 210. 
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On the other hand it may be argued that it is the manufac-
turer who basically permitted sale or supply of the goods and 
therefore, it is he who should bear the brunt. In his defence it 
may be put that since he was not a party to the deal with consum-
er so his liability does not arise. 
It needs mention here that at the global level there has 
been a shift in the legal policy and now manufacturer is consid-
ered the right person to foot the bill. He is in a position to 
distribute the loss equitably and to cover the risk through 
insurance. As laid down in Henning Sen v. Bloom field Motors 
The burden of losses consequent upon use of defective 
article is borne by those who are in a position to 
either control the danger or make an equitable distri-
bution of the losses when they do occur. 
Need to hold manufacturer liable is well highlighted by the 
Law Reform Commission of New South Wales that it has come to 
be recognised that in the modern world where brand images and 
sales promotion by gimmickry or direct advertising on a nation 
wide scale are an accepted feature of every day life. It is the 
manufacturer who plays the vital role in persuading the consumer 
251. 32 NJ 358.161 A 2d 69; In Escola v. Cola Bottling Co.24 Cal. 
2d 453. Traynor J says that the manufacturer is in the best 
position to distribute the loss equitably arising due to 
preparation of faulty product. He can take out risk in-
surance and include it in the cost. 
252. Working paper on the Sale of Goods (1975), para 63. Cf. John 
Goldring and Mark Richardson; liability Of Manufacturers For 
Defective Goods ALJ Vol5, March 1977 at 127. 
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to purchase his product. Many consumer goods are today sold in 
sealed containers which defy inspection or if available for 
examination, are so complex and of such intricate design that an 
inspection would convey nothing about their quality to the aver-
age purchaser ... the consumer is therefore driven to rely on the 
advice of traders and the accuracy of advertisement extolling the 
product he seeks. He relies more and more heavily on the manufac-
turer (on the brand name promoted by extensive advertising) and 
yet the sale is not normally made through him, but through some 
retail firm. The manufacturer can make what extravagant claims he 
likes for his product but he will be under no contractual liabil-
ity to the purchaser for these promises, unless he can be brought 
within the Carlil v. carbolic Smoke Ball Co. pr inciple'^ -'-'. 
In England, the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, replacing the 
Consumer Safety Act, 1978 has incorporated a wide definition of " 
producer" which gives the injured consumer a visible and accessi-
ble target"^^^. This definition runs as follows: 
253.' In the same vein Ontoria Law Commission observed. In modern 
marketing millieu, the manufacturer is responsible for put-
ting his product in the stream of commerce in most cases for 
creating demand for them by continuous advertising. The 
retailer is a little more than a way station. He determines 
the material and components and controls the quality of the 
goods. He determines the guarantee for his customers and is 
responsible for the spare parts and service 
facilities.Almost all the consumer's knowledge about the 
goods is delivered from the labels or markings attached to 
the goods or sales. Literature that accompanies them — and 
these two originate from the manufacturer, report of Consum-
er Warranties and Guarantees In the sale of Goods, Toronto, 
June 1972 Chapter V. Para 19. 
254. See comment on the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, New L.J. 2 
October, 1987 at 930. 
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Producer of a product means: 
a. the person who manufactured it; 
b. in case of a substance which has not been manu-
factured but has been won or abstracted; the 
person who won or abstracted it; 
c. In case of a product which has not been manufac-
tured, won or attributable to an industrial or 
other process having been carried out (for 
example in relation to agricultural)the person 
who carried out that process. 
Although the definition of producer is not free from 
ambiguities, yet it has made manufacturer directly liable. Anoth-
er salient feature of the Act is the incorporation of strict 
rather than fault based liability in respect of the loss caused 
by defective products. Existing tort and contract remedies remain 
available, but are now supplemented by a new conceptual structure 
which focuses primarily on the condition of a product rather than 
the conduct of a producer^^^. 
In India the tortious liability, like that of section 402 
of American (Second) Restatement of Tort, 1965 is based on strict 
liability. This rule was followed in a different context in M C 
Mehta V. Union of India^^'^, but the MRTP and CP Acts have not 
255. Section 1(2) . 
256. Alistair d a r k ; Legislation, The Consumer Protection 
Act, 1987 Vol. 60 MLR 614. 
257. the Supreme Court held: We are of the view that an enter-
prise which is engaged in the hazardous or inherently dan-
gerous industry which has a potential threat to the health 
and safety of the persons working in the factory and resid-
ing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non dele-
gable duty to community to ensure that no harm results to 
any one on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous 
nature of activity which it has undertaken A.I.R (1987) Sc. 
1086. 
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gone further. The compensation to consumer under these enactments 
can be awarded only when the opposite Party is found negligent. 
The liability of the respondent arises only when his goods 
do not correspond with the standards prescribed by the competent 
authority and such goods involve risk of injury. The MRTP Act 
does not provide the constitution of any competent authority nor 
declares any authority competent for such purpose. The CP Act on 
the other hand gives Power^^® to the district forum inter alia to 
remove the defect^^^ pointed out by the "appropriate laboratory" 
2S 0 from the goods in question. The term appropriate laboratory^ 
has been defined in the Act itself and a list of appropriate 
261 laboratories has been circulated by the Government of India : 
However, neither in the MRTP Act nor in CP Act is prescribed any 
standard which the regulatory agencies have to follow. The bureau 
of Indian standards Act, 1986 gives power to the bureau to grant, 
renew, suspend or cancel licence for the use of the standard 
Mark'"'. The issue of licence or its 
258. Section 14. 
259. The word defect has been defined in section 2(f) of the CP 
Act as any fault, imperfection or short comings in the 
quality, quantity, potency, purity or standard which is 
required to be maintained by or under any law for the time 
being in force or as is claimed by the trader in any manner 
whatsoever in relation to any goods. 
260. The appropriate laboratory means a laboratory or organisa 
tion recognised by the Central Government and includes any 
such laboratory or organisation established by or under any 
law for the time being in force which is maintained, fi-
nanced or aided by the Central Government or a State Govern-
ment for carrying out analysis or test of any goods with a 
view to determine whether such goods suffer from any defect. 
261. Vide circular letter No. D. O.No. 10/39/87-CPU, dated 1st. 
June, 1988. 
262. Section 10. 
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renewal depends upon as to whether the manufacturer complies with 
the bureau of Indian Standards Certification Mark. However non 
compliance does not stamp the goods as perse hazardous nor is it 
compulsory that all the goods shall conform to the requirement of 
certification Mark^°-'. 
In Australia the trade practices (Amendment) Act (No.2) 1977 
through section 63 A A empowers the Minister for Business and 
Consumer Affairs to publish through notice in the Common wealth 
Gazette that in respect of goods of a kind specified in the 
notice, a particular standard prepared or approved by the stan-
dards Association of Australia is a consumer product standard for 
the purposes of sections 62 and 63. These standards have been 
classified in to safety standard and information standard. Sec-
tion 62 (2) which is partly based on United States Consumer Pro-
ducts Safety Act, 1972, provides that the safety standards must 
relate to 
a) performance, composition, contents, design, 
construction, finish or packing of the goods; 
and 
b) the form and content of markings, warnings or 
instructions to accompany the goods. 
Which are reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce risk of 
injury to persons issuing the goods or to any other person. 
263. The provisions of section 11 of the Bureau of Indian Stan-
dards Act, 1986 prohibits use in relation to any article or 
process, or in the title of any patent or in any trade mark 
of design, the standard mark or any colourable limitation 
except under a licence. The licence is necessary only for 
those manufacturers who wish to use standard mark. 
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Section 63(2) provides that the regulation may in respect of 
goods of a particular kind, prescribe a consumer product informa-
tion standard consisting of such requirements as to --
a) the disclosure of information relating to the 
performance, composition, contents, design, 
construction finish or packaging of the goods; 
and 
b) the form and manner in which that information 
is to be disclosed on or with the goods, 
as are reasonably necessary to give person using the goods 
accurate information as to the quality, quantity, nature or value 
of the goods. 
The contravention of these regulations subject to the excep-
tions is pu>\1^ )n<3t.ble on conviction by a fine not exceeding $ 1000 
and in case of defendant who is a body corporate, by a fine not 
exceeding $50, 000. 
It is suggested that in order to minimize the danger which 
the hazardous goods are likely to pose, an independent body be 
constituted with the powers to prescribe standards on the same 
lines as are prescribed in Australia. The MRTP Commission and 
Redressal Agencies be given power to enforce such standards and 
violation if any, be checked by imposing fine. 
Since the "risk of injury" is the core test under the pres-
ent provision to prohibit a trade practice, it is not clear as to 
whether it is confined to only physical injury or injury of any 
sort. The MRTP commission expressed conflicting opinions on this 
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point. In public Interest issues research Academy v. KMP oil 
Industries pvt. Ltd^^^. the respondent engaged in the business of 
marketing coconut oil, packed it in volumetric measures in terms 
of liters and mililiters, contrary to the Standards of Weights 
and Measures (packaged commodities) Rules, 1977 where under it 
had to be packed by weight interms of grams and kilograms and 
therefore, caused wrongful loss to the consumer to the tune of 10 
per cent quantity of oil. The commission held that it violated 
clause (4) of section 36 A of the Act. 
2 6 5 On the other hand In re food specialities ltd. • , the 
commission held that if non compliance with the standards pre-
scribed causes only financial loss and does not involve the risk 
of physical injury, it does not amount to an unfair trade prac-
tice within the meaning of section 36 A (4) of the MRTP Act, 
1969. The sale of a package containing contents less than what is 
mentioned on the container may amount to contravention of the 
Standard of Weights and Measures (ij^ ftciMq^  •wnmnmrtiti •§!> Act or 
rules thereunder,but the implementation of the said Act or rules 
is not within the jurisdiction of the commission unless there is 
an unfair trade practice within the meaning of section 36 A of 
the MRTP Act. 
It is submitted that it is the former and not the latter 
opinion of the commission which is the correct interpretation of 
264. UTPE No.40 1986 order dated 17.12.1987. 
265. (1991) 70 Comp. Cas. 565. 
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the provision. The Bombay High court in Abdul Kadar v, Kashi-
nattp-^^ held that the word" injury" is a word of large import and 
cannot be restricted to mean monetary injury only any wrong or 
damage done to another, either in his person, right, reputation 
or property. The supreme court in a recent ruling of Consumer 
Unity and Trust Society v. the CMD Bank of Bazoda and Anir 
held: loss is a generic term. It signifies some detriment or 
26 8 deprivation or damage. Injury too means any damage or wrong 
Thus the word injury cannot be confined to physical injury only 
9 6 9 
but includes monetary loss as well . 
266. AIR 1968 Bom. 267 at 270. 
267. (1995) 3 CTJ 97 (Supreme Court) CP 
268. Id. at 99. 
269. Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code defines injury as any 
harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind 
reputation or property. 
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POWERS OF THE 
MRTP COMMISSION 
ViS-A-ViS 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 
E>OWEX^ T O GE^AlSrr I N J U l S I C m O N 
Injunctive relief is a product of equity courts and the 
object is "to lock the stable door before the horse is stolen"-'-. 
The injunction as a preventive remedy is invoked where either a 
wrong is being done or there is a reasonable likelihood that an 
injurious act already begun will continue. Although all the 
legislations aiming to protect consumer interest have the provi-
sion for injunction^, this relief was not available under origi-
nal MRTP Act/ 1969. Interestingly the provision dealing with the 
grant of injunction was incorporated in the year 1984 in which 
the chapter on unfair trade practice was introduced, on the 
recommendations of the Sachar Committee. The Committee observed 
that it is possible that the commission may in some cases be of 
the opinion that prime facie the trade practice in question 
should not continue, but commission cannot stop such practices as 
it has no power to pass interim injunction which is a serious 
1. United Drug Co v. Pazodney, 2 4 F 2d 577 (DCE) 
2. For instance, section 80 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 
of Australia, section 16 of the Clayton Act, 1914 of USA and 
section 3 of the Restrictive Trade Practice Act, 1976" of 
England. 
3. It was said: There is no power at present with the commis-
sion to pass any order of interim injunction. It may happen 
that a matter is brought before the commission and prima 
facie the commission is of the view that such practice 
should not be allowed to continue during the pendency of 
inquiry. But at present there is no power to issue any 
interim injunction. This is a serious lacuna. We would 
therefore, recommend that the commission should have the 
power, on the application of the Director General of trade 
practices, the Central Govt. State Govt., or any other 
aggrieved person, to grant an interim injunction restraining 
any person from engaging in or continuing with any of the 
prohibited practices... Report of the High Powered Expert 
Committee on Companies and MRTP Act (Popularly known as 
Sachar Committee) 1978 at 274. 
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lacuna in the Act. On the recommendations of the Sachar Commit-
tee, section 12(A) was carved out to provide provision for in-
junction . Ever since the incorporation of provision dealing with 
the injunction, the MRTP Commission has received a plethora of 
applications for the grant of injunctive relief as is revealed by 
the following table. 
TABLE : I 
Statement showing year-wise Institution, disposal and pending 
number of injunction applications U/s 12A of the MRTP Act. 
Year Applications Applications Applications Applications 
pending at received disposed of pending at 
the beginning during the during the the end of 
of the year year year year 
25 18 7 
71 33 45 
116 97 64 
162 136 90 
66 78 78 
81 63 96 
58 78 76 
81 70 97 
149 63 183 
The 15th-23rd Annual Report Pertaining to the Execution 
of the provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practice's Act, 1969 for the period from 1st Jan,, 
1985 to 31st December, 1993. After 1993 till date no 
Report has been Published. 
SectioB 12. i|i) reads as: vheie, dariog aa inquiry before tke coulssioo It Is proved vhetber by the 
coiplaUaDt, Director Geaeral, any trader or class of traders or any other person, by affidavit or 
othernisei that any aodertakiog or aoy person is carrying on or is about to cany on any lonopollstic 
or any restrictive or onfair trade practice and such . -.. trade practice is likely 
to affect prejadicially the pobllc interest or the interest of any trader, class of traders or traders 
generally or of any consnier or consniers generally, the couissioo lay for the purposes of staying or 
preventing the aodertaking or as the case tay be, such person froi causing sach prejudicial effect, by 
order, grant a temporary injunction restraining such undertaking or person froi carrying on any lonop-
ollstlc or restrictive or unfair, trade practices until the conclusion of such Inquiry or until fur-
ther orders. 
(2) The provisions of rules 2A to 5 (both inclusive of order xxxix of the First Schedule) of the Code 
Of Procedure, IJflJ (5 of 1501) shall as far as lay be, apply to a temporary injunction, issued by 
the cociission under this section, as they apply to a tenporary injunction issued by a civil court, 
and any reference to any such rule to a suit shall be construed as a reference to an inquiry before 
the couission. 
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1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
SOURCE : 
Nil 
7 
45 
64 
90 
78 
96 
76 
97 
; The 
The remedy of injunctive relief can be provided only when 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. that there is an inquiry before the MRTP conunission. 
2. during that inquiry it is proved whether by the 
complainant. Director General, any trader or class 
of traders or any other person, by affidavit or 
otherwise, that any undertaking or any person is 
carrying on or about to carry on any monopolistic or 
restrictive or unfair trade practice. 
3. that such a trade practice is likely to affect 
prejudicially the public interest or the interest of 
any trader, class of traders or any consumer or 
consumers generally. 
The controversy rolled round the fact that what is meant by 
"during an inquiry before the commission"? Conflicting opinions 
were expressed on this point. The Gujarat High Court in f/im Co 
Ltd. V. Liberty Match Co and Ors observed that section 12(A) 
envisages the making of an application for an injunction during 
an inquiry before the commission. In other words, the inquiry 
must be pending before such an application can be submitted. 
These words postulate that before an interlocutory injunction can 
be granted by the commission, the Pre-requisite is pending in-
quiry. The inquiry itself must arise independent of the prayer 
for an interlocutory injunction^. 
5. (1991) 70 Comp cas. 620. 
6. Id at 632. 
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Following its earlier decision in Eagle Flask Pvt. Ltd. v. 
Union of India^ , the Division Bench of Bombay High court -in 
Milton Plastic v. Union of India^, came in agreement with the 
Gujarat High court by invoking Regulation 50 of the MRTPC Regula-
g 
tions, 1991. In the opinion of the court the said Regulation 
makes it clear that when the commission is of the opinion that 
there are sufficient grounds to issue a process, such process 
shall be issued and it will be called notice of inquiry. Thus the 
inquiry before the Commission begins with the issue of notice of 
inquiry. 
Another Division Bench of the Bombay High court in M P 
Ramachandran v. Union of India^^, without expressly rejecting the 
opinion expressed in Milton plastic (Supra), tried to interpret 
its ratio in such a way as to serve its own purpose. The court 
laid down that the Division Bench in Milton plastic did not say 
that the enquiry will conmience only after the service of the 
notice of inquiry. There are many situations where the term 
"issue" would envisage not merely passing of the order and 
keeping it in the drawer but actual communication of the 
service to the parties concerned. Nevertheless, this principle is 
7. Write petition No. 3516 of 1987 Now. 18, 1987. 
8. (1992) 2 Bom. LR; (1994) 4 Comp. L J 112. 
9. Regulation 50 runs as follows: If on receipt of a Complaint, 
reference or application or information under clause (a) of 
section 10 of the Act and on consideration of any evidence or 
record or a preliminary investigation report, if any, the 
commission is of the opinion that there are sufficient grounds 
to issue a process, such a process shall be issued and it will 
be called notice of inquiry. 
10. (1993) 77 Comp. Cas 54. 
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not attracted in the present case. What is material, is a deci-
sion of the Commission about the prima facie satisfaction of the 
existence of grounds for entertainment of the complaint. It will 
not be in the interest of the consumers to hold that the Commis-
sion is duty bound to issue a notice of inquiry before passing an 
injunction order^. 
It is submitted that the opinions of Gujarat and Bombay (in 
Milton Plastic's Case) High Courts are open to question for the 
follow reasons: 
a. The very purpose of providing a provision for injunc 
tion is to prevent imminence of a wrong or the con-
tinuance of the wrong already perpetrated. As wilbi-
force in Hoffmm La Roche (£) £ Co. v. Secretary of 
State for Trade Industry-^ puts it, "the object of an 
interlocutory injunction is to prevent a litigant, 
who must necessarily suffer the law's delay, from 
losing by that delay, the fruit of his litigation. 
This objective will be frustrated by the rulings of 
the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts 
b. A false or misleading advertisement generally remains 
current for a limited period. The period during which 
this advertisement will remain in force, will be con-
sumed first by lodging a complaint and then filing a 
separate application for temporary injunction as 
envisaged in the above said opinions and when thie 
turn of issuing an injunction will come, the trader 
maVJ discontinue the practice and thus will make 
injunction futile. 
c. The Bombay High Court misinterpreted Regulation 50. 
The said Regulation in so many words makes its clear 
that the notice of enffui^ TVshall be issued where the 
commission required the attendance of the person or 
persons complained. It never says that the inquiry 
11. Id at 61; MRTP Commission in voice and IFCO v. ITC Ltd also 
came in agreement with the Bombay High courts opinion in M P 
Ramachandrans (1995) 1 Comp.L J 235 
12. (1975) AC 295, 355 (House of Lords). 
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before the conunission begins with the issuing of a notice 
of inquiry as articulated in the opinion, instead o£ 
Regulation 50, it is Regulation 17 which is applicable. It 
may be noted that under Regulation 17 of the MRTP Regula-
tions, 1991 the commission may, on receipt of a complaint, 
reference, application or information, or as the case may 
be, on its own knowledge under section 36B, order a pre-
liminary investigation by the Director General and Rec|ula-
tion 17(2) provides that the order of investigation by the 
commission under sub-regulation shall be deemed to be the 
commencement of inquiry under the Act. 
Thus the proper interpretation of section 12-A on this 
matter would be, that the sooner the commission issues a notice 
of inquiry, either suo motu or on the application of any person, 
the inquiry is deemed to have started. It would not be wrong to 
stretch this theory a little more by stating that when a com-
plaint is filed, the commission is seized of the matter, the 
inquiry starts^-^. 
The above view may appear, impinging the principles of 
natural justice by not giving respondent an opportunity to put 
1 5 his view point as lord Up John in Duzayappah v. Fernanado 
opines: 
While great urgency may rightly limit such opportun-
ity, there can never be a denial of that opportuni-
ty, if the principles of natural justice are appli-
cable^^. 
13. Venkata; Injunctions Under The MRTP Act: Some Aspects 1985 1 
Comp LJ 30 at 31. 
14. R Santhanam in his article "Injunction Orders By MRTP Com-
mission," (1986) 3 Comp LJ 91 opines that hearing should be 
given to the respondent before passing an ad interim injunc-
tion. 
15. (1967) 2 AC AC 337.. 
16. Id at 346 see also swadeshi cotton Mills v. Union of India 
(1981) 51 Comp cas 210. 
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Further, the Supreme Court has frowned any attempt to take 
away any fundamental right to carry on business and has made it 
imperative for the authority concerned to give a proper, fair, 
judicious and adequate opportunity of being heard to the person 
n befdre depriving him of the right to carry on business-^'. 
However, the Supreme Court did not find it advisable to 
place principles of natural justice in the strait jackets, in-
stead opined in Nagendra Nath Bora and Ant v. Commissioner of 
hills Division^^, that the rules of natural justice vary with the 
varying constitutions of statutory bodies, and the rules pre-
scribed by the Act under which they function and the question 
whether or not any rule of natural justice had been contravened, 
should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the 
light of the statutory rules and provisions. 
Not only this alone, section I2A(2) clearly states that rules 
2A to 5 (both inclusive) of Order xxxix of the First Schedule to 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall as far as may be, apply 
to a temporary injunction, issued by the commission under this 
section. Rule 3 of Order xxxix. Civil Procedure Code gives dis-
cretion to the MRTP commission to pass an ex parte ad interim 
injunction where delay in issuing the same will defeat the very 
17. See State of Punjab v. Cardial Sing AIR SC 319 see also Dora 
Phalanli v. State of Punjab and Ors AIR 1979 SC 1594; 
Narain Govind Garate v. State of Maharashtra Ors AIR 1977 SC 
183, Keshav Mills Corporation v. Union of India (1973) 
3SGR22. 
18. AIR 1958 SC 398. 
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purpose. Thus the MRTP commission took a rightful stand in DG v. 
Shantha Kumari , when it was laid down that in view of rule 3 of 
Order xxxix of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 
12(2) of the MRTP Act, a notice should be given to the respondent 
before issuing a temporary injunction unless the delay will 
defeat the very purpose of injunction'^ . 
Another point which goes in favour of the approach adopted 
by the MRTP commission is non application of sub section (3) of 
section 148-A of the Civil Procedure code to section 12(A) of the 
MRTP Act. This runs as follows: 
Where, after a caveat has been lodged under sub section 
(1) any application is filed in any suit or proceeding, 
the court shall serve a notice of the application on the 
caveator. 
It was aptly made clear by the MRTP commission in DG v. 
Universal Luggage MF Car , that the provisions of the Civil 
Procedure Code have been applied only to some extent by section 
12(1) of the MRTP Act. Section 148-A is not included in those 
provisions. However, the Commission applied the provisions of 
Civil Procedure Code, vide Regulation 15(2) (Now 13(2) MRTP 
Regulation, 1991) of the MRTPC Regulation 1974. In regulation 
15(2), it has been clearly stated that the provisions of Civil 
Procedure Code will apply only where there is no specific provi-
sion in these regulations. That means, the Civil Procedure Code 
19.(1987) 62 Comp. Cas 157. 
20. Id at 158. 
21.(1987) 62 Comp Cas 275. 
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cannot override the regulations and that being so, obviously, it 
cannot over-ride the parent statute i.e. the MRTP Act under which 
the regulations have been framed. 
Furthermore, the MRTP Commission has taken a pragmatic stand 
by insisting that since the relief of temporary injunction owes 
its origin to equity; the well established principle of equity is 
that he who seeks equity must do equity and therefore complainant 
should come with clean hands . The applicant must be able to 
prove not only that he has a prima facie case, and that balance 
of convenience has in his favour, but also that irreparable 
2 3 injury would be caused to him if it is not granted . The MRTP 
Commission rejected the opinion expressed by the majority of High 
courts that the existence of a prima facie case Is sine qua non 
for considering the grant of temporary injunction and held that 
it itself is not sufficient and temporary injunction cannot be 
granted unless and until the balance of convenience is In his 
favour and there is likelihood of irreparable loss or injury. The 
right course for a judge is to look at the whole case. He must 
have regard not only to the strength of the claim but also to the 
strength of the defence and then decide what is best to be done. 
Sometimes it is best to grant injunction so as to maintain the 
22.Consumer Durable Dealers Asso. v, Godrej Boyce (1989) 2 Comp 
LJ 292. 
23.Id at 291. 
24.In fact it is the opinion of Rajasthan High court expressed in 
Shayak Mohd & Ors v. Iqbal Ahmad AIR 1973 at 115 which was 
adopted by the MRTP commission. 
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status quo until the case is over. At other times, it is best not 
to impose restraint upon the respondent but leave him free to go 
ahead. The best approach would be to exercise broad discretion 
having regard to the entirety of the facts of the case. The 
remedy of the interlocutory injunction is to be kept flexible 
and discretionary rather than being the subject of strict 
rules^^. 
In America, section 408 of the Trans Alaska Oil Pipeline 
Act, empowerd for the first time the Federal Trade Commission to 
seek temporary or permanent injunction from the court. The stan-
dard of proof to be met by the commission for the issuance of a 
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is not 
the same as is imposed by the traditional equity standard which 
the common law applies to private litigants. The Conference 
Report states: 
The intent [of section 408 (f)] is to maintain the 
statutory or public interest standard which is now 
applicable and not to impose the traditional equity 
standard of irreparable damage, the probability of 
success on the merits, and that the balance of equities 
favours the petitioner. This latter standard is derived 
from common law and is appropriate for litigation 
between private parties. It is not, however, appro-
priate for the implementation of a Federal Statute by 
an independent regulatory agency where the standards of 
the public interest measure the propriety and the 
need for injunctive relief^^. 
25.See RC Yadav v. ITC limited (1991) 1 Comp. LJ 119; DG v. 
Cement Manufacturer Association (1991) 1 comp. LJ 291. 
26.H.R. Rep No 93 624 Cong. 1st Sees. 31 (1973). 
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In case of unfair trade practices, it is not sufficient to 
see whether balance of convenience is in favour of plaintiff but 
to measure balance of convenience and irreparable loss vis-a-vis 
general public. 
Conflict Between section 36 C and 12 A Removed: 
Under section 36 B(a), the MRTP Conunission may inquiry into 
any unfair trade practice upon .receiving a complaint of facts 
which constitutes such practice) from any trade o-S'sCicJ^ tvcn oY 
Con&owNey. Section 36 (C) before amendment^^ provided that on 
receipt of a complaint under section 36B(A), the Commission shall 
cause a preliminary investigation to be made by DC (I&R) before 
Issuing any process requiring the attendance of the person com-
plained against. 
Thus any application seeking temporary injunction could have 
been easily thwarted by raising defence that mandatory require-
ment of causing a preliminary investigation has not been gone 
thrpugh. The grant of injunction did not augur well with the 
requirement under section 36(C) as also it was not possible to 
read word "shall" as "may" as the legislature had consciously 
employed this expression. In fact, the word "shall" in section 
27.Before amendment in 1991, section 36 (c) was as followsiln 
respect of any unfair trade practice of which complcxi nt is 
made by an association under clause (a) of section 36B,the 
commission shall before issuing any process require the atten-
dance of the person complained against, cause a preliminary i>iv^'i. 
^oM«nTohe made by the DG in such a manner as it may direct, for the 
purpose of satisfying itself that the complaint requires to be 
enquired into. 
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11(1) which is in pari materia with section 36(C), was substitut-
ed by the word "may" by the amendment Act, 1984. This anomaly has 
been removed by amending section 36(C). The amended provision 
runs as under; 
The Commission may, before issuing any process requir-
ing the attendance of the person against whom an in-
quiry (other than an inquiry upon an application by the 
Director General) may be made under section 36 B, by an 
order requirl the Director General to make, or cause 
to be made, a preliminary investigation in such a 
manner as it may direct and submit a report to the 
Commission, for the purpose of satisfying itself that 
the matter requires to be inquired into. 
The amendment made in section 36(C) fortifies the opinion 
expressed by the Commission in VOICE and Indian Federation of 
Consumer organisation IFCO v. ITC Ltd. (Supra). 
However, the above discussion is merely of an academic 
interest as the MRTP (Amendment) Act,1991 has set the controversy 
at rest by incorporating following two explanations to section 
12A 
Explanation I: 
For the purposes of this section an inquiry shall 
be deemed to have commenced upon the receipt by the 
commission of any complaint, reference or, as the case 
may be, application or upon its own Icnowledge or infor-
mation reduced to writing by the commission. 
Explanation II: 
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared 
that the power of the commission with respect to tempo-
rary injunction includes power to grant a temporary 
injunction without giving notice to the opposite party. 
Locus standi For The Grant of Temporarv Injunction: 
Section 12 A clothes, any trader, class of traders or "any 
other person" with the power to file an application for the grant 
of temporary injunction. It is interesting to note that neither 
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section 10(a) nor section 36 B provides that any trader or class 
of traders can file a complaint. The question is, when they are 
not entitled to file a complaint, how the requirement that 
"during the inquiry" be satisfied and trader's injunction appli-
cation will be allowed. 
A superficial reading of section 12 A shows that it is a 
drafting mistake. However, there is a ruling of the MRTP commis-
28 sion expressed in an agreement relating to Nylon Filament Yarn , 
Upheld by the Delhi^^, Allahabad^°. and Calcutta"^ ^ High courts 
that the commission can exercise suo motu power under section 
10(a) or 36 B(a) and source of information can be even Invalid or 
irregular complaint or even an anonymous letter. Thus the commis-
sion on receiving complaint from a trader or a class of trader, 
can treat it as an information for instituting suo motu inquiry. 
Once it is done, the trader or class of traders can then apply 
for* the grant of temporary injunction. 
Application of Civil Procedure Code 1908: 
No provision under the MRTP Act provides punishment for the 
violation of an injunction order. However, sub clause (2) of 
section 12-A makes provisions of rules 2 A to 5 (both inclusive) 
28. (1975) 47 Comp. Gas 646. 
29. Nirlon Synthetic Fires and chemical Ltd. and anr v. R.D. 
SaxenSf D.G. of Investigation & Ors (1976) 46 Comp. cas. 419 
see also Ballaspur Industries Ltd. v.DG (I&R), (1988)3 Comp 
LJ 283. 
30. JK Synthetics Ltd v. R.D Saxena, Director of Investigation 
and Ors (1977) 47 Comp. cas 323. 
31. ITC Ltd v.MRTP Commission and Ors (1976) 46 Comp. cas 619. 
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of Order xxxix of the first schedule of civil procedure, applica-
ble to a temporary injunction issued by the commission. The moot 
point is that can MRTP commission exercise powers of civil court 
under Civil Procedure Code for breach of an injunction order? The 
answer seems in affirmative, as the very purpose of granting of 
injunction, will be frustrated if the commission is not given 
power to punish for violation. However, it appears that the 
suitable follow-up provisions to fully effectuate this power 
under sub section (2) of section 12-A have not been made and 
therefore in a given case how the commission would proceed to, 
say, commit a person to civil prison for infringement of the 
injunction order, remains ambiguous. Section 135 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908 read with sections 55, 57 and 59, suggest 
that the person to be arrested is to be brought to the court. 
Sub-section (2) of section 12-A does not expressly provide that 
any reference to court in Order xxxix rule (2-A to 5) shall be 
construed as reference to commission . 
An important question arises as to whether temporary injunc-
tion order can bring within its import, not only the actual 
perpetrator but those aiding, abetting or conspiring with the 
actual wrong doer. Section 12A is silent on this point instead, 
it .expressly covers not only actual doer but also those who are 
about to carry on the proscribed practice. Section 80 of the 
32. S .M. Dugar, Law Relating to Restrictive and unfair Trade 
practices with consumer protection (1992 2nd ed.) at 107. 
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Trade Practices Act 1974 of Australia provides that the court may 
on applicationto 
a) The M i n i s t e r , 
b) The Conun i s s ione r , 
c) Subject to sub section (lA) any other person, grant 
an injunction restraining a person from engaging in a 
conduct that constitutes or would constitute 
a) a contravention of a provision of part IV or V 
b) attempting to contravene such provision 
c) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a per-
son to contravene such provision. 
d) Induc-ing or attempting to induce, a person wheth-
er by threats, promises or otherwise to contravene 
such provision. 
e) being in any way directly or indirectly knowingly 
concerned in, or party to the contravention by 
person or any provision; or conspire with others 
to contravene such provision. 
Thus the above provision is comprehensive enough to cover 
advertising agencies, mass media and all those who help directly 
or indirectly in the contravention of the provision. This type of 
relief is not possible under the present scheme of the MPTP Act 
33 The Sachar Committee had in its report recommended a provision, 
33. The suggestion of the Sachar Committee runs as follows: The 
Commission may 
i) on an application of the Director General of Trade 
practices or any other persons;or 
ii) on its own motion during the course of any inquiry into 
any monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practice 
under this Act, issue an injunction restraining a 
person or an undertaking from --
a) engaging in any conduct that constitutes or would 
constitute contravention of any of the provisions of 
sections (sections relating to monopolistic, restric-
tive and unfair trade practice^; 
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like section 80 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 but 
the same was not incorporated in the Act. It is suggested that 
the provision be incorporated in order to give more teeth to the 
injunctive relief. 
In India temporary injunction can be granted by the MRTP 
commission. . In USA section 16 of the Clayton Act provides 
for Injunctive relief which can be granted not by the Federal 
Trade Commission but by any court of America having jurisdiction 
over the parties against the threatened loss or damage by viola-
tion of the anti trust laws .In Australia also position is no 
different from America and only court can grant temporary injunc-
tion. 
In India legislature quite rightly thought it advisable to 
arm the MRTP commission with the power to grant injunction, in 
view of the constitution of the MRTP commission and its 
b) attempting to contravene any such provision; 
c) aiding, abetting in the contravention of any such provi-
sion; 
d) inducing or attempting to induce a person whether by 
threats, promises or otherwise, to contravene any such 
provision, 
e) being in any way,directly or in directly and knowingly 
concerned in, or party to the contravention by a person 
or any such provision; or 
f) conspiring with others to contravene any such provision. 
(12) where, in the opinion of the commission, it is 
desirable to do so , the commission may grant an interim 
injunction pending determination of an application or 
inquiry under section (1). 
(3) the commission may rescind or vary an injunction 
granted under sub section (l)or subsection (2). 
34. Callmann unfair competition. Trade Marks and Monopolies 
Vol.4 at 172. 
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experience as it deals exclusively with the business practices. 
However, section 55 of the MRTP Act, which deals with the appeal 
against the orders of the MRTP Commission, is silent on the 
appeal against the order of the MRTP Commission under section 
12-A. Does it mean that the injunction order is not appealable? 
This is not possible as the aggrieved party can go to the High 
Court or supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. 
The object of granting an injunction can be frustrated by a stay 
of High court or Supreme Court. The labour and time taken by the 
commission would be in vain.The resort to High Courts by way of 
writ petitions against even interim order by the commission is 
not in any way new, as there are examples in galore where the 
respondents have filed writ petitions on many interim orders 
passed by the commission. Although commission can also go to the 
Supreme Court against the order of the High Court yet, that will 
not be in the interest of the consumers as the unscrupulous 
trader will always try to buy time. Therefore the present legal 
position is more favourable to the TYOLCX^V than the ColiaUTrfettt' s 
gratifying to mention here the word of advice of Bombay HC in 
Ramchandzan v. Union of India^^. 
Once it is assumed that the commission had acted 
with jurisdiction, this court should not ordinarily 
entertain a writ petition under Art.226 of the 
constitution of India against such an ad interim 
order. It will certainly be open to the writ peti-
tioner to present its version before the commission 
and offer support and buttresses on which it 
designs its defence.The commission will certainly 
look into the entirety of materials uninhibited by 
the a-^ interim order. 
35. Supra note 9. 
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The above judicial restraint exhibited by the Bombay High 
Court is of course a positive step to allow MRTP Conunission to 
function without interference. Nevertheless there is no guarantee 
that the other High Courts will also take like stand in future. 
Thus it is suggested that section 55 be amended by making order 
of injunction appealable before the Supreme Court with a 
clause stating that an interim injunction order passed by the 
MRTP Commission shall not be called in question in any High 
Court. 
The grant of temporary injunction is the discretion of the 
courts so also of the commission as is evident from the bare 
reading of section 12-A. The commission has to exercise its 
discretion between the two polar extremes which are "not to 
damage the business of a defendant, nor unreasonably hesitate to 
give proper protection to consumer or consumers and trader or 
traders generally." The rule may be stated not with out reserva-
tion however, that an interim injunction which in effect, pre-
determines the ultimate outcome of the litigation and gives the 
same relief as that which is sought by the final judgment, should 
be granted with great caution, and only when necessity 
requires-^^. Where respondent cannot be duly notified and time is 
of the essence, the ex parte injunction may be granted. If the 
injury to the complainant is not aggravated by requiring him to 
36. Writing Mfg. Co. v. Joseph H. Banland Co. 56 NYS 114 (1898). 
Lesher v. Flowers for you, Inc, 151 KYS 2d 8L (Sup 
Ct.1956),See also Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United 
Bank Ltd. (1985) 55 Comp. Cas 423. 
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notify the respondent to appear and show cause why the relief 
sought should not be granted, there is no immediate and pressing 
need for an ex-parte proceedings^. The ex-parte injunction issued 
by a Gangtok Distric Court against ITC should be an eye opener 
for MRTP Commission. Here respondents, the manufacturers of 
cigaretts under the Brand name of WD and H.O. Wills were using 
this brand for two decades. Even then the Court restrained re-
spondents from selling cigaretts under that name till the dispo-
sal of the case^®. This ex-parte injunction caused a daily reve-
nue loss of rupees five crores to the Government and more than 
rupees one crore to the company concerned . The company had to 
seek the intervention of the Supreme Court of India for expedi-
tious hearing of the case. Another ex-parte order passed by the 
commission itself in DG (I£R) v. Cement Manufacturers Association 
and Ors^^ reveals the lassitude on the part of the commission 
when even closed cement unites were charged of restrictive trade 
41 practices of collectively raising up the cement prices . Thus 
37.New York Asbestos Mfg. Co. v. Ambler Asbestos AIR Cell Cover-
ing Co, 99F 85 (CCED Pa 1900); Advance Neckwear Co. v. Goidl, 
77 SW 2d 598 (Tex Cir App. 1434). 
38.Earlier the MRTP Commission had dismised the injunction appli-
cation against the respondent, RC Yadav v. ITC limited CLD 
Vol. (XX) 1991 at 65. 
39.See S.S. Kumar, Ex parte injunction - May lead to Tragic 
Consequences CLD Vol. (xx) 1991 at 9. 
40. UTPE No. 179/ 1989 lA No.65/ 1989 decided on 10.9.90. 
41 The Economic Times 19 Sept, 1990. 
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the word of caution sounded by the Supreme court in a recent 
ruling in Union Territory of Pondichary v. P. V. Suresh,^ which 
applies with full force to the MRTP Commission, deserves mention 
here: 
Passing of interim order is not and cannot be a matter 
' of course -- nor a matter of charity. In matters touch-
ing public revenue the courts aught to be more cau-
tious. For better or worse, the courts have come to 
acquire a veto over the public exchequer. This power 
should be exercised with good amount of self restraint 
and with a sense of responsibility. The power is cou-
pled with accountability -- accountability to the 
Constitution, to the laws of the land and above all to 
ourselves. The court must apply its mind to the facts 
of the case and must also envisage the implications and 
consequences of the order it proposes to make. This is 
so even at the ad interim stage when the respondent is 
not represented. 
E>C3««EaR T O GRJsJt^rr CX3ME>EaSI£U^TXON 
To the fourteenth century Judges success of any action 
depended on the maxim ubi remedium ibu jus (where there is a 
remedy there is a right). However, nineteenth century witnessed 
metamorphosis of this principle resulting in birth of the maxim 
ubi jus ubi remedium (where there is a right there is a 
4 3 
remedy) •'. Thus it became a well established principle of Juris-
prudence that for every wrong there must be a remedy. This was 
reflected in all the antitrust legislations throughout the globe. 
The relief is provided by way of compensation to any consumer if 
42.(1994)1 Comp. LJ 120; Similar echo is found in the opinion 
expressed by Gauhati High court in Smt. Apariajit Mukerjee and 
Ors V. Anil Kumar Mukherjee and ors, AIR (1990) Gau 73. 
43.These days the form of remedy is hardly an appropriate way to 
define substantive rights and liabilities. Wright, Introduc-
tion to the law of Torts (1944) 8 CLJ 238. 
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loss or injury is caused by the unfair method of competition 
employed by any trader. . 
The original MRTP Act did not contain any provision for the 
45 
award of compensation prior to 1984. The Sachar Committee ob-
served that the prohibited practicecan cause loss or damage to 
the consumer but there is no provision to provided compensation 
to the injured party. At present, MRTP Commission can pass only 
44.For instance. In USA Sec 7 of the Sherman Act and Sec 4 of 
Clayton Act, provide that any person who has been injured in 
his business or property by reason of any thing forbidden or 
declared to be unlawful may sue with respect to the amount in 
controversy and recover three-fold the damages sustained and 
the costs. Similarly sec 6 of the Federal Act (Switzerland); 
Sec 6 of the Act against Restraint of Competition (Spain); Sec 
25 of the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and 
Maintenance of Fair Trade Act Japan; Sec 82 of the Trade Prac-
tices Act, 1974 (Australia) as amended in 1977 and the Com-
bines Investigation Act of Canada as amended by Competition 
Bill, 1977 by Sec 31.1 provide provision to recover damages 
from the person who has indulged in trade practices which are 
prohibited. 
45.It was observed : It is apparent that the prohibited practic-
es, if indulged in, are likely to cause grave loss or damage 
to many consumers. But in the Act there is no provision for 
awarding damages to a person, a body or even the state and the 
Central Government against those who have indulged in any of 
.the practices which are prohibited. This is a highly unsatis-
factory state of affairs. A consumer may be compelled to pay 
higher prices as a result of monopolistic, restrictive or 
unfair trade practices. And yet as the Act at present stands, 
the only order which he may obtain is of cease and desist. 
Such an order can at best be a preventive one for future. It 
can obviously not compensate the Injured party for the losses 
already suffered. Thus, unless a provision is made for damag-
es, a party who suffer from the prohibited practice being 
indulged in by producer or seller or supplier will hardly 
receive the benefit which the Act is supposed to confer on an 
average consumer. The injury to the business or property 
caused as a result of prohibited practice calls for remedy... 
We therefore feel that a similar provision as in Australian 
and Canadian Acts should be made in our Act. Report of the 
High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and, MRTP Acts Au-
gust, 1978 (Popularly known as Sachar Committees Report PP. 
273-274. 
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cease and desist order which can at the best prevent a party 
indulging in the prohibited practice in future. 
In pursuance of the recommendations of the Sachar Committee, 
the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 provided section 12-B^^. This 
provision armed the MRTP Coiiunission with the powers to grant 
compensation. Since the inception of section 12-B, the commission 
attended a number of compensation applications as is revealed by 
the following table. 
TABLE : II 
Statement showing the institution, disposal and pending compensa-
tion applications before the MRTP Commission under section 12-B. 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Complaints 
at 
of 
the begining 
the year 
Nil 
104 
65 
1694 
3686 
3405 
7094 
5535 
5568 
Complaints 
during the 
year 
107 
63 
1992 
2865 
2848 
4070 
682 
280 
359 
Complaint 
disposed 
3 
102 
363 
873 
3069 
441 
2141 
247 
5098 
:s 
of 
Complaints 
pending 
104 
65 
1694 
3686 
3465 
7094 
5535 
5568 
829 
SOURCE : The 15th~ 23rd Annual Reports pertaining to the Execu-
tion of provisions of the Monopolies And Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, 1969 for the period from 1st Jan, 
1985 to 3lst December 1993. After 1993 till data no further report has been published. 
46.Section 12 B runs as follows:-
DWhere, as a result of the monopolistic or restrictive or 
unfair trade practice, carried on by any undertaking or any 
person, any loss or damage is caused to the central Govern-
ment, or any State Govt, or any trader or class of traders 
or any consumer, such Government or as the case may be, 
trader or class of traders or consumer may, with out preju-
dice to the right of such Govt, trader or class of traders 
or consumer to institute a suit for the recovery of any 
compensation for the loss or damage so caused make an appli-
cation to the commission for an order for the recovery from 
that undertaking or owner thereof, or, as the case may be, 
from such person, of such amount as the commission may 
determine, as compensation for the loss or damage so caused. 
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'section 12 B of the MRTP Act is a beneficial piece of legis-
lation enacted in the interest of consumers, traders or the 
Governments which may have suffered loss or damage as a conse-
quence of unfair trade practice carried on by erring undertak-
ings. In construing such statutes, the universally accepted rule 
is that the courts must adopt, a beneficial rule of interpreta-
tion. That is to say if the statute reasonably admits such a 
construction, the interpretation which furthers the policy and 
object of the Act must be preferred to the construction which 
will defeat the object^^. 
Locus Standi For The Grant of frompensation; 
An application for the compensation can be filed by central 
govt, or any state government, trader or class of traders or any 
consumer. The expression "Consumer" has not been defined in the 
MRTP Act. Section 12 B does not give any inkling about the locus 
standi of the person who is not an actual buyer of the goods or 
services. For example where a teaching shop owner advertises that 
he is running a computer course affiliated with A.M.U., the 
father of Z deposits fee for the admission of his son Z. If it is 
discovered later on that the said teaching shop has no affilia-
tion, does Z have remedy by way of compensation under Section 12 
B? By applying the traditional rule of privity of contract,Z, 
47. Y.P. Mahna V.Bharat Television (1994) 81 Comp Cas 27. 
250 
will have no remedy^^ .The other alternative is to give wider 
meaning to the words "any consumer" as advocated by the MRTP 
commission in Y P Mahra (Supra). In this manner "any consumer" 
can be safely interpreted to include actual user, not necessarily 
the actual buyer^^. However, in order to remove any doubt, better 
course is to incorporate the definition of consumer under the 
MRTP Act as provided under section 2(d) of the CP Act, 1986^°. 
48. This English rule enunciated in Tweddle v. Atkinson KB 
(1977) 2 levinz 210; 83 ER 523 and affirmed by the House of 
lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Self-ridge Co. (1915) 
A.C. 847 was applied by the courts in India for instance see 
Jamna Das v. Ram Autar, (1911) 30 1A7, ILR 34 All 63; Nanku 
Prasad Singh v. Kamta Prasad Singh, AIR 1923 PC 54; Basu Ram 
Budhu Mai v. Dhan Singh Biswas Singh, AIR 1957 PunJ. 169. 
The rule is that only the parties to the contract can sue 
each other and not a stranger. 
49. For similar opinion see Venkat; Unfair Trade Practices : Com 
pensation For Loss or Damage, (1985) 1 Comp LJ 117. 
50. 'The definition runs as follows: 
Consumer means any person who: 
i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been 
paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or 
under any system of deferred payment and includes any 
user of such goods other than the person who buys such 
goods for consideration paid or promised or partly 
paid or partly promised, or under any system of de-
ferred payment when such use is made with the approval 
of such person, but does not include a person who 
obtains such goods for resale or fer any commercial 
purpose; and 
ii)hires any services for a consideration which has been 
paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised; 
or under any system of deferred payment and includes 
beneficiary of such services other than the person who 
hires the services for consideration paid or promised 
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any 
system of deferred payment, when such services are 
availed of with the approval of the first mentioned 
person. 
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Section 36 B does not accord locus standi to trader but like 
section 12-A, section 12-B arms the trader with the power to file 
compensation application. Does it mean that before filing compen-
sation application, it is not necessary that a prior inquiry be 
instituted? Section 12-B is silent on this point. The relevant 
words in sub-section( 1) are "as a result of the monopolistic or 
restrictive or unfair trade practice..." These words do not show 
that inquiry is a condition precedent for filing compensation 
application. Furthermore clause (3) of section 12-B provides that 
the "commission may, after an inqui;:y into the allegations made 
in the application filed under sub-section{1) , make an order 
directing the owner of the undertaking or other person to make 
payment..." The words used in this sub clause show that an inde-
pendent inquiry is to be Instituted under section 12-B. Thus it 
is not necessary that before filing an application for compensa-
tion, existence of any monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade 
practice, must have been established through an inquiry. Through 
compensation application itself the allegation can be proved. 
Another point which weighs heavily in favour of the above inter-
pretation is the standard of proof. Under section 36 D cease and 
desist order can be passed, if it is shown that the respondent is 
carrying on a trade practice which has a potential to cause loss 
or injury or there is likelihood that such loss or injury might 
be caused. It is not necessary that the complainant has suffered 
actual loss. But under section 12 B, proof of actual loss is a 
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condition prec dent for grant of compensation 
An interesting question arises relating to the law of Evi-
dence that is, to what extent facts proved in an inquiry under 
section 36 D will be helpful under section 12-B? It is submitted 
that since these sections have different standards of proof, even 
if cease and desist order is passed under section 36-D, the 
application for compensation needs consideration de novo. This 
becomes more essential in a situation where respondent has volun-
tarily accepted the cease and desist order. 
APDlication Of The Limitation Act: 
The MRTP Act contains at present no provision either relat-
ing to the applicability of the Limitation Act or itself pre-
scribing any limitation period within which compensation applica-
<x\iJia.<> cvj to 
tion should be filed. A crucial question]whether the Limitation 
Act is at all applicable to the compensation application under 
section 12 B. The Australian Trade Practices Act, 1974 which is 
identical to section 12 B of the MRTP Act, 1969, through section 
82 provides: 
1. A person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of 
another person that was done in contravention of 
provision of part IV or V may recover the amount of 
the loss or damage by action against that other 
person or against any person involved in the con-
travention; 
51. See for similar views, S. M. Dugar, Law Relating to Restric-
tiveand Unfair Trade Practices with Consumer Protection 
(1992, 2 ed.) at 118. See also Saling Ram v. Remal Public 
School, Compensation Application No's 1317 to 1326, 1341 to 
51 & 1612, order dated 28,11.1989. Also see M L Sachdev; 
Award of Compensation under MRTP Act, (1985) 2 Comp. LJ 86. 
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2. An action under sub section (1) may be commenced at 
any time within 3 years after the date on which the 
cause of action occurred. 
Since CP Act, 1986 also did not (before amendment) contain 
any express provision on limitation, it was nevertheless made 
clear by the National commission in R. D. Chinoy v. Central Bank 
of India^^, that the limitation Act does apply to the proceedings 
under the Act. The absence of any specific provision in the Act 
however, should not give rise to any presumption that the appli-
cation can be made at any time. It is an equitable principle of 
law that a person would lose his remedy if he falls asleep. Also 
no one is to be exposed to the risk of stale claims of which he 
may be quite ignorant and which he may not be able to meet in 
view of the changed circumstances. At present it can be presumed 
that the law of limitation applies to the compensation applica-
tions. However, the period of limitation would start from the 
date of loss or injury and not from the date the unfair trade 
practice was committed^-^. In order to avoid any possible contro-
versy, it would be better to clearly spell out in the Act itself, 
the period of limitation for filing application under section 12 
B of the Act. 
Measure 9f namaaes: 
The compensation under section 12 B can be granted for the 
"loss or damage". As pointed out by the Punjab High Court in 
52. (1993)3 Comp LJ 105 See also Citi Bank N. A. v. Ganesh 
Narian Sabro (19 93) 3 Comp. LJ 212; Shri Rajesh Industries 
V. Punjab National Bank and Anr (1991) 1 Comp. LJ 4 34. 
53. Supra note 49. 
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Chunllal V. Hazdford fire Insurance Company''^ that the word loss 
has no precise meaning. It is a generic and a comprehensive term 
covering different situations and is synonmous with damage re-
sulting either in consequence of destruction, deprivation or even 
depreciation^^. However, section 12-B does not lay down any 
standard which is to be applied in awarding compensation. The 
guidance for measuring damage can be had either, from the law of 
contract or law of torts. 
This intriguing problem was realised by the MRTP Commission 
eg 
itself when in Bandani Chadha v. Sherl Loiuse Slimming centre , 
it was observed: 
The term "loss" refers to both pecuniary and non pecuni-
ary loss. "Damages" refer to the disadvantages that a 
person suffers as a result of the act or omission by 
another. While this is so, the measurement of compensa-
tion is probably a difficult aspect of the law as it 
stands at present, as the law no-where provides any 
suitable yardstick to measure compensation for loss or 
damage envisaged under section 12-B. In absence of such a 
statutory yardstick, what should be awarded as compensa-
tion becomes very important. It is well settled law that 
all losses or damages are not capable of being compensat-
ed. Only those which have a casual connection with the 
unfair trade practice or which are the proximate (and not 
remote) consequences of such unfair trade practices are 
compensable. Subject to this broad and acceptable parame-
ter, what should be the measure of compensation, yet 
remains to be resolved, for the measurement of compensa-
tion in contracts is different from measurement of com-
pensation in tort^^. 
54. AIR 1958, Punj, 440. 
55. Id at 444. 
56. (1991) Vol. 70 Comp. cas 712 
56a. Id at 718. 
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Under the law of contract the basic premise to award damages 
is as laid by Lord Haldane in British Westing House Electric 
Ltd. V. Under ground Electric Railways Company^ , to place inno-
cent party as far as money can do it, in as good situation as if 
the contract had been performed or as stated by lord wright in 
Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Karlshamns^^^, that the broad prin-
ciple of law of damages is that the party injured by the other 
party's breach of contract is entitled to such compensation as 
will put him in the position he would have been but for breach. 
On the other hand, compensation under law of torts is gov-
erned by the maxim restitutio in integrum i.e. to place the 
victim in the same financial position, so far as this can be done 
by an award of money, in which he would have been had the accid-
ent not happened^". 
MRTP commission without avowedly approving any standard, 
measured the compensation by involving both, contract and tort 
principles. 
In Krishna Kumar Sharma v. M/s Superfine Type-writers^^, the 
MRTP Commission observed that under section 73 of the Contract 
57. (1992) A.C. 673, 689. 
57a. (1949) A. C. 196, 220 See also Hadly v. Baxendale of Ex 341, 
Viction Laundry Ltd. v. Newsmen Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 
528 CA Asquisth J Laid down that it is well settled that the 
governing principle of damages is to put the party whose 
rights have been violated in the same position, as far as 
money can do so, as if his rights were observed. This opin-
ion was adopted by AP High Court in Dhulipudi Namayya v. 
Union of India, AIR 19 58 AP 53 3. 
58. John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (1957) at 225. 
59. .Comp. Law Digist Vol.18, December, 22. 
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Act, compensation is recoverable for any loss or damage (i)aris-
ing naturally in the usual course of things from the breach; or 
(ii) which the parties know at the time of the contract as a 
likely result from the breach. Thus in the first instance the 
liability depends upon a reasonable man's fore-sight of the loss 
and in the second instance it is subjective because the extent of 
liability will depend upon the knowledge of the parties about the 
probable result of the breach°^. 
Another Bench of the MRTP Commission in Mrs. Bandana Chadha 
and Ors v. sheri- Louise Slimming centre^^ applied a different 
scale when it observed: 
In an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the 
amount of damages to which the applicant is entitled 
is, prime facie, the amount by which the price hds been 
paid, exceeds the true value of the thing bought . A 
basic principle for measure of damages in tort is that 
there should be restitutio in integrum. In an action 
for deceit the proper starting point for the assessment 
of damages is to compare the position of applicant as 
it was, before the fraudulent statement was made to 
him, with his position as it becomes as a result of 
reliance upon the statement. 
It is submitted that it is in the interest of the consumers 
if MRTP commission applies principles of law of torts instead of 
law of contract for the following reasons: 
60. Id at 23. 
61. Supra note 56 
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DUnder law of contract there is a well established rule that 
while quantifying the damages, the terms in the contract 
should be construed strictly where as under law of Torts, 
courts award exemplary damages also, so as to deter the 
wrong doer from causing harm to the society. 
2)Under the law of contract courts generally do not award 
punitive damages. Since under MRTP Act, perpetrator of 
wrong cannot be imprisoned, compensation can be used as a 
tool to prevent unscrupulous trader from resorting to 
unconscionable business practice which is oossible under 
law of Torts and not under the Contract Act^^ 
3)Since the Australian law is analogous to the MRTP ^Ct, th( 
Australian court in Figgin pty Ltd.v. centre pointr , hel< 
he 
Ld 
that the damages to be recovered are to be determined in a 
manner similar to deceit cases. The principles to be ap-
plied are similar to those applied in determining the 
measure of damages in tort, and in Ess-petroleum co.Ltd. v. 
Mardon^^ it is laid down that the correct way to approach 
the assessment of damage is to compare the position in 
which the applicants might have been expected to be if the 
misleading conduct had not occurred with the situation they 
were in as a result of acting in reliance on the conduct. 
Duty to Mitigate; 
The explanation attached to section 73 of the Contract Act 
provides for the duty to mitigate damages and under the law of 
torts the point to be taken into account is whether the victim 
62. However punitive damages may be granted in some special 
cases. The American Restatement of the law of contracts, 
section 342 provides punitive damage where the breach was 
wanton or reckless and caused bodily injury, see also Adds 
V. Gramophone co.Ltd. (1909) Ac 488; Jarvis v. Swan Tours 
Ltd, (1973) I AILER 71 CA; Jackson,v. Horizon Holidays, 
(1975) 3 AILER 92 CA; Andard Mount (London) Ltd. v. 
Curewel (India) Ltd., AIR 1985 Del 45; Pzema v. Mustak Ahmad 
AIR 1987 Guj 106. 
63. (1981) 36 ALR 23 see also Brown v. Jam Factory (1981) 35 ALR 
79 
64. (1976) All E.R.S 
65. This explanation runs as follows: In estimating the loss or 
damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which 
existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-
performance of the contract must be taken into account. 
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endeavoured to mitigate the loss arising from the tortious act 
The .question is, to what extent this duty to mitigate is applica-
ble under section 12-B of the MRTP Act. In other words, is the 
consumer under duty to avoid the loss which may be the likely 
result of the any unfair business practice? The MRTP commission 
in Anis Khan v. Kaypee Land and Finance (P) Ltd. answered it in 
affirmative. It was laid down that the law which comes to the 
help of unwary consumers also expects them to exercise the 
prudence of a reasonable man, before entering into deals involv-
ing expenditure of huge amount. It is expected of people who 
book/purchase commercial spaces or other immovable property to 
have minimum precaution of satisfying themselves about the legal 
approval of competent authority, existence of the property site 
and other apparent precautions before entering into such deal. 
It is submitted that the above stand taken by the Commission 
does not augur well with the world wide change which has taken 
from the common law maxim of Caveat Emptor to Caveat Venditor. It 
has to be borne in mind that the aim of the whole body of consum-
er laws is to protect gullible, unwary, crudulous, unprotected, 
unthinking consumers. They need extra protection from the 
unscrupulous traders bent to fleece them. Even otherwise why 
66. See Neeu Anand v. Shri Louse slimming Centre, Comp. L Di-
gest, Vol, XX, Sept. 1990, 49. 
67. (1994) 1 Comp LJ 47. 
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should law expect from a docile consumer "minimum precaution" and 
not to expect from the trader to come with full truth instead of 
half truth. As lord Denning M R declared in Doyle v. Olby (Iron-
mongers) Ltd.^^, that "it does not lie in the mouth of the fraud-
ulent person to say that the result could not have reasonably 
been foreseen, "and an Australian court in State of South Aus-
tralia V. Johnson went ahead by placing unfair trade practices 
in the realm of wrong of deceit and not under negligent misrepre-
sentation. In former plaintiff recovers the difference between 
the amount paid and the value of the property acquired, the 
object being to place him in a position equivalent to that which 
he would have occupied, had the transaction not taken place and 
in latter case, the plaintiff's damages are limited to that which 
were reasonably foreseeable. 
The above opinion of the commission, it is submitted will 
bolster the dishonest traders and will not further the cause of 
innocent consumers who believe in values and upright-ness. It is 
therefore suggested that the present approach adopted should be 
done away with and trader should be burdened with a duty to come 
with full disclosures likely to affect the decision of the con-
sumers falling which, compensation should be awarded to the con-
sumer for any loss or damage so caused by the unfair business 
practice employed by the trader. 
68. (1969) 2 Q. B. 158 at 67. 
69. (1982) 42 ALR 161. 
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Application of Mens-rea: 
The twin maxims. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (the 
act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention was so 
and actus me invito factus non est mens actus" which means an act 
done by me against my will is not my act at all, have been ruled 
as bereft of any application in the offences perpetrated on 
consumers as Prof. Jerome Hall puts it. 
To meet new important social problems like sale of 
narcotics, sale of adultered food, in toxicating li-
quors, etc. the application of the rule<'(str ict 
liability has to be enforced'^. 
Since consumer offences fall under the category of the 
public welfare offences^, it has been argued that such 
70. Jerome Hall : General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. 
PP.327-28, see also American Jurisprudence, 2nd Vol. at 864 
wherein it is laid down that "the distribution of impure or 
adultered food for consumption is an act perilous to human 
life and health, hence a dangerous act cannot be made inno-
cent and harmless by the want of knowledge or good faith of 
the seller". Prof Waddames opines that one who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or the consumer or to his property, is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer of or to his property, if (a) the seller 
is engaged in the business of supplying such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold. The rule stated in (a) and (b) above appliese.v.ej)though 
(i) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product and (ii) the user or consumer 
has not brought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller. Waddames S. M. : Strict 
liability of Suppliers of Goods (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 154 
.at 160. 
71. Sayre Francis owes; Classifies Public Welfare offences into 
eight categories and the sale of impure or adultered food or 
drugs and misbranded articles fall second and third items in 
'his list see Public Welfare Offences (1993), 33 Col. L. Rev. 
65. 
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offences create absolute liability^'^. While deciding cases under 
the prevention of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which is anoth-
er consumer protection legislation and violation of which invites 
penal consequences, it has been held in a number of cases that 
7 1 
mens rea has no application . Under this backdrop the question 
arises, is it open for the respondent to come up with the defence 
that unfair business practice which caused loss or injury to the 
complainant, was caused by him without any malice or bad inten-
tion on his part. The answer without any reservation is in nega-
tive not only in view of the foregoing discussion but also be-
cause of the fact that under the MRTP Act, only plausible remedy 
is the compensation as a reparation to the wrong done to the 
consumer. Since under MRTP Act there's no provision for imposing 
fine or sentencing wrong doer to imprisonment, hence the compen-
sation serves twin purpose. It gives consumer money equivalent to 
the loss caused and it deters trader from indulging in the inju-
rious trade practices. So it will not be in the interest of the 
consumer to make compensation available subject to the presence 
of mens-rea on the part of wrong doer. 
72. For detailed study on the topic see Jackson, R. M.: Absolute 
Prohibition in Statutory Offences, (1936) 6 Com. LJ 83; Rad 
zinowicz and Turnor (Ed); Modern Approaches to Criminal Law 
(Collected Essays), 1984 P. 262. 
73. See M/s Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chandra v. Delhi Administration 
and Anr., AIR 1975 Sc 1309, wherein justice Alagiriswamy 
observed that under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act 
it is not necessary to establish mens-rea, i,e, criminal 
intention either on the part of the manufacturer or dis-
tributor or vendor. Id at 1319, see also Pyaarali K. Tejani 
V. Mahadeo Ram Chandra Bange and Ors 1975 F. AJ. 429 at 438; 
Bhola Nath Sahu v. State (1973) Cr. LJ 135 (ori) at 138. 
262 
Consumer Class Action: 
In the words of Hans Kelsen: The validity of legal system 
and of the rules there of depend upon their being by and large 
effective, that is, upon their being realised in actual conduct. 
Pressing a rule of conduct to the point of assertion of right by 
way of legal action is the acid test of the efficacy of law ... 
Rules which establish non-justiciable rights are imperfect or 
cosmetic existing merely on paper and not susceptible of being 
translated into effective action^^. Rights can be enjoyed only 
when there is a mechanism for their effective protection. Such 
protection is best assured by a workable remedy within the frame 
7 S 
work, of the judicial system . 
Judged by such notion of effectiveness, consumer law lacks a 
7 fi 
spirit of realism . Specialised enforcement agencies are chroni-
cally short of manpower and resources, a consequence not only of 
necessarily limited public funds but also because of the approach 
of the Government which have kept consumer rights enforcing 
77 
agencies in blues . 
74.Pure theory of Law, at 32 
75. M. Cappeleti, Access to Justice, vol. Ill, at 517. 
76.Gordon Borrier and Dubrey Diamond, The Consumer Soceity and 
the Law, (4th ed. 1981) at 337. 
77.See Deleep Goswami, Supreme Court to Rescue of Consumers 
(1989) 3 Comp LJ 89. The Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahin-
dra V. Union of India, AIR 1979, Sc 798 Lamented and said : it 
appears that the Central Govt, paid Scant regard to this 
legislative requirement and though the office of the Chairman 
fell vacant as far back as 9 August, 1976, it failed to make 
appointment of Chairman Until 24 Feb. 1978. Of the two other 
members of the Commission, one had already resigned earlier 
and his vacancy was also not filled with the result that the 
commission continued with only one member for a period of 
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Present consumer concern is largely accredited to modern 
technological developments which heralded the end "of torpor of 
legislators and consumerists. Aggressive advertising campaign 
clouded the consumer choice. It becomes very difficult even on 
reasonable examination to differentiate between the goods 
although of different grade, quality and standard. This provided 
a good scope for playing fraud on gullible consumers.lt is right-
ly said by Rosenberg^ that it is difficult to determine accu-
rately the dollar cost of fraud to consumers. More alarming are 
the findings of research study conducted by the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. It was found that in many instances 
fraudulent operators carefully avoid cheating individuals out of 
large sums of money because they realise that no one bilked out 
of fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer to get his money 
back .... The number of consumers who have not redressed because 
the amount lost is not commensurate with the attorney's fee, 
constitute the vast majority . This lends support to the 
about 18 months. This was most unfortunate state of affairs, 
for it betrayed total lack of concern for the proper constitu-
tion and functioning of the commission and complete neglect of 
its statutory obligation by the Central Govt, we fail to see 
any reason why the Central government could not make necessary 
appointments and properly constitute the commission in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Act Id at 806. 
78.Mark L. Rosenberg, Consumer Class Action, Har. Civ. Reg. Civ. 
Lib. L.Rev; 1972, Vol.7 at 602. 
79.Pennsylania Comment 409. This study was funded by the Shelton 
Harrison Foundation and involved extensive interviews with 
businesses, lawyers and bankers in Pensylvania, New York, New 
Jersey and other areas of the country. 
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observation that it is better to take one dim from each of 10 
million people at the point of corporation than $100,000 from 
each of 10 banks at the point of gun^°. This in fact is a well 
thought out strategy that although the aggregate of the loss 
entailed may be so serious and widespread as to make the matter 
one of public consequence, yet no private suit would be brought 
to stop the unfair conduct, since the loss to each of the indi-
viduals is too small to warrant it^^. It was found by the State 
Commission of Rajasthan in Upffokta Sarankshan Munch v. M/s Wind-
sor Foods that by selling a biscuit packet only 25 gms 
less than the prescribed 500 gms, Windsor cheated public to the 
tune of more than one lakh in one year in a state of Rajasthan 
alone. 
While Juxtaposing above facts there is a little doubt about 
the need of mechanism through which even small claims can be 
redressed. India, an under developed country has its own limita-
tions. Poverty, illiteracy, ignorance of rights, lack of informa-
tion are factors responsible for consumer exploitation. Further-
more, to move to the court for small claims is a taboo. So in 
India consumer class action or to allow any member of a class to 
pursue the cause of the class is a social necessity. 
The class action concept developed as an exception to the 
equity rules of compulsory joinders in order to avoid multiple 
80. C Wright White Collar Crime at (G Geis ed.) 1968. 
81. F.T.C V. Kelsner (1929) 280 US 19 at 28. 
82. (1993) 2 CPR 610. 
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actipns and effectuate complete settlement of disputes where the 
8 3 interested parties were numerous for joinder -^. 
In USA credit goes to the courts of California for fashion-
ing the representative action doctrine as an alternative to 
joinder. California supreme court, while articulating rules for 
the application of this doctrine held, where the question is "one 
of general or common interest", or where parties form a voluntary 
association for public or private purposes, the persons interest-
ed are commonly numerous and any attempt to unite them all in the 
84 
suit would be, even if practicable, exceedingly inconvenient , 
recourse can be had to class action. 
At the federal level Rule 23 of US Civil Procedure Code 
takes care of class action suits. The requirements for class 
action are: 
1. there be a definable class of plaintiffs. 
2. there be common question of law and fact, and 
3. representatives fully and adequately protect the inter-
est of the class . 
4. The conmion question must predominate over individual 
questions^°. 
83.For analysis of the development of rules governing class ac-
tions under various statutory and common law frame works see 
Z. Chafee; Some Problems of Equity (1950). 
84.1. Cal. 55 (1850). 
85.Rule 23 (2). 
86.Rule 23(b)(3). 
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5. The best notice practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through a reasonable efforts must be 
given . 
The scope of federal class action under Rule 23 was limited 
by US supreme court by holding that the individual claims of 
class members can be aggregated only if they are enforcing a 
single right in which they have common interest and common ques-
tion must predominate the individual questions . Individual 
notice must be sent to class members who can be identified with 
reasonable efforts®^. The idea that the core purpose of Rule 23 
is the adequacy of representation and not the notice, was reject-
ed by courts and what is reasonable effort was left un-
explained^ . 
By requiring individual notice, US consumers faced precari-
ous situation because to right mass wrongs through class action, 
membership of the class may run into millions and an amount also 
in millions may be required for individual notice^^. This proved 
roost serious obstacle in the maintenance of class action suits. 
Commenting on these findings, Richards H. S. Tur remarks: 
87. Rule 23(c)(3). 
88. Synder v. Harris, 394 US 332 (1969). 
89. Eisen v. Carlise 4 Jacqullin 417 US 156 (1974). 
90. For Critical Comment see Peterh Schuck & Marshan Cohen, The 
Consumer Class Action : An Endangered Species, San Diego L. 
Rev (1974) Vol. 12:39 at 63. 
91. In Eisen's case supra note 16, total membership of the class 
was 6,000,000. Approximately 2,250,000 could be identified 
with the reasonable effort and this would have cost to Eisen 
$ 225,000 not to mention the additional cost of publication 
notice to the others. 
267 
In principle there is less than compelling reason to 
notify all members of the class in advance that a case 
is to be filed and certainly no reason at all that any 
such notification be by way of individual letter to 
each member rather than by news paper, radio or tele-
vision advertisement 
The Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 1976 to a great 
extent diluted the narrow approach which US Federal courts had 
adopted, while interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Civil Proce-
dure Code. Instead of common question predominating the individu-
al question, the Act requires that the question of law and fact 
common to the members of the class must be substantial, when 
compared to question affecting only individual members . Notice 
cost will be borne by representative, the dependent or both as 
the court deems fit . 
In England, Order 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court provides: 
Where numerous persons have same interest in any proceed-
ing... the proceeding may begin and unless the court 
otherwise orders, continued by or against any oge of them 
as representing all except one or more of them"^. 
92.Richard H. S. Tur, litigation And The Consumer Interest, the 
class Action and Beyond, Legal Studies, Vol.2, No.2; July 1982 
at 157. 
93.Section 8 (2) 
94.Section 8 (b)(4) 
95.Rule 12 (1) 
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The expression "same interest" was interpreted as "conunon 
interest and common grievance"^ . The scope of Order 5 Rule 12 
was constricted by Kings Bench in Markt Co v. Knight Steam Ship 
Ltd.^^ by holding that the cause of action arising out of differ-
ent contracts even by same device and by same dealer will not be 
redressed through representative suit. It was considered appro-
priate only for injunctive relief. This narrow interpretation was 
relaxed in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman Industries 
Ltd.^^ by following a split procedure theory, through which 
representative suit can be instituted and when court is satisfied 
that the defendant is liable, then each member of the class will 
have to bring separate action to establish the damages actually 
suffered. Hither-to, representative suit in England is available 
only in situations as contemplated by lord willbiforce in Wooder 
V. Wimpey^^ that where one individual books a meal in a restau-
rant for a group and all suffered food poisoning, or one individ-
ual books a coach which fails to arrive thereby all the members 
of the party suffer. It implies that there should be same cause 
of action arising out of the same transaction. 
In Canada though all provinces permit class action, non 
permits the same for damages. The root of this proscription is 
the opinion expressed in English Markt and Co.^^° case that 
96. Dube of Bedford Vellis, (1901) ACI at 9. 
97. (1910) KB 104. 
98. (1979) 3 All E.R. 507. 
99. (1980) I All E.R. 571 at 576. 
100. Supra note 97. 
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damages are personal to the person suffering them, there is no 
common interest amongst those who have suffered the damages. 
Several attempts have been made to persuade the courts to ignore 
the Markt case but of no avail. Commenting on this approach a 
Canadian author observes "There is every reason to modernize the 
rules of court to remove the milestone of Markt doctrine and to 
introduce the safeguards along the lines of Rule 23 of the Ameri-
can Federal Rules of procedure to prevent abuse of the new 
remedy^'^^. 
Amendments were proposed in Combines Investigation Act, 1923 
to encourage private enforcement. Through these amendments one 
suit can be commenced by an individual or a group of persons on 
behalf of a class which is based on common question of law and 
102 fact . The case can be sustained if the court is satisfied that 
(l)it is undertaken in good faith, (2)that prima facie it has 
merit (3)that it provides the fairest and most efficient means of 
adjudicating the dispute and those initiating it can adequately 
represent the interest of the class as a whole . However, its 
application is restricted to damages caused by the commission of 
offences under the Combines Investigation Act and does not extend 
to other transactions^^^. 
In France, selected groups are entitled to pursue the cause 
of consumers. In civil action for damages for enforcing collec-
101.. Supra note 97, 
102. Section 39.12 (2) (b). 
103. Ibid Section 39.12 (2) 
104. Christopher S AX Worthy, Recent Developments in Consumer law 
in Canada Int. Comp. Quart. L. Rev. Apr. (1980) at 386. 
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tive interest of the group of the consumers. However, more sig-
nificance is attached to securing observance of the law than to 
obtaining damages. In Germany, Consumer groups are specifically 
authorised by statute to sue on behalf of the consumers. However, 
they can seek only injunctive relief and damages cannot be 
claimed on behalf of the consumer . 
Indian consumers enjoy a rare distinction as they can vin-
dicate their rights by class action slimpliciter or the internal 
plaintiff class action (representative suit) and by the public 
interest class action or an external plaintiff class action. 
Simpliciter class action is provided under sectionl2 B (2) of the 
MRTP Act which runs as: 
Where any loss or damage referred to in sub section (1) 
is caused to numerous persons having the same interest 
one or more of such persons may, with the permission of 
the commission, make an application, under that sub 
section for and on behalf of, or for the benefit of the 
persons so interested, and there upon the provisions of 
rules and of Order 1 of the first schedule to the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908), shall apply sub-
ject to the modification that every reference therein 
to a suit or decree shall be construed as a reference 
to the application before the commission and the order 
of the commission thereon. 
So far as external plaintiff class action is concerned like 
France, standing is granted to voluntary registered consumer 
organisations, under section 36B [a]. But all that glitters is 
not gold. This statutory right of standing to registered consumer 
organisations came for deliberation before MRTPC in Voice v. 
105. Fisch (1979) 2 American J. of Comparative L 51 at 79. 
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Bharat TV S Ors.^^ It was observed that a voluntary organisation 
cannot sue in representative capacity on the ground that such 
organisation cannot have the "same interest" as required under 
section 12 B(c). This decision has thus closed the doors for 
voluntary organisations to file a suit in representative capaci-
ty. This will not be out of place to mention that granting of 
locus standi to voluntary consumer organisations was a policy 
decision taken by the Government of India in the year 1986. So 
not only MRTP Act, 1969 but other Acts were also amended to 
107 provide locus standi to registered consumer organisations 
This inclusion of the provision for locus standi was necessitated 
by the fact that beneficiaries of these legislations, generally 
belong to weaker sections of the society, who have not made 
effective use of the legal process for vindication of the rights 
conferred on them. It is not as much vindication of private right 
as protection of public interest which is avowed objective of 
legislation in conferring locus standi"^ . It is therefore, 
suggested that either in the MRTP Regulations or MRTP Act, an 
explanation be attached to provide that a recognised consumer 
106. RTPE No. 138/1984 order dated 6.12.1986. 
107. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1956, Drugs And Cosmet-
ics Act, 1940. Standard of Weights and Measures Act, 1956, 
and Essential Commodities Act, 1965. 
108. For critical analysis see D N Saraf, Monopolies and Trade 
Practices Commission in Action - Some ReflectionSon Consumer 
Protection, 31 JILI (1989) 289, See also of the same author, 
some facets of consumer justice through CDRA 34 JILI 
(1992)36. 
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association shall be deemed to have the same interest as other 
consumers on whose behalf the consumer association has filed the 
complaint. 
Another important issue of topical interest is what consti-
tutes "same interest". For English courts, it implies common 
grievance and common interest arising out of the same transaction 
or contract which can be redressed through the same cause of 
action (Supra). On the otherhand, American approach is that there 
must,be common question of law and fact and common question must 
predominate the individual question (Supra). 
Since consumer class action in India is yet at the take off 
stage, so this expression (same interest) was not put to inter-
pretation. Consumer class action provided under MRTP Act and CP 
Act is based on order 1 rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. The 
expression "same interest" was interpreted to mean "same cause of 
action". Later on an explanation was added to order 1 rule 8 on 
the recommendations of the 54th Report of the Law Commission. It 
was made clear that the same cause of action is not necessary for 
representative suit. However, while interpreting order 1 rule 8, 
the courts invoked English markt doctrine and held that the class 
action cannot be maintained where damages are claimed^ . It is 
submitted that this observation will not hold good so for 
109 Janki Das v. John Bull Ltd., 1910 "The Times" April 10. See 
also Gindey v. Anglo Indian Association, AIR 1930 Rang 117 
(1819) . 
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consumer representative suit is concerned as the MRTP Act 
and CP Acts^^^ expressly provide that compensation can be 
claimed through class action to make good the loss caused due 
to monopolistic or restrictive or unfair trade practices. 
Present Indian practice is in favour of American ap-
proach, it has been held that "same interest" does not mean 
"identical interest" and it includes similar but distinct 
interest and it is not necessary that it should arise from 
the same transaction^^. Similarly in Consumer Protection 
Council V. Lohia Machines Ltd and Ors^ , Gujarat State Com-
mission held that the interest of the consumers and society 
at large will be better protected if voluntary consumer 
associations are permitted to file complaint covering the 
persons "similarly situated" when the cause of action arises 
out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or 
transactions against the same respondent. 
Thus it is clear that Lord Willbif orce' s opinion ex-
pressed in Wooder's case, (Supra) that the representative 
suit is possible only where cause of action arises from the 
110.Section 12 B(2). 
111.Section 12 (c) read with section 14(d). 
112.Mulla Code of Civil Procedure (1972) at 329. However, 
MRTPC in Devendra Kumar v. Indian R. CO. Ltd. held that 
the word "similar" does not connote "same" CA No.200/1989 
in UTPE/5/1987. 
113. (1992) ICPR 128. 
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same transaction is devoid of any effect so far as representative 
suit in India is concerned. Instead^ the test is that the persons 
should be "similarly situated". This test brings us more closer 
to the American test of common question of law and fact. This is 
encouraging trend and boon to consumer movement and in turn to 
consumer justice. 
There is of course an American experience which shows that 
the results of class action are, clogging the courts, main 
beneficiaries being the attorneys and not the class, using class 
action by unscrupulous lawyers to strike a settlement (a lega-
lised blackmail) problems of disbursement of damages against the 
class members, difficulties of proof by an individual member of 
the class, notice to the individual members-"-^^. But it should be 
noted that such difficulties flow from the nature of American 
legal system and legal profession than from any inherent short-
coming of the class action procedure. For example in India, con-
tingent fee charged from the clients in the event of success is 
illegal and any such agreement is unenforceable as being opposed 
to public policy. Individual notice to the members can be dis-
pensed with, where it is impracticable. Further, notice-cost will 
not be as high as in America. There is of course difficulty in 
distributing damages. But the choice lies between no remedy and 
appropriate remedy. 
114. Leela Krishna (ed). Consumer Protection and Legal Control, 
S. N. Jain, Standing and Public Interest Litigation at 109. 
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P O W E R T O R E V I E W O R D E R S 
The power to review orders is based on equity, justice and 
good conscience as there is a possibility that the earlier order, 
recorded by the court is not based on the actual evidence or 
other material error might have influenced the judgment or the 
order was passed under the circumstances which no longer 
lie 
exist-^ -^ *^ . Justice demands that the earlier order should be re-
viewed in the light of the new circumstances. Since no human 
being is infallible so are judges. Reversal of the earlier order 
implies Judicial uprightness. 
As Supreme Court in Palace Administration Board v. Rama 
Verma^^ observed: 
Once a clear judgment is revealed, no sense of shame or 
infallibility complex obsesses us or dissuades this 
court from the anxiety to be ultimately right and not 
consistently wrong. 
However, it should not be interpreted to mean that the 
decision after review is always absolutely correct. But of 
course, second thought minimises the errors which might have 
crept in the decision for one reason or the other. The often 
quoted opinion of J. Jackson throws light on the proposition. 
115. Association of the State Road Transport undertaking New 
Delhi and Ors v. Premier Tyres Ltd., New Delhi, and Ors. 
(1994) 2 Comp LJ 146; In Delhi Pipe Dealers Association, the 
MRTPC observed that its decisions are given in the context 
of economic situation prevailing at the time when decision 
was given. Any basic change in the situation might alter the 
very foundation of decision and may call for change in 
decision itself. 1975 Tax, L. R. 2034 (MRTPC). 
116. (1980) 3 SCR 187; AIR 1980 SC 187. 
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He comments; 
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by anoth-
er, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a 
difference in out look, normally found between person-
nel comprising different courts. However, reversal by a 
higher court is not a proof that Justice is thereby 
done. There is no doubt that if there were a super 
Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our rever-
sals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not 
final because we ar^.infallible but we are infallible 
beca 
1 because we are in 
use we are final . 
In tune with the overall scheme of laws, MRTP Act provides a 
provision for amendment or revocation of the orders through 
review. Section 13(2) runs as follows: 
Any order made by the commission may be amended or 
revoked at any time in the manner in which it was made. 
The above provision raises the following problems of inter-
pretation. Is this power unlimited or, is it subject to inherent 
limitations? what is the extention of the commission's power? 
Does the expression "in the manner in which it was made", implies 
that the commission by invoking this provision, can order fresh 
hearing? 
A plain reading of the above provision makes it abundantly 
clear that there are no fetters placed on its scope. This provi-
sion is different from that of section 22 of the English Restric-
tive Trade Practices Act, 1956 under which a court can discharge 
the 'previous order only when there is a prima iacia evidence of 
117. Porawn v. Allen (1952) 344 US 443, 540. 
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material change in the relevant circumstances. It is the discre-
tion of the Commission whether to exercise power or not under 
this provision. However, the discretion cannot be arbitrary vague 
118 
or fanciful. It must be guided by relevant considerations . 
Although there are no apparent limitations on this power, it 
cannot be construed so wide as to permit rehearing on the same 
material-^-^^. It has to be kept in mind that basically this is a 
corrective or rectificatory power, so it cannot be exercised to 
order fresh hearing. 
The expression "in the manner in which it was made" cannot 
be construed as giving power to the commission to make fresh 
order in the same way as previous order was made i.e. by hearing 
parties and witnesses. But it merely indicates a procedure to be 
followed by the commission in amending or revoking an order. The 
expression has no bearing on the content of the power granted 
120 
under section 13(2) or on its scope and ambit"^ . 
Another interesting question is, can a case decided by one 
Bench of the commission be reviewed by another Bench? 
118. Mahindera and Mahindra v. Union of India AIR 1979 Sc 798 
at 813. 
119. Id at 814. 
120. Id at 812. The MRTP Commission followed this opinion of 
the Supreme court in a number of cases eg. In the matter of 
M/s Fedders lyod Corporation Pvt; Comp. Law Digest 1987 
(Vol.17) at 63; DG (I&R) v. Shara India Savings & Invst. Corp 
Ltd. (1993) 1 Comp. LJ 316; Ghasita Mai Mela Ram^ Delhi v. 
Ballapur Industries Ltd New Delhi And anr. (1992) 2 Comp. LJ 
2 52; Indian News Paper Society v. Indo-Japan Photo Films Co. 
Ltd. And anr. (1991) 71 Comp. Cas 260. 
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In M/s Meltex (India) Pvt. Ltd.^^^, an order for preliminary 
investigation was issued against the respondent by the Chairman 
of the Commission, the respondent came with an application, 
requesting to amend the order. The Chairman referred the matter 
to a Bench comprising of DC Aggarwal and H C Gupta. They came up 
with conflicting observations. 
' 12 2 
DC Aggarwal observed that the relevant Regulation"^'^^ of the 
MRTP Commission provides that an application for review under 
section 13(2) shall attract the provisions of section 114 and 
order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as far as possible. 
rules 5 and 6 of the said Order provide that where the judge/ 
judges who made the order, a review of which is applied for, 
continues or continue attached to the court at the time when the 
application for review is presented, such judge or judges or any 
of them shall hear the same. It therefore, means that where an 
order is made by two judges out of which one may have left, the 
other one should hear the review application. 
Another Member, H. C .Gupta observed that the Chairman of 
the Commission has been given power under the MRTP Act, to con-
stitute Benches . So it is in the discretion of the Chairman 
to decide as to who should be the member of a particular Bench. 
121. In the Maltex of M/s Meltex (India) Pvt. Ltd. Comp. L 
Digest (Vol.17) 1988 at 63. 
122. Regulation 85 of the MRTP Commission Regulation, 1974. 
123. Section 10 (2). 
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This power of the Commission cannot be taken away by Regulation 
85 of the MRTP Regulation, 1974. Thus a review application can be 
heard by a member or members different from those who had decided 
the case earlier. 
Akin to the above issue is, whether a larger Bench can 
decide the review application. The MRTP Commission, while answer-
ing it in affirmative in CERC v. Pressure Cooker Appliances 
Ltd^^^. laid down that it is a well settled principle of law that 
the Regulation made under the provisions of any law cannot have 
precedence over any of the provisions of that law. Regulation 85 
which makes rule 5 Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code applica-
ble to the review application, is inconsistent with section 16(2) 
of the MRTP Act. While this section authorises the chairman of 
the Commission to constitute Benches, rule 5 Order 47 takes away 
that power from the Commission by providing that it is only the 
Judge or Judges who heard the case at the first instance, must 
hear the review application also. Further, rule 5 is also incon-
sistent with section 13(2). This section gives power to the com-
mission, to review its own order but rule 5 confers this power to 
those judges only who had passed the original order. 
In order to augment its view point, the MRTP Commission 
called in aid the decision of the Supreme Court in AR Antulay v. 
124. C.F.Supra note 121. 
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R.S. Nayak and am in which (in the opinion of the Commission) 
seven member Bench heard review application against the decision 
handed down by a Bench of five members. 
It is submitted that the above two rulings of the commission 
(Meltex and Pressure Cooker) are open to question on the follow-
ing grounds: 
1. Like Regulation 85 of the MRTPC Regulation 1974, 
rule 12 of the Delhi High court rules-^^°, makes sec-
tion 114 and Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code 
applicable to review applications. Yet, it (rule 5 of 
Order 47) has been never considered by the Delhi High 
court, in consistent with the power of the Chief 
Justice to constitute Benches. 
2. The Supreme court rules while making rule 1 Order 47 
of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to review 
applications, expressly exclude the application of 
rule 5 Order 47. Had exclusion of the application of 
rule 5 Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code intended 
by the legislature, an exclusionary clause similar to 
the Supreme Court rules would have found place in 
Regulation 85. 
3. The help taken from the Supreme Court's ruling in AR 
Antulay (Supra) is not at all available as the peti-
tion in that case was heard by the apex court in an 
appeal and not in review. 
4. The constituting of larger Bench is nothing short of 
hearing the matter again, as if it were a court of 
appeal against the order of a two member Bench. The 
Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahindra (Supra) made 
it clear that the order of review cannot be construed 
so wide as to order rehearing on the same material on 
which the previous order was passed. 
125. AIR, 1981 SC 1531. 
126. Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules 1967 Chapter XIII 
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5.However, the point which goes in favour of the judg-
ment in Pressure Cooker Appliances Ltd. is that the 
one member of the Bench who handed down the earlier 
order had retired and another member (D.C.Aggarwal) of 
the Bench could not have alone reviewed the order 
passed by the two member Bench. This exigency is 
recognised in rule 5 Order 47 itself. Instead of 
laying stress on this point, MRTPC tried to arrogate 
the power under section 16(2). 
EHDWaSR TO E>UNISH F O R CXDNTEa«lE>T 
In an ordered community^ courts are established for the 
pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and 
order. In the general interest of the community it is imperative 
that the authority of the courts should not be imperilled and 
that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable 
interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed, 
it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of 
administering justice are concerned for their own dignity. It is 
because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the 
19 7 
recognised courts of the land are so f louted'*-''' . 
The MRTP Commission had no power to punish for contempt 
although the Sachar Committee did recommend a provision for 
128 
it, *•" yet it was not carried by the parliament when the MRTP 
(Amendment) Act, 1984 was passed. However, the MRTP (Amendment) 
Act, 1991 provided a provision by carving out section 13-B, which 
runs as follows: 
127. Attorney General v. Times News paper. 
128. The Sachar Committee had recommended : The Commission shall 
be a court of Record and shall have all powers of such court 
including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Id at 
280. 
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The Commission shall have, and exercise, the same juris-
diction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of 
itself as a High court has and may exercise and, for 
this purpose the provisions of the contempt of courts 
Act, 1971 shall have effect, subject to the modifica-
tions that 
a) the reference therein to a High court shall be 
construed as including a reference to the commis-
sion; 
b) the reference to the Advocate General in section 
15 of the said Act shall be construed as a refer-
ence to such law officer as the Central Govern-
ment may, by notification in the official Ga-
zette, specify in this behalf. 
Since this provision is of recent origin, the MRTP Commis-
sion did not find opportunity to deliberate on it. However, 
section 13-B makes directly the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 
applicable, so guidance can be had from the principles laid down 
by the High Courts and Supreme court on the nebulous issues. 
Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines it as 
under: 
a) Contempt of Courts "means civil contempt or crimi-
nal contempt; 
b) Civil Contempt means wilful disobedience to any 
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other 
process of a court or wilful breach of an under-
taking given to a court; 
c) Criminal contempt means the publication (whether 
by words, spoken or written or by signs or by 
visible representations, or otherwise, or any 
matter or the doing of any act whatsoever which 
i. scandalise or tends to scandalise or lowers 
or tends to lower the authority of any court, 
or 
ii. prejudicies or interferes or tends tointer 
fere with the due course of any judicial 
proceedings, 
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iii. interferes or tends to interfere with or ob 
structs or tends to obstruct, the adminis-
tration of justice in any other manner. 
d) "High Court" means the High court for a state or a 
union territory, and includes the court of the 
Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory. 
129 
The self imposed limitation of the courts on contempt 
application is that where there is an effective alternative 
remedy for enforcing the decree by normal execution proceedings, 
it will not be proper for the courts to exercise jurisdiction 
under the Contempt of Courts Act. This dictum if applied to the 
MRTP Act, a case for civil contempt will rarely be made as the 
punishment provided under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts 
Act is a maximum of 6 months simple imprisonment or with a fine 
which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both, tven. 0-^ 
apology may sometimes suffice. On the other hand, the punishment 
under section 48C of the MRTP Act for violation of the orders of 
the commission is a minimum of six months (for otherwise reasons 
have to be recorded) which may extend to 3 years and with fine 
which may extend to 10 lakh rupees. However, only effectiveness 
which Contempt of Courts Act has, is the summary nature of the 
proceedings whereas section 56 of the MRTP Act empowers the 
129. See for instance: £)r. Bimal Chandra Sen v. Mrs. Kamla Mathur, 
1983, Cr LJ 495 (Del); Indus Tewari v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1981 
All 309; Indu v. Ram Bahadur Chaturvedi AIR All 309; Ram Rup 
Pandey v. R. K. Bhargava, AIR 1971 All 231; and Calcutta 
Medical Stores v. Stadmed, (1977) 81 Cal. WN 209. 
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courts to try offences and commission itself cannot take cog-
nizance^-^^. Nevertheless Madras HC in Ramalingam v. Mahalinga 
Nador^-^^ observed that it is not expedient to involve contempt 
jurisdiction as a mode of executing a decree, or merely because 
other remedies may take time, or are more circumlocutory in 
character. 
Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act makes wilful disobe-
dience of even direction of the courts as a ground for contempt. 
This will include injunction issued by the MRTP Commission under 
section 12 A. Section 12 A itself makes the provisions of rules 
2A to 5 (both inclusive) of Order XXXiX of the first schedule to 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) applicable to the 
injunction under the MRTP Act. The question arises then; can the 
violator of injunction be prosecuted for contempt of the MRTP 
Commission under section 13-B or be brought within the confines 
of rule 2-A of Order 39 CPC. The Calcutta HC in Samii Kumar 
Sarkaz and ozs v. Mahazaj Singti^^^ and Delhi High Court in Bimal 
Chandza v. Kamla Mathuz^^^ held that it is a well settled 
130. Section 56 runs as; No court inferior to that of a court of 
session whill try any offence under this Act. The Sachar 
Committee had suggested that it is more appropriate that the 
economic offences under the Act should be tried by the 
Commission which is an expert body and more suited for this 
purpose than the Magistrate. This suggestion was not accept-
ed by the Government. 
131. AIR 1966 Mad. 21. 
132. .1983 Cri LJ NOC 11 (Cal). 
133. 1983 Cri LJ 495 Del. See also Indu Tewari v. Ram Bahaduz 
AIR 1981 309. 
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principle of law that when there is a special law and general 
law, the special law prevails over the general law since special 
procedure and provisions are contained in CPC itself under Order 
39 rule 2-A for taking action for the disobedience of an order of 
injunction, the general law of contempt of court cannot be in-
voked in such cases which is primarily reserved for what essen-
tially brings the administration of justice into contempt or un-
duly weakens it . 
Section 36-D(2) of the MRTP Act allows the commission not to 
pass cease and desist order where respondent gives an undertaking 
to remove the prejudicial effect of the trade practice. It is not 
clear as to whether violation of such undertaking be called as 
violation of section 36-D so as to bring erring respondent within 
the clutches of section 48-C. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts 
Act, 1971 expressely provides that even wilful disobedience of 
the undertaking given by the court is treated as civil contempt. 
So section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act will take care of the 
grey area left by section 36-B(2) of the MRTP Act. It is provided 
in Halsbury's laws of England"'-^ ^ and followed by the courts"*-^ ^ in 
India without any reservation that an undertaking given to a 
court by a person or corporation in pending proceedings, on the 
134. 4th Ed. Vol. 9; P. 44. 
135. See Virochen v. Ram Saran Dass, 1982 Cr. LJ 1219 (P & 
H); Saleemuddin v. Sharafuddin, AIR 1980 Del. 39; Sudhir 
Bhasim v. Babu Ram ILR (1979) 1 Del. 280; Mangal Thakur v. 
Sundar Bhagat AIR 1977 Pat. 282 and Chhanganbhai v. Soni 
Chandubhai AIR 1976 Sc 1909. 
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faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action 
or inaction has the same force as an injunction made by courts 
and a breach of the under "tair*^  ing is misconduct amounting to 
contempt. 
In fact it is the criminal contempt as defined in section 
2(c) which gave teeth to the MRTP Commission. In order to deter-
mine whether the alleged contemner has committed contemptous act 
under section 2(c), the test is to see whether the words com-
plained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or 
interfer with the course of justice and the due administration of 
law . If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the 
administration of justice, he has the ordinary remedies for 
defamation. Thus one is a wrong done to the judge personally 
<i-Yi<?- the other isawrong done to the public 
latter and not the former which is contemptuous 
; ^ 137 It is the 
Standard of Proof and Justification for Contempt: 
A ticklish question arises in case of standard of proof in 
contempt proceedings. Since section 2 of the Contempt of Courts 
Act, 1971 defines both civil and criminal contempt, a moot point 
is what should be the standard of proof as it varies in civil and 
criminal proceedings. The Karnataka High Court in K. Adinarayan 
V. S. Maziyappa^^^ held that the jurisdiction to make an order 
136. Prasad v. Emperor, AIR 1943 PC 202. 
137. B. R. Verma, Law of Contempt of Court (2nd Ed. 1986) at 96. 
138. 1984 Cr LJ 992 Kant. 
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for contempt is per se, neither civil nor criminal but is sui 
generis. The Supreme court in MR Parashaz v. Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah^^ held that contempt must be proved beyond doubt. The 
rational of this approach has been spelt out by the Division 
Bench of Madras High Court in Syed Azimudin v. Syad 
Mazharuddin that in the matter of contempt of court, the court 
apply the rules regarding evidence which are applicable in crimi-
nal cases, though the contempt may be of civil nature. The stigma 
attached to the person found quilty of contempt and the punish-
ment imposed on him are serious matters and therefore, the courts 
must be wary and must punish only those who are conclusively 
found to be guilty of flouting the orders of the court. 
On the question as to what should be (if any) justification 
for a contemptuous act, the Supreme Court came up with the con-
flicting observations. The apex court in Perspective Publication 
V. State of Maharashtra opined. 
Truthfulness or factual correctness is a good defence 
in an action for libel but in the law of contempt 
there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which 
such a defence has been recognised. 
139. 1984 Cr LJ 337 SC. 
140. 1977 2 MLJ 464. 
141. 1971 Cr. LJ 268 see also C K Daphtazy v. O P Gupta AIR 
1971 SC 1132, if evidence was to be allowed to justify 
allegations amounting to contempt of court, it would tend 
to encourage disappointed litigant. 
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Justice Mukherjea in UaUiinu Ramaktishiid Roddy v. State o£ 
Madras^^^ observed that the article in question is a scurrilous 
attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer. Spe-
cific instances have been given where the officer is alleged to 
have taken bribes or behaved with impropriety to litigants who 
did not satisfy his dishonest demands. If the allegations were 
true, obviously it would be to the benefit of the public to bring 
these matters into light. But if they were false they cannot but 
undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of 
justice and bring the judiciary to disrepute^^^. 
14 4 
It is worth while to mention here that in England Justice 
in their Report on contempt of court in 1959 suggested that good 
faith should be considered a good defence but statement should be 
made not to press but to the lord Chancel lor •'•^^ or to his MP. The 
Phillimore CominiLLee however recommended that the truth should be 
considered as a valid defence where publication was for public 
benefit . The Law Commission has recommended that only false 
142. 1952 SCR 425. 
143. Id at 434. 
144. Justice, is the name of the British Section of the Interna 
tional Commission of Jurists. 
145. In England Lord Chancellor has a power to remove judicial 
officers below High Court level if they misbehave. 
146. Phillmore Committee Report, Para 166. 
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allegations should be subject to sanctions^^' English Jurists 
have also in unequivocal terms supported that the fair conunent 
and good faith should be considered a valid defence ^ . 
E>OWE:R TO E>A.SS CEASE AISID D E S I S T ORDER 
The power to pass cease and desist order was already in the 
armoury of the MRTP Commission to control restrictive trade 
practices, when a chapter on unfair trade practices was incorpo-
rated. This power was given to the Commission on the recommenda-
tions of the Monopolies and inquiry Commission^^ and was extend-
ed to unfair trade practice through section 36-D which is as 
under: 
147. Offences Relating To Interference With The Courts of Jus-
tice(1979) law come No. 96 Para 364-370. 
148. Lord. Denning observed: We do not fear criticism nor do 
we resent it. For there is something more important at 
stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. It is the 
right of every man, in parliament or out of it, in the press 
or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken 
conunent matters to Public interest. In the same vein opines 
Salmon LJ. No criticism of a judgment however vigrous, can 
amount to contempt ol court provided it keeps within the 
limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith Cf Supra note 
127 at 93. 
149. The Monopolies and Inquiry Commission observed: Where the 
judicial examination results in a finding that no restric-
tive trade practice is being pursued or that though such a 
practice is being pursued, it is in the interest of the 
general public, or that it does not work to the common 
detriment, no further action need to be taken except that 
the decision should be given proper publicity in a suitable 
way. Where the decision is otherwise, in other words, where 
the finding is that one or more enterprises are guilty of 
pursuing a restrictive practice to the common detriment, 
something in addition to giving publicity to the finding is 
called for.Vlethink the most fruitful line of action would be 
the issue by the commission itself of an order to discontin-
ue the practice. 
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The commission may inquire into any unfair trade prac-
tice which may come before it for inquiry and if after 
such inquiry, it is of the opinion that the practice is 
prejudicial to the public interest, or to the interest 
of any consumer or consumers generally, it may by order 
direct that: 
a. the practice shall be discontinued and shall not be 
repeated; and 
b. any agreement relating to such unfair trade practice 
shall be void or shall stand modified in respect 
there of in such manner as may be specified in the 
order. 
The working of the MRTP Commission shows that it has not 
passed cease and desist order so vigorously as it ought to have, 
keeping in view the rush of the inquiries instituted against the 
unfair trade practices. This finding is based on the following 
table. 
TABLE - III 
Statement showing year wise institution and disposal o£ the 
inquiries U/S 36 D(i) and cease and desist orders passed thereof. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
No. of 
enq. 
brought 
forward 
Nil 
53 
89 
258 
615 
773 
651 
577 
No. 
ins 
the 
of enq. 
t. during 
year 
54 
96 
256 
512 
428 
196 
175 
168 
No. of enq. 
disposed of 
during the 
year 
6 
60 
87 
155 
270 
318 
249 
238 
No. of enq. 
pending 
the 
the 
end 
yeai 
53 
89 
258 
615 
773 
651 
577 
507 
at 
of 
No of 
cease 
& desist 
orders 
passed 
Nil 
Nil 
1 
26 
57 
31 
22 
11 
SOURCE: The 14th - 21st Annual Reports pertaining to the Execu-
tion of the Provisions of the MRTP Act, 1969. The 22nd 
and 23rd Annual Reports do not contain such information. 
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Section 36-D Not in Consonance With Section 36-B 
Section 36-B deals with the issue of locus Standi and grants 
standing not only to the consumer, consumer association, trade 
association, central and state Governments and Director General 
but also empowers the MRTP Commission to file a complaint sue 
motu either upon its own knowledge or information. On the other 
hand, section 36-D provides that the "Commission may inquire into 
any unfair trade practice which may come before it for inquiry". 
This expression does not embrass within its import the suo motu 
inquiry which Commission is competent to institute by virtue of 
section 36-B. There is no decision from the Commission on this 
point vis-a-vis unfair trade practices. However, similar issue 
was agitated with respect to restrictive trade practices under 
section 37-D in I.T.C. v. MRTP Conunission^^^ and it was observed 
that the words "come before it" do not necessarily mean that it 
would come before the Commission from other sources than its own 
knowledge and information. This is a beneficial construction of 
the expression and it is suggested that the same interpretation 
should be given to section 36-D. However, in order to avoid any 
possible controversy, it is suggested that the words "which may 
come before it for inquiry" be omitted from section 36-D. 
A very interesting question arises in respect of the unfair 
trade practice which has been discontinued before the MRTP Com-
mission passes cease and desist order. A trader may adopt an 
unfair trade practice and when a complaint against him is filed 
150. (1975) 2 Comp LJ 274. 
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before the MRTP Commission, he may discontinue that practice. 
This fact received judicial notice in England with respect to 
restrictive trade practice and lord Evershed made, the following 
observations: 
It was the intention of the parliament to prevent what 
might otherwise be a simple means of evading the Act, 
i.e. by cancelling any relevant agreement as soon as 
there was any threat or likelihood of it being brought 
before the Court, then reviving it immediately after 
any proceeding had ended . 
The Allahabad High court while over-ruling the opinion of 
the single judge Bench in R D Saxena v. J K Synthetics Ltd. and 
ors^^^ held that the proceedings under section 37 were not ren-
dered futile by the expiry of the period for which the impugned 
agreement was entered into. The powers of the Commission to 
inquire into restrictive trade practices were not exhausted by 
the discontinuance of the practice, whether before or during the 
pendency of the inquiry. However, the approach of the MRTP Com-
mission in respect of the unfair trade practice has been quite 
opposite. The Commission has dropped proceedings once it has been 
brought to its knowledge that the alleged unfair trade practice 
in question has been discontinued^-* . This approach, it is sub-
mitted, will provide an escape route for the trader as envisaged 
151. Cf. H.M.Jhala, The Law of MRTP in India (1981) at 196. 
152. Special Appeal No.249 of 1976 decided on 15.6.1978 3 RTPI 
478. 
153. See for details 15th - 23rd Annual Reports of the MRTP 
Commission Pertaining To The Execution of The provisions of 
The MRTP Act, 1969. 
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by Lord Evershed (Supra). Therefore, it is suggested that an 
Explanation be attached to section 36-D making it mandatory for 
the Commission to launch fulfledged proceedings irrespective of 
the fact whether the prohibited practice is in force or has been 
discontinued. On reaching to the conclusion that the disputed 
practice although discontinued, was prejudicial to public inter-
est, a desist order can be passed so that if it is repeated, the 
violator will be punished under section 48-C. If the approach as 
suggested, is not adopted, then the Commission cannot punish the 
violator for repeating a prohibited practice as section 48-C 
makes punishable the Commission's orders and mere dropping of 
proceedings cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as an 
order. 
The above suggested interpretation is in conformity with the 
provision of 36-D(l) which says that the Commission may by order, 
direct that the practice shall be discontinued or shall not be 
repeated. The words "or shall not be repeated" refer to those 
practices which have been already discontinued. The word "or" is 
significant. Had the intention of the legislature been different, 
then instead of "or" "and" should have been used. 
The other question is as to whether the cease and desist 
order precludes any trader from employing any other unfair trade 
practice which was not in question when the said order was 
passed. Section 36-D(l) is silent on this count. But MRTP Commis-
sion* in Vadodaza Sahez Gzahak Mandal & Ozs v. Rajesh Patel^^^ 
154. (1991) 3 Comp LJ 179. 
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laid down that an order of the Conunission directing the respond-
ent that "he shall not indulge in the impugned unfair trade 
practice as per the notice of enquiry", should be construed as an 
order preventing the respondent from continuing not only the 
prohibited practice which was in question but also any other 
155 
unfair trade practice which he might carry on in future . 
It is submitted that the opinion of the Commission satisfies 
the spirit of the Act. Since unlike Trade Description^Act, 1968 
(England), the MRTP Act does not make mere indulgence in unfair 
trade practice as an offence but has its role limited to cease 
and desist order which can at the best be called an order "to 
stop and sin no more", the present approach will deter a trader 
from indulging in unfair trade practice, once a cease and desist 
order is passed against him. Nevertheless, the opinion is not in 
accord with the letter of law. As Section 36-D(2) provides that 
"such practice" shall be discontinued "and not" such practices 
"shall be discontinued". 
Secondly, section 13(3) clearly states that an order made by 
the Commission may be general in its application or may be limit-
ed to any particular class of traders or particular class of 
trade practice or particular locality. Thus it must be spelt out 
in the order itself, whether the Commission wants to proscribe 
only the practice in question or such like practices which the 
respondent is likely to adopt in future. 
155. Id at 181. 
295 
Section 36(D) prohibits an unfair trade practice which is 
prejudicial to public interest or the interest of the consumer or 
consumer's generally. It is not clear as to whether, the Commis-
sion can pass cease and desist order under sub section (l), of 
section 36-D where the unfair trade practice is prejudicial to 
any trader or manufacturev, Under section 36-B a complaint can be 
filed inter alia by a trade association and a trade association 
has been defined as a body of persons formed for furtherance of 
the trade interest of its members"'-^^. A single trader or a class 
of traders cannot file a complaint. Naturally no cease and desist 
order can be passed even if the practice is injurious to compet-
ing trader or class of traders. Since under section 12-A injunc-
tion can be granted on the application of a trader or class of 
traders and under section 12-B compensation can be granted to a 
trader or class of traders, so there is a need for harmonious 
construction of sections 12-A, 12-B, 36-B and 36-D. This can be 
possible only by interpreting the words "public interest" under 
section 36-D as to cover both, class of traders as well as a 
single trader"^^^. 
However, it is suggested that like consumer, trader may be 
accorded locus standi under section 36-B and Commission be empow-
ered to pass cease and desist order, where a trade practice is 
156. Section 2(1). 
157. S. M. Dugar holds also similar opinion see S. M. Dugar 
law Relating to Restrictive and Unfair Trade Practices with 
Consumer Protection (1992) at 412. 
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prejudicial to competing trader. Since traders as compared to 
consumers are more alert and conscious of the tricks employed by 
their competing traders, so arming them with the power to file 
complaint, will give boost to the consumer movement. It will be 
quite apposite to mention here that in USA, section 5 of the 
original Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 was interpreted to 
cover relief only to the rival traders and the rationale was that 
competing traders will force each other not to resort to unfair 
business practices and consumer will automatically get fair deal. 
It is only through wheeler lea Amendment Act, 1938 that the reach 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 was extended to consum-
ers also. 
Consent Order: 
There is a school of thought which believes that if business 
has to be regulated, it can be through persuasion and not by 
sanctions and for proper functioning of the regulatory system it 
is sine qua non that the people are to be consulted and given an 
opportunity to express their views on it-'-^ °. This is perhaps the 
reason that the legislature gave option to the MRTP Commission 
either to pass cease and desist order or to pass consent order. 
Section 36-D(2) provides that the Commission may, instead of 
making any order under this section, permit any party to carry on 
any trade practice, if it so applies and take such steps within 
the time specified by the Commission as may be necessary to 
158. D. N. Saraf; Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission in Action -- Some Reflections on Consumer Protection 
31 JILI (1989) at 303. 
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ensure that the trade practice is no longer prejudicial to public 
interest or to the interest of any consumer or consumers general-
ly, and in any such case, if the Commission is satisfied that the 
necessary steps have been taken within the time so specified, it 
may decide not to make any order under this section in respect of 
that trade practice. 
The MRTP Commission while invoking section 36-D(2) has 
approved a good number of consent orders as is shown by table IV 
below: 
TABLE : IV 
Statement showing year wise Institution and disposal o£ inquiries 
relating to unfair trade practices and approval of consent orders 
by the Commission under section 36-D(2). 
Year No. of enquiries No. of enquiries No of consent 
instituted disposed orders passed 
1984 54 6 Nil 
1985 96 60 58 
1986 266 87 83 
1987 612 155 106 
1988 428 270 296 
1989 196 318 249 
1990 175 249 223 
1991 168 238 198 
SOURCE: The 14th - 21st Annual Reports pertaining to the Execu-
tion of the Provisions of the MRTP Act, 1969. The 22nd 
and 23rd Annual Reports do not contain such information. 
The working of the MRTP Commission shows that under section 
36-D(2) enough latitude is given by the commission to the busi-
ness tycoons, indulging in unfair trade practices. The Commission 
accepted the qualified undertakings like the one as under: 
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That the respondent has not committed any RTP/UTP, 
without in any way admitting the RTP/UTP, the respond-
ent undertakes not to repeat it . 
What is worst, section 36-D(2) enjoins the MRTP Commission 
to ensure that the respondent has taken appropriate steps to 
purge the business from the taint of being prejudicial to the 
public interest, the Commission never bothered to monitor the 
trade practices adopted by the respondent subsequent to the 
consent order^ . 
A point is»where Commission issues a consent order under 
section 36-D(2), can that order be appealed under section 55 by 
the Director General or any other complainant, if they are not 
satisfied with such order? One possible interpretation is that 
section 36-D(2) says that "instead of making an order" which 
means that the consent order under 36-D(2) is not an order at all 
and hence not appealable under section 55. The other view is that 
the decision "not to make an order" under section 36-D(2) would 
be taken as an order itself and hence appealable . 
A question similar to the above is relating to the violation 
of the consent order. In other words where a respondent under-
159. Cf Ibid. 
160. Supra note 153. MRTP Commission is empowered under section 
13-A to order investigation either by the DG or by any other 
person to verify whether respondent has compiled with the 
orders of the Commission or not. 
161. H. M. Jhala holds this opinion in respect of section 37 
which is almost similar to section 36-D. See supra note 151 
at 203. See also Delhi Pipe Dealers Association v. Indian 
tube CO. ltd. and anr RTPE No. IA/74 MRTPC order dated 
25.12.75. 
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takes not to repeat the practice, can commission launch prosecu-
tion under section 48-C against such respondent if he violates 
his own undertaking or it has to pass first cease and desist 
order before taking such action. The language of section 48-C 
reads as under: 
If any person contravenes any order made by the Com-
mission under section 36-D, he shall be punishable 
with imprisonment which shall not be less than six 
months term or which may extend to three years and 
with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees. 
The language of section 48-C is clear on the point that so 
far as section 36-D goes there is no difference between the order 
passed under section 36-D(l) and 36-D(2). Violation o£ both these 
orders invite penal consequences. 
« 
Thus it is submitted that even consent order is an order and 
violation of which will result in penal consequences under sec-
tion 48-C. This is a proper interpretation, otherwise consent 
order will provide a gate-way of escape for respondent who will 
give readily an undertaking knowing fully well that the breach of 
it is not going to affect him in any way. 
Another nebulous issue surrounding section 36-D is the 
competence of the MRTP Commission to pass consent order without 
holding a full-fledged inquiry as envisaged under sections 36-C 
and 36-E read with section 11. In otherwords the point in issue 
is can the MRTP Commission pass consent order without holding 
inquiry as otherwise required? There is no authority on this 
point from the MRTP Commission vis-a-vis unfair trade practices. 
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However, with respect to restrictive trade practices, the Commis-
16 2 
si on in Delhi Pipe Dealers Association v. Indian Tube Co. Ltd. 
answered it in affirmative. However, Calcutta High Court in 
Bengal Potteries Ltd. v. MRTP Commission imposed a condition 
by saying that the requisite permission can be granted only to 
the parties to a restrictive trade practice. Before exercising 
any discretion under section 37(2) of the Act, the Commission 
must come to the conclusion that the applicant is a party to the 
restrictive trade practice. However, if the applicant concedes 
that an assumption be made that the conditions for the applica-
tion of section 37(1) do exist, the application can be enter-
tained. It is submitted that the above ruling is beneficial as it 
will save time, money and energy of the Commission and the de-
sire^ object can be achieved at the earliest. So it is suggested 
that a similar approach be adopted with respect to unfair trade 
practices also. 
False or misleading advertisement once viewed has its own 
life. Once a false or misleading advertisement has been success-
ful in creating an image among the masses, there will be residual 
effect of the unlawful advertising, which will continue to in-
fluence the consumer's decision to purchase, even after the 
unlawful advertising itself has been discontinued . Studies 
162. 1975 Tax. LR 2034. 
163. (1975) 2 Comp LJ 401. 
164. Ferald J Thaiti; Consumer Protection : Advertising - The FTC 
Response; The Business Lawyer, April, 1972 at 894. 
301 
have indicated that there is normally a delayed response b^ 
consumers to advertisements^^. This delayed consumer response to 
or residual effect of an advertisement, is a recognised phenome-
non in advertising . The cease and desist order rightly called 
as an order to go and sin no more"^" is often ineffective as it 
does not help to dissipate the false impression previously creat-
ed by such advertisement. 
The premise of corrective advertising is that it can prevent 
this continuing deception by eliminating the false impressior 
that may result from the lingering effect of a false or mislead-
ing advertisement. It is aimed at correcting this false impres-
sion in a manner calculated to gain exposure equal to that of the 
initial deception . 
Like MRTP (before Amendment Act, 1991) and CP Acts, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of USA does not expressly provide 
any power to the Federal Trade Commission to order for corrective 
165. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Advertis-
ing at 107-108 (1968) See also Charlton & Fawcett, The FTC 
and False Advertising, 17 UK, Law Review 599, 600 (1969). 
166. Id at 108. 
167. Robert Pitsofsky; Beyond Nadar : Consumer Protection and the 
Regulation of Advertising. Harv. LR. Vol. 90 (1977) at 
687. 
168. Corrective Advertising - The New Response to Consumer Decep 
tion, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1972) at 416. However in Eng-
land the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968 Review Committee recom-
• mended against corrective advertising. It thought that it 
might fail to reach those who were misled. For Criticism of 
this view see Ross Cranston, Consumers and the Law (1978) at 
51. In Australia a provision to direct advertiser to issue 
corrective advertisement is provided under section 80-A of 
the Trade Practices Act, 1974. 
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I C Q 
advertisement. However, in ITT Continental Banking Co^ , the 
Federal Trader Commission went beyond the traditional cease and 
desist order. In this case respondent was falsely advertising 
that its bread product designated by the trade name "Profile" was 
effective for weight reduction. The Federal Commission gave 
option to the respondent, either to cease and desist from dis-
seminating the advertisement for a period of one year from the 
date of this order, oz to spend not less than 25% of total expen-
diture (excluding production cost) for each media in each market, 
for advertising in a manner approved by the authorised represen-
tatives of the Federal Commission that profile bread is not 
effective for weight reduction, contrary to possible interpreta-
tions of prior advertising. In the case of radio and television 
advertising, such advertising is to be disseminated in the same 
print media as other advertising of profile bread. 
It is submitted that this judgment has to a great extent 
militated the deterrent effect of the corrective advertisement by 
giving option to the advertiser, not to advertise his product for 
one year. Since the objective of the corrective advertisement is 
to dissipate the lingering effect of false or misleading adver-
tisement, how this residual effect can be removed by simply 
stopping the advertiser from advertising the product for one 
year? In order to achieve the desired result from corrective 
advertising, proper approach is to direct the advertiser to spend 
not less than 25% of the total advertising cost on corrective 
169. 36 FED REG 18,522 (1971). 
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advertising, for the period, for which false advertisement had 
7 n been shown 
The circumstances in which corrective advertisement may be 
ordered have been outlined in Warner - lambert Co v. Federal 
Trade Conuaission^^ ^. The tests are (1) the deceptive advertise-
ment must have played a substantial role in creating or reinforc-
ing in the public mind a false belief which survives even after 
the false advertising ceases. (2) there is clear and continuing 
injury to competition and to the consuming public as consumers 
continue to make purchasing decisions based on the false belief 
and injury cannot be averted by merely requiring respondent to 
cease disseminating the advertisement. 
It is submitted that the case of Warner-lambert, has laid 
down a high standard for invoking the corrective advertisement 
remedy. This case was unusual. It had disseminated advertisement 
for fifty long years and broadcast up to the date of suit. The 
manufacturer has claimed that the mouthwash was effective in 
ameliorating, preventing and curing cold and sore throats. There 
was persuasive evidence that the claim was believed by purchasers 
at least upto the time of suit. So record did support each of 
those findings. It is difficult to apply this standard in hard 
170. The FTC has already recognised that in certain cases 
the option of refraining from advertising for a year will 
not be available. New York Times, Dec. 3, 1971, p. 27 Cf. 
Supra note 5. 
171. 1977, 562 F 2d. 749. 
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cases. Even in America it has been argued that if these issues 
are made relevant in the corrective advertising contex-t and the 
burden of proof for each is placed on the commission staff, the 
17 2 
remedy would be imposed rarely 
Robert Pitofsky has proposed that in order to invoke the 
remedy of corrective advertising, the commission should prove 
1. the existence of a material fraud or deception with 
respect to a major advertising theme; 
2. that his fraud created in a substantial number of 
consumers a misconception about the product; and 
3. that this misconception significantly influenced the 
purchasing decisions of these consumers . 
Even Pitofsky's proposition will not at present suit Indian 
scheme of things. Clause (2) and (3) will require objective 
analysis of consumer views which can be obtained through surveys 
only. In India, at present there is no Governmental or Semi 
Governmental agency which can undertake this job, so to elicit 
the consumer views about a particular advertisement, is not easy. 
The MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 has incorporated clause (c) 
in section 36(d) which runs as follows: 
Any information, statement or advertisement relating to 
such unfair trade practice shall be disclosed, issued 
or published as the case may be, in such manner as may 
be specified in the order. 
172. Supra note 4 at 697. 
173. Ibid. 
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Thus whether a corrective advertisement can be ordered, or 
nor, depends upon the Commission's own assessment of the situa-
tion. If situation demands. Commission has now express powers to 
issue corrective advertisement which is independent of the con-
sumer perceptions. What should be the duration of such advertise-
ment? How long shall it go and what should be the media, on which 
it will be displayed, are the questions which the Commission has 
to decide himself. 
Corrective Advertising and The Constitution: 
Art 19(i)(a) of the Indian constitution guarantees Freedom 
of Speech. The question which came for judicial determination in 
Hamdard Dawakhani v. Union of India^ was whether commercial 
advertising falls within the freedom of speech? The apex court 
answered it in negative for the reason, that the commercial 
advertisements propagate the efficacy, value and importance of 
goods and not the ideas, social, political or economic . Howev-
er, more than two decades later, the apex court changed its 
1 7 fi 
opinion in IB News papez Bombay Ltd. v. Union of India and 
held that the observations made in the Hamdard Dewakhana case are 
too broady stated. The commercial advertisements cannot be denied 
the protection of Article 19 (l)(a) of the Constitution merely 
174. AIR 1960 Sc 551. 
175. Id at 563 See also Ushodaya Publications Pvt. Ltd. v. AP 
(81) A.A.P. 109 (FB). 
176. AIR 1986 Sc 515. 
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because they are issued by businessmen . In a recent case of 
Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.^'^^ the Supreme 
court went ahead by extending the protection of Art. 19(1)(a) 
not only to advertisers but also consumers. It was laid down that 
this Article guarantees not only freedom of speech and expression 
but it also protects the rights of the individual to listen, read 
and receive the said speech. So far as the economic needs of 
citizens are concerned, their fulfilment has to be guided by 
their information, disseminated through the advertisements. The 
protection of this Article is available to the Speaker as well as 
17 9 to the receipient of the speech . 
After elevating commercial advertisements to the status of 
speech and expressioguaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a ) , the question 
arises, is this freedom absolute or subject to some restrictions? 
The American Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharm-
acy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.°^ made it clear 
that the extending of protection of first constitutional amend-
ment to commercial advertising does not mean that the protection 
is absolute and admits no restriction. Some forms of commercial 
speech regulations are surely permissible and in Central 
111. Id at 547. 
178. AIR 1995 Sc 2438. 
179. Id at 448. 
180. (1976) 425 US 748. 
181. Id at 1830. 
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Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York^^^, the court laid down four pronged test to enable the 
advertisement to reap the benefits of first amendment. These are: 
I) to determine whether the activity is lawful i.e. it should not 
be misleading (2) whether the asserted Government interest is 
substantial, if both inquiries yield positive answers, then it 
must be determined (3) whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest (4) and whether it is not more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest. The restrictions 
propounded in the Central Hudson are in-applicable in India for 
the reason, that the courts in India do not enjoy the freedom to 
impose restrictions which they consider reasonable like the 
American courts. In America, the first amendment simply says that 
"congress shall not make any law.... abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press". In India restrictions are mentioned in 
Art. 19 itself which are declared reasonable and courts have no 
scope to impose any restriction which is not mentioned in Art. 
19(2). This restriction on the power of courts is realised by the 
apex court also. In Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahnager Telephone 
Niganr°^, it was aptly made clear: 
Unlike the first amendment under the American Constitu-
tion, our Constitution itself lays down in Art. 19(2) 
the restrictions that can be imposed on the Fundamental 
rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitu-
tion. 
182. (1980) 447 US 557. 
183. Supra note 179. 
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This corrective advertising generated a debate in America as 
to its constitutionality. 
Roseden-^ '^^  believes that the corrective advertising remedy 
is devoid of constitutional mandate for the following reasons: 
1. Corrective adver Lisemeiits are indirect or secondary 
restraints imposed by an administrative action 
Such restraints are prior restraints which are 
permissible either in a statute imposing penal 
sanctions under the far reaching procedural safe-
guards provided in the American legal system or 
if it comes within one of the established exceptions 
to the bar of first amendment. Since Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 1914 is not a penal statute, nor 
procedural safeguards as that of penal sanction are 
provided, and it also does not come under any of the 
exceptions to first amendment, so corrective adver-
tising is unconstitutional. 
184. Roseden; A Treatise on the law of Advertising Vol.1, 1978 at 
9-43. 
185. Roseden is in agreement with the classification of 
prior restraint propounded by Prof. Emersion in his Article 
"The Doctrine of Prior Restraint," 20 Law and Contempt, prob 
648 (1955). Prof. Emersion divides the circumstances to 
which prior restraint applies into 4 classes. The fourth 
class is "Indirect or secondary restraints. This covers the 
restraint imposed by the administrative action. Roseden is 
of the opinion that this fourth class of prior restraints 
covers corrective advertising also Id, 9 - 10. 
186. Roseden opines that if a civil proceeding is available 
against a prior restraint and if such civil proceeding 
contains safeguards equal to those governing a criminal 
proceeding such prior restraints may be also permissible in 
matters other than those concerning obscenity . This ob-
servation of Roseden is infact based on the combined effect 
of the cases; Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697, 717; Kingsley 
Books Inc V. Brown 364 US 513 (1958) and Speiser v. Randall 
357 US 513 (1958). However, he himself admits that in any 
event, we have rarely, if ever seen civil proceedings pre-
scribing safeguards equal to the traditional safeguards of 
criminal proceedings, so that in final analysis, the broad-
ening of the exceptions as contained in Kingslay and Speis-
er, is unlikely to have any practical effect. 
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2. CurrecLive advertisements are not in comport with 
the liibt aiiieiidiiient as the thesis underlying the cor-
rective advertising is that it erases the residual 
effect of the deceptive advertisement but no reliable 
surveys as to such retention are available. So its 
duration and its effect are purely speculative. To 
invade the property right of the persons on the ground 
of a speculative concept is wholly arbitrary. Further-
more, the retention for any length of time extends only 
to the name of a product or to a slogan that has been 
repeated incessantly and possibly to the general pur-
pose of the product. Therefore, unless past deception 
is inherent in the name of a product or in the slogan, 
there is little if any retention. It is certainly 
unwarranted to infer from the fact of retention of a 
brand name or a slogen those details of advertisements 
18 7 
which have been deceptive . 
Roseden while questioning constitutionality of corrective 
advertising, has his eye on the first and fifth amendments of 
the American Constitution and judicial gloss put on these amend-
ments. It is to be seen how far his observations hold true to 
Indian Constitution. 
The fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression 
incorporated in Art. 19(1)(a) stands on different footing than 
the first diaendiueiiL to American Constitution. The American Con-
stitution does not contain any restriction to the freedom encom-
passed, whereas Art. 19(2) itself lays down the restrictions 
which can be imposed on freedom of speech and expression. This 
marked difference was realised by Douglas J in Kingslay Cozpoza-
tion V. Regents ot the University of New York °, it was laid 
down : 
187. Supra note 29a at 9-29 
188. 360 US 684, 698 . 
U) 
If we had a provision in our constitution for reason-
able regulation of the press such as India has included 
in her's there would be room for argument that censor-
ship in the interest of morality will be permissible. 
The Supreme court of India also in unequivocal terms made itCL 
•1 Q Q 
in Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration when it was held: 
In our opinion, it ia hardly fruitful to refer to the 
American decisionSparticularly when this court has more 
than once enunciated the scope and effect of Art.19 
(l)(a)... our constitution provides reasonable, pre-
cise, general guidance in the matter. It would then be 
misleading to construe it in the light of American 
decisions given in the different contextr . 
Thus the opinion of Roseden shall not apply mutates mutandis 
to the Indian Constitution. However, the question which needs an 
answer here is, whether the effect of prior restraint of correc-
tive advertising is sufficient to quash this remedy as unconsti-
tutional? The Supreme Court of India in a K A Abbas v. Union of 
India allowed the precensorship of cinematography films and 
opined that it does not violate freedom of speech and expression 
as these restrictions are permissible on the grounds of decency 
and morality. On the same analogy prior restraints in the guise 
of corrective advertising shall not infringe Art. 19(1)(a) pro-
vided of course Art.19(2) permits such restrictions.In Tata Press 
189. (1973) 3 SCR 533 See also Iran-Cochin v. Bombay Co. Ltd; 
1952 SCR/112 Bombay v. M D Chamarbang-walla 1957 SCR 878. 
190. M H Seervani : Constitutional Law of India, 3rd ed. Vo.1 at 
491 
191. (1971) 2 SCR 446. 
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Ltd. V. Mahanagar Telephone Nigan?'^'^, the apex courtdeclared that 
the false, deceptive and untruthful advertisements would be hit 
by Art.19(2) and can be regulated/prohibited by the State. Howev-
er, the court did not give any inkling about the ground under 
which such advertisements will be prohibited, as the grounds like 
false, deceptive and untruthful do not find place under Art 19(2) 
which runs as under: 
Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect 
the operation of any law or prevent State from making 
law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restric-
tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the 
said subclause in the interest of the sovereignty and 
integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly 
relations with the foreign state, public order, decency 
or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defa-
mation or incitement to an offence. 
Furthermore, it is now well established through judicial 
dicta^^-^ that the restrictions which are imposed for securing the 
objects which are enjoined by Directive principles of state 
policy included in part iv of the Constitution may be regarded as 
reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause (2) - (6) of 
Art. 19. Therefore, Art. 38(1) merits mention here: 
The state shall strive to promote the welfare of the 
people by securing and protecting as effectively as it 
may, a social order in which justice, social, economic 
and political, shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life. Further AYt 14 permits classification 
and not class legislation. A classification between 
fair and false/ deceptive advertisement is permissible 
under Att 14. 
1 9 2 . Supra n o t e 1 8 3 . 
1 9 3 . State of Bombay v. Valsara ( 1 9 5 1 ) SCR 6 8 2 ; Bejoy Cotton 
Mills V. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 33 Orient (leaving 
Mills V. Union of India 1962 Supp. 3 SCR 487 ; Hanief Qur-
eshi V. State of Bihar; AIR 1958 SC 7 3 1 . 
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Thus Arts.14^19(2) and 38(1) allow the placing of reasonable 
restrictions on commercial advertisements on the grounds of 
decency, morality^^ and for the welfare of the public. These 
expressions are of wide connotation but they are circumscribed 
by an equally important condition, that is, these restrictions 
must have a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved. The problem in India is to determine modes operandi of 
these restrictions. Section 36-D of the MRTP Act, 1969 gives 
option to the MRTP Commission either to pass cease and desist 
order or consent order. The commission has been armed with the 
power by MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 to direct the respondent that 
194. It is worth while to mention here that after amendments to 
MRTP Act in 1991, the definition of unfair trade practice is 
almost similar to section 5 of the Federal Trade Practices 
Act, 1914 as amended by the wheeler lea amendment Act 1938. 
The Supreme Court of America in FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson 
laid down the tests to determine whether a trade practice is 
an unfair one. These tests revolve round the broad parameters 
of decency and morality which are as follows: 
a. Whether the practice without necessarily having been pre-
viously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it 
has been established by statutes, the common law or other-
wise -- whether, in otherwords it is within atleast the 
penumbra of some common law, statutory or other concepts of 
unfairness, b. Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive or unscrupulous.Whether it causes substantial injury 
to consumer: 405 us 233, 244-54.(1972). 
195. The words decency and morality should not be given 
narrow interpretation as enunciated in R V Hicklin (1868)3 
QB 360 or gs provided under statutory definition incorporat-
ed in obscne Publication Act, 1959 of England but what may 
be regarded as decent and moral from the business point of 
view. 
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any information statement or advertisement relating to such 
unfair trade practice shall be disclosed, issued or published as 
the case may be in such manner as may be specified in the 
order. This power of the commission is wide enough to include 
affirmative disclosure as well as corrective Advertising . Thus 
the MRTP commission will be within the confines of its right If 
it believes that mere cease and desist order or consent order 
will not dissipate the lingering effect of false or deceptive 
advertisement and will require the advertisers to issue correc-
tive advertisement or have affirmative disclosure in future 
advertisements and how much he shall spend on such advertisement 
is for the commission to determine. 
Second important challenge posed by Roseden's observations 
is that the corrective advertising order do not satisfy consti-
tutionally necessary substantive pre requisites .He opines that 
the residual effect which through corrective advertising is 
attempted to erase, is based simply on conjectures and constitu-
tionally protected right cannot be taken away on mere 
conjecture. He also questions the present FTC approach to order 
196. Section 36-D (c). 
197. Corrective advertisement may be compared to, and is variant 
of affirmative disclosure, yet it differs in certain import-
ant respects. Traditionally, affirmative disclosures have 
been required only where the failure to reveal certain facts 
in current advertisements might actively mislead the consum-
er where as corrective advertising is a remedy designed to 
counteract abuses brought about through past false adver-
tisement. See Note; Corrective Advertising -- The New Re-
sponse to Consumer Deception 72 Col. L Rev. 415, 419. 
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respondent to issue corrective advertisement for all products 
alike. These observation of Roseden holds good under the present 
Indian scheme of laws also. The residual effect which corrective 
advertisement has to rub off must be proved one and not based on 
surmises, similarly MRTP commission cannot evolve a general rule 
applicable to all and sundry but has to examine the facts and 
peculiarities of each case. The approach of FTC to issue correc-
tive advertisement for one year and spend 25% of the advertising 
expenditure for all products alike may in certain situations fall 
to serve the purpose or may be more than demanded by the situa-
tion. So y^^'t cLu ration and the amount to be spent must be kept 
onJL 
open dependent upon the circumstances of the case. 
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POWERS OF THE 
CONSUMER FORA 
ViS-A-ViS 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 
The powers which the District consumer forum can exercise 
are enumerated in section 14 of the CP Act. Similar powers can be 
exercised by the State Commissions and National Commission by 
virtue of sections 18 and 22 respectively. These powers are : 
a) to remove the defect pointed out by the appropriate 
laboratory from the goods in question; 
b) to replace the goods with new goods of similar de-
scription which shall be free from any defect; 
c) to return to the complainant the price, or , as the 
case may be, the charges paid by the complainant; 
d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compen-
sation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered 
by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite 
party; 
e) to remove the defects or deficiencies in the services 
in question; 
f) to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the re-
strictive trade practice or not to repeat them; 
g) not to offer the hazardous goods for sale; 
h) to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered for 
sale; 
i) to provide adequate cost to parties. 
The above mentioned powers can be exercised by the Redressal 
Agencies only when after conducting the proceedings under section 
13, they are satisfied that the goods complained against suffer 
from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of 
the allegations contained in the complaint about the services is 
proved. 
Section 14, it is submitted, is not properly drafted. It 
says that the Redressal Agencies can exercise powers only when 
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they are satisfied that the goods sufffer from any of the defects 
or allegations made in the complaint against Lhe services are 
proved. However, complaint as defined under section 2(c) can lie 
not only against "defects" or "deficiencies" but also against 
unfair or restrictive trade practices, excessive price charging 
and goods hazardous to life, it is therefore, suggested that 
section 14 be recast to provide "if after the proceedings con-
ducted under section 13, the District forum is satisfied that any 
of the allegations contained in the complaint are proved". 
The powers enumerated in section 14 are not in comport with 
section 2(c) which defines complaint. Section 2(c)(iv) runs as 
under: 
A trader has charged for the goods mentioned in the 
complaint, a price in excess of the price fixed by or 
under any law for the time being in force or displayed 
on the goods or any pacl^age containing such goods. 
The Redressal Agencies do not possess power to order return 
of excess price charged by the trader in violation of the price 
fixed by or under any law for the time being in force or dis-
played on the goods or its package. Found fettered by this legis-
lative lapse, the MP State Commission in Bhazgav Auto & Electric 
Stores V. Lajjaram Tiwari^, observed: 
It cannot be said that section 14 empowers the District 
Forum to grant any relief in case of charging of excess 
price by a trader. This may be a legislative lacuna or 
a loop-hole but, it is not for us to plug it or to 
ignore it. We therefore, hold that no relief can be 
1. 1(1994) CPJ 455 
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granted by a District Forum in the matter of complaints 
regarding charging of excess price . 
It is suggested that section 14 be amended to incorporate a 
clause empowering the District Forum to order return of excess of 
any price charged. The clause may run as follows: 
To return the consumer price charged in excess of the 
price fixed by or under the law for the time being in 
force or displayed on the goods or its package. 
The National Commission has taken a stand that the re-
liefs enumerated in section 14 are exhaustive and not 
illustrative. In otherwords consumer fora are bound to grant 
only those reliefs as are mentioned in section 14'^ . However, 
the National Commission itself did not stick to its own 
,Id at 458. On the other hand The National Commission in Bharat 
Tractors v. Shri Ram Chandra Pandey, F.A. No 1 of 1989 order 
dated May, 17, 1989 did not interfere with the iJtate Commis-
sion's order requiring the respondent to return excess amount. 
D. N. Saraf opines that although this power is not mentioned 
expressly in section 14, this is an implied power which consum-
er fora must excercise. See D. N. Saraf, Law of Consumer Pro-
tection in India (1st. ed 1990) at 167. 
,See for instance Devashish Mitra v. The Managing Director 
Lakshime Varsha company & Anr 1 (1992) CPJ 30; Anil Kumar 
Pareek v. Municipal Board Shahpura 11 (1991) CPJ 250. In both 
these cases complainant claimed that fraud has been perpetrat-
ed on him by the respondent. But the apex Commission declined 
to grant relief in view of section 14; see also Rajasthan state 
industrial Development & investment corp. v. premier paints 11 
(1992) CPJ 599, Bhalcheruvn Lay Out Flat Owner's Association v. 
Visakha Patnam Urban Development Authority (1992) 1 CPJ 46; 
Manager Milk Chilling Centre v. Mehijonagar Citizens Council 
(1991) CPJ 219; A P State Electricity Board v. A P State Elec-
tricity Consumer Association 1 (1992) CPJ 14 8; Consumer Protec-
tion Council V. Indian Railways 1 (1992) CPJ 120; Consumer 
unity & protection Centre v. Laxmichand Bhaji ltd. o p No 8 of 
1988, Kongara Ananth Ram v. Telecom District Engineer (1992) 1 
CTJ 124; Madras Meteropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board 
V. Consumer 's Council of India (1993) 1 CTJ 17; Union of India 
V. Chairman, Madras P.C Association (1993) 1 Comp. LJ 213. 
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stand^ but granted relief which the apex Commission considered 
necessary in the interest of the justice. 
It is suggested that a residuary clause be incorporated in 
section 14 which may be as follows: 
To grant such reliefs as the District Forum deems 
fit in the interest of justice. 
E > O W E R T O R E I M O V E D E F E C T S O R D E F I O I E M O I E S 
5 
The Consumer fora are empowered to remove defects in goods 
and if it is not possible then to replace goods . If replace-
ment is also not possible then to return the price of 
n 
goods'. Similarly in case of services, consumer fora can 
either order to remove deficiency or return the charges paid 
4.In Archant Converters v. United India Insurance Co. ltd. 11 
(1991) CPJ 246.The National Commission directed that the 
arbitrator would conclude the deliberations on the case and 
make his award within a period of six months. In Hindustan 
Motors ltd V. Suri Fashions pvt. ltd. 1 (1991) CPJ 249 and in 
Jagam Lai AgarwaT v. Hindustan Motors ltd. (F A No 32 of 1990), 
the National Commission upheld the direction of the State 
Commission to provide the complainant a guarantee for a further 
period of one year in respect of a defective part of the car. 
In M K Gupta v. Lucknow Development Authority (1992) CPJ 66 The 
apex Commission directed the respondent to hand over the pos-
session of the house to the complainant on "as is where is" 
condition before a given date. In Banglore Development Authori-
. ty V. Savitri Sanghi (FA. No 72 of 1990), the respondent was 
directed to execute a necessary lease-cum sale document and 
deposit the same together with the amount of stamp duty. In Mrs 
Mable Roosevelt v. State of Kerala, the apex Commission gave a 
direction to provide a provision of employment to the complain-
ant or her children (F A No 72 of 1990). 
5. Section 14 (a) & (e) 
6. Section 14 (b) 
7. Section 14 (c) 
8. Section 14 (e) 
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by the the consumer^. The expressions "defect" and deficiency 
have been defined in the CP Act. The definition of defect goes as 
under: 
defect means any fault imperfection or shortcoming in the 
quality, quantity, purity or standard which is required 
to be maintained by or under any law for the time being 
in force or under any contract, express or implied or as 
is claimed by the traders in any manner what so ever in 
relation to any goods . 
and definition of deficiency is : 
deficiency means any fault imperfection, shortcoming or 
inadequacy in the quality , nature and manner of perfor-
mance which is required to be maintained by or under any 
law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to 
be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or 
otherwise in relation to any service . 
A plain look at the above mentioned definitions would in-
dicate that the legislature intended to give the widest amplitude 
to the words "defect" and deficiency. What first meets the eye is 
that these definitions do not seem to confine the words "defect" 
and "deficiency" within any narrow or technical definition. 
Indeed, these are deliberatly couched in the widest horizon of 
thesebeing any kind of fault, imperfection or shortcoming. The 
legislature in employing these words was patently casting its net 
so wide as to bring within its import every deviation from the 
requirements spelt out in the latter part of the definitions-^^. 
9. Section 14 (c) 
10. Section 2 (f) 
11. Section 2 (g) 
12 J.D Shazma v. M/s Maruti Udyog ltd & ors (1991) 1 CPR 436 at 
442. See also Anup Kumar Kailash V.S.M.Kanwar and ors (1992) 
1 CPR 410; Chaman Singh Faujdar <J Anr v. The Green Remedies 
ltd i Anr 11 (1992) CPJ 915, 
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What is then of equal importance are two aspects regarding 
the quality, quantity, potency or standard in case of goods and 
quality, nature and manner of performance in case of services. 
First, this may either be required to be maintained by any law or 
rules for the time being in force. Second, where there is no such 
statutory requirment, then in alternative these requirements are 
to be tested on the anvil of what is claimed by the trader in any 
manner what so ever. This would obviously mean that such claim 
may be either express or implied. To put it in technical terms, 
the definition of the defect and deficiency with regard to the 
standard required to be maintained by law or in alternative as 
claimed by the trader expressly or impliedly in any manner what 
so ever are to be read disjunctively. The employment of the 
word"or" here is clearly disjunctive and not con jective-*-"^ . 
There are legislations which do prescribe the standard which 
the trader of the goods or provider of services must main-
tained. Naturally if the standard so prescribed is not maintained 
13. Ibid. 
14. See for instance Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Standards of 
Weights and Measures Act, 1976; the Standards of weights and 
Measures (packaged commodities) Rules, 1977, the Standard of 
Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985. The Insectcide 
Act, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955. Sale of 
Goods Act, 1930. 
15. For services there are special laws for instance. Insurance 
Act, 'Electricity Act, Indian post office Act, Indian Rail-
ways Act, etc. Howeverconsumer fora can exercise jurisdica-
tion over these services only when the same are not expres-
sely barred and are not free or under a contract of person-
al service. 
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then the CP Act can be invoked. In its wider sense, any law for 
the time in force will also include any custom or practice having 
the force of law. Whether the rules of law of torts regarding the 
standard of care to be taken by a person in respect of goods 
will also fall in to this category is not clear . 
The discretion to order, to remove defect or replace goods 
with new goods of similar description or to return the price, 
lies in the consumer fora. From the decsions of the National 
Commission it appears that the replacement or refund for the 
price is possible only when goods suffer from the manufacturing 
defect. In M/s TA TA Engineering & locomotive co Ltd & Anr v. M. 
18 Moosa the National Commission held: 
It is surprising to know that no manufacturing 
defect has been pointed out in the vehicle 
Even if there are numerous defects which can be 
rectified, it will be very hard on the manufactur-
ers to replace the vehicle or refund its price 
merely because some defect (not manufacturing 
defect appears which can be rectified or defective 
part can be replaced^^. 
16. D.N Saraf, law of Consumer Protection in India (l,ed 1990) at 
139. 
17. Abhaya Kumar Panda v. M/s Bajaj Auto Limited 1 (1992) CPJ 88. 
The National Commission ordered replacement of auto trailer 
when it found that the vehicle had major manufacturing struc-
tural defect. See also Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v.B.G Thakur 
Desia 11 (1993) CPJ 22. 
18. (1994) 3 CPR 395. 
19. Id at 397. 
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To say that the goods must have only manufacturing defect so that 
its replacement can be ordered, it is submitted, is not correct. 
Leaving aside the manufacturing defect, some times it is possible 
that the goods may have numerous defects which even if rectified, 
will not make goods new but reconditioned. In such situation 
order to remove defects but not the replacement, will do injus-
tice to the consumer. The pragmatic observation of Rougier J in 
» 
Bernstein v Pamson Motors (Golden Green) merits mention 
the relevant factor is whether the defect is of such a 
nature that it is in fact capable of being satisfacto-
rily repaired so as to produce a result as good as new. 
There could come stage when an army of minor, uncon-
nected defects would be evidence of such bad workman-
ship in the manufacture, or on the assembly line gener-
ally as to amount in toto breach of the condition of 
merchantablity. 
Another vexed question is whether non supply of goods 
amounts to "defect" or deficiency as defined in the CP Act. Under 
law of contract, non supply of goods amounts to breach of con-
tract and remedy is either to sue for specific performance of 
contract or claim for damages. Since breach of contract is not a 
21 
consumer dispute*-^, so no question of specific performance aris-
es. It is pertinent to mention here that the authors have ex-
pressed divergent views on the absence of provision of specific 
performance of the contract in the CP Act. One view is that the 
omission of provision for specific performance of the contract is 
20. 1987 (2) All ER 220. 
21. See V. Hydru v. Amal Banerjee (1992) 2 CPR 243; M/s Tilottama 
Security Printers v. Board Of Secondry Education, Orissa and 
Anr (1992) 2 CPR 328. 
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a lapse on the part of the legislature^^. Other view is that the 
Act comes in action only after the goods have been supplied. It 
does not deal with any thing before the goods are supplied. Hence 
2 3 the question of specific performance does not arise . Leaving 
aside this debate on the issue of specific performance, the 
National Commission in a number of cases^^ held that the non 
supply of goods can in no case amount to "defect" as defined in 
the Act and the contention that it amounts to deficiency was also 
rejected by the apex Commission by holding that non supply in 
fact is a case of sale of goods simpliciter and it does neither 
involve rendering of any service for consideration nor is it a 
case of hiring of service. 
However, the Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Assistant En-
gineer, Hazyana Agro Industries Corporation overruled the 
opinion of the National Commission and held: 
In view of section 2(1) (c) (iii), complaint will 
include any allegation in writing made by a complainant 
that the service mentioned in the complaint suffer from 
deficiency in any respect. As such, even if the com-
plaint regarding the delayed supply of the tractor, in 
the fact and circumstances of the present case, may not 
be covered by 
22. S. N. Singh Consumer protection legislation: A Critique JILI 
(1987) 380 at 38 
23. S. S. H. Azmi Sale of Goods and Consumer Protection in India 
(ist ed. 1992) at 248. 
24. See M/s Maruti Udyog ltd. v. Mrs Bhuvana Viswanathen & ors 11 
(1993) CPJ 172; Visarbha Brick Manufacturers Association Si 
ors V. Coal India Ltd & NS 1 (1993) CPJ 248; Dr. Bhavna 
Chinvbhai v. Cargo Motors 11(1992) CPJ 760 (GUJ). 
25. (1994) 2 CTJ 289 (Supreme court) CP. 
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section 2 (1) (c) (1), it shall amount to deficiency in 
service by the respondent. The definitions of deficien-
cy and service given under sections 2 (1) (g) and (0) 
will cover the action of the respondent, i.e. inten-
tionally delaying the supply of the tractor. In the 
facts and ci rcuinstdnces ot the case there should not be 
any difficulty in holding that the service which was 
made available to the appellant by the respondent, 
suffered from deficiency . 
The above opinion was reiterated by the supreme court in Mohindez 
7 7 Pratap Das v. Modern Automobiles and Anr^ and Punjab water 
supply and sewage Board v. Udapur cement works and Anr^ . 
It is submitted that the opinion enunciated in the Om Pra-
kash (supra) is without gain say in favour of the consumers who 
are forced to pay more than the agreed amount, nevertheless it is 
without the mandate of law. The non supply is simply a breach of 
contract. The sale of goods can by no amount of interpretational 
7 9 
casuistry be called as rendering of service . 
Nevertheless, the issue of non supply or delayed supply of 
goods shall be covered by the amended definition of unfair trade 
practice which includes any "Unfair method or unfair or deceptive 
practice" adopted by a trader vis-a- vis the consumer. This legal 
position was realised and accepted by the Supreme Court in the 
26. Id at 293. 
27. (1995) 3 CTJ 782 (Supreme Court) CP. 
28. (1995) 3 CTJ 993 (Supreme Court) CP. 
29. See tor contrary opinion D N Sara^, xxviii ASIL (1992) 54. 
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Om prakash's case . However, the amendment was made in the MRTP 
Act-^ -'- by Act No 58 of 1991 with effect from 29.9.1991 and the 
contract of the sale of tractor in Om Prakash's case was made on 
12.12.1990. This was the main reason why the Supreme Court could 
not give benefit of this amended definition to the appellant. But 
32 the interesting point is that in the latter two cases , Supreme 
court followed the reasoning of Om Prakash's case and did not 
even mention the amended definition of unfair trade practice. 
There fore, the reasoning is erroneous. 
L > O W E E < -^rO A . W A . R O O O M E> E M S A . T I O N 
At the time ot passing of the CP Act, 1986, consumer fora 
could grant four reliefs which were incorporated in Section 14. 
First two reliefs were related to goods and these were (a) to 
remove defect pointed out by the appropriate Laboratory and (b) 
to replace the goods with new goods. Third relief was related to 
both, goods as well as services which was; to return price or 
charges as the case may be to the Consumer. The fourth relief 
contained in clause (d) was as under: 
30.The Supreme Court laid down; but after the introduction of 
the amendment, which provides that the unfair or deceptive 
practice adopted by a trader vis-a-vis the Consumer, the con-
duct and practice intentionally adopted by the respondent, in 
not making delivery of the tractor to the appellant, shall 
certainly be deemed to be unfair practice. Id at 292. 
31.Before the Consumer protection (Amendment) Act, 1993, the 
unfair trade practices definition in CP Act was the same as 
incorporated in section 36A of the MRTP Act by virtue of sec-
tion 2(r) of the Act. 
32. Supra note 26&27. 
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to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensa-
tion to the Consumer Lor any loss or injury suffered by 
the Consumer due to the negligence of the opposite 
party. 
Since there was no relief available to the consumer for 
deficient service, su section 14 (d) was interpreted in such a 
way as to create an impression that the compensation is the 
relief available only in case service rendered is found defi-
cient^-* and not where goods sold are defective . However, this 
is not correct. The correct interpretation is that if any one of 
the allegations mentioned in the complaint (as defined under 
section 2 (1) (c)) is proved and it is also established that the 
complainant suffered loss or injury due to the negligence of the 
opposite party, compensation can be granted and it is immaterial 
whether the goods or services are in question. 
In order to make position more clear and to provide, in 
addition to compensation, other reliefs for deficient service, 
section 14 was amended by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) 
33. In Vaghri Gopalbahi v. Parmaz Nevasen Balabhai & Anr (1993) 
ICPR 526, it was held that a Consumer was to prove two 
things for getting compensation under section 14 (1) (d) of 
COPRA viz, that he hired the services of opp. party for 
consideration and that he has suffered injury due to negli-
gence of the opp. party, 
34. See B. Sundaramoorthy. A suggestion for Amendment of the 
consumer protection Act, 1986 (1993) 2 CPR 289, after citing 
cases, the learned author says that the word negligence has 
been wrongly used in section 14 (l)(d) in place of word 
deficiency in service. Which in the opinion of the author 
is fortified by the National Commission's decisions. 
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Act, 1993^^. The compensation provision is thus general one and 
is available to Consumer when he proves any one of the allega-
tions in complaint which occasions loss to him and that loss is 
caused due to negligence of the opposite party. 
The National Commission took a stand that for section 14 (d) 
two conditions must be satisfied- (1) The Consumer must have 
suffered loss or injury (2) That the injury or loss must have 
been caused due to the negligence of the opposite party 
Explaining the scope of section 14 (d), the Supreme Court in Con-
sumer unity and Trust Society Jaipur v. The Chairman and Managing 
Director, Bank of Baroda, Calcutta, and Anr^^ held that each of 
these expressions used in the sub section are of wide connotation 
and are fully comprehended both in common and legal sense. Negli-
gence is absence of reasonable or prudent care which a reasonable 
person is expected Lo observe in a given set of circumstances. 
But the negligence for which a Consumer can claim to be compen-
sated under this sub section must cause some loss or injury to 
35. Not only original four reliefs were retained but five more 
reliefs were incorporated. These are (e) to remove the 
defects or deficiencies in the service- in question (f) to 
discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive 
trade practice or not to repeat them, (g) not to offer the 
hazardous goods for sale (h) to withdraw the hazardous goods 
from being offered for sale, (i) to provide for adequate 
cost to parties. 
36. See for instance General Manager, South Eastern Railway v. 
Anand Prasad Sinha (1989) 3 Comp. LJ 269; Commercial Office 
Telecom v. Hih<Ji SLdtt; Warehousing Corp, (1991)1 CPJ 42; 
Indian Air lines v. Rajesh Kumar Upadhyay (1991)1 CPJ 206; 
Consumer unity & Trust Society v. Bank of Baroda (1992)1 CPJ 
18; (Western India State Motors v. Sobhag Mai Meena (1992)1 
CPJ 44. 
37. (1995) 3 CTJ 97 (Supreme Court) CP. 
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him. Loss is a generic term. It signifies some deteriment or de-
privation or damage. Injury means any damage or wrong. It means 
invasion of legally protected interest of another. Thus, the 
provisions of section 14 (1) (d) are attracted if the person from 
whom damages are claimed, is found to have acted negligently and 
such negligence must result in some loss to the person claiming 
damages. In other words, loss or injury, if any must flow from 
negligence. Mere loss or injury without negligence is not contem-
plated by this section"^". 
When Legislature enacted CP Act, some novel and revolution-
ary concepts were introduced in the Act and thus made it a 
unique piece of legislation free from the traditional doctrines. 
However, provision for compensation is still made dependent on 
the negligence of the opposite party. It is not the factum of 
defect alone which will entitle the Consumer to compensation, the 
basis for claiming cJaiiiages in the negligence of the opposite 
party. 
In England section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1987 
has incorporated the principle of strict liability and has done 
away with the traditional negligence based liability . The 
38. Id at 99. 
39. See 2 provides: (1) Subject to the following provisions of 
this part, where any damage is caused wholly or partly by 
defect in a product, every person to whom subsection (2) 
below applies shall be liable for the damage. (2) This 
subsection applies to (a)the producer of the product; (b) 
any person who by putting his name on the product or using 
trade mark or other distinguishing mark in relation to the 
product, has held himself out to be that producer of the 
product; c) any person who has imported the product into a 
member state from business of his, to supply to another. 
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principi^ of strict liability has also taken firm roots in the 
industrially advanced countries. Due to futility and difficulty 
of proving negligence in most of the cases, the principle has 
been accepted that instead of fault of the person (manufacture )-
distributor, seller or provider of services) it would serve the 
ends- of justice if the fault of the product is demonstrated and 
it is shown that the damage or loss was caused due to the fault 
of the product^^. It is therefore, suggested that the word negli-
gence be dropped from clause (d) and when the complainant proves 
that a product is defective or service is deficient, and he 
suffered damage due to no fault of his, he should be entitled to 
compensation. 
The CP Act and the rules framed thereunder are silent on 
the yardstick which tihould be applied while awarding compensation 
as the principles for awarding compensation under law of torts 
are different from the law ut contruct. Not only this alone, the 
scope is also different. While resolving this uncertainity the 
* 
National Commission in Col Bbeem Singh v. National Insurance 
Company held that the liability to pay compensation under 
section 14 (1) (d) is in the nature of liability in torts and not 
under contract. 
Another welcome observation of the National Commission is 
that where no compensation is claimed, the Consumer fora on its 
40. DN Saraf, Law of Consumer protection in India (1st ed 1990) 
at 165. 
41, 1 (1992) CPJ 205 See also Krishnaswamy v. The Manager South-
ern Region, AIR India Ors III (1992) CPJ 376. 
330 
own should quantify the compensation and where it is impractica-
ble to adduce evidence regarding the actual loss. Consumer 
42 
courts, should on their own assess it 
IPOWIil* T O EaSteXDRCZlE OEUZJEIiS 
Leaving aside the debate of the jurists that it is because a 
rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of coercion may be 
43 
attached to it, it is not obligatory because there is coercion , 
the truth of the matter is that in some areas there will be 
flagarant voilation of rules unless they are backed by some 
effective sanctions '*. Alive to this ground reality, legislature 
do provide penal provisions whenever people are enjoined to do or 
not to do any thing through law. Conforming to this traditional 
legal policy'' , the CP Act, 1986 in order to seek compliance with 
the orders of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies,provide 
sections 26 and 26 for the enforcement of orders and imposition 
of penalties on the defaulter in the event of violation of those 
42. Smt Kalash Kumari v. prof. Shankar and Co III (1991) CPC 
302, Rajasthan state Electricity Board v. Roshan Lai Jain 11 
(1992) CPJ 626 H. SEB Panchkula & ors. v. Prithi Singh Ap 
Nos 346 & 352 of 1992 decided on 15th December, 1992 and 
Mukand Lai Gabs v. Telecom District Manager of Karnal 11 
(1993) CP 5 935. 
43. A L Goodhart, English law and the Moral law at 17. 
44. A Socio-legal study undertaken to determine why people (in 
this case tax- payers) obeyed the law found that "the threat 
of sanction can deter people from violating the law, perhaps 
an important part hy inducing a moralistic attitude towards 
compliance". Schwartz and Orleans (1957) 34 U.Chi. L.R 274 
at 300. 
45. In H S E B v. Pirthi Singh 11 (1993) CPJ 715 at 719 it is 
stated that without the sanction of section 27 perhaps the 
Consumer jurisdiction would only be a paper-tiger lacking 
teeth altogether. 
Jl 
orders^^. Section 25 provides that every order made by CDRA's may 
be enforced by them in the same manner as if it were a decrees or 
an order made by a court in a pending suit. However, in the event 
of their inability to execute their orders, it shall be lawful 
for the CDRA's to send such orders for their execution to the 
court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction an individu-
al voluntarily resides or personally works for gain or a business 
organisation is situated against whom any order has been passed 
respectively. Section 27 provides that where a trader or a person 
against whom a complaint is made or that the complainant fails or 
omits to comply with any order made by the CDRA's, the defaulter 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not 
be less than one month but which may extend to three years or 
with a fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but 
which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. However, 
CDRA's, have been empowered to impot>e a sentence of imprisonment 
or fine less than the prescribed, if circumstances so require. 
Commenting on the scope of sections 25 and 27, Haryana state 
Commission in H S E B v. Pirthi Singti^^ held: 
Section 25 is an enabling provision confering a discre-
tion on the redressal agencies to enforce their orders 
through the civil court in the event of their inablity 
to execute these orders themselves^^. 
46. M/s Rajani Gas Company v. Jawalekar, 1 (1992) CPJ 786. 
47. Supra note 3 
48. Id at 719 
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Section 27 does not create an offence stricto sensu, 
but is only a methodology of stringent penalty on pain 
of which the orders of redressal agencies are to be 
complied with expeditiously. It appears from the tenor 
of the section that the obligation of compliance with 
the orders of the redressal agencies lies immediately 
and squarely on the traders or a person against whom 
the same has been passed. The intent of the section is 
plain that the moment he steps in this mandatory duty, 
he automatically invites the rigour of the penalty 
under this provision . 
Sections 25 and 27 have been thus incorporated to achieve 
common goal ie the speedy enforcement of the orders of the 
CDRA's^ . While section 25 visualise the enforcement of such 
orders by a civil process as if they were a decree or order made 
by a court of law in a suit proceeding therein^^ Section 27 
confers a quasi criminal sanction for their enforcement by way 
of punishment with imprisonment or imposition of monetary penal-
ties . This necessitates the correlating of section525 and 27 of 
the Act^^ and have to be construed together . 
49. Ibid 
50. Mrs Suman Late v. M/s Anand Construction Delhi pvt Ltd. 
(1993)1 CPR 352. 
51. M/s Aurora Sales (India) v. M/s Transport Corporation of 
India ltd and Ors (1992) 2 CPR 387. 
52. However, Delhi State Commission In M/s Vikmans & Anr v. 
Rakesh Kumar (1992) 1 CPR 287 and S V Rao v. By Ford 
leasing ltd. (1994) 3 CPR 512 held that proceedings under 
section 27 are criminal in nature. 
53. Kohinoor Carpets, Panipat & Ors, v. Rajander Arora, 11 
(1991) CPR 429. 
54. Supra note 44 at 354. 
55. H S E B & Ors v Pirthi Singh, 11 (1993) CPJ 715. 
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The question which was debated before the Consumer fora was 
whether it is necessary that the decree holder must satisfy first 
section 25 and only then he can invoke section 27 or it entirely 
depends upon the decree holder whether to take help of section 25 
or 27 . 
The Delhi state Commission in Om Prakash Bhatia v. M/s Deepa 
chits pvt. ltd. and ors^^ held that it is evident that sections 
25 & 27 are in the nature of execution proceedings and constitute 
independent remedies. The decree holder can avail of the other 
remedy, if by availing of one remedy, he failed to recover the 
amount . On the other hand, the M P State Commission in Dr. K. C 
Barolia v. Sipani Automobil^es^^ held that the spirit of the Act 
expects that first, proceedings under section 25 be followed and 
in case executant fails to execute orders or judgment debtor 
fails or omits to comply with the orders then section 27 is to be 
CO 
invoked-^^. 
Haryana State Commission in H S E B v. Pirthi Singh^^ made 
full scanning of sections 25 and 27 and observed that an incisive 
and indepth reading of section 25 would make it manifest that the 
56. 1 (1993) CPJ 567. 
57. Id at 569. 
58. (1994) 3 CPR 312. 
59. Id at 313. 
60. Supra note 45 at. 71'J . 
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primary duty laid down on the redressal agencies is to execute 
their substantive orders themselves and not to shift that burden 
on the civil courts. This is manifest from the meaningful 
words."It shall be lawful for the District forum, the state 
Commission or the National Commission to send in the event of its 
inablity to execute such order to the court within the local 
limits of whose jurisdiction". This is made clear by the use of 
the words, "in the event of its inability to execute it", which 
implies that the primary duty to execute the orders is that of 
the CDRA's themselves and in the event of their inability to do 
so, it is lawful to make resort to the civil court for execu-
tion^^. 
Furthermore, section 25 gives discretion to the redressal 
agencies by employing the word "may". It is not that this provi-
sion says that such orders can only be enforced as decrees or 
orders or that this is the only methodology for enforcement. The 
employment of word "may" is significant and it is well settled 
that unless indicated otherwise it has to be so construed. Pat-
ently there is nothing herein to read the word "may" as 
"shall" . Had it been otherwise, then parliament would have 
employed categoric terminology that the order of the redressal 
61. Ibid 
62. Ibid, 
agencies can be only enforced as civil decrees and not 
otherwise . 
It is submitted, as rightly pointed out by the Haryan State 
Commission that there is nothing contained in sections 25 and 27 
which limits the choice of the decree holder to have first 
resort to section 25. Section 25 clearly provides that in case 
Consumer forum is not able to execute orders only then matter may 
be referred to civil court. The Consumer fora can themselves 
executed their orders with the help of section 51 of the Civil 
Procedure Code read with Order xxi rules 39 and 40. It is only 
when Consumer fora are unable to execute the orders then it is 
permissible to refer decree to the civil court for execution. If 
orders of the Consumer fora as a routine are converted in the 
decrees and are enforced through ordinary civil courts, then 
the very purpose of the Act to provide cheap and speady remedy 
will be defeated which is the primary object of the Act. In the 
words of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M 
Gupta°^ that the " Law in fact meets the long necessity of 
protecting the common man from such wrongs for which the remedy 
63. However, in Amzit lal v. M/s Instant Growth Fund pvt ltd and 
Ors (1994) 2 CPR 482, it was held that the legislature has 
provided two different remedies to the decree holder to 
recover the decretal amount, one through the execution of 
the decree as isdone by a decree holder in a civil case and 
the other by initiating the criminal proceedings under 
section 27. In otherwords discretion is of the decree holder 
whether he comes before Consumer forum under section 25 or 
27 . Id at 485. 
64. Ill (1993) CPJ 17. 
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under ordinary law for various reasons has become illusory ", so 
it will not serve Consumer interest to convert the "order" into 
"decrees" and relegate the decree holder to ordinary civil court 
for its execution. The holding of the MP state Commission In 
Dr. K C Barolia (supra) that section 25 must be first satisfied 
and only when desired results are not achieved, help of section 
27 may be taken. It is submitted, is not correct. Basically in 
sections 25 and 27 two independent remedies have been incorporat-
ed by the legislature for executing the orders of the forum. If 
the decree holder approaches the Consumer forum under section 27, 
the forum will not be right to direct him to exhaust first 
section 25 and only then come under section 27. Sections 25 and 
27 therefore give two optional remedies to the decree holder and 
it lies entirely in his discretien what option he is going to 
exercise. The Consumer forum neither have any right nor discre-
tion to impose its own opinion on decree holder on the issue of 
mode of execution of orders. This was realised by the Delhi 
State Commission in Amrit lal v. M/s Instant Growth Fund Pvt. 
Ltd. and ors°^, when it was held that the legislature has pro-
vided two different remedies to the decree holder to recover the 
decretal amount. One through the execution of the decree as is 
done by a decree holder in a civil case and the other byinitiat-
ing the criminal proceedings under section 27. 
Section 27 arms the Consumer fora with the power to inflict 
punishment or impose fine on the judgment debitor in case of his 
65. Supra note 63. 
337 
default. However, rules have not been framed for the exercise of 
this power by the Consumer fora. Realising this legislative 
lapse. Justice Balakrishna Eradi observes: 
Yet another important matter in respect of which the 
existing provisions contained in the Act require to be 
amplified is that while section 27 of the CP Act ex-
pressly empowers redressal forum to impose punishment 
of impris-onment against a person who fails or refuses 
to comply with its order, it is not expressly stipulat-
ed that an order of fine or a warrant of arrest issued 
by a forum constituted under the Act is to be deemed to 
be an order or warrant issued by a competent criminal 
court and should be executed and enforced as such by 
the police authorties. In order to obviate difficul-
t'ies and doubts concering the matter, it is necessary 
that an express provision in the above regard should be 
incorporated in section 27 of the Act . 
In the absence of rules regulating exercise of power under sec-
tion 27, Consumer fora came up not only with the conflicting 
observations but issued orders which did not befit to the crimi-
nal jurisprudence. For instance in Union of India v. Chairman 
Madras Provincial Consumer Association '^ the District forum made 
the following observation which was upheld by the state Commis-
sion also. 
In default of compliance of the above order, we punish 
and sentence Mr R Narasimhan, the general Manager, 
Southern Railway, one year simple imprisoment under 
section 27 of the Consumer protection Act. 1986°^. 
66. Address of Hon'bie justice v. Dalakrishna Eradi to National 
convention of Presidents And Members of the State Consumer 
Disputes Redressal Commission New Delhi 24 January 1994. 
67. 11 (1992) CPJ 524. 
68. Id at 525 see also for similar composite orders; JK Synthet-
ic ltd V. Smt Anita Bhargava (1996)1 CPR 287; Punjab & Sind 
Bank v. Manpreet Singh Sood (1994) 2 CPR 627. 
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The National Commission in no uncertain terms expressed its dis-
pleasure as under: 
We have to express our strong disapproval of the proce-
dure adopted by the district forum in proceedings to 
pass an order of punishment and sentence of imprison-
ment on the general Manager, mentioning him by name, 
even at the stage of grant for relief on the complaint 
petition^ . 
The question arises that in absence of the rules for exercising 
power under section 27, can relevant provisions of the Criminal 
Proeedure Code 1973 be invoked? The National Commission without 
answering this pointed question laid down in union of India v. 
Chairman Provincial Consumer Association'^ that if an action is 
taken under section 27 of the Act, natural justice requires that 
the person sought to be proceeded against shall be issued notice 
and his explanation shall be heared before any conclusion is 
reached that an order of punishment and imposition of any sen-
tence is called for. 
The Delhi state Commission in S.V. Rao v. Byford leasing 
71 ltd made a categoric observation by holding that the provisions 
69. Id at 527 See also Union of India v. K Thiruvengadam. Con-
sumer cases Reporter Vol 3 April 1993 (part iv ) at 255. 
70. I,bid see also Signet Corporation v. Commissioner MCD and Ors 
(1995) 3 CPR 261. It cannot be disputed that it is a neces-
sary condition precedent under section 27 that before a 
person is visited with punishment he should be afforded a 
fair and reasonable opportunity of showing cause against it 
Id at 263. 
71. (1994) 3 CPR 512. 
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of Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to proceedings 
under section 27 of the Act.In order to reach this conclusion, 
the Commission took the help of the Supreme Court's opinion 
inLucknow Development Authority v. M K Gupta'^ in which it was 
laid down that since CP Act is a social welfare legistation, its 
provisions should be construed liberally and in favour of the 
Consumer so that the purpose and object of the Act is achieved. 
The Commission thus held that no such procedure should be adopted 
by which trial is likely to be protracted and becomes cumbersome 
as it will defeat the very purpose of the Act to provide speedy 
justice to the Consumers . The Commission also took the the help 
of the National Commission's opinion in N K Modi v. H/s Fair 
Engineers (pvt) ltd in which it was stated that though the Con-
sumer fora are vested with the function of adjudicating disputes 
concerning certain categories of the grievances of Consumers, 
they are to function in an informal manner conforming only to the 
principles of natural justice and free from the shakles and 
trappings of courts. 
The Delhi state Commission provided the guidelines in M/s vikman 
7 S 
V. Rakesh Kumer'^ which are as under: 
It is well settled that if a person is being tried for 
an offence, which prescribes a sentence of imprisonment 
or, fine he should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
72. Supra note 54. 
73. Supra note 61 at 515. 
74. 1(1993) CPJ 53 (NC). 
75. 1(1992) CPJ 386. 
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defend himself. He cannot be sentenced to undergo 
Imprisonment and pay fine without affording such an 
opportunity. It is also well settled that an accused 
cannot be convicted in absentia. Therefore, it is the 
duty of forum to secure the presence of appellant 
before an action could be taken against him. If his 
presence could not be secured by summons. It should 
have been secured by issuing bailable warrants. If 
after service of the warrants he absented himself, non 
bailable warrants could be issued against him °. 
The question arises: are the orders passed by the District 
« 
Consumer fora under sections 25 and 27 appealable to state Com-
mission. It has been argued ' that the apeal is a matter of right 
for the aggrieved person. Since section 15 contains a general 
provision for apeal against any order of the District forum, it 
7 fl 
can be filed against all orders, whether interim' or final. 
Whether dealing with jurisdiction of the forum or some other 
TO 
aspect .^ 
On the other hand Haryana State Commission in Kohinooz 
Carpets Panipat £ ors v. Rajindez Azoza^^ held that section 15 
refers to "an order" made by the District forum and not of "any 
76. Id at 387 See for similar guidelines General Manager (Tele 
phone) and Anr.v. Smt: Champalaxmi Krushnachandra Deva 
(1993) 1 CPR 121; Secretary, Gujarat, Secondary Education 
Board & Anr v. Daksha Ishwarlal Dhorajuya, (1993) CPR 203. 
77. S N Singh; Appellat and Revisional Jurisdiction under Con-
sumer Protection Act. Corporate Law Advisor April 1992 at 
148. 
78. It needs mention here that there is no express provision 
under the CP Act providing grant of interim order. 
79. Id at 194. 
80. 11 (1991) CPJ 429. 
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or every order" made by it and that such an order had a contextu-
al refrence to the Preceding section 14 containing the findings 
of the District fourm on a complaint preferred before it under 
section 12. To construe "an order" as "any order" in section 15 
when carried to logical lengths would lead to an obvious absurdi-
ty°-^. If that were to be so, then every order, whether interlo-
cutory, interim or one merely giving an adjourment made by the 
District Fourm would come within the sweep of section 15. Thus 
according to the Commission where two interpretations of a sta-
tuory provision are possible, the one which could lead to absured 
or mischievous results have to be necessarily avoided. To read 
section 15 as laying down that any and every order of whatever 
nature passed by the District forum would become appealable there 
under appeared to be running patently against the basic canons of 
construction^^. 
Repelling the argument that the appeal can be filed as a 
matter of right the Commission said: 
The right to appeal is a pure creature of the statute. 
There is no inherent or natural right to a first ap-
peal. If parliament in its wisdom does not provide any 
appeal from an order, it cannot be created on the 
ground that such an order is onerous in nature. The 
best judge for the provision of the substantive right 
Qf appeal is the legislature and not the courts on any 
grounds of compassion, or sentiment . 
81. Id at 433. 
82. Id at 434. 
83. Id at 436. See also J.S kalra v. National Insurance Co ltd. 
1 (1993) CPJ 339 M/s Agarwal Sales Corp. v. Jagdish Vyas 
(1993) 1 CPR 70; Raymond Synthetic ltd. v. Babulal Khenka 
(1993)1 CPR 518 and DP Mishra Telecom. District Engineer 
Ajmer & ors Rajesh Tondon (1993) 1 CPJ 433. 
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It is submitted that the above opinion of the Haryana state 
Commission is correct and in consonance with the purpose and 
object of the Act to provide speedy and inexpensive justice to 
the Consumers. In India it is a horary adage that the real 
trouble of the litigant starts after he has obtained decree in 
his favour. The judgment debtor will naturally try very hard to 
put every hurdle on the way of execution of decree. So holding 
otherwise will give handle to the judgment debtor to abuse the 
process of law and will prolong the injustice perpetrated on 
decree holder. 
Nevertheless, if there is really any miscarriage of justice, 
the judgment debtor can go to the superior fOrum for revision in 
order to rectify the error, if any. This fact was realised by 
the Gujarat^^ and Rajasthan State Commissions also . 
Section 27 provides punishment for non complKxnce of the 
order of the CDRA's by the trader or any other person. The 
84. See General Manager (Telephone) and Anr v. Smt. Champalaxmi 
Krushnachandar Dave (1993) 1 CPR 121 and JE. Secretary 
Gujarat Secondry Education & Anr v. Daksha Ishwarlal Dhora-
juya. (1993) 1 CPR203. 
85. It was stated: The State Commission possesses general power 
of revision. It can at any stage of its motion, if it is so 
desirous and certainly when illegality or irregularities 
resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for 
the records and examine them. The discretion in the exercise 
of revisional Jurisdiction should be exercised within the 
four corners of clause(b) of section 17. Section 17 (b) 
enables the State Commission to correct and when necessary, 
correct cases of errors of Jurisdiction committed by the 
District forum and the object behind it is to provide the 
means to an aggrieved party to obtain rectification of non 
appealable order in exceptional cases.(1993) ICPR 70 at 74 
See also CR Katoria v. Consumer Disputes Redressal District 
Forum, patiala and Ors 11(1993) CPJ 805. 
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question arises that if a corporation or a company violates the 
order^who will be punished? There was a debate under the physi-
cal civil law whether company or corporation be liable for phys-
86 
cial punishment? In Narian Singh v. S Hardyal Singh Harika° , 
the Punjab High court held that the agent and others who act for 
a corporation and who knowingly violate or disobey an injunction 
against the corporation are punishable for contempt, even though 
the injunction is issued only against the corporation. 
The above opinion of the Punjab High Court found express 
approval of the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muncipal Board and 
Others v. Ekka Tanga Mazdoor Union and Ors°', when it was laid 
down that a command to a corporation is in fact command to those 
who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. If 
they, after being apprised of the orders directed to the corpora-
tion, prevent compliance or fail to take appropriate action, 
within their power for the performance of the duty of obeying the 
orders, they and the corporate body are both guility of disobe-
dience and may be punished for contempt. 
Fortified by the above opinions, the Delhi State Commission 
in Amrit Lai v. M/s Instant Growth Fund Pvt. Ltd. and ors^^ and 
S. V Rao V. By ford leasing Lt^'^ took the stand that the officers 
86. AIR 1958 Punj. 180. 
87. AIR 1970 Sc 1767. 
88. Supra note 54. 
89. Supra note 61. 
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of the company will be punished in case they fail to carry out 
the orders of the CDRA's. 
E > O V J E R T O E > A . S S I N T E R I M O R D E R S s 
The CP Act, 1986 does not contain any express provision for 
granting injunction. Authors have expressed divergent views on 
this point. One view is that since the Act was passed in undue 
haste, that is why many significant aspects have not been covered 
90 
or foreseen. One among them being temporary injunction^ . The 
other view is that there is a general rule that if a court has 
right to pass final order in certain matter, then it is deemed 
to possess such power for passing an interim order also. Hence 
91 there is no omission of these provisions in haste •^. This 
issue has come up before the consumer fora time and again and the 
Supreme Court also found occasion to deliberate on this issue. 
Reliefs which consumer fora can grant are enumerated in 
Section 14 of the CP Act. This section, before Consumer Protec-
tion (Amendment) Act, 1993, read as under: 
1. If, after the proceeding conducted under section 13, 
the District forum is satisfied that the goods complained 
against suffer from any of the defects specified in the 
complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the 
complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an 
order to the opposite party directing him to take one or 
more of the following things namely: 
90. See S. N. Singh, Consumer Protection Legislation, A Cri-
tique 29 JILI (1987) 380 at 385. 
91. See S. S. H. Azmi; Sale of Goods And Consumer Protection in 
India (1st ed. 1992) at 247. 
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a to remove the defects pointed out by the appropriate 
laboratory from the goods in question; 
b) to replace goods with new goods of similar de-
scription which shall be free from any defect; 
c) to return to the complainant the price or, as the 
case may be charges paid by the complainant; 
d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compen-
sation to the consumer for any loss or injury suf-
fered by the consumer due to the negligence of the 
opposite party. 
Commenting on the scope of this section, the State Commis-
sions of Punjab^^, Ra jasthan^-^, Gujarat'^, Karnataka , Bihar , 
Orissa^', and West Bengal^® declined to grant an interim injunc-
tion on the plea that only final and not interlocutory orders are 
envisaged in section 14. These Commissions in unison took the 
stand that section 14 itself states that the District forum can 
92. Punjab State Electricity Board v. M/S. Anand Aggarwal Oils 
Pvt. Ltd. 11(1993) CPJ 891; M/S. Sampuram Singh and Sons v. 
The Punjab State and Anr. Ill (1993) CPJ 1993. 
93. Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Maheshwari 
Textile Mills Bhilwara, (1992) 2 CPR 333, M/S. Sales Office 
System Pvt. Ltd. and Anr v. M/S. Mayank Photo Copier (1993) 
2 CPR 8 Rajasthan SEB and Ors v. Hira Lai (CPJ) 1993 at 183. 
94. General Manager (Telephone) and Anr. v. Smt. Champalaxmi 
Krushnachandra Dave (1993) ICPR 121. Phiroz Savak Sha Green 
V. Blue Fountain Enterprises & Ors. 1(1994) CPJ at 339. 
95. Dr.S.P.Thirumala Rao v. M.D. Karnataka State Board Transport 
(1991) 1 CPJ; Akil Karnataka Madwala Machideva Mahajan Singh 
V. Commissioner, Banglore City Co. & Anr. (1992) 2 CPJ 543; 
The Chairman, Karnataka Housing Board v. Sri K. S. Panchapa-
keshan (1992) 1 CPR 482. 
96. Telecom. Distt. Engineer v. Smt. Parmila Prasad (1994) 1 CPR 
12. 
97. Telecom. Distt. Engineer v. Prasanta Kumar Chand 11 1(1994) 
CPJ 198. 
98. Chittranjan Dey v. Mrinal Kant Chakraborty (1995)3 CPR 347. 
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direct the opposite party only after it (district forum) has 
conducted proceedings under section 13. Thus reading sections 13 
and l4 together, there is no scope for any interim order. Only 
final order can be passed under the CP Act. 
9 9 On the other hand State Commissions of Gujarat / Andra 
Pradesh^°°, West Bengal^°^ and UP^°2 held that the Consumer Dis-
putes Redressal Forum has the power and competence to pass an 
interim order considering the exigency of the situation, prima 
facie case and balance of convenience and in order to maintain 
status quo of the property in dispute. 
The National Commission in National Dairy Development Board 
V. Consumer Protection Council and ors^^ observed that we are of 
the opinion that the applicant is well founded in its contention 
that the impugned interlocutory order passed by the State Commis-
sion is totally beyond the scope of powers conferred by the 
99. Rathod Liljibhai and Ors v. M/S. Escorts Ltd.^ Original Com-
plaint No. 303 of 1991 order dated. 27. 11. 1992. 
100. Dr. R. Venkatesh Wara Roa v. The Indian Assurance Co. Ltd. 
CDIA No.326 of 1991; M/S. Sakti Cattle and Poultry Feed 
Suppliers v. The New India Assurance Co. CDIA No.327 of 1991 
and M. Kesava Rayhla v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 
CDIA No. 328 of 1991. 
101. M/S. Bharat Biscuit Co. (Pvt) Ltd. v. Calcutta Telephone 
(1995) 3 CPR 69; WBSEB v. Rajeshwar Prasad Shaw (1994) 3 CPR 
445; WBSEB v. Suhasaria Oil and Rice Mills S.C.Case 
N0.234/R/1994 and Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Anil 
Tolasaria (1996) 2 CPR 632. 
102. United India Insurance Co. v. Mohd Saleem and Ors. (1994) 3 
CPR 369. 
103. 11(1992) CPJ 427 NC. 
347 
CP Act, 1986. Section 14(1) of the Act enumerates the reliefs 
that can be granted by a Redressal Forum constituted under the 
Act. It is obvious that any relief that cannot be granted even by 
a final order passed under section 14(1), cannot be given by a 
Redressal Forum by means of an interlocutory order for the pass-
ing of which there is no warrant under any provision of the 
Act^O^ 
In a later case of Chivayinkil CP Bhadra Kumar v. S. Mhen-
dzan -^, the National Commission without assigning any reason 
granted interim stay. The order goes as under: 
There will be an interim stay on condition that the 
. appellant should pay to the respondent or deposit before 
the State Commission for payment on the respondent one 
half of the amount payable by him under the impugned 
order of the State Commission within one month from 
today. 
The Calcutta High court in Re State Transport Authority and 
Anr^ ", held that it is well settled that unless a tribunal set 
up under a special statute is vested with such power under the 
statute itself, it cannot pass such an order, nor can a tribunal 
exercise the inherent power prescribed under the Code of Civil 
Procedure, if such a tribunal is not a court"*- '. So far as the 
104. Id at 428. See The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Dr. R. 
Venkateshwara Rao 1(1993) CPJ 61 NC; District Manager^ 
Telephones and Ors. v. M/S. Monilal Brij Mohan 1(1993) CPJ 
41 NC. 
105. Ill (1992) CPJ 71 NC. 
106. 11 (1992) CPJ 677. 
107. Id at 682. 
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CP Act is concerned, the procedure to be adopted by a District 
Forum on receipt of a complaint is laid down in section 13 of the 
said Act and sub-section (4) of the said section states that for 
the purposes of the said section, the forum shall enjoy the same 
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil 
Procedure, while trying a suit, in respect of the following 
matters: 
i. the summoning and enforcing attendance of any 
defendant or witness and examining the witness on 
oath; 
ii. the discovery and production of any document or 
other material object producible as evidence; 
iii. the reception of evidence on affidavits; 
iv. the requisitioning of the report of the concerned 
analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory 
or from any other relevant source; 
V. issuing of any commission for the examination of 
any witness; and 
vi. any other matter which may be prescribed; and same 
powers have been vested with the State Commission 
aliic) .J:. per Lht- [jroviijioii of i.crLion 18 of the 
Act. 
The High Court then concludes that from the above provisions 
it is thus quite clear, that neither District Forum nor the 
State Commission has been vested with any power under the CP Act, 
1986, to grant and/or pass any ad interim order, nor any of those 
tribunals is a civil court so as to be deemed as such to enjoy 
the inherent powers as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
These tribunals have been vested with only some limited powers of 
a civil court as specifically sta-ted in sections 13 and 18 of 
the said Act and as such the said tribunal cannot travel beyond 
349 
their limited powers. Hence the interim orders passed both by the 
President, CjlcuLLd DisLricL Furum and the Chairman, State Com-
mission, are wholly without jur isdiction-'-^" . 
In the meanwhile Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 
was passed. This Act inter alia amended section 14 and five more 
reliefs were incorporated in the section which are as follows: 
e. to remove defects in goods or deficiencies in the 
service in question; 
f. to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the 
restrictive trade practice or not to repeat that 
practice; 
g. not to offer hazardous goods for sale; 
h. to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered 
for sale; and 
i. to provide for adequate costs to parties. 
The Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick 
1 n q 
Das had unamended section 14 before it. While reproducing 
clause (a) to (d) of section 14 the apex court held that a care-
ful reading of the above discloses that there is no power under 
the Act to grant an interim relief or even an ad-interim relief. 
Only final relief could be granted, if the jurisdiction of the 
forum to grant relief is confined to the four clauses mentioned 
108. fbid; See also M/S. Selex Office System Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. 
V. M/S.Mayank Photo Copier (199 3) 2 CPR 8; Rajasthan State 
Electricity Board and Anr. v. Meheshwari Textile Mills 
Bhilwara (1992) CPR 333. 
109. (1994) 2 CTJ 385 (Supreme Court) CP. 
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under section 14, it passes our comprehension as to how an inter-
im injunction could ever be granted disregarding even the balance 
of convenience . 
. The above opinion of the Supreme Court being binding prece-
dent by virtue of Art. 141 of the Constitution was followed by 
the National Commission in M/S.Escorts v. Rathod Laljibhai and 
Ors^^^ and Calcutta High Court in West Bengal State Electricity 
Board v. Laxmi Ice Plant Industries^^^, without any reservation. 
Since there is no express provision in the CP Act either for 
granting interim relief or stay, so the problem of staying the 
operation of the judgment of the lower forum by the superior 
forum while the latter is hearing in appeal the decision of the 
former, came up for deliberation before the State Commissions. 
The UP State Commission in United India Insurance Co. v. Mohd. 
Saleem and Ors^^ held that "we find no limitation, express or 
110. Id at 398. 
111. (1995) 1 CPR 333. It was held that "the State Commission had 
passed an interim order granting relief in the form of a 
deposit being directed to be made with the Commission pend-
ing disposal of the original complaint. As has been laid 
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Morgan Stanley 
Mutual fund v. Kartick Das and Dr. Arvind Gupta Securities 
and Exchange Board of India and Ors, the Commission has no 
power to grant any interim relief in original complaint 
petitions. 
112. (1994) 2 CTJ 849 (Calcutta HC) (CP) . It was observed: "We 
are also of the view that neither the District Forum nor the 
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission West Bengal, 
has any power to grant interim relief to pass interim order 
as section 14 of the said Act does not vest such authorities 
with such powers". 
113. (1994) 3 CPR 369. 
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Implied, in the provisions of the Act to persuade us to take the 
view that the commission has no power, during the pendency of an 
» 
appeal before it, to suspend the operation of the order under 
challenge in the appeal•'••'• ^  . 
The State Commission made it clear that the consequences of 
negating the existence of the power to grant stay, during the 
pendency of an appeal in suitable cases can result in grave 
injustice, particularly, .when the Act does not contain any ex-
press provision to direct restitution if the appeal before it 
succeeds. As an instance*wherein a case the District Forum awards 
an unduly excessive amount by way of compensation and enforces 
its order by recourse to coercive methods and the appeal before 
the Commission against the award succeeds, recourse may possibly 
have to be taken ofj the successful party to proceedings before a 
civil court to recover the amount from the one which succeeded 
before the District Forum. The delay and expenses involved apart, 
it will lead, the multiplicity of proceedings defeating the very 
purpose of the Act. The recognition of existence of power in the 
State Commission to grant suitable interim order, depending 
upon the circumstances of a particular case, keeping in abeyance 
the enforcement of the order under appeal wholly or part, upon 
such condition if any, considered appropriate by it, would ad-
vance the cause of justice. Such a view must be preferred to the 
one which defeats it"'--^ .^ 
114. Id at 370. 
115. Id at 371. 
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The State Commission of West Bengal in D.E.(Cf) Calcutta 
Telephone v. Hani Kana Gupta Bhayn . came in agreement with the 
UP State Commission (Supra) but with different reasons. It was 
opined that though an interim order by way of injunction is not 
available before a forum, a stay order or an order for main-
tenance of status quo in appropriate cases stand on a different 
footing, as such an order does not purport to make an injunctive 
order against a person before the dispute is actually heard. It 
only tends to desist the parties from changing the facts consti-
117 tuting the dispute when the forum is in seision of the matter 
The amendment in section 14 engendered controversy as to the 
118 power of the consumer fora to grant interim order. One view^ -^ *^  is 
that even after amendment, section 14 does not provide for issue 
of an ad interim injunction. Section 14(1) as it stands today, 
makes it very clear that one or more of the directions in terms 
of its clauses (a) to (i) are to be issued only after the consum-
» 
er redressal agency has satisfied itself after conducting the 
proceedings under section 13 that the goods complained against 
suffer from defects or the services rendered are tainted with 
deficiency. Section 14 read with section 13 leaves no scope for 
any order other than a final order"^^^. 
116. (1995) 2 CPR 428. 
117. Id at 430. 
118. S.S.Kumar; Should Consumer Courts Be Conferred The Power 
To Grant Interim Relief (1996) 4 CTJ 103. 
119. Id at 
353 
Another view is expressed by the West Bengal State Commis-
sion in W.B.S.E.B. v. Rajeswar Prasad Shaw^^^. In this revision 
application. Prof. Sunil Kanti, Member of the Commission held 
that the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley's case (Supra) does not 
prohibit interim injunction. The observations made by the Supreme 
court in that case were in view of the peculiar facts of the 
case. Their lordship's observations were that the Calcutta Dis-
trict Forum entertained a case which does not fall within the 
ambit of the CP Act. Secondly, the interim order passed by the 
Calcutta District Forum was without consideration of balance of 
convenience, thirdly, the principles of granting exparte and 
interim injunction as laid down by the Supreme Court have not 
been followed and fourthly, that the exparte ad interim order of 
injunction granted by the Calcutta District Forum was neither 
communicated to the Appellant/opposite party nor the copy of the 
application was served upon him . According to the Hon'ble 
Member thus, the Supreme Court's opinion is per incurrim and does 
not form any binding precedent. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
only considered clause (a) to (d) of section 14^^^ and not (e) of 
the same section which has opened flood gates in respect of power 
and jurisdiction to the Consumer Dispute Redtesaal Focum^^-^. The 
learned Member also did not find himself bound by the opinion of 
the apex commission in National Diary Development Boards' case 
120. (1994) 3 CPR at 445. 
121. (1994) 3 'CPR at 447. 
122. Id at 447. 
123. Id at 448. 
» 
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(Supra) as it was decided before the Consumer Protection (Amend-
ment) Act, 1993 which has amended section 14-^^^. However, in a 
dissenting opinion of the Hon'ble President, it is stated that 
clause (e) no doubt gives new relief which can be granted in 
favour of a complainant but it does not on that count create a 
new right exercisable at an interlocutory stage. A careful scru-
tiny oJE section 14 would make it clear that the amendment in 
section has not extended the procedural ambit involved in this 
section. The opening words of sub-section (1) of section 14 are 
"if after proceeding conducted under section 13, the District 
Forum is satisfied". So what ever reliefs are envisaged in sec-
tion 14, the same may be given only after proceedings of section 
13 are completed. Section 13 deals with the hearing of objection 
and consideration of evidence adduced by the parties. In other 
words whatever relief is granted under section 14 it must, be 
after the opposite party's case is considered (if, of course, he 
appears and the case is not heard ex-parte). Necessarily, there-
fore, any relief granted under Section 14 must be final . 
Nevertheless, the Hon'ble President was convinced and even 
made mention that he agrees with Prof. Kar (Member) that for 
proper adjudication of any dispute the property involved must be 
preserved or the status quo must be maintained as far as possible 
and that it is the inherent power of the court to take action in 
124. Id at 450. 
125. Id at 451. 
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such matters even apart from the provisions of Order 39 of the 
Civil Procedure Code... An interim order in possible cases may be 
effective and advantageous to the parties"*"^  . But Hon'ble Presi-
dent found himself bound by the Supreme Court's opinion in Morgan 
Stanley case which forms•a binding precedent in view of Art.141 
of the Indian constitution-^^'. 
« 
From the afore discussed case law following points emerge. 
1. Consumer Redressal Agencies do not possess the power 
to grant interim order; 
2. Consumer fora are quasi judicial bodies or tribunals 
and not courts, so they cannot exercise inherent 
power of the courts to grant interim relief; 
3. In view of the amendments made in section 14, Con-
sumer fora can now grant interim relief; 
4. There is a difference between stay and interim 
order. Consumer fora can grant stay but not interim 
order. 
It is submitted that some of the above propositions are 
neither based on the sound principles of logic nor is there any 
legal inhibition to hold otherwise on the larger considerations 
of equity, justice and good conscience. 
There is no dispute on the fact that the CP Act unlike MRTP 
Act does not possess express provision to pass interim orders. It 
is also not correct to contend that clause (e) of section 14 has 
any way enlarged the scope of the section to the extent of pass-
126. Id at 452. 
127. Ibid. 
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ing interim orders. It is worth while to mention here that sec-
tion 14 of the CP Act was amended in pursuance of the recommenda-
tions of the Working Group-^ ^^ . This Working Group inter alia sug-
gested that the National commission. State Commission and Dis-
trict fora should be given powers to direct the respondent to (i) 
remove the defects and deficiencies in the services in question 
(ii) to issue cease and desist orders or to grant appropriate 
interim relief. From these two suggestions only first one was 
incorporated in the CP Act in toto and clause (f) was incorporat-
ed which is "to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the 
restrictive trade practice or not to repeat that practice". This 
clause is in substance similar to the first part of the second 
suggestion of the Working Group. The second part i.e. "to grant 
interim relief" was not incorporated in the Act for the reasons 
best known to legislators. Thus it is amply clear that clause (e) 
was not introduced in the CP Act for granting interim relief nor 
is there any scope to read such powers from the wording of clause 
(e). Thus it is submitted that the observation of the West Bengal 
State Commission in W.B.S.B.B. v. Rajeswar Prasad Shat^^^ that 
clause (e) of section 14 permits even grant of interim relief is 
not correct. 
128. High power Working Group was constituted on 7.1.1991 under 
the Chairmanship of the then Minister of Food and Civil 
supplies. Government of West Bengal. See for details, D. N. 
Saraf Supplement to Law on Consumer Protection in India 
(1992)at 23-24. 
129. Supra note 125, 
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The question arises, can consumer fora in absence of express 
provision to grant interim relief, exercise inherent powers to 
grant the same? In other words do consumer fora have inherent 
130 power to issue interim orders? In American Jurisprudence it is 
stated that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause 
of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inher-
ent power to do all which is reasonably necessary to the adminis-
tration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this 
power, a court may, when it is necessary in order to protect or 
preserve the subject matter of the litigation to protect its 
jurisdiction, and to make its judgment effective, grant or issue 
a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal 
action^"^^. It is also an established principle of construction 
that where an Act confers Jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants 
the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are 
necessary to its execution^^^. This principle of construction was 
followed by the Supreme court also^ -^ -^  and any express prohibition 
for granting interim injunction has been declared ultra vires and 
130. 42 Am Jur 2d injunctions at 11. 
131. Ibid. 
132.See Max Well on Interpretation of Statutes (11th. ed. ) also 
see Southerlands Statutory Construction, (3rd. Ed.) Art. 
5401 and 5402. 
133. See I.T.O v. Mohd. Kunhi (1969) 71 ITR 815 Sc. It is firmly 
established rule that an express grant of statutory power 
carries with it by necessary implications the authority to 
use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. 
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struck down as unconstitutional by the MP High Court in Sat. 
Basant Kumari v. State of MP^^^ . 
However, the question which still alludes answer is, can 
consumer fora which are in fact not courts but tribunals, exer-
cise inherent power to issue interim orders? The Calcutta High 
Court in Re Transport Authority and Anr.'' answered it in nega-
tive. It is however, submitted that the opinion of the Calcutta 
High Court is not corriact in view of the long line of the con-
trary decisions of the Supreme Court-'--^ .^ In Union of India v. 
Paras Laminates (P) Ltd.^^', the Supreme court in unequivocal 
terms laid down: 
there is no doubt that the tribunal functions as a 
court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all 
the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Being a 
judicial body it has all those incidental and ancillary 
powers which are necessary to make fully effective the 
express grant of statutory power... The powers of the 
tribunal are no doubt limited, its area of jurisdiction 
is clearly defined but within the bounds of its juris-
diction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly 
granted. The implied grant is of course, limited, by 
the express grant and, therefore, it can only be of 
such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for 
doing all such acts or employing all such means as are 
reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. 
134. AIR 1990 MP 160. See also Swati Traders v. C.T.O (1990) 76 
STC 393 (Kant). In this case Karnataka High Court went ahead 
by holding that the inherent power of the tribunal to grant 
stay cannot even be taken away by a statutory amendment by 
legislature. 
135. Supra note 111. 
136. See for instance Supra note 133. Sujam 
Municipal corporation of Delhi and Anr. 
137. (1990) 186 OTR 722. 
Kishore and Ors. v. 
(1993) 1 S.C.C. 22. 
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There is no iota of doubt that the interim order can make 
the final grant effective whether it is the case of unfair trade 
practice or defect in goods or deficiency of service or staying 
the operation of the decision of the subordinate forum. 
The opinion of the Calcutta High Court in the State Trans-
port Authority and Anr (Supra) does not appeal to logic also. 
Since the remedy of interim order has been bequeathed by equity 
courts, so when courts have inherent power to issue injunction ex 
debltio justitiae, why tribunals be debarred from exercising 
the same. By no amount of interpretation casuistry can tribunals 
be restrained from exercising inherent powers of granting interim 
relief . 
It has also been argued that since remedy under the CP Act 
is time bound °, so there is no need of granting interim 
relief "'^ . However, the actual working of the fora has made the 
time bound decisions still a distant dream. It is evident from 
the following data^^°. 
Porum/ComiDission Cases Pending Upto Total No of 
Cases Pending 
District Forum 
State Commission 
National Commission 
Mid 1993 
Mid 1993 
Jan.1994 
1,30,000 
17,700 
1,698 
138. Supra note 91. 
139. Section 140. 
140. See S. S. Kumar, Alarming Increase in Pendency of Consumer 
cases (1994) 2 CTJ 199. 
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The stand of UP State commission in United Insurance CO. v. 
Mohd. Saleem^^^ and W. B. State Commission DE(CF) Calcutta Tele-
phone V, Mani Gupta Bhayn^^^, that consumer fora can grant stay 
for stalling the operation of the judgment of lower fora but 
cannot issue other interim orders, is not, it is submitted, 
correct. 
The legal implications of these two injunctions (stay and 
interim relief) are no doubt different depending upon the situa-
tion in which the order is issued. Nevertheless, this dichotomy 
is neither permissible nor is there any scope to read the same 
under CP Act. Sections 17 and 21 give power to the State commis-
sion and National Commission respectively to hear appeals against 
the decisions of the District forum or State commission as the 
case may be. These two sections like section 14 are silent on any 
interim order or stay the operation of the judgment of the subor-
dinate forum or Commission. Thus to hold that consumer fora can 
grant stay but not interim relief is not correct. As is rightly 
said in W.B.S.E.B. v. Rajeshwaz prasad Shaw^^^ that the said 
submission is somewhat unheard of or is ridiculous because the CP 
Act as such does not provide any provision in specific language 
for grant of interlocutory injunction order either in original 
complaint petition or by the appellate forum. The similar ques-
tion of powerlessness or incompetency arises when the appellate 
forum under the CP Act passes any interim order staying operation 
of the impugned order in the appeal or revision or grants 
141. Supra note 118. 
142. Supra note 119. 
143. Supra note 134. 
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stay in the execution which is also an interim order and if the 
appellate forum has got any right and power to pass interim order 
to maintain the property in status - quo, then it is not intelli-
gible why the District forum in original petition before it would 
be debarred to apply the same right and power to preserve the 
property in status quo by passing an interlocutory interim order. 
To sum up, although the CP Act does not contain express 
provision for granting interim relief, the consumer fora like 
that of civil courts can exercise inherent powers to grant the 
same in order to make the final grant effective. It is, however, 
suggested that sections 14, 17 and 21 be amended"'-^ ^ to provide 
for the District forum. State Commission and National Commission 
express powers to grant stay or interim relief as the case may be 
in the appropriate cases after following the guidelines laid down 
by the Supreme Court-'-^ .^ 
141. Jistice fi*lakrishao Kiadi also favouis aaeadieot to these sectiots to qtaot ioteiii relief. See The 
EcoDOiic Tiies, 15 March, 19)4 (The Consuier Day). See also S. Santhaoai, DO Consuier Coorts lave lo 
PoNcr To Giant ad inteiii lelief.(l))4) 3 Coip. U 43 at 47. 
145. The Supreme Court has in Morgan Stanley case Supra note 25 
laid down following principles (a) whether irreparable or 
serious mischief will be caused to the plaintiff (b)whether 
the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater 
injustice than the grant of it would involve (c) the court 
will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had 
notice of the act complained so that the making of improper 
order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the 
court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for 
sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant exparte 
injunction; (e) the court would expect a party applying for 
ex-parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the 
application (f) even if granted, the ex-parte injunction 
would be for a limited period of time (g) general principle 
like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irrepar-
able loss would also be considered by the court, pp.395-96. 
See also United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, (1981) 2 
sec 766; Shiv Kumar Chada v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(1993) 3 sec 161 at 176. 
362 
W H O CZAM JFIJJB: C X a M E » L A I N T 
. A N D AC3A.X1SIST WIHOM? 
The MRTP and CP Acts have done away with the traditional 
principle of privity of contract and has accorded locus standi to 
Central and State Governments, voluntary organisations besides, 
consumer. At present there is no definition of consumer under 
the MRTP Act but a comprehensive definition is provided under the 
CP Act which includes not only a person who has purchased goods 
for consideration which has been paid or promised but also any 
one who uses those goods with the approval of the actual buyer 
but does not include a person who has obtained such goods for 
resale or for any commercial purpose. Similarly a person who 
hires service for consideration paid or promised is also a con-
sumer including any beneficiary of such service other than the 
actual hirer-'-^ .^ This definition uses the word "consideration" 
instead of price or money used in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 respectively. However it is . not 
146. Section 2(d) of the CP Act provides : Consumer means any 
person who (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has 
been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or 
under any system of deferred payment and includes any user 
of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for 
consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly 
promised or under any system of deferred payment when such 
use is made with the approval of such person, but does not 
include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for 
any commercial purpose; or (ii) hires or avails of any 
service for a consideration which has been paid or promised 
or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of 
deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such serv-
ices other than the person who hires or avails of the serv-
ices for consideration paid or promised or partly paid and 
partly promised or under any system of deferred payment, 
when such services are availed of with the approval of the 
first mentioned person. 
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an anomaly-'-^^. The word consideration has been used in the sense 
as defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872^^^ with a view to 
give protection to a larger section of the society designated as 
consumers^^^. The Act makes a radical and deliberate departure 
from the traditional way of defining selling-'-^ '^  and buying ''• of 
1 S5 
goods-^-^'. 
An interesting question arose in case of Consumer Unity and 
Trust Society v. State of Rajasthan^^^ as to whether the direct 
and indirect taxes paid to the state by a citizen constitute 
consideration for services and facilities provided to a citizen 
by the state. The National Commission being influenced by the 
147. See I C Sexana : The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, A view 
point 30 JILI 321, 326 The learned author argues that it is 
not understood why the Act adopted this course, when both 
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1930 dealing with the Sale of immovable property and 
goods respectively avoided the term consideration and used 
the term price for money. 
148. Section 2 (d). 
149. K.R. Chandratre opines that the inference is that a consid-
eration for the purposes of the COPRA should involve "pay-
ment" present or future, which will necessarily have to 
assume the shape of money. See K R Chandratre Hand Book of 
Consumer Protection Law (1st. ed., 1993) at 35. 
150. Section 2 (i) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
161. Section 2 (d) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
152. See S.S.H. Azmi, Sale of Goods and Consumer Protection in 
India (1st. ed., 1992) at 236. 
153. See Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmundra 
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Muttu (1954) 1 SCR 1005; 
Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Trichur v. State of 
Kerala and Ors (1982) 1 SCR 519; Municipal Corporation of 
the city of Baroda v. Bahubhai, Judgment Today (1989)3 SC 
437; Sreenwasa General Trader v. State of AP and Ors (1983) 
3 SCR 84 3. 
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various Supreme Court prouncementa , held that unlike a fee, a 
tax, in its true nature is a levy made by the State for the 
general purposes of the Government and it cannot be regarded as a 
payment for any particular or special service. While it is 
undoubtedly true that the Government in a welfare State is under 
a duty to provide various forms of facilities to citizens and the 
expenditure incurred thereon will have to be met from out of the 
consolidated funds of the State, it cannot be said that a tax 
levied for the general purposes of the State constitutes consid-
eration for any special facility, benefit or service, provided by 
the State^^^. 
This interpretation constricted the scope of this provision. 
In a Social Welfare State like India services are provided to 
citizens free of charge. This should not provide licence to the 
• I C C 
provider of service to cause loss or injury . In view of this 
decision, the Working Group constituted to suggest amendments to 
the CP Act^^', inter alia recommended that a proviso be added to 
the definition of consumer stating that the consideration shall 
not be a condition precedent in case of (i) health and medical 
service (ii) availing of mandatory services provided by the State 
154. (1990) 1 Comp. LJ 314. 
155. Id at 321. 
156. D. N. Saraf; Some facets of Consumer Justice through Consum-
er Disputes Redressal Agencies 34 JILI (1992) at 46. 
157. Vide Notification No. 9/4/90 - CCI, dated 7th. Jan, 1991. 
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or local authorities-^ . However, this recommendation did not 
find favour with the parliament when consumer protection (Amend-
ment) Act, 1993 was passed. 
The term "commercial purpose" used in the definition of con-
sumer has not been defined in the Act. The National Commission 
without elaborating this expression held in M/S Osvial Fine Arts 
V. M/S HMT Madras^^'^ and Western India State Motors v. Sobhay Mai 
Meena^^^ that the complaint cannot lie before redressal forums 
for the reason, in former case complaint is against the defective 
offset printing machine and in later case against a defective car 
which is being used as a taxi. In both these cases goods pur-
chased are used for "commercial purpose". This restrictive inter-
pretation of the word commercial purpose left a good number of 
consumers without protection. If purchasing a car for using it as 
a taxi is considered commercial purpose, then hand cart owner 
using it for carrying goods in the market, purchasing of rickshaw 
or purchasing of tools by carpenter will also be called as goods 
purchased for commercial putpose^^. 
158. D. N. Saraf; Supplement to Law of Consumer Protection in 
India at 10. 
159. 1(1991) CPJ 330 NC. 
160. (1992) 2 CPR 415 NC See also Pushpa Means v. Shah Enterpris 
es (Rajasthan) Ltd. Ozs 1(1992) CPJ 271. The Rajasthan State 
Commission held that the Commercial purpose is that purpose 
the object of which is to make profit. Commercial encompass-
es all business activities. 
161. D.N.Saraf suggested that where the goods purchased cannot be 
used for gain without the application of labour or skill of 
the buyer, the purpose should not be deemed to be a commer-
cial : D. N. Saraf; Law of Consumer Protection in India 
(1st. ed., 1990) at 136. 
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The threadbare discussion of this term came to notice in 
Synco Textiles Ltd. v. Gzeaves Cotton and CompanjT^^. In this 
case complainant was an operator of oil mill who purchased three 
power generating sets from the respondent company which were 
defective. The Rajasthan State Commission held that the sale as 
one for commercial purpose and declined to grant relief to the 
complainant. In an appeal to the National Commission, the appell-
ants' counsel made following averements: 
1. there is a clear cut distinction between a "commercial 
organisation", "commercial activity" and "commercial 
purpose" which Rajasthan State Commission failed to 
appreciate. 
2. that the original complainant was trading in edible 
oil and oil cake seeds but not in plant and machinery 
used for conversion of raw material into finished 
goods. 
3. this being a commercial organisation, he purchased 
such plant and equipment including generators to be 
used as stand-by's in case of power failure to maintain 
commercial activity and thus to produce the items of 
finished goods in which he trades for earning profit. 
4. the electricity produced by the generating sets was not 
for sale; It was only for production purposes as dis-
tinct from commercial purpose. 
5. The State Commission's opinion will give rise to an 
unnecessary confusion and will place an artificial and 
arbitrary demarcating line in as much as a fridge, a 
fan, a water cooler etc. purchased and installed in a 
residence will not be considered as the one purchased 
for "commercial purpose" and hence would be covered by 
the Act, but if installed in a factory, a shop, a 
doctor's clinic or in a lawyer's chamber will become an 
acquisition for commercial purpose and hence would not 
attract the provisions of the CP Act. Similarly the 
same situation will arise in respect of a car purchased 
by an officer of a compatiy with the funds provided by 
his employer, and a car purchased by a company for the 
use of its officer. The latter but not the former would 
be for "commercial purpose". 
162. 1(1992) CPJ 499. 
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The National Commission while overruling all the arguments 
of the appellant's counsel observed that the dictionary meaning 
of the word "commercial" makes the intention of the legislature 
clear that they wanted to exclude from the definition of "consum-
er", any person who buys goods for the purpose of their being 
used in any activity engaged on a large scale for the purpose of 
making profit. Since resale of the goods has been separately and 
specifically mentioned in the earlier portion of the definition 
clause, the words for any "commercial purpose" must be understood 
as covering cases other than those of resale of the goods. It is 
thus obvious that the parliament wanted to exclude from the scope 
of the definition not merely persons who obtained goods for 
resale but also those who purchase with a view to using such 
on 
goods for carryingi any activity on a large scale for the purpose 
of earning profit. But at the same time it is necessary that 
there should be close nexus between the transaction of purchase 
of goods and the large scale activity carried on for earning 
profit^^^. 
A strong dissenting opinion was recorded by Y Krishna Member 
of the WCDRC. He said that the words "any commercial purpose" 
mean the goods are meant for eventual sale as distinct from 
immediate resale. Otherwise it will lead to serious anomalies for 
example, a fridge purchased by a chemist for his shop and for his 
residence, a fan purchased by a lawyer for his chamber and for 
his house, a water cooler purchased for a factory and for a 
163. Id at 504. 
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governmental office will have to be treated differently. The 
character of any economic activity whose purpose is to make 
profit or to obtain financial return will be commercial, irres-
pective of the scale of the activity. The purpose is common to 
all economic activities. The expression commercial purpose has to 
be construed narrowly and should be distinguished from commercial 
production and commercial activity. Sub section 2(i)(d)(1) and 
(ii) have to be interpreted harmoniously. The interpretation so 
adopted should be logical and equitable so as to avoid patent 
anomalies and inconsistencies in the application of the law 
Since the dissenting opinion of Y Krishna was more convinc-
ing than the majority opinion, the State Commissions came up with 
•ICC 
the conflicting opinions . This perforced the National Commis-
sion to clear its stand in Secretary Consumer Guidance and 
Research Society of India v. M/s BPL India Ltd^^^ . The apex 
commission admitted that the scope and applicability of the 
exclusion clause of the definition of consumer have not been 
specifically developed or highlighted in some earlier judgments. 
164. Id at 508. 
165. Orissa State Commission in Abhey Kumar Pandav v. Bajaj Auto 
Ltd. 11 (1991) 3 CPJ 644 held that the purchaser of an auto 
trailer vehicle for self employment to earn livelihood is a 
consumer. For similar opinion see S. Radha Krishna v. The 
National Small Industries Corp. Ltd and Anr. (19 92) 2 CPR 
217 and Sanjay Vinayak Pant v. M/S Chetna Machinery and 
Paper Mart and Anr 1(1993) CPJ 5. On the other hand the 
Karnataka State Commission in the Secretary Consumer 
Guidance and Research Society of India v. M/S BPL India Ltd. 
1(1992) CPJ 140 held that the Paper copier was purchased for 
commercial purpose. 
166. Ibid. 
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Such as those in Oswal Fine Arts v. HMT Madras (^ Ut>ra.) 
I . and Western India State Motors v. Sobhag Mai Meena and Ors 
( SPtoO . It was made clear that these decisions are not 
to be regarded as laying down any proposition that a person pur-
chasing a machine, a car or other items of goods as a means of 
self employment for earning his livelihood will fall within the 
exclusion clause of the definition^ °. 
While following the above decision, the consumer redressal 
1G 7 
agencies have held that a van used to run as a taxi-^° , coaches 
for organising and operating tours-'-^ ®, a tractor for hiring out 
for earning profit"^^^, a truck to be used as a public carrier , 
a computer by a large commercial organisation for expansion of 
its business-^^, a telecard machine for installation in business 
17 2 
premises , an equipment by a manufacturer of paper and pulp for 
166. Id at 144. 
1 5 7 . Bimil Kumar and Anr v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Anr (1993) 2 
CPR 2 2 . 
1 6 8 . Travels and Trades Pvt. Ltd. v. M/S Swaraj Mazada Ltd. and 
Ors 1 ( 1 9 9 1 ) CPJ 681 See a l s o Swaraj Mazada v. Mohan Kumar 1 
(1993) CPJ 54 NC. 
169. Shree Bhanwar Singh v. Manager Isher Tractor Ltd. Jaipur and 
Ors (1993) 1 CPJ 309. See also Bhindza Prassad v. Manager 
Director, Eicher Ltd. and Ors, (1993) 1 CPR 290. 
170. Shaheed Hussan v. M/S Shah And Lohia Auto Ltd, 1(1991) CPJ 
56; Satish Kumar Sood v. M/S Alfa Automobiles and Ors, 
1(1992) CPJ 202; Tara Prasad Swain v. M/S Swaraj Mazada Ltd 
and Ors (1993) 1 CPR 392. 
171. M/S HCL Ltd v. M/S Krishna Naniniak and Sons 11(1993) CPJ 
174. 
172. Marijit Singh v. Dharm Pal Gupta (1993) 2 CPR 162. 
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its installation in a f actory-'-^ -^ , glazed tiles, a hot water 
boiler and mixing tank for using in a hotel^'^, a paper copier 
for private business^^^, an ultra sound machine for a private 
clinics^ , an Xerox machine by a bank for their office use , 
Yarn for making cloth for sale-'-^ ,^ purchase of equipment for 
running an industry-*-' ^ ; Installation of key telephone electronic 
system in a commercial concern for business ; air conditioner 
•JOT 
for show room of a firm , purchase of X ray machine for run-
1 o o 
ninq diagnostic laboratory^*^''; purchase of plant and machinery 
for manufacturing of paper mould egg trays-^ **-*; purchase of 
cold nut machine for manufacturing of cold forged hex, nut and 
173. M/s Alfa Transformers pvt ltd v. Thernax ltd 11 (1993) CIJ 
957. 
174. M/s star paper Mills ltd v.M/s Batubal & Co (1991)2 CPR 704. 
175. Lucky Star Estate v. Laxmi Boiler 1(1991) CPJ 471 also see 
M/s Solvochem intermediates pvt. ltd v. M/s Boiler tee 
Engineers pvt. ltd. (1992) 2 CPR 322. 
176. M/s Selex office system pvt ltd v. M. K Jindal 11 (1991) CPJ 
110. 
177. Dr. B S Single v. Chairman/Managing Director indeham ltd. 1 
(1993) CPJ 552. 
178. IDC Elect ltd v. A jar a Urban Co-operative Bank ltd. Ors 1 
(1993) CPJ 65. 
179. M/s Madhusudan Textile v. M/s Durhi Textile ltd. (1993) 1 
CPR 36. 
180. M/s Rata Contel pvt ltd v. M/s printek & Ors. (1994) 3 CPR 
389. 
181. Hi, Hadimba creations v. M/s Escorts ltd. (1994)3 CPR 453. 
182. New Empire Silk House v. Carrier Air Co. ltd. and Anr. 
(1994) 3 CPR 489. 
183. M/s Agfa Gevaert India ltd v. M/s Jitpal X Ray Pvt. Ltd. and 
Ors. (1994) 2 CPR 227. 
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bolts-^®^; purchasing of weight bridge-"-®^ ; purchasing of kitchen 
and cellar equipments for hotel and restaurant , installation 
of intercom for facilitating work of administration of 
factory^®^, purchase of EPABX system for better management of 
business, purchase of chick for poultry farm-'-®®, all are purchas-
es made for commercial purpose. On the other hand goods purchased 
for self employment such as a car by builder to use it for his 
business ; an electronic type writer for one's own 
institution^^^, an auto Lrailer^^^, kitply for constr-
uction of dispensary-*-^^, machinery for manufacturing reprocessed 
19 3 plastic granules from plastic waste and scrapes-^^-^, offset 
184. M/s Metallex India v. the Karnataka state Financial Corp.S 
Anz. (1995) CPR 88. 
185. Supra note 167. 
186. Mrs. Sheela Thomas and ors v. Managing Director, Kerala 
Finanical Corporation (1995) 2 CPR 123. 
187. Electro Dynamics v. The Managing Director and Anr (1995) 2 
CPR 129. 
188. M/s Catvision products ltd v. M/s Pragati Computers ltd. 
(1995) 3 CPR 363. 
189. M/s Bhatir Poultry farm v. M/s Kewalramani Hatcheries (1996) 
1 CPR 66. 
190. Rajendra Kumar Ganesh Bhai prajapati v. Came Motors pvt. ltd 
and Ors. (1992)1 CPR 761. 
191. M/s Network India ltd v. Gudipudi Hanumonthe Sharma 11 
(•1993) CPJ 674 see also Rajesha Mahana v. M/s Auto Controls 
pvt ltd (1995) 1 CPR 95. 
192. Abhay Kumar panda v. Bajaj Auto ltd. 11 (1991) CPJ 644. See 
also V.R Reghultaman v. Kerala Automobiles ltd. (1995)3 CPR 
21. 
193. S.Radha Krishna v. The National Small Industries Corporation 
limited and Anr (1992) 2 CPR 217. 
372 
machine^^^, paper copier-^^^ or Xerox by an unemployed person for 
earning livelihood"'-^^, purchase of jeep car for convenience of 
partner-'-^^; concrete mixer of maintaining family-*-' ; cement for 
construction of hotel"*-^^, knitting machine^^*^. Electronic type-
writer to increase efficiency of office^" , were held not for 
conunercial purpose. 
Any purchase relating to agricultural activity is not con-
sidered for commercial purpose. Thus, sunflower seeds for 
on o 203 
sowing^ ; boiler by a society for pine apple growers ; 
194. San jay Venayak Pant v. Chetna Machinery and paper Mart 1 
(1993) CPJ 5. 
195. The Secretary Consumer Guidance & Research society of India 
V. M/s BPL India ltd 1 (1992) CPJ 140 see also Selex office 
system pvt. ltd and Anr v. Mayank Photo copier (1995) 1 CPR 
24. 
196. Mrs. S Ansuya S Anr through S. M. N Consumer protection 
council Madras v. M/s Methodox system pvt ltd (1991) 2 CPR 
335. 
197. M/s Govind Bhai Shankerial and co v. M/s Mahindra & Mahindra 
ltd & Anr (1994)2 CPR 339. 
198. Prahled Bhai Kadu v. Sayagi Iron work pvt ltd (1994) 2 CPR 
353. 
199. Hotel Nadadeep V. Rama Chandra Baburao Kohil & Ors (1994) 2 
CPR 211. 
200. Kumari Neena Goswami v. M/s Karam Chand Thaper & Bros ltd & 
Anr (1995) 3 CPR 10. 
201. Rajesh Mahara v. M/s Auto Controls (P) ltd (1995) 1 CPR 96. 
202. See for instance Cheethirals Pullaiah Sons & Anr v. Alvala-
pati Chandra Reddy & Anr (1993) 2 CPR 36; Laxami Agriculture 
Seed Store v. Dhop Singh and Ors 1 (1994) CPJ 184. 
20 3. M/s Indra Fabricators and ors v. pineapple Marketing co-
operative society ltd (1992) 2 CPR 36. 
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purchase of tractor for land cultivation'^^^ and hybrid chilly 
seeds^^^ were held to be used for agriculture which is distinct 
from commercial purpose. The reason for holding agricultural 
activity as not commercial one, were outlined by the National 
Conunission in MI Joyti Marketing and projected and Anr v. M 
Pandian and Anr^^^. In this case the complainant purchased motor 
pump set of 7.5 horse power from the appellant for lift irriga-
tion of land. The pump set turned defective. It was held, that 
(1) when person buys any article for consideration to use it for 
some self employment in order to earn his own livelihood, the 
purchase is not for a commercial purpose (2) the irrigation of 
land by the pump set has no proximate nexus with the ultimate 
produce or price of the crop. The crop depends upon various 
factors like seed, fertilizers, pest control etc. 
Interestingly, the same Member of the National Commission (Y 
Krishna) who gave dissenting opinion in Syno Co textile (supra) 
recorded another dissenting opinion here in the light of the 
majority opinion of syno co textile case (supra) and held that 
the production oL commecclai crop pecae was cuiiiiiit:ccldi dcLivity. 
Besides, modern agriculture is essentially commercial agriculture 
and as such agriculture is commercial activity. Any purchase made 
204. Raghbir Singh and Anr v. The Zimidara Engg. Co and Anr 
(1994) 2 CPR 355. 
205. Mahboob Baig v. Rayalaseem seeds Corp Anr (1996) CPR 257. 
206. (1992) 1 CPR 781. 
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by a farmer for the purpose of better farming is clearly purchase 
on 7 
for commercial purpose'" . 
The principles laid down in the above case law can be sum-
marized as under; 
l.The buyer who purchases goods for earning liveli-
hood by self employment is a consumer and goods so 
purchased are not for commercial purpose. 
2.Where the purchase of goods is for carrying on 
any activity on large scale for the purchase of 
earning profit and there is a close nexus between 
the purchase of goods and the large scale activity, 
the purchaser of such goods is not a consumer. 
3.Agricultural activity is different and distinct 
from commercial activity. 
It is submitted that the above principles are not free from 
ambiguity. Every vocation is carried on for earning livelihood. 
Although the word self-employment qualifies the term livelihood, 
still it is not clear whether the consumer must exclusively use 
it by himself or he can along with himself also employ others for 
carrying on business smoothly. Will it make any difference if 
several persons join hands for earning livelihood by investing 
labour jointly ? The impracticability of the test can be seen 
from the observations of the Bombay State Commission in Dr. Jasw-
ant Singh D Patil v. The Managing Director Kitply Industries^^^ 
207. Id at 785, The Haryana State Commission while deciding the 
case of Surinder Kumar v. M/s Escorts Ltd and Anr 1(199 3) 
CPJ 438 held that the parliament has clearly employed the 
phrase "commercial purpose" in its generic sense. It would 
appear that "agriculture" is a genus distinct from commerce 
and consequently "commercial purpose" and agriculture pur-
pose are genetically different. The core issue is whether a 
plainly agriculture purpose can be labelled as a commercial 
one? in our view it cannot be so. Id at 444. 
208. (1994) 3 CPR 93. 
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and the National Commission in H/s Agfa Geract India ltd v. M/s 
Jatpal X-Ray Private limited and Ors^^^. In former case, pur-
chase of Kitply for making dispensary by a doctor who just 
started his practice was held for commercial purpose but in later 
case, where five doctors joined together to start practice and to 
run diagnostic lab, purchase of X-Ray machine by them was de-
clared as meant for commercial purpose. 
There is no yard stick to measure whether the activity is 
large scale or small scale. The test is subjective one. Then the 
idea as to what constitutes a large scale activity may differ 
from place to place, time to time and person to person. It is 
also not easy to ascertain the nexus between the purchase of the 
product and ultimate production. In Continental Device India ltd 
V. Skyland Interiors (P) ltd and Ors^^^, the purchase of furni-
ture by a company was held for commercial purpose but a case by 
a builder in Rajender Kumar v. Came motors pvt S Ors^^^ and a 
purchase of jeep car for convenience of partners in M/s Govind 
Bhai Shank lal S co v. M/s Mahindra & Mahindra Itd^^^ was held 
not for commercial purpose In M/s Joyti Marketing £ projects ltd 
Anr V.M. Pandian S Anr^^^, the National Commission held that the 
pump set has no proximate nexus with the ultimate produce or 
price of the crop. The crop depends upon various factors like 
seed fertilizers, pest control etc. If the seed is bad then there 
209. (1994) 2 CPR 227. 
210. (1992) 1 CPR 761. 
211. Ibid. 
212. Supra note 197. 
213. Supra note 206. 
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will be no good crops. But In Synco Textiles pvt ltd v. Greaves 
Cotton & Co Itd^^^, the National commission opined that the 
purcha'se of three power generating sets was for commercial pur-
pose. Here, the apex commission did not take note of the fact 
that ultimate productions of oil mill was also subject to many 
attendant factors. For instance supply of raw material to mill, 
proper functioning of the mill, employees not resorting to 
strike. 
The Working Group constituted to suggest suitable amend-
ments to the C P Act observed: 
This provision has caused genuine difficulties to 
consumers individually or collectively who buy goods 
for eking out their livelihood like a widow who buys a 
sewing machine or a rickshaw puller who purchases a 
rickshaw etc. The group is of the view that the exclu-
sion of commercial purpose has to continue to exclude 
large scale business from taking advantage of the 
provisions of the Act as otherwise the consumer courts 
would get bogged down in inter business wrangles but at 
the same time it is necessary to safeguard the inter-
ests of small consumers who buy goods for self employ-
ment to earn livelihood. It is therefore recommended 
that an exception may be provided to bring with in the 
purview of the Act, only cases mentioned above^ . 
In pursuance of the recommendations of the Working Group, 
the CP Act has been amended. An Explanation attached through 
amendment to the definition of consumer runs as follows; 
For the purposes of sub-clause (1) commercial purpose 
does not include use by a consumer of goods brought and 
used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his 
livelihood by means of self employment. 
214. Supra note 162. 
215. Supra note 158 at 10. 
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This Explanation does not auger well with the main defini-
tion of the consumer, for the following reasons: 
Section 2(d) which defines consumer, gives right to file 
tut 
complaint against the trader not only to the actual buyerjany 
one who uses those goods with the approval of the actual buyer. 
But the Explanation makes it compulsory that the consumer must 
have first bought the goods in question and then he must have 
himself used those goods exclusively. Thus where a father pur-
chases an Xerox machine for his son for earning livelihood by 
self employment, neither father nor his son by virtue of the 
Explanation will be a consumer for the reason, father has pur-
chased the machine but not used it whereas the son has used it 
but not purchased it. 
Commenting on the import of the Explanation,the supreme 
court in Laxmi Engineering works v.P S G Industrial^^^ held that 
the several words employed in the Explanation viz, uses them by 
himself, exciubively tut the putpoae oL edtniny his livelihood 
and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of Parlia-
ment clear that the goods bought must be used by the buyer him-
self by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A person 
who purchases an auto rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for 
earning his livelihood would be a consumer. A person who . 
purchases lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself 
for earning his livelihood would be a consumer, (in the above 
illustrations), if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two 
216. AIR 1995 SC 1428. 
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persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machin-
ery, he does not cease to be a consumer. As against this a person 
who purchases an auto- rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or 
other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another 
person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation 
flowing from the expression "used by him" and by means of self 
employment in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of 
the words for the purpose of earning his livelihood is explained 
217 
and clarified by the other two sets of words . 
The apex court admitted that the above construction may not 
be in tune with the scheme and object of the Act, nevertheless, 
found himself fettered by the language used in the 
explanation^^®. 
It is submitted that neither the approach adopted by the 
Consumer Redressal Agencies while interpreting the term "commer-
cial purpose" nor Explanation attached to the definition of the 
goods further the scheme and object of the Act. Since the CP Act 
is a beneficial piece of legislation so such construction has to 
be employed which will benefit the large section of the society 
designated/consumers. As rightly said by the Punjab State Commis-
sion in Ragbir Singh S Anz v. the Zimindara Engineering Co & 
Anr^ that the kernel question arises whether the Redressal 
Agencies under the Act should fold their hands and blame the 
217. Id at 1432. 
218. Ibid. 
219. (1994) 3 CPR 336. 
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draftsman for the Lacuna or in alternative to give force and life 
to the real intention of the legislation*''". 
It can therefore be interpreted that the Explanation append-
ed to section 2 (d) clarifies the position only in one respect 
i.e where goods are purchased and used by the consumer exclusive-
ly for earning livelihood, those goods are not for commercial 
purpose. But for the rest, Redressal Agencies have to decide 
221 
whether the goods purchased are for commercial purpose or not , 
To determine whether the goods purchased are meant for commercial 
purpose, the following tests should be applied. 
1) The goods purchased are not for immediate final 
consumption. 
2) There is a direct nexus between the purchase of 
goods and the profit or loss from their further 
disposal. Such direct nexus is absent when the 
goods or services are converted for producing 
other goods or services. 
3) there is a nexus of form and kind between the 
goods purchased and the goods sold. The nexus is 
absent where goods undergo transformation and 
conversion. 
220. Id at 258. 
221. This opinion is fortified by the ruling of the Supreme Court 
in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Punjab v. Shib Metal 
works AIR 1965 SC 1076 that if the words used in the Entry 
are capable of a narrow or broad construction being reason-
ably possible, and it appears that the broad construction 
would help the furtherance of the object, then it would be 
necessary to prefer such construction. See also Kanwar Singh 
V. Delhi Administration AIR 1965 SC 871. 
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Section 12^^^ of the CP Act provides inter alia that the 
complaint shall be made by the consumer to whom such goods are 
sold or delivered or agreed to be delivered or such service 
provided or agreed to be provided. This section is not in comport 
with section 2(l)(b) and (d). Section 12(a)(b) gives only actual 
buyer or hirer a right to file complaint leaving out the user of 
the goods or services other than the actual buyer or hirer. 
Section 2(1)(b) says that the complaint means (a) consumer or (b) 
any voluntary organisation registered under the companies Act, 
1956 or under any law for the time being in force or ... consumer 
is defined under section 2(1)(d) which covers not only buyer of 
goods and hirer of services for consideration but any one who 
uses those goods or avails of services with the permission of the 
actual buyer or hirer. Thus if as per section 12(a) of the Act, 
only a person who is buyer of goods or hirer of services can make 
a complaint, then the definition of the complainant and consumer 
222. Section 12 runs as under : A complaint in relation to any 
goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or 
any service provided or agreed to be provided may be filed 
with a District forum by: 
a)the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or 
agreed to be sold or delivered or such service provided or 
agreed to be provided; 
b)any recognised consumer association whether the consumer 
to whom the goods sold or delivered or agreed to be pro-
vided is a member of such association or not; 
c)one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers 
having the same interest with the permission of the dis-
trict forum, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all 
consumers so interested ; or 
d) the Central Government or the State Government. 
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as given under the Act becomes meaningless. If the user of the 
goods with the permission of buyer and the recipient of services 
from the hirer for consideration are treated as consumer, then 
they must have also right to file complaint otherwise their 
inclusion is of no use. It is, therefore, suggested that section 
12(a) land (b) be amended on the following lines: 
A complaint in relation to any goods sold or delivered or 
agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or 
agreed to be provided may be filed with a District forum by 
a. the consumer, or 
b. any recognised consumer association, whether such 
consumer is the member of such association or not, 
or • • •, 
When a consumer has to file complaint, the moot point is 
against whom shall he? Shall he file complaint against seller, 
whole sale dealer, supplier or manufacturer? Section 2(c) defines 
compla i n t o^ \ -.: 
Complaint means an allegation in writing made by a complain-
ant that 
i. any unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade pra-
ctice has been adopted by any trader; 
ii. 
iii . 
iv. a trader has charged for the goods mentioned in the 
complaint a price in excess of the price fixed by or 
under any law for the time being in force or dis-
played on the goods or any package containing such 
goods with a view to obtaining any relief provided 
by or under this Act; 
v. goods which will be hazardous to life and safety 
when used are being offered for sale to the public 
in contravention of the provision of any law for the 
time being in force requiring traders to display 
information in regard to the contents, manner and 
effect or use of goods. 
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The above definition provides that the complaint shall be 
against the trader and trader means a person who sells or dis-
tributes any goods for sale and includes the manufacturer there-
of, and where such goods are sold or distributed in package form, 
includes the packer thereof^^-^. 
When the above definition of trader was put to interpreta-
tion different opinions were expressed. 
The Haryana State Commission in H/s Subhash Chand Ashok 
Kumar v. Anil Kumar and Anr^^^ held that it is no where laid down 
in the Act or Rules framed thereunder that when ever a trader or 
a seller or distributor of any goods is proceeded against under 
the Act, the original manufacturer of such goods, if any must 
also be traced and necessarily made liable for the default along-
with him. There is no provision which either mandates or indi-
cates such procedure nor is there any precedent to support such 
view. 
The Karnataka State Commission in Prematic International 
Electronics v. K Subbaraman and anr held dealer as well as 
223. Section 2(q), 
224 111(1992) CPJ 37. See also M/s Laxmi Agriculture Seed Store 
V. Dhop Singh & Ors 1(1994) CPJ 185; M/s Chaudhary Automo-
biles, Hisar v. Shri Anil Kumar (1991)1 CPJ 104. However in 
M/s Enfield India Ltd v. N. P. Singh 111(1993) CPJ 1801 the 
same Commission held that a plain reading of the definition 
of trader makes it manifest that a manufacturer is squarely 
within the ambit of a trader and when defective goods are 
sold or marketed by him, the consumer can lodge a complaint 
on the basic cause of action for such goods suffering from 
one or more defects or deficiency in service. 
225. 111(1992) CPJ 120 See also M/s Manoj Electronics Ltd. v. 
V.C. Bansal & Ors 111(1993) CPJ 1718. 
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manufacturer jointly liable. But Mahrashtra State Commission in 
H/s Nangia Automobiles v. Somas! Saynan<P^^; Goa State Commission 
227 in Tagore Gzacias and Anr v. H/s Essen Computers Ltd^ ; Rajas-
than State Commission in M/s Ghumar Electronics v. Laxmi Narain & 
AnxP-^^ and Gujarat State Commission in Bharat Petroleum Corpora-
tion Ltd V. Banaskantha District Consumer Education S Research 
Centre and Anr^^^ held manufacturer liable. 
It is submitted that the right approach is to inquire who is 
responsible for the defect. If it is a manufacturing defect, 
naturally manufacturer has to be responsible for it. Similarly if 
defect is the result of mishandling or negligence of the seller, 
then the seller has to foot the bill. 
Akin to this approach, is the opinion of MP State Commission 
in Manager M/s Badkul Brothers v. Rajesh Kumar Sen^^^, it was 
laid down: 
The guarantee is given by the manufacturer if a dealer 
takes all precautions to comply with the terms of the 
guarantee and it is not proved that the defects devel-
oped due to something done or not done by the dealer, 
the dealer cannot be held responsible^ -^ -'-. 
226. 111(1992) CPJ 23. 
227. 1(1993) CPJ 19. 
228. (1993) 2 CPR 634. 
229. (1994) 2 CPR 336. 
230. 1(1993) CPJ 532. 
231. Id at 533. 
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It is worthwhile to mention here that the principle of 
privity of contract is inapplicable under CP Act. Not only actual 
buyer of goods or hirer of services can file complaint but also 
user of the goods or the one who avails of those services with 
the permission of actual buyer can file complaint. Similarly 
complaint can be filed not only against the seller but also 
against the manufacturer as is provided by the definition of 
trader232^ 
MRTP Act. 1969 v. Consumer Protection Act. 1986 
When the CP Act, 1986 was passed, inter alia, the Unfair 
trade practices were also brought within its purview. Section 
2(r) before the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 defined 
unfair trade practice with reference to section 36-A of the MRTP 
Act and it was further provided that any unfair trade practice 
adopted by the owner of an undertaking to which part A of Chapter 
III of the MRTP Act applies or any person acting on behalf of or 
for the benefit of such owner shall not be regarded as an unfair 
trade practice under the CP Act. Thus for undertakings to which 
part A of Chapter III of the MRTP Act applieti, the MRTP Commis-
sion had exclusive jurisdiction and consequently, any unfair 
trade practice adopted by the owner of such undertaking either 
directly or through any other person acting on his behalf 
or for his benefit would squarely be within the jurisdiction of 
232. For detail discussion on the applicability of Privity Rule 
see S. S. H Azmi Critique on Indian Oil Corporation v. 
Consumer Protection Council Kerala 37 JILI (1995) 398. 
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the MRTP Commission for the purpose of any decision on the 
question whether it is an unfair trade practice or not. The CP 
Act had no jurisdiction over the unfair trade practices adopted 
by such undertakings. At least there was one area over which the 
MRTP Commission had exclusive jurisdiction. But when the CP Act 
was amended by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993, 
certain changes were made in section 2(r) also. The definition of 
the unfair trade practice was bodily lifted and incorporated in 
section 2(r) and its clause (2) was omitted. The definition of 
unfair trade practice under the both Acts is now same. Thus these 
two Acts have concurrent jurisdiction over the unfair trade 
practices. The jurisdiction of the authorities under the two Acts 
will certainly overlap but, still there are areas, where one 
authority can exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other 
as the scheme of the two Acts is different in terms of locus 
standi for filing complaint and relief sought. 
The complaint under the CP Act can be filed by the consum-
er, recognised consumer association, one or more persons where 
there are numerous persons having the same interest. Central or 
State Government. But under the MRTP Act, it can be filed by the 
trade association, consumer, recognised consumer association. 
Central or State Government, Director General and upon its own 
knowledge and information, the commission may also inquire into 
any unfair trade practice. Thus if a trade association wants to 
file a complaint against the person who has adopted the unfair 
trade practice, such complaint shall lie before the MRTP Commis-
sion only and not before redressal agencies under the CP Act, 
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Similarly a complaint on behalf of the class can lie only before 
the redressal agencies and not before the MRTP Act. 
Both, the MRTP Act and CP Act give lelieL to cunaumet. The 
word consumer has been defined under the CP Act and not under the 
MRTP Act. The CP Act provides that the consumer is not only the 
actual buyer of goods or hirer of services but also includes the 
person who uses those goods or services with the permission of 
the actual buyer or hirer but excludes a person who obtains such 
goods for resale or for any commercial purpose or who avails 
services free of charge or under a contract of personal service. 
In absence of any definition of consumer under the MRTP Act, it 
can be said that the MRTP Act does not recognise any distinction 
between commercial sale and consumer sale as is maintained under 
the CP Act. Thus under the MRTP Act a complaint can be filed 
against a person who has adopted any unfair trade practice and 
details of the purpose of the goods is immaterial. This is forti-
fied by the fact that the trade association has been given locus 
standi under the MRTP Act and not under the CP Act. 
Both these Acts do not recognise the principle of privity of 
contract but in two different ways. Under the CP Act, complaint 
against a person who has adopted unfair trade practice can be 
Instituted not only by the actual buyer of goods or hirer of 
services but also by any one who uses those goods or services 
with the permission of the actual buyer. Thus the CP Act gives 
locus standi to any one who is not party to the contract made 
between the actual buyer and trader but imposes a condition that 
such person should have used those goods or services with the 
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permission of the actual purchaser or hirer. On the other hand, 
the MRTP Conunission is open for all those who have consumed the 
goods irrespective of the fact' whether they are actual buyers or 
not and whether while using those goods or services, they sought 
the permission of the actual buyer or not. 
It is possible that a consumer may purchase goods in pur-
suance of an unfair trade practice (eg. false or misleading 
advertisement) adopted by the manufacturer. Shall he file com-
plaint against the seller or manufacturer? Section 2(c) of the CP 
Act provides that the complaint shall lie against the trader and 
trader, has been defined as a person who sells or distributes any 
goods for sale and includes the manufacturer there of and where 
such goods are sold or distributed in package form, includes the 
packer there of^ -^ *^ . The redressal agencies have expressed con-
flicting opinions on this point^"^^. But under the MRTP Act, the 
compliant will lie against any person who adopts unfair trade 
practice as actual buying.of goods is not a condition. 
The MRTP Act can be invoked only when a consumer purchases 
goods or hires services in response to a representation which is 
233. Section 2(q). 
234. See M/s Subhash Chand Ashok Kumar v. Anil Kumar and Anr 
111(1992) CPJ 37; M/s Laximi Agriculture Seed Store v. Dhop Singh 
and Ors 1(1994) CPJ 185; M/s Chaudhary Automobiles Hisar v. Shri 
Anil Kumar 1(1991) CPJ 104. IL wus held that the rnanufactutec 
should be traced and necessarily made liable for the default. 
Whereas in Prematic International Electronic v. K Subbaraman and 
anr 111(1992) CPJ 120 held dealer as well as manufacturer jointly 
liable. But in M/s Nagina Automobiles v. Samori Saumand 111(1992) 
CPJ 23 and M/s Ghumar Electronic v. Laxami Narain and anr. (1993) 
2 CPR 634 only manufacturer was held responsible. 
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either false or misleading but where a consumer purchases goods 
or hires services on his own and not in response to a represen-
tation, the MRTP Act is inapplicable but CP Act will apply. In 
otherwords where a person claims something about the goods or 
services, then those goods or services should be according to the 
representation made. If they are not, then the complaint will lie 
both under the CP Act as well as MRTP Act. But where he remains 
silent and consumer purchases goods which are defective or hires 
service which is deficient, complaint will lie only under the CP 
Act. 
When it is established that the unfair trade practice was 
adopted by the respondent, the possible reliefs to consumer under 
the MRTP Act are (1) injunction against the respondent (2) cease 
and desist order or an undertaking from the respondent that he 
shall purge the trade practice from being prejudicial to the 
public interest (3) to direct the respondent to issue corrective 
advertisement. 
Where^as under CP Act the respondent may be directed to 
remove defect or replace goods with new ones or remove deficiency 
in service; to cease and desist from such unfair trade practice; 
to return the consumer, price or the charge as the case may be. 
But consumer redressal agencies cannot order to issue corrective 
advertisement nor is there any express provision for issuing of 
injunction. Thus the complainant will have to make choice of fora 
as per the relief which he is desirous to obtain. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
SUQQESTIONS 
The needs of the pastoral society of the past were few and 
simple. The rapid growth of the economic development coupled with 
the amazing progress of the science and technology changed the 
wants and needs of the society. The change of market structure 
and the stiff competition of the producers, forced them to devise 
means and methods to place the consumer in a mood to buy. Studies 
are being conducted to elicit the consumer preferences and 
trained business executives are given the job of sale of goods or 
services. The complex manufacturing process forced consumers to 
rely more and more on the information disseminated by the pro-
ducers. This gave much scope to the unscrupulous traders to ex-
ploit the ignorance of the consumer. In order to harvest it to 
the maximum, sales promotion schemes are adopted which are false, 
or misleading. These promotional schemes not only lure potential 
customeprs away from truthful producers and injuries individual 
consumers by inducing transactions premised on inaccurate infor-
mation; it also misallocates economic resources by leading cus-
tomers to purchase products that do not match their wants. Such 
practices are injurious to competing producers also as the money 
taken by the unscrupulous producer is the money taken from the 
honest businessman. Thus there is a clear public interest in 
controlling these unfair business practices. 
The unfair trade practices incorporated in the MRTP and CP 
Acts are basically those commercial advertisements which are 
false, misleading or unfair. These advertisements raise many 
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issues for researcher to ponder. The MRTP Commission^CDRA's have 
been armed with the powers to control these unfair business 
practices. These powers are inadequate. The Regulatory agencies 
have also failed to evolve a plausible jurisprudence. So for 
proper understanding of these issues and the suggestions thereof, 
the thesis has been divided into following chapters. 
Chapter I is introductory in nature in which a brief account of 
the issues which have not been hither to addressed or have not 
been satisfactorily answered, have been projected. The research 
methodology along with the objectives set for the present re-
search have been elucidated. The research design to accomplish 
these objectives has been given. 
Chapter II dwells on the historical development of the law relat-
ing to unfair business practices. Initially the remedies avail-
able to consumers were of three types. 
(1) Civil suit by consumers. The remedy sought to be enforced 
through civil suit was either tortious or contractual (2) Civil 
suit by competitor (3) Criminal prosecution. 
The remedy under law of torts was almost illusory because of 
the requirements of proof. It has to be proved that the reason-
able consumer would have been deceived by such advertisement. 
Only intentional misrepresentation was actionable and representa-
tion should have been relating to past or existing fact and not 
an opinion of the seller. 
The contractual remedy has remained under the dominance of 
the three common law principles namely. Caveat Emptor, sanctity 
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of contract and privity of contract. Caveat Emptor suited to the 
conditions when goods were simple. The seller and buyer were face 
to face. Apotheosis of the promise was possible before the advent 
of the Standard Form Contracts and privity of contract bears 
some significance in cases of commercial sales and not in consum-
er sales. The twentieth century developments have proved that 
these catch phrases of the past have outlived their utility. The 
market structure of the past has undergone a sea change which 
the propounders of these doctrines might not have envisaged. 
Although the courts have evolved principles to mitigate the 
rigour of these doctrines, there was need to provide new legal 
frame work to guard consumer interest. This was met by passing 
the MRTP and CP Acts. 
Chapter III covers the first part of the definition of unfair 
trade practice. It says that unfair method, unfair or deceptive 
acts should not be adopted for promoting sale, supply or use of 
goods or services. 
However, it is not made clear as to whether goods involve 
only existing goods or also future goods. It has been suggested 
that the future goods should also be brought within the confines 
of the definition. Otherwise practical difficult will ensue. 
Firstly,.where for example a company whose goods are still in the 
manufacturing stage falsely advertises that the goods are of 
particular quality and discontinues the advertisement when goods 
are actually thrown open in the market. Then a consumer who 
purchases goods in pursuance of the advertisement will get no 
compensation for any loss or injury as the goods were not in 
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existence at the time when advertisement was made . Secondly, if 
the view that the goods must be in existence at the time when 
representation was made is upheld then the same test should be 
applied to service also. Since servicesunlike goods have no 
permanent existence and may be regarded as being inchoate until 
they are actually supplied^ It will be difficulty to bring a 
representation within the definition for example the quality of 
services which have not at the time the representation is made, 
actually been supplied. 
The application of the MRTP and CP Acts to shares and deben-
tures has remained still unresolved. The present interpretation 
of the Unfair Trade Practice, Trade and Trade Practice makes it 
necessary that the company must trade in shares and mere issue of 
shares to public for raising capital cannot be called as a trade 
practice. This view is taken inspite of the fact that the MRTP 
(Amendment) Act, 1991 amended the definition of goods so as to 
cover shares before allotment also. This interpretation has left 
the purchaser of shares and debentures outside the protection of 
the CP Act and MRTP Act unless the definitions of trade and trade 
practice are also amended. Even this will not bring shares and 
debentures within the purview of the CP Act for the reason, goods 
are defined in the CP Act with reference to the sale of Goods Act 
and shares before allotment have not been expressly covered like 
the MRTP Act and also shares after allotment cannot make the 
purchaser, the consumer, as the shares are meant for commercial 
purpose or for resale.so it is suggested that the shares and 
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debentures be treated as service falling within the term "finan-
cgi^ -," as expressly mentioned in the definition. 
The scope of the expressions, "unfair method/ unfair or 
deceptive acts", used in the definition have not been outlined. 
Initially in America the term unfair was said to cover a prac-
tice which is unlawful, offend public policy as laid down in 
statutes, the common law or otherwise or which is immoral, uneth-
ical, oppressive or unscrupulous or which causes substantial 
injury to consumers or competitors. It has been argued that these 
criteria are vague and the terms used are devoid of precise 
meaning. Although in America new doctrine of unfairness suggests 
that the substantial injury to the consumer and violation of 
public policy are two tests required to determine whether a trade 
practice is unfair, still these test cannot guard properly con-
sumer interest in India as the substantial injury element in 
America excludes an injury which consumers themselves could not 
have reasonably avoided. This test will cover only those situa-
tions where consumer was coerced to purchase and element of 
public policy is still there. Therefore following definition has 
been suggested for unfair trade practice. 
An unfair trade practice is a trade practice which 
causes substantial injury to consumers which is not 
outweighed by an offsetting consumer or competitive 
benefits that the practice produces. 
Explanation: while determining as to whether injury to 
the consumer is substantial, regard shall be had to the 
value of the goods or services in question. 
The term deceptive act has also not been explained. In 
America conflicting opinions have been expressed on this point. 
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One view is that it is an act or practice by which consumers if 
acting reasonably would likely to be misled to their detriment by 
a material representation. Another view is that an act which is 
capable of misleading to a substantial number of consumers with 
regard to material facts. These two views have been analysed and 
it has been found that both of them are inadequate as consumer 
protection laws in India are recent in origin and level of 
consumer awareness is not sohigh as it is in America*so follow-
ing definition of deceptive act has been suggested. 
A deceptive trade practice is a trade practice which 
has a potential to mislead consumers of ordinary intel-
ligence with regard to material facts. 
Chapter IV titled Commercial Advertising - legal perspectives 
deals with issues like, constitutional protection, application of 
mens rea, standard of protection, defence of puffing, television 
commercials, comparative advertising and interpretation of 
advertisements. 
After initial wavering it has come to be judicially recog-
nised that the commercial ads enjoy constitutional protection. 
This is considered by the researcher a positive step as the 
profit motive alone should not be the determining factor for an 
advertisement to fall outside the freedom of speech. However, 
this does not mean that the advertiser has a right to be wrong 
but there should be no censure on the dissemination of truthful 
information needed by the large section of the society designated 
as consumers merely on the ground that the information has com-
mercial motives. This will naturally need the gleaning of 
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information necessary for subserving public good from that which 
is false or deceptive. 
The application of the mens rea to commercial advertisements 
has not received judicial notice. The words like, falsely^ inten-
tionally, knowingly have been used in the definition of unfair 
trade practice which connote mens rea. Then should mens rea be 
imported in the definition of unfair trade practice and only in 
its fjfesence should trader be held liable to compensate for any 
loss or injury to consumers? 
It has been suggested that the answer to this question 
should be in negative as the class of practices legislated in the 
ActSare not criminal in any real sense but are practices prohibi-
ted under penalty. The efficacy of the two Acts cannot be attri-
tioned by reading mens rea in the liability for compensation to 
the consumer who has suffered loss due to the false representa-
tion. The compensation is the only tangible remedy available 
under the two Acts to deter the unscrupulous trader. 
The aim of the law controlling unfair trade practice is to 
protect the consumers, who. include, credulous and gullible, rea-
sonably intelligent and the average consumer. Then the question 
is whose intelligence be treated as a standard for determining as 
to whether an advertisement is false, deceptive or not? It has 
been argued that the Indian consumers are not only unorganised^ 
ignorant, ill informed and ill advised, they are also ignorant of 
the'irrights. Consumers are not conscious of the surreptious meth-
ods of the traders. Traders are fully in know of the plight of 
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the consumers. .They therefore, harvest it to the maximum. So it 
will not serve any worth while purpose if "reasonable man's" 
standard is upheld, leaving vast majority of credulous, gullible 
and unthinking^ unprotected. However, this common man's test 
cannot be regarded as a general standard applicable in all situa-
tions. The context in which an advertisement is addressed should 
also be taken into account. For example, where an advertisement 
for a specialised equipment is directed at an expert group, such 
as engineers, the standard will be different as against the 
advertisement addressed to general consuming public or directed 
to children. 
By virtue of defence of puffing a wide latitude is allowed 
to traders in extolling the qualities of the products they have 
to sell. So long an advertiser confines himself to general praise 
of his goods, he is safe, no matter how exaggerated his praise 
may be. The underlying argument in the defence of puffing is that 
no reasonable man shall believe such advertisement as true. But 
this defence cannot reconcile with the common man's test as 
advocated above. Furthermore, an advertiser will not resort to 
puffing unless he has a faith that the gullible consumers will be 
allured by his campaign. Thus it is suggested that the commercial 
puffery be made actionable . 
The television commercials have given new dimension to the 
false and misleading advertisements. Sometimes it is not possible 
to advertise a product with its natural colour or with the com-
posed substances for example true colours of coffee, and orange 
juice are lost in transmission on a television screen and 
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artificial substance must be substituted to obtain a natural 
look. This involves the problem of interpretation of television 
commercials. One possible interpretation is to treat demonstra-
tion merely a dramatization of the express claim made in the 
advertisement. Thus the demonstration is unconnected with the 
express claim and so long express claim is true, the advertise-
ment will not be treated as deceptive even though the demonstra-
tion was accomplished by trickery. Second approach is to treat 
television demonstration as a warranty without taking into ac-
count the express claim, Thus the demonstration obtained by 
employing trickery will be considered as deceptive but it is not 
necessary that the demonstration should prove the express claim 
made in the advertisement. The third approach is the combination 
of the first two, i.e to interpret a television demonstration 
both a warranty that the result could be duplicated without 
trickery and a proof of the express claim made in the advertise-
ment. A demonstration which failed either of these tests would be 
considered deceptive and would not be permitted. It is suggested 
that the demonstration as well as the express claim made should 
be correct. In other words an advertisement should be accurate at 
both ends of the TV camera. 
To determine whether a particular comparative advertisement 
is false or misleading is not free from difficulty. For the 
reason (a) there is no clear line between "comparative and non 
comparative" (b) a considerable amount of puffery has tradition-
ally been allowed in advertising, the same is true in case of 
comparative advertising. The limits of permissible puffery are^ay 
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from being clear. It will not be out of place to mention here 
that it has been suggested above that the commercial puffery be 
held actionable which should include puffs employed for compara-
tive advertising also. 
In India there is no clear cut policy regarding the insig-
nificant comparisons or where a trader describes accurately 
competitors goods but exaggerated the merits of his own goods. 
Besides the quality comparisons, there is no legislative or 
judicial policy regarding the price comparisons. It has been 
suggested that the insignificant comparisons should be declared 
as misleading. Otherwise an advertiser will focus more on insig-
nificant comparisons and will derive benefit out of all propor-
tions and what is insignificant will vary from case to case. 
Where an advertiser after truthfully stating the merits of the 
competing product, falsely embellishes his own, it is suggested 
that it should be treated as unfair trade practice. Since an 
advertiser misrepresents his own goods, such misrepresentation 
will be no less unfair by mere fact that the advertiser fairly 
states the quality of its competitors goods. Following are the 
suggestions which should be incorporated in the MRTP and CP Acts 
for regulating comparative advertisements. 
1. The aspects of the advertisers product which are 
being compared with the competitors product should 
be made clear. 
2. The comparisons should be factual, accurate and 
capable of substantiation. 
31 There is no likelihood of the consumer being 
misled as a result of comparison, whether about 
the product advertised or that with which it is 
compared. 
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4. The advertisement should not unfairly denigrate, 
attack or discredit other products/ advertisers or 
advertisements directly or by implications. 
5. The subject matter is not chosen in such a way as 
to confer an artificial advantage upon the adver-
tiser or so as to suggest that a better bargain is 
offered than is truely the case. 
The commercial advertisements are either informative or 
pursuasive.. The informative content of advertisement has raised 
many problems of interpretation. Several suggestions have been 
made for the interpretation of advertisements in the light of the 
Judicial decisions. 
Chapter V discusses specific categories of false and misleading 
advertisements. Various sub clauses of the definition laying down 
different forms of false or misleading representations are not 
properly worded. Sub clauses (i), (ii), (iii) talk of representa-
tions which are false. Does it mean that if a representation is 
of the nature mentioned in these clauses which is not false but 
misleading, will be outside the purview of these clauses? 
Although it may be argued that (1) false representations encom-
passes misleading representations as well and (2) the words 
"unfair or deceptive acts used in the main body of the definition 
are wide enough to include misleading statements also, then what 
is the need of retaining the word misleading in sub-clauses (vi), 
(ix), and (x). It is therefore suggested that in order to remove 
any doubt, sub clause (1) be amended on the following lines. 
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The practice of making any statement, whether orally ox in writ-
ing or by visible representations which is false or misleading 
that 
The word " falsely" used in clauses (i). Hi), (iii) and the 
words "falsely or misleading" used in clauses (vi),(ix), (xi) 
should be dropped. 
Clause (i) says that it is "the practice of making any 
statement. The word "practice" means repeated action, habitual 
performance or succession of acts of similar kind. In otherwords 
it must be more than one act. If this interpretation is given to 
the word practice^ then single act of representation will not 
constitute unfair trade practice. It is suggested that clause (i) 
be read with section (v) (ii) of the MRTP Act so that a single or 
isolated act of any person in relation to any trade is enough to 
stamp any trade practice as unfair provided of course other 
characteristics of unfair trade practice are found. 
A thread bare discussion on clauses (i) to (x) has been 
made. The expressions not yet put to interpretation and those on 
which conflicting opinions have been expressed, have been dis-
cussed along with some alternatives. 
Fictitious bargain offers have raised many legal issues 
either relating to interpretation or limitation of the provision 
dealing with the bargain offers. For instance, if the trader 
disparages his own goods and thereby induces the buyer to switch 
over other item available at higher price and more profitable to 
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the trader, he will not be covered under the present provision 
which will be violated only when the bargain offer is not so or 
is not available for a reasonable period or in reasonable quanti-
ties . 
A question arisea; are the labels on the goods as offers? 
There are two possible interpretations. One is not to use the 
term offer here in a technical sense and not to insist on the 
dichotomy of the offer and invitation to treat . This will bring 
all that in the ambit of the term advertisement which might 
otherwise be excluded if the offer is given a restricted 
meaning 
The other interpretation is to give offer narrow meaning in 
the sense as understood in the contract law. It is suggested that 
the former view should be preferred over the latter as it will 
widened the reach of the provision. Other wise , the trader will 
escape from liability by contending that he never made an offer. 
The provision requires that the intention of the trader not 
to sell advertised goods must be proved. This will give respond-
ent an opportunity to escape from liability by contending that 
the non availability of goods was due to reasons beyond his 
control. It is therefore suggested that the provision be amended 
so as to dispense with the requirement of intention. 
The provision dealing with the bargain offers has an Expla-
nation attached which has two clauses. Clause (a) says that the 
bargain price means a price that is stated in any advertisement 
to be a bargain price, by reference to an ordinary price or 
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otherwise. This clause is ambiguous. It does not make clear as to 
whether the ordinary price is the price of the trader who has 
made a bargain offer, or any other trader. This Explanation 
will also not help where a retailer who owns two or more outlets 
may indicate in shop A that an article was previously sold at a 
higher price when it was so sold only at shop B. This problem 
will be added up if shop B is at a considerable distance away and 
possibly in an area where retail margins are normally higher than 
those in the area of shop A. Clause (a) of the Explanation is 
also silent about the time during which the ordinary price 
should be in vogue. Thus runs the danger of unscrupulous traders 
raising prices today, lowering them tomorrow and then claiming 
price reduction. Similarly advertisements like buy today for Rs 
100 and not tomorrow for Rs 200 or buy now before price rise 
will not be covered by the explanation. It is therefore suggested 
that the Explanation attached to the provision dealing with the 
bargain offers be recast so as to cover above discussed situa-
tions. 
It is suggested that there should be no fixed period for 
determining reasonableness of time during which a bargain offer 
should last, for the following reasons: 
1. The period may vary from case to case depending 
upon the nature and size of the business, quantity 
at sale and nature of the market in which business 
is carried on; 
2. No hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding 
the reasonableness of the period, what may be 
reasonable period for a particular item may not be 
reasonable for another; 
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3. If the rigid rule about the reasonableness of the 
period is upheld, then even the bonafide bargain 
offers will fall within the proscription. For 
example, where there was a bargain offer for a 
limited sale which did not last for a prescribed 
period, the traders will be hauled up for not 
providing the goods in accordance with the offer. 
4. Where for example bargain offer relates to the 
sale of 10 radio sets or 20 refrigerators, the 
question of prescribing a period does not arise 
and the offer shall remain valid till the last set 
is disposed of. 
The question as to whether the offering of gifts, prizes or 
conducting of contests, lotteries, game of a chance or skill are 
perse unfair, has been debated before the MRTP commission time 
and,again. The commission expressed conflicting opinions and the 
issue is still unresolved. In order to maintain balance between 
the legitimate interest of the traders and the consumers, it has 
been suggested; 
1. offering of gifts or prizes genuinely should not 
be prohibited 
2. lotteries are against public policy and therefore 
should be prohibited 
3. lotteries which do not directly or indirectly 
demand public subscription should be permitted 
4. lotteries which run on the finance raised by the 
public subscription and which involve skill to a 
substantial degree are not in fact lotteries but 
game of skill, so it should not be proscribed. 
The provision controlling sale or supply of goods hazardous 
to life is ambiguously worded. It does not make clear as to 
whether manufacturer or seller is responsible to consumer in case 
loss or injury is caused to the consumer. It has been suggested 
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that the proper course is to see who is responsible for loss or 
who is in a position to control the danger. 
This provision makes liability dependent on the negligence. 
The Ifability under the law of torts is strict and transborder 
laws also provide no fault liability in such cases. There is no 
reason not to adopt the same rule in such case also. The liabili-
ty under this provision arises only when the goods,do not comply 
with the standards prescribed by the competent authority. Howev-
er, neither in the MRTP Act nor in CP Act, there is any authority 
designated to prescribe standards which the traders must follow. 
Under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986 licence or its 
renewal is made only when the manufacturer complies with the 
Bureau of Indian Standards Certification Mark. However, non 
compliance do not stamp the goods as perse hazardous nor is it 
complusory that all the goods shall conform to the requirements 
of certification mark. It is suggested that in order to minimize 
the dangers which the hazardous goods are likely to pose, an 
independent body be constituted with the powers to prescribe 
standards. The standards be made compulsory and the MRTP and CP 
Acts be given powers to enforce these standards. 
Chapter(v) covers powers of the MRTP commission vis-a vis unfair 
trade practices. This chapter has been divided into six sub 
chapters which are (1) power to issue injunction (2) power to 
grant compensation (3) power to review orders (4) power to punish 
for contempt (5) power to pass cease and desist order and consent 
order (6) power to order corrective advertisement-
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The provision dealing with the issue of injunction uses the 
expression "during an inquiry before the conunission". On this 
issue, conflicting opinions were expressed by the High courts and 
the MRTP commission. One view is that the inquiry must be pending 
before an application for injunction is made. Another view is 
that the pending inquiry befote the commission Is not essentidl 
but prima facie existence of grounds for entertainment of the 
complaint will suffice. It is suggested that the proper interpre-
tation of section 12 A would be, that the sooner the commission 
issues a notice of inquiry, either suo motu or on the application 
of the person, the inquiry is deemed to have started, it would-
not be wrong to stretch this theory a little more by stating that 
when a complaint is filed, the commission is seized of the mat-
ter, the inquiry starts. 
It is not clear as to whether the MRTP commission can exer-
cise powers of civil court under Civil Procedure Code for breach 
of an injunction order? It is suggested that the approach of the 
MRTP commission should be to arrogate power to punish for viola-
tion. However, it appears that the suitable follow up provisions 
to fully effectuate this power under sub section (2) of section 
12-A have not been made and therefore in a given case how the 
commission would proceed to, say commit person to civil prison 
for infringement of the injunction order, remains ambiguous . 
Section 135 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with sec-
tions 55,57 and 59, suggest that the person to be arrested is to 
be brought to the court. Sub section (2) of section 12-A does not 
expressly provide that any reference to court in Order xxxlx rule 
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(2-A to 5) shall be construed as reference to commission. Thus 
sub section (2) be amended to remove this anomaly. At present 
injunction cannot be passed against those, aiding, abetting or 
conspiring the actual wrong doer. So one more clause be attached 
to section 12 (A) so as to encompass the above persons also. 
Whether the interim injunction order is appealable or not is yet 
to be resolved. However, examples are in galore where the High 
courts or the Supreme court was called in aid to stay the opera-
tion of the injunction order. It is therefore suggested that the 
injunction order be made appealable before the Supreme Court with 
a clause stating that an injunction order passed by the MRTP 
commission shall not be called in question in any High court. 
The provision dealing with the compensation provides that in 
case loss or injury, compensation will be given to consumer. But 
the word consumer has not be defined in the MRTP Act. So it is 
not clear as to whether the term consumer includes user of the 
goods who is not the actual buyer. It is suggested that the 
definition of consumer as provided under section 2 (d) of the CP 
Act be incorporated in the MRTP Act also. 
Section 36B does not accord locus standi to trader but like 
section 12-A, section 12 B, arms the trader with the power to 
file compensation application. Does it mean that before filing 
compensation application, it is not necessary that a prior in-
quiry be instituted. Section 12-B is silent on this point. The 
relevant words in sub-section (1) are "as a result of the monopo-
listic or restrictive or unfair trade practice...." These words 
do not show that inquiry is a condition precedent for filing 
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compensation application. Further more, clause (3) of section 
12-B provides that the commission may, after an inquiry into the 
allegations made in the application filed under sub-section (1), 
make an order directing the owner of the undertaking or other 
person to make payment " The words in this sub clause show 
that an independent inquiry is to be instituted under section 
12-B. Thus it is not necessary that before filing an application 
for compensation, existence of any monopolistic, restrictive or 
unfair trade practice must have been established through inquiry. 
Through compensation application itself the allegation can be 
proved. 
There is no guidance in the MRTP Act and the Rules and 
Regulations framed thereunder regarding the principle for measur-
ing damages. The MRTP commission expressed conflicting opinions 
on this point. Some Benches of the commission applied law of con-
tract and some law of torts. It is suggested that the principles 
of law of torts be applied for the following reasons: 
1). Under law of contract there is a well established rule that 
while quantifying the damages, the terms in the contract should 
be construed strictly where as under law of torts, courts award 
exemplary damages also, so as to deter the wrong doer from caus-
ing harm to the society. 
2). Under the law of contract, courts do not generally award 
punitive damages. Since under the MRTP Act, perpetrator of wrong 
cannot be imprisoned, compensation can be used as a tool to prev-
ent unscrupulous trader from resorting to unconscionable business 
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practice which is possible under law of torts and not under 
contract Act. 
The MRTP (Amendment)' Act, 1991 provides provision £or class 
action suits. However the MRTP commission held that a voluntary 
registered consumer organisation cannot file suit in the repre-
sentative capacity as it cannot be said to have the "same inter-
est" as the class has. It is therefore suggested that an Expla-
nation be provided either in the MRTP Regulations or MRTP Act 
that a recognised consumer association shall be deemed to have 
the same interest as the consumer on whose behalf the consumer 
association has filed the complaint. Another issue relating to 
class action suit is what constitutes "same interest". One view 
is that it implies common grievance and common interest arising 
out of the same transaction. Other view is that there must be 
common question of law and fact and common question must predomi-
nate the individual question. The consumer class action is based 
on Order/Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. An Explanation was 
attached to this ©rder on the recommendations of the 54th Report 
of the Law Commission. It was made clear that the "same cause of 
action" is not necessary for representation suit. Thus it will be 
sufficient if it is shown that the members of the class are 
"similarly situated" or there exists "common question of law and 
fact". 
The power of MRTP commission to amend or revoke its earlier 
order raises many problems of interpretation (1) Is this power 
unlimited or, is it subject to limitations? What is the extension 
of the commission's power ? Does the expression " in the manner 
409 
in which it was made", impl/ that the commission by invoking 
this provision, can order fresh hearing? 
It is the discretion of the commission whether to exercise 
power or not under this provision. However, the discretion cannot 
be arbitrary vague or fanciful. It must be guided by relevant 
considerations. Although there are no apparent limitations on 
this power, it cannot be construed so wide as to permit rehearing 
on the same material. It has to be kept in mind that basically 
this is a corrective or rectif icatory power, so it cannot be 
ekercised to order fresh hearing. The expression "in the manner 
in which it was made cannot be construed as giving power to the 
commission to make fresh order in the same way as previous order 
was made i.e. by hearing' parties and witnesses. But it merely 
indicates a procedure to be followed by the commission in amend-
ing or revoking an order. 
The power to punish for contempt was incorporated in the 
MRTP Act in the year 1991. No case has been decided yet in which 
the MRTP commission has exercised this power. The approach of the 
courts has been to disallow contempt application where there is 
an effective alternative remedy for enforcing the decree. If this 
dictum is applied to the MRTP Act, a case for civil contempt will 
rarely be made as the punishment provided under section 12 of the 
Contempt of Courts Act is a maximum of 6 months simple imprison-
ment or a fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or both. 
Even an apology may sometimes suffice. On the other hand, the 
punishment under section 48-C of the MRTP Act for violation of 
the orders of the commission is a minimum of six months (for 
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otherwise reasons have to be recorded) which may extend to 3 
years and fine which may extend to 10 lakh rupees. However, only 
effectiveness which Contempt of Courts Act has, is the summary 
nature of the proceedings. Whereas section 56 of the MRTP Act 
empowers the courts to try offences and commission itself cannot 
take cognizance. 
Section 36-D{2) of the MRTP Act allows the commission not to 
pass cease and desist order where respondent gives an undertaking 
to remove the prejudicial effect of the trade practice. It is not 
clear as to whether violation of such undertaking be called as 
violation of section 36-D so as to bring erring respondent within 
the clutches of section 48-C. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts 
Act, 1971 expressly provides that even wilful disobedience of the 
undertaking given by the court is treated as civil contempt. So 
section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act will take care of the 
grey area left by section 36-B(2) of the MRTP Act. 
The courts have expressed conflicting opinions on the ques-
tion of justification for the contempt. One view is that the 
truthfulness or factual correctness is no defence for contemptu-
ous act. Quite opposite of it is the other view. However, it is 
suggested that the fair comment and good faith should be regarded 
as a valid defence. 
Section 36-D which gives power to the MRTP commission to 
pass cease and desist order is not in consonance with section 
36-B which gives inter alia power to the commission to file com-
plaint sue motu either upon its own knowledge or information. 
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Section 36-D provides that the "Commission may inquire into any 
unfair trade practice which may come before it for Inquiry". This 
expression does not embrass within its import the suo motu in-
quiry which the commission is competent to institute by virtue of 
section 36-B. It is suggested that the words "come before it" 
should not be interpreted to mean that it would come before the 
Commission from other sources than its own knowledge and informa-
tion. However/ in order to avoid any possible controversy, it is 
suggested that the words which may come before it for inquiry be 
omitted from section 36-D. 
An interesting question arises in reapect of the unfair 
trade practice discontinued since the complaint is filed. In such 
cases the Commission has dropped proceeding once it is satisfied 
that the practice in question has been discontinued. It is sub-
mitted that this approach will provide an escape route for the 
trader. It is therefore, suggested that an explanation be at-
tached to section 36-D making it mandatory for the Commission to 
launch fulfledged proceedings irrespective of the fact whether 
the prohibited practice is in force or has been discontinued. On 
reaching to the conclusion that the disputed practice although 
discontinued/ was prejudicial to public interest, a desist order 
can be passed so that if it is repeated/ the violator will be 
punished under section 48-C. If the approach as suggested, is not 
adopted then the Commission cannot punish the violator for re-
peating a prohibited practice as section 48-C makes punishable 
the Commission's orders and mere dropping of proceedings cannot 
by any stretch of imagination be called as an order. 
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A single trader or a class of traders cannoL file a com-
plaint. Naturally no cease and desist order can be passed even if 
the practice is injurious to competing trader or class of trad-
ers. Since under section 12-A injunction can be granted on the 
application of a trader or class of traders and under section 12-
B compensation can be granted to a trader or class of traders, so 
there is a need for harmonious construction of sections 12-A, 12-
B, 36-B and 36-D. This can be possible only by interpreting the 
words "Public interest under section 36-D as to cover both, class 
of traders as well as a single trader. However, it is suggested 
that like consumer, trader may be accorded locus standi under 
section 36-B and Commission be empowered to pass cease and desist 
order, where a trade practice is prejudicial to competing trader. 
Since trader as compared to consumers are more alert and con-
scious of the tricks employed by their competing traders, so 
arming them with the power to file complaint will help in con-
trolling unfair trade practices. 
The issues surrounding consent order are; (1) Is consent 
order appealable where complainant or D G is not satisfied, (2) 
Is violation of consent order punishable under section 48-C. 
These twin issues can be resolved by answering to single ques-
tion: Is consent order also an order under section 36-D. Con-
flicting opinions have been expressed on this point. It is sub-
mitted that the consent order be treated as an order and breach 
of it punishable under section 48-C. Otherwise consent order 
will provide a gate way of escape, for respondent who will give 
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readily an undertaking knowing fully well that the breach of it 
is not going to affect him in any way. 
Chapter VI cover powers of the consumer forum which include 
power to remove defects or deficiencies, power to award compensa-
tion, power to enforce orders, power to pass interim orders and 
who can file complaint against whom and general observations 
relating to MRTP and CP Acts. 
Section 14 of the CP Act provides powers which consumer fora 
can exercise. However, this section says that these powers can be 
exercised only when goods are found defective or any of the 
allegations contained in the complaint relating to services is 
proved. But a complaint can be filed not only against the defec-
tive goods but also against the unfair or restrictive trade 
practices, excessive price charging and goods hazardous to life. 
It is therefore, suggested that section 14 be recast to provide, 
"if after the proceedings conducted under section 13, the Dis-
trict forum is satisfied that any of the allegations contained in 
the complaint is proved". ' 
At present consumer fora do no possess power to order return 
of excess price charged. Section 14 be amended in order to incor-
porate a clause which will run as follows: 
To return the consumer, price charged in excess of the 
price fixed by or under the law for the time being in 
force or displayed on the goods or its package. 
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The powers of the consumer fora are restricted to section 
14. It is suggested that a residuary clause be incorporated in 
section 14 which should run on the following lines: 
To grant such reliefs as the District forum deems fit 
in the interest of justice. 
The compensation provision was interpreted in such a way as 
to create an impression that the compensation is the relief 
available for deficient service only. However, this is not cor-
rect. The compensation provision is general one and is available 
to consumer wheti he proves any of the allegations in complaint 
which occasions loss to him and that loss is caused due to the 
negligence of the opposite party. 
The relief in terms of compensation is dependent on the 
negligence of the opposite party. In Industrially advanced 
countries the principle of strict liability has taken firm roots. 
Instead of fault of the trader, the fault of the product is 
demonstrated. It is therefore, suggested that the word negligence 
be dropped from clause (d) and when the complainant proves that a 
product is defective or service is deficient, and he suffered 
damage due to no fault of his, he should be entitled to compensa-
tion . 
The power to enforce orders are laid down in sections 25 and 
27. Section 25 provides that the orders may be enforced in the 
same manner as if it were a decree or an order made by a court in 
a pending suit but in case of the inability of the CDRAS to exec-
ute their order, it shall be lawful for them to send such orders 
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for execution to the court. Section 27 provides punishment for 
defaulter. 
The question which has been debated before the consumer fora 
is, whether it is necessary that the decree holder must satisfy 
first section 25 and only then he can invoke section 27 or it 
entirely depends upon the decree holder whether to take help of 
section 25 or 27. Basically in sections 25 and 27 two independent 
remedies have been incorporated by the legislature for executing 
the orders of the forum. If the decree holder approaches the 
consumer forum under section 27, the forum will not be right to 
ask him to exhaust first section 25 and only then come under 
section 27. Sections 25 and 27 therefore give two optional reme-
dies to the decree holder and it lies entirely in his discretion 
what option he is going to exercise. 
Section 27 arms the consumer fora with power to inflict 
punishment or impose fine on the judgment debtor in case of his 
default. However, rules have not been framed for the exercise of 
this power by the consumer fora. It is necessary that an express 
provision be incorporated in section 27 for the said purpose. 
The conflicting observations have been made on the question; 
whether orders passed by the District forum under sections 25 and 
27 are appealable to state Commission? It is submitted that the 
orders passed under sections 25 and 27 are not appealable. Sec-
tion 15 which gives right of appeal has to be read with section 
14. Otherwise any order passed by the forum will be appealable. 
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However, if there is any miscarriage of justice, the judgment 
debtor can go to the superior forum for revision. 
Consumer fora do not possess express powers to issue interim 
injunction. However, consumer fora have inherent powers to issue 
the same like that of civil court. In order to avoid any contro-
versy it has been suggested to amend sections 14, 17 and 21 to 
provide express power to grant stay or interim relief by the 
District forum. State Commission and National Commission. 
The above discussed powers have been given to consumer fora 
for protecting consumers. The definition of consumer provides 
that not only actual buyer is included but also the actual user. 
However, purchasers of goods for resale or for commercial purpose 
are excluded. There is no definition of the term commercial 
purpose but an Explanation was attached to the definition o£ 
consumer which provides that the goods purchased and used by the 
consumer for earning livelihood by self employment are not goods 
for commercial purpose. This explanation is not in accord with 
the definition of the consumer which gives locus standi to the 
user of the goods who may or may not be the actual buyer whereas 
the Explanation makes it essential that the purchaser and user 
must be one and the same person. It is also submitted that the 
explanation clarifies position in respect of those goods which 
have been purchased for earning livelihood by self employment. 
But for the rest, redressal agencies have to decide whether the 
goods purchased are for commercial purpose or not. To determine 
whether the goods purchased are meant for commercial purpose, 
following tests be applied. 
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1. the goods purchased are not £or immediate final 
consumption; 
2. there is a direct nexus between the purchase of 
goods and the profit or loss from their further 
disposal. Such direct nexus is absent when the 
goods or services are converted for producing 
other goods or services; 
3. there is a nexus of form and kind between the 
goods purchased and the goods sold. The nexus is 
absent where goods undergo transformation and 
conversion. 
Section 12 provides that a complaint can be filed by the 
consumer to whom goods have been sold or delivered or services 
provided and section 2(1)(b) says that the complaint can be filed 
by the consumer who by section 2(d) has been defined not the 
actual buyer but also actual user. Since the user of the goods or 
services with the permission of the actual buyer is treated as 
consumer, their inclusion in the definition will be meaningless 
unless they have a right to file complaint. It is therefore, 
suggested that section 12 be amended on the following lines: 
A complaint.... by 
a) the consumer, or 
b) any recognised consumer association, whether such 
consumer is the member of such association or not, 
or 
The consumer fora have not shown unanimity on the issue; who 
is responsible to the consumer - seller or manufacturer? It is 
submitted that since the privity rule is inapplicable to the CP 
Act, so better course is to fix liability on the person who is 
responsible for the defect. 
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